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    Abstract
This dissertation analyzes a normative change in state perception and political action 
towards the Internet. This change is currently reflected in certain measures aimed at the 
exercise of control and state sovereignty in and over cyberspace. These include phenomena 
such as the total surveillance of data streams and the extensive collection of connection 
data by secret services, the control (political censorship) and manipulation of information 
(information war) as well as the arms spiral around offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt 
and destroy information infrastructures. States face a loss of control that they want to 
compensate for. The phenomenon of the perceived loss of control and the establishment of 
a norm of control (filter and monitoring technology) is equally evident in various 
democratic and non-democratic states, as various studies show.
This militarized perception of the Internet is remarkable in so far as Western 
politicians used to perceive the same Internet technology in the 1980s and 1990s in a 
completely different way. Back then the lack of state control was seen as desirable. Instead 
of controlling and monitoring all aspects of the Internet, a "hands-off" and laissez-faire 
idea dominated political behavior at the time: the possibilities of democratization through 
information technologies, the liberalization of authoritarian societies through technology 
and the free availability of global knowledge. The idea of national control over 
communications technology was considered innovation-inhibiting, undemocratic and even 
technically impossible. The topic of this work is the interaction between state power and 
sovereignty (e.g. political control through information sovereignty) and digital 
technologies. The research question is: Which process led to the establishment of norms of 
control and rule (surveillance, censorship, cyber-war) with regard to the medium Internet? 
Furthermore, the question arises: What are the implications of this change in standards for 
the fundamental functioning of the Internet? The aim is to examine in detail the thesis of 
the militarization of cyberspace empirically on the basis of a longitudinal case study using 
the example of Internet development in the USA since the 1960s. An interdisciplinary and 
multi-theoretical approach is chosen from constructivist norms research and the Social 
Construction of Technology approach.
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1. Introduction
I am disturbed by how states abuse laws on Internet access. I am concerned that 
surveillance programmes are becoming too aggressive. I understand that national security 
and criminal activity may justify some exceptional and narrowly-tailored use of 
surveillance. But that is all the more reason to safeguard human rights and fundamental 
freedoms."
Ban Ki-moon
Let me start with a thought experiment. Just imagine that in the 1970s, Russian agents had 
been able to photocopy large portions of the file-cabinets from the US Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM). This data would have included sensitive information such as 
fingerprints, social security IDs, postal addresses and national security clearance of the 
majority of staffers within the political bureaucracy. Imagine further, that Russian spies 
had been able to photocopy the campaign files (funding, strategy etc.) and personal 
communication of a democratic party during an election, using this material to blackmail 
one of the candidates.
Imagine further, that like the Stasi in the former German Democratic Republic, 
domestic and foreign intelligence agencies strive to monitor every communication channel 
in their own country and in other countries as well. Imagine that intelligence agencies 
would demand capabilities to send covert agents or saboteurs to critical infrastructures like 
dams, electricity plants or water supplies. These saboteurs would plant remote-controlled 
bombs, waiting to be activated on demand, destroying or disrupting the operation of the 
facility.
Finally, imagine that the KGB and every other intelligence agency in the world had 
placed surveillance bugs everywhere: on every person, in every home, car, office and 
government building in every country on earth and that these could be switched on from 
afar. Imagine that intelligence agencies worldwide would lobby their governments to 
receive capacities to switch on these surveillance bugs on demand. 
These events sound like a Tom Clancy novel but all of them are based on real 
empirical events that happened, not in the Cold War, but in the last few years. These events 
did not happen in the physical world, but in the digital domain. For example, in 2014 the 
OPM was hacked and sensitive information of US Government officials had been stolen 
over the Internet (Office of Personnel Management, 2015). In 2016, Russian hackers stole 
sensitive information from the Democratic National Committee during the US Election 
(Harris, 2016). The planting of surveillance bugs everywhere refers to smartphones or 
smart home appliances connected to the Internet. Most states equip their intelligence 
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agencies with special Trojan software and legal competences to "cyber-attack"1 these 
devices with malware, to turn on the microphone, extract private data or to save every 
keystroke on the device. This practice is not limited to national territory but also includes 
the jurisdiction of other states because these bugs can be sent electronically. 
The wiretapping of the entire communications infrastructure refers to the Snowden 
leaks of 2013, when it was uncovered that US Intelligence agencies where copying large 
portions of Internet communication to intercept communication of both citizens and 
international users. Whereas the Stasi monitored only audio phone calls and relied on 
informants (Foschepoth, 2013), Internet communication contains all types of audio-visual 
or behavioral data. If one would print all this data on A4 paper, it would require an 
estimate of 42 billion file-cabinets to store it. The Stasi had around 48000 file cabinets in 
its entire archive (Stasi versus NSA, 2017). 
Why do I present these examples? Because they are examples of how states begin to 
control the Internet and digital technologies, which this thesis is about. They offer a 
glimpse of how states behave in cyberspace. When one picks up a random newspaper, 
chances are that one discovers headlines such as "we’re on the verge of cyber-war" 
(Giamoia, 2016), "how America can beat Russia in Cyber War" (Singer, 2017) or 
intelligence agency X "wants to start cyber-counterattacks" (DPA, 2017). Now, more than 
ever, the Internet is understood in terms of war: "cyber-attacks", "arms race in 
cyberspace", "cyber-deterrence" and more have become buzzwords in public discourses. 
We are taking it for granted that "cyber-soldiers" from Russia or the National Security 
Agency (NSA) hack into the digital infrastructures, threatening to shut down power-grids 
or worse.2 
The premise of this thesis is that we witness an ongoing militarization and 
securitization of the Internet (Deibert, 2003). This means that the Internet is more and 
more understood as a domain of national security and that surveillance, espionage, 
sabotage and hacking have become the preferred tools of statecraft. More and more states 
perceive the Internet as a national security problem and try to deal with this threat with 
military and intelligence capabilities (Shafqat & Masood, 2016). I argue that the 
militarization of cyberspace with practices of Internet surveillance, cyber-attacks and 
1 Defined as "deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks 
or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks" (Singer & Friedman, 
2014, p. 68).
2 Observe that the "cyber"-prefix is used in all kinds of way in current discourses, which often is problematic 
because it subsumes highly diverse issues under one umbrella. I agree with Thomas Rid who argues that the 
use of "the cyber" as a noun should be avoided and often indicates a superficial understanding of topic (Rid, 
2013, p. ix). The author apologizes in advance for the extensive use of the cyber prefix throughout the thesis. 
I will use hyphens like cyber-security, cyber-attacks unless I refer to quotations.
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digital espionage have become so normalized in the last few years, that we do not fully 
understand their meaning and overall societal impact. That is why I have presented current 
events with the Cold War metaphor to reveal how extraordinary they are. We have become 
so accustomed to this militarization that there is little public debate about questions of 
whether it should be considered a norm that states hack each other’s elections with cyber-
attacks or whether it should be considered normal that democratic and authoritarian 
regimes likewise hack the Internet infrastructure to monitor global communications both 
domestic and abroad. Should we consider it a norm that democratic and authoritarian states 
develop specialized malware to hack into smartphones to turn them into surveillance 
devices? All these questions should be asked yet there is very little public debate about 
this.
All of this indicates that states controlling the Internet has become normalized. The 
militarization of the Internet has become a norm, a standard of state behavior. Some even 
argue that "the struggle to control cyberspace is defining American national security in the 
twenty first century" (Harris, 2014, p. Prologue).3 The norm states that it is the appropriate 
right of a state to control cyberspace itself, or information stored or send therein, globally 
as well as domestically. Control derives from the French word "contreroller" and means in 
its etymological sense "to check, to verify, to register, to regulate or to exert authority" 
(Etymonline, 2016). States try to exercise authority over the Internet with the means of 
digital surveillance, espionage and cyber-warfare4 capabilities. These measures follow a 
security logic and are often legitimized with threats from cyber and terrorist attacks. For 
example, the former German minister for the interior, Hans Peter Friedrich argued that "a 
loss of control monitoring communication of criminals must be compensated by new 
technological and legal [Internet surveillance] means" (KGP, 2013).5 Another example is 
the Internet surveillance program by British intelligence agencies leaked by Edward 
Snowden which, by no accident, is called "mastering the Internet" (Goertz & Obermaier, 
2013). These two examples are indicators of the norm of control I will analyze in this 
thesis. 
Why is this relevant? Because the norm of controlling cyberspace stands in conflict 
with many norms of democratic societies. The ongoing trend of the militarization of 
cyberspace is the reason why former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon warns in the 
entry quote about these practices and their impact on human rights. Internet surveillance 
3 Since some ebooks only have dynamic page numbers that depend on the font size, I can only refer to the 
chapter of the book as a source.
4 "Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing 
damage or disruption" (Clarke & Knake, 2010, p. 6). Intelligence collection is another purpose of cyber-war.
5 Square brackets always mean inclusions by the author.
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can have severe consequences for human rights, the rule of law and the functioning of 
democracies. In December 2014, the UN General assembly reinforced these concerns with 
a resolution (68/167) "The right to privacy in the digital age." The UN is:
 "deeply concerned at the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of 
communications, including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of 
communications, as well as the collection of personal data, in particular when 
carried out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of human 
rights […]" (United Nations General Assembly, 2014a).
For example, controlling content on the Internet via filter software or "truth 
ministries" checking for "fake news" contests the norm that censorship should not take 
place in democracies. Suspicionless or preemptive mass surveillance of citizens’ Internet 
data streams contests the norm that such intrusive surveillance measures should be based 
on a probable cause. That is why several constitutional courts and the European Court of 
Justice argued that the mass retention of Internet meta-data "exceeds the limits of what is 
strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be justified within a democratic society" 
(DW, 2016). Surveillance is potentially harmful for democracies because it can undermine 
the trust in government and limit citizens’ freedom of association and expression, as some 
social psychological studies show (Turner, 2016). More so, clandestine cyber-war 
activities blur the dichotomy of war and peace and domestic and foreign. They thus limit 
the democratic control of the military and intelligence agencies. Controlling the Internet in 
terms of censorship, by manipulating information stored therein, or disrupting the 
information space in other country, for example during elections, invites for abuse. While 
most liberal democracies still have checks and balances in place, authoritarian regimes 
engage in the same practices without much restraint and oversight. That both democratic 
and authoritarian states adopt very similar measures to control cyberspace is very peculiar 
and one of the puzzles addressed in this thesis.
1.1 Puzzle & Research Question
The trend that more and more states begin to control the Internet and the information 
therein is a somewhat puzzling development for three reasons. 
First, it is peculiar that both liberal-democratic and authoritarian regimes more and 
more adopt the same perspective on cyberspace and begin to control the Internet with very 
similar techniques and practices. The behavior of both liberal-democracies and 
authoritarian regimes in cyberspace is in fact very similar, as Betz and Stevens argue:
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"What is rarely acknowledged in Western security discourse is that recent moves 
by democratic governments into these regulatory spaces have much in common 
with the practices of other states whose control regimes are often the subject of 
Western opprobrium and condemnation" (Betz & Stevens, 2012, p. 67).
For example, most Internet surveillance activities in Western countries are legitimized with 
the war on terror. Cyber-war activities are legitimized with external threats like Russia and 
the perceived loss of control. Authoritarian regimes likewise use terrorism as a pretense to 
exercise more control over the Internet. However, once enabled these activities tend to 
"mission-creep" to areas besides fighting terrorism, for example tracking minorities 
(Muslims) or the political opposition.
Likewise, cyber-war and surveillance feature prominently in most recent national 
security strategies of democratic and nondemocratic states alike and are in fact very similar 
in their goals, means and even terminology (Shafqat & Masood, 2016). For example, with 
its Investigatory Powers Bill, the United Kingdom introduced one of the most far reaching 
Internet surveillance laws in a democracy. The bill has a close resemblance to the legal 
regimes in China and Russia and thus was struck down by the European Court of Justice as 
being in violation of democratic norms (Woollacott, 2016). 
Although we mostly hear of Russian or Chinese hacking in the US or Europe, 
Western intelligence agencies are similarly active abroad as many of the Snowden leaks of 
2013 indicate (Intercept, 2014). Intelligence agencies from liberal and authoritarian 
regimes even struggle with similar problems and lobby their government for more 
capacities, for example allowing them to break encryption. Currently, we witness a 
worldwide initiative, led by Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the USA for 
"exceptional access" into cryptographic messengers. Encrypted smartphone apps 
circumvent Internet surveillance and thus intelligence agencies lobby for capacities to 
circumvent encryption, for example by using malware, i.e. cyber-attacks (Schulze, 2016b). 
Meanwhile Russia (Szoldra, 2016) and China (Gierow, 2016) adopted very similar 
measures by regulating the use of encryption by their citizens. While western governments 
want to break encryption to hunt terrorists, Russia and China use the very same techniques 
to crackdown on dissidents. The goals might differ, but the means are the same.
The same can be seen with censorship, which is a traditional tool of authoritarian 
rule, but is currently actively demanded in many Western states, for example to deal with 
pornography, propaganda or what is nowadays called "fake news" (Schulze, 2016a). I 
argue that all these phenomena are a indicators that state control over the Internet has 
become a new, so-called "dark" norm. Dark norms contest traditional liberal democratic 
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norms which most Western democracies (still) adhere to (Heller, Kahl, & Pisoiu, 2012). It 
is very puzzling that both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes show a very 
similar behavior in cyberspace. We might expect information controls, censorship and 
cyberspace control in authoritarian regimes, because it has been an integral part of these 
regimes for ages. Controlling information and information spaces is a means of power to 
stabilize a regime. The fact that many democratic countries nowadays demand similar 
capabilities is curious. Democracies normally adhere to fundamental norms such as 
freedom of speech, privacy rights and laws like the 4th amendment that guarantees 
protection from unnecessary state surveillance of private lives and communications. Thus, 
one would expect a certain democratic constraint. Suspicionless surveillance violates core 
rule of law principles such as the need for a probable cause before surveillance is initiated. 
These norms are contested by Internet mass surveillance and censorship practices which 
target everyone without suspicion. The question is, why do both democratic and 
authoritarian states adopt similar measures regarding the Internet?
There is a second puzzling aspect that becomes only apparent if one considers the 
behavior of democratic states in cyberspace before the war on terror. During the 1980s and 
1990s, liberal democracies had a very different position regarding state control of 
information technologies. Former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz argued in 1985 
that controlling information technologies is both democratically and economically 
inappropriate. He argued that information and communication technologies (ICT) bring 
economic advantages and important technical developments such as micro processing. If 
authoritarian states restrict or control these technologies, they would fall behind 
economically. If they allowed ICT to spread in their country, they might lose the 
information monopoly and censorship capacities which they require to maintain order. ICT 
would create a "dictator’s dilemma": either authoritarian states allow ICT and lose control 
over their population and catch up economically. Or they continue blocking and censoring 
information and maintain power, but loose economically. The idea that states could or 
should control the new ICT and information was perceived as bad for innovation, 
undemocratic and even impossible (Kedzie & Aragon, 2002). In other words, during the 
1980s and 1990s the aforementioned democratic constraint regarding surveillance and ICT 
control actually existed and was promoted by key politicians. Former President Bill 
Clinton said in 2000: "Trying to control the Internet is like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall" 
(Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016). 
This indicates a completely different perception of the Internet and other information 
technologies. In the past, the Internet was not militarized. It was not seen predominantly as 
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a national security threat. During the 1990s, the Internet was primarily seen as a tool for 
liberalization and democratization and not as a method for warfare and surveillance. Back 
in the day, democratic regimes actively argued that democracies should not control these 
technologies and argued for democratic constraint, whereas nowadays they want to control 
cyberspace like their authoritarian counterparts. Why do democratic states adopt norms 
that are the complete opposite of what they preached in the past? 
The third puzzle includes the combination of the militarization and the technical 
features of the Internet itself. Militaries worldwide try to position themselves as dominant 
actors within cyberspace, aiming to gain more and more control over the technical and 
social infrastructure. At the same time, they are ill-suited to do so because of technical 
features of the Internet. The Internet is managed by private entities and is operating on a 
global scale beyond the jurisdiction of one single state. Internet governance studies 
diagnose a creative chaos of different actors with different responsibilities, indicated by the 
dominant research question in this field: "who controls the Internet?" (Goldsmith & Wu, 
2008; Eriksson & Giacomello, 2009). That is because the Internet was designed not to be 
in possession of one entity alone. The Internet protocols actively prevent control of one 
single entity, as later chapters will show (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet Protocols and 
Norms). Additionally, the Internet knows no borders and no separation between the 
domestic and the international, which alters traditional notions of territorial defense, the 
prime duty of militaries. Therefore, the Internet cannot be defended in the same way as a 
country, by building fortifications around critical infrastructure. Thus, the military is 
neither in a logical position to defend cyberspace, nor do most militaries have the technical 
capacities to do so (at least until a few years ago). In contrast, private companies and 
Internet service providers (ISP) are technically better suited to provide essential cyber-
security. For example, both German and US forces struggle with recruiting, because cyber-
security jobs in the private sector are more lucrative (Wiegold, 2016). Some argued that 
the militaries’ relationship to the Internet is that of a colonial force, coming in from the 
outside, claiming to be in charge of security (Barlow, 1996). It is puzzling that an entity 
that is in no logical position to control the technology tries do so because this process costs 
a lot of money and resources could be spend on a more civic cyber-security.
It is puzzling that within the last 30 years our meaning and perception of the Internet 
has made a 180 degree turn. Whereas during the 1990s, the Internet was seen as a positive 
force of democratization, a global library that would benefit education and would usher in 
economic growth, new innovations, new forms of governance and would ultimately bring 
mankind closer together, current discourses describe the complete opposite. Discourses on 
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cyber-war and surveillance often have the character of doomsday scenarios or operate with 
dystopian predictions (Lawson, 2011). In other words: whereas the Internet was once 
described as a digital, cyber-utopia, we now only see it in terms of war, cyber-war. This 
change of perception and state behavior, from cyber-utopia to cyber-war, is what this 
thesis is about. 
The (preliminary) guiding questions of this dissertation are: How can we explain this 
change? How could the norm of Internet control become dominant in Western 
democracies? I argue that the utopian perspective of the 1990s and the current dystopian or 
war perspective to the Internet resemble two competing world views or paradigms, which 
guide state-behavior towards the Internet. Thus, the change from cyber-utopia to cyber-war 
is understood as a paradigm and norm-change in cyberspace. This paradigm change alters 
what the Internet means for states and what appropriate state behavior towards this 
technology is. I argue that Internet control practices such as mass surveillance and cyber-
war in both democratic and authoritarian states are part of the same mind set, which is 
promoted by a particular understanding of the Internet. Mary McEvoy Manjikian called the 
military narrative towards the Internet "cyber-realism", and the utopian/democratic 
narrative "cyber-utopianism" (McEvoy Manjikian, 2010). I will use her terminology but 
advance her argument. I argue that these two paradigms propose and advocate different 
norms: cyber-realism advocates for Internet control of states in terms of more surveillance 
and cyber-war capabilities whereas cyber-utopianism argues that states ought not control 
cyberspace and that governance of this technology should lie in the hands of decentralized 
civil-networks, not states. 
Taking into account these theoretical insights, the research question is reformulated: 
Which process leads to the development of Internet control as the dominant norm for states 
in dealing with Internet?
1.2 Literature Review
Having outlined the research question, the task is to determine what research has to say 
about the militarization of the Internet and the dominance of Internet control norms.
Political science and International Relations (IR) are late-comer to Internet studies 
(Margetts, 2013). Until the mid 2000s, researching the technology ranked not high. 
Wellman describes three generations of Internet studies (Wellman, 2004). The first was 
driven by utopian ideas of an information or network society (Castells, 1999) bringing a 
new form enlightenment. This was mostly dominated by sociologists, futurologists, media-
studies (focusing on use) and computer science (focusing on protocol design and 
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development), as well as early Internet advocates themselves. Since the end of the 
millennium, policy-makers, academics and economists have began to see the relevance of 
this new technology and asked for systematic study, ushering in the second generation of 
Internet studies (Wellman, 2004). Here, the first questions about Internet governance came 
up, which since then has been one major approach to study the Internet within political 
science (Hofmann, 2005). The general theme of research was the impact of ICT upon 
society. Since 2004, we have been able witness the third generation, which is asking for 
general theories. In the recent Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies, Dutton argues that the 
key issues of Internet studies can be summarized with the question: Who shapes the 
Internet, why and with what implications for whom (Dutton, 2013a)? 
As one of the first works, Lawrence Lessig’s influential book Code: And other Laws 
of Cyberspace theorized the interrelationship of law, policy and technology and is seen by 
many as a catalyst for political science, turning its attention towards the Internet (Lessig, 
2000). For political scientists, the first issues were questions about the relationship 
between the Internet and democracy (Margetts, 2013), but systematic approaches were 
lacking. In 2006, Eriksson and Giacomello published a provoking article: "The Information 
Revolution, Security, and International Relations: (IR)relevant Theory?", pointing to the 
fact that IR theory did not have much to say about the Internet (Eriksson & Giacomello, 
2006). This changed, however, with the hacking incident in Estonia 2007 (see appendix. 
Table 9. List of Internet Milestones and Security Incidents). Events like the 2011 Arab 
Spring or the Wikileaks cable-gate triggered an increased interest in Internet-related 
phenomena. Studies include the use of social media by social movements (Etling et al., 
2010; Hofheinz, 2011), or in presidential campaigns (Harfoush, 2009; Lilleker & Vedel, 
2013) and politics in general. Around the same, time a fourth-generation of Internet studies 
was developing. These studies aimed to demystify early utopianism and focused on how 
authoritarian and democratic regimes use the Internet to control their citizens (Deibert et 
al., 2008; Morozov, 2011) or focused on the negative aspects of digitalization and 
globalization in general (Keen, 2014).
Since the revelation of Edward Snowden in 2013, there has been an increased 
interest in power-politics and surveillance studies (Murakami Wood, 2015) and more and 
more dissertations are produced on this issue. It can be argued that within political science, 
there are three theory-inspired branches of studying the Internet: Internet governance, IR-
realism and constructivism. Governance, inspired by neo-liberal institutionalism, focuses 
on Internet governance international bodies such as the EU or UNO (Betz & Kübler, 2013; 
Mueller, 2010). These works often focus on the question: "Who controls the Internet?" 
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(Hofmann, 2005; Goldsmith & Wu, 2008; Eriksson & Giacomello, 2009) and illuminate 
different answers. There are studies on Internet governance within the European Union 
(Radu, 2015; Kremer & Müller, 2014) global bodies such as ICANN (Mueller, 2010) or 
the different standard consortiums like the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the 
International Telecommunication Union (DeNardis, 2009; Denardis, 2013). Other topics 
include questions of good or effective governance (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013), Internet 
security (Mueller, Schmidt, & Kuerbis, 2013; Schmidt, 2014), the comparison of different 
national approaches (Giacomello, 2005) and questions of legal ownership (Mueller, 2005). 
The problem with this body of research is that it is not that much focused on change and 
thus not that much suited for this project. Additionally, the security perspective on Internet 
governance only came up recently (Wolff, 2016).
Besides the who question, there is also the question: "how to control cyberspace?" It 
is often tackled by interdisciplinary research inspired by computer science (Deibert & 
Crete-Nishihata, 2012). Especially noteworthy here are the American Berkman Center and 
Canadian Citizen Lab. This branch of research focuses on the modality of Internet controls, 
for example via technical censorship (Rundle & Birdling, 2008; Deibert et al., 2008; 
Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008; Zuckerman, 2010b) or legal control of corporations and Internet 
intermediaries (Roberts & Palfrey, 2010; Zuckerman, 2010b; Goldsmith & Wu, 2008). 
Researchers from the Citizen Lab and from the OpenNet Initiative pioneered the work on 
researching Internet and information controls6 and they identified the historical evolution 
of these controls which are a product of the militarization of cyberspace (Deibert et al., 
2010). Historically, controlling the Internet or information thereon via censorship could 
first be witnessed in authoritarian regimes. The great Firewall in China or Middle-Eastern 
countries where religious, political or sexual contents are blocked from the Internet, are 
examples. The second generation of Internet control included laws that regulate 
appropriate information production, diffusion and consumption on the Internet. An 
example are slander-laws that erase (take-down) indecent material from the web and 
making website hosts responsible for user-generated content so that they have to face legal 
consequences if the state wishes so. These controls are present in democratic and 
authoritarian regimes, although they take different forms (copyright for example). The 
third generation of information controls is more recent and more offensive. New 
6 "Actions conducted in and through cyberspace that seek to deny, disrupt, manipulate, and shape 
information and communications for strategic and political ends. Information controls include an array of 
technologies, regulatory measures, laws, policies, and tactics. These can include media regulation, licensing 
regimes, content removal, libel and slander laws, and content filtering" (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 
343).
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techniques aim not just at denying certain information or Internet access (like censorship) 
but try to contest it, to produce counter-information (propaganda) as well as to disrupt 
online activities with cyber-attacks (Deibert et al., 2010). Disrupting the website of the 
political adversary during an election or spreading "fake news" are the latest iteration of 
this. 
A second approach to study the Internet within political science is IR-realism. Realist 
scholars tend to focus on questions of state-sovereignty in cyberspace (Betz, 2012; Betz & 
Stevens, 2012) or the modalities of power (Nye, 2010; Nye, 2011). There is also a body of 
literature dealing with national security issues, often indicated by adding the "cyber" 
prefix: cyber-security (Nissenbaum, 2005; Geers, 2011), cyber-terrorism (Lewis, 2002) 
and related concepts such as cyber-deterrence (Libicki, 2009). The evolution of this body 
of literature will be traced in a following chapter in order to keep this section rather short 
(see chap. 4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism). 
Within realism, there is the mostly military-inspired discourse on cyber-warfare to 
which this thesis also contributes. Dunn-Cavelty (Dunn Cavelty, 2010) describes two 
general sets of literature bodies: one military and one academic. I would also add a legal 
body of literature which focuses on the compatibility of cyberspace with international law. 
Military scholars (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Molander, Riddle, & Wilson, 1996; 
Pfaltzgraff & Shultz, 1997; Papp & Alberts, 2000) theorized cyber-war in terms of a 
fundamental revolution in military affairs (RMA), speculating about its game-changing 
nature. They argued that cyberspace is ultimately a new phenomenon that cannot be 
grasped by traditional concepts of war and peace and therefore negates many established 
truths (like the offense-defense balance, the concept of retaliation and deterrence). There is 
also a critical generation of academic literature that questions whether cyber-war is indeed 
war (Rid, 2013; Healey & Grindal, 2013; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Kaplan, 2016).
A third political science approach to the Internet is driven by constructivism. IR-
constructivism is dominated by the securitization framework (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 
1997), which analyzes how the Internet and related phenomena such as hacktivism, crime 
and war are rhetorically constructed as national security threats (Deibert, 2003). There 
already is a substantial body of literature analyzing the social framing of cyberspace. These 
studies focus on language aspects, such as doomsday narratives (Lawson, 2011; Dunn 
Cavelty, 2013b), metaphors (Lawson, 2011; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009) and the general 
mechanisms of threat policy and framing (Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Dunn Cavelty & Jaeger, 
2015; Morozov, 2009). These are studied in different countries like Sweden (Eriksson, 
2001), the USA (Bendrath, 2003) and Germany (Schulze, 2012) and after cyber-security 
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events such as the NSA-scandal7 (Schulze, 2015). Probably there are other country studies 
the author is unaware of. There are also first attempts of theory building, for example by 
using Ulrich Becks "risk society framework" to explain Internet threats (Aradau, 2010; 
Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012) or Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (Dunn 
Cavelty, 2015). 
Surprisingly, another branch of constructivism has little to say about cyber-war and 
the Internet: norm-research. Although many practitioners and scholars agree that there are 
norms in cyberspace and that actors, for example conflict parties should be guided by legal 
principles (Grove, Goodman, & Lukasik, 2010) such as the law of armed conflict (Schmitt, 
2013) or due-diligence duties (Bendiek, 2016), detailed norm-research studies are lacking. 
Recent critical norm research has discovered the existence of dark norms within the war on 
terror that contest traditional liberal norms, for example in terms of the reemergence of 
torture, but digital surveillance and cyber-war have not been systematically studied yet 
(Heller & Kahl, 2013). There is a gap in the literature this thesis tries to fill. 
Within norm research, there are two exceptions however, which are important 
foundations for this thesis. First, Miles Townes was among the first who combined the 
constructivist framework of norm-diffusion (see chap. 2.1 Norms and Theories of 
Normative Change) with the global spread of the Internet. Townes argues that "the Internet 
embodies prescriptive decisions about how networking technology ought to work, and 
what privileges and responsibilities parties to the technology ought to have; these decisions 
have important political consequences" (Townes, 2012, p. 44). He correctly argues that 
academic norms, and not military ones shaped the design and global diffusion of the 
Internet. He does not really specify what these norms are in detail and where they come 
from. With high detail, he shows the global diffusion of networking technologies and 
exemplifies the working of the norm-life cycle until the early 1990s, but not further. 
Furthermore, he does not analyze the consequences of these norms and only focuses on the 
academic epistemic community. Policy or military norms are neglected. Nevertheless, his 
paper is highly insightful and was a major source of inspiration for this thesis.
Another source of inspiration was the exemplary work of Mary McEvoy Manjikian, 
who observed in her study three distinct narratives, or the "origin stories" of cyberspace: a 
utopian, a liberal and a realist reading of the technology. She focused on a narrative 
perspective, on creation stories "to describe cyberspace—its essence, its utility, and its 
relation to issues of state power" (McEvoy Manjikian, 2010, p. 382). She analyzes how 
these origin stories frame cyberspace and infers from them implications for IR theory in 
7 National Security Agency.
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terms of power, territory and citizenship (McEvoy Manjikian, 2010). Her argument is that 
the utopian narrative became replaced by Realpolitik, which is another version of the 
militarization thesis that also underlies my argument. 
Her focus is not so much on norms though. I will build on her assessment and initial 
typology of cyber-utopianism, cyber-liberalism and cyber-realism and complement these 
narratives with a paradigm perspective. This means that it is not just about the discursive 
narrative, but also about the norms, practices and policies embedded in political paradigms 
that shape the perception of the Internet and guide state behavior. Additionally, Manjikian 
argues that the creators of the technology adhered to the liberal narrative. While this seems 
to be partly the case, I would argue that the construction perspective represents a fourth 
origin story of the Internet. Because this thesis has a focus on the construction of the 
artifact called the Internet, the norms and visions of the designers have to be recognized. 
They established the first reading, the first narrative of this technology. 
In sum, I will analyze the developmental path of four paradigms (cyber-realism, 
cyber-liberalism, cyber-utopianism, and the engineering perspective) and argue that the 
norm change in cyber-space towards more control can be understood as a paradigm change 
from cyber-utopianism to cyber-realism. This allows me to bridge the gap between the 
different theoretical camps outlined so far. Let me now briefly introduce the goals of the 
study.
1.3 Contributions of the Study
Besides addressing the aforementioned research gaps, the aim is to provide a minimally 
sufficient explanation of the dominance of the cyber-realist norm of control (Beach & 
Pedersen, 2012, p. 63). To do this, this thesis develops a norm-research approach that 
provides an alternative to the discursive dominance of securitization studies in explaining 
the Internet. Most constructivist studies remain in the discourse analysis tradition, focusing 
on speech acts alone. What is seldom analyzed is the material impact of those speech-acts, 
as Dunn-Cavelty criticizes (Dunn Cavelty, 2015). This thesis acknowledges the 
securitization of cyber-space thesis, which can be broadly defined as a:
"[…] process whereby more issues, problems, behaviors, and phenomena get 
defined in "security" terms and subjected to the "protectionist reflex" (Beck 1998). 
If an issue is successfully securitized it is possible to legitimize extraordinary 
means to solve the perceived problem(s), with the corollary that the issue becomes 
an inappropriate topic for critical debate or resistance (Buzan et al. 1998)" (Bennett 
& Parsons, 2013).
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However, this thesis goes beyond the discursive securitization because we need to look at 
the material and ideational causes and effects of cyber-phenomena. This thesis builds on 
securitization assumptions and norm-research but addresses some of their shortcomings.
First, it argues that we also need to study the material impact of securitization of 
cyberspace in terms of legal, normative and technological change. I argue that normative 
and technological change are related processes that do not just have discursive, but also 
material impacts. For example, we can witness in China that the desire to control the 
Internet leads to a reengineering of the Chinese part of the Internet to allow better 
censorship (Lindsay, Cheung, & Reveron, 2015). The desire for state-control leads to re-
engineering practices that affect the global functioning of the Internet. State-produced 
malware like Stuxnet, so-called "cyber-weapons" (that would shut down a nation’s Internet 
in case of war), as well as efforts to break or weaken encryption standards are real material 
effects of the norm of control (Moore & Rid, 2016; Schulze, 2017).
Internet control also has security implications. Intelligence officials for example 
argue that weakening Internet encryption in the name of national security makes countries 
more vulnerable in cyberspace. Internet control can harm cyber-security (Hayden, 2016a). 
The more states develop tools to break into each other’s systems, the more insecure the 
entire Internet infrastructure gets, representing a classical security dilemma. This thesis 
will include frameworks from Science and Technology Studies (STS) to theorize 
normative and technological implications. Technological change also often is a norm-
change, which is widely ignored by IR-constructivism (Herrera, 2003, p. 567). By 
including the literature on technological change, we can expand IR-constructivist 
frameworks which is important for the next argument.
Second, I argue that we should modify norm research to make it useful for Internet 
and technology studies. In a later chapter I offer a detailed critique of dominant theories of 
normative change so that I will keep this section rather short (see chap. 2.1.3 Critique of 
Diffusion Models). My general argument is that it is not enough to focus on singular 
ideational factors like ideas (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Checkel, 1997; Legro, 2000) or 
individual norms (Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Klotz, 1995; Katzenstein, Jepperson, & Wendt, 
1996; Florini, 1996; Checkel, 1999) but that one must combine these under one umbrella. 
It makes sense to analyze the interaction of multiple norms and ideas. Thus, another aim of 
this thesis is to provide further explanations for norm change. I do this with the paradigm 
approach.
My third argument is that we should adopt a longitudinal perspective. Most 
securitization or Internet studies adopt a snap-shot nature. Due to pragmatic reasons, most 
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studies focus on single events or single discourses to analyze the impact of the 
securitization of the Internet. The empirical trend of the militarization of cyberspace 
(Deibert, 2003) has not been studied in detail and more importantly not over a long period 
of time. Only Thomas Rid’s excellent history of cybernetics provides valuable longitudinal 
insights (Rid, 2016). However, theoretical explanations of why this process is happening 
and what causal consequences it might have are lacking. This is an advantage of norm-
change literature, which often focuses on longer timeframes.
The few longitudinal studies that exist are histories of the Internet itself. These 
historic books often focus on technical aspects and do not include the political or the 
military dimension (Hafner & Lyon, 1998; Abbate, 2000). They also are rather descriptive 
and do not tend to theorize, maybe with the exception of Burman (Burman, 2003) and 
(Townes, 2012). In contrast, studies arguing from a more military perspective (Healey & 
Grindal, 2013; Kaplan, 2016) do not illuminate the civil or political dimension. I would 
argue that we need a holistic perspective to analyze a norm change in cyberspace.
A longitudinal study allows us to incorporate a constructivist norm framework for 
the study of the Internet and thus can act as an alternative or supplement explanation to 
securitization. This thesis argues that the phenomenon of militarization of the Internet can 
be conceptualized as a normative change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) or a norm diffusion 
(Gilardi, 2013). Because the Internet developed within our life-time, it is a perfect case to 
analyze the genesis, diffusion and regression of norms (McKeown, 2009). A longitudinal 
or process-tracing study allow us not just to analyze the diffusion of one norm (cyber-
realism), but also the regression of others (cyber-utopianism). The empirical trend of the 
militarization of cyberspace (Deibert, 2003) has not been studied in detail, and more 
importantly over a long periods of time. Only Thomas Rid’s excellent history of 
cybernetics provides valuable longitudinal insights (Rid, 2016). But being more a historical 
book, theoretical explanations why this process is happening and what causal 
consequences it might have are lacking. This is peculiar because the emergence of the 
Internet (from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s) and the mainstream diffusion of it (since 
1992) represents an interesting case. With the Internet, humankind has the unique 
opportunity to observe an emergent structure that, in the memory of most, is merely around 
25 years old. We can observe the formation of meaning and norms that are produced by 
different actors who engage with the technology from the start or ex-nihilo. In that sense it 
represents a tabula rasa to study state behavior which had to be developed from sratch. It is 
a new technology which opened a completely new discourse and meaning space that was 
quite uncontested in its early days. As such it is a perfect situation to study the emergence 
1. Introduction
30
and diffusion of new norms that surround a technology. The question that remains however 
is, what type of case should we select to study the militarization and the norm change in 
cyberspace?
1.4 Case Selection: The United States
Normative change is typically studied with a methodology called causal-process-tracing, a 
within-case technique, which is explained in higher detail in a later chapter (see chap. 3. 
Methodology & Research Design). Process-tracing typically asks questions like how did 
an outcome (like a the norm of Internet control) come into being? As a case study 
technique, causal process tracing requires a case selection, an instance where the assumed 
normative change from utopian to cyber-realist norms happened. 
Only one case is selected to trace the process of norm change. Ideally, the case must 
show a strong positive effect on the outcome variable, in my case is the change or variance 
in norms: cyber-utopian norms becoming replaced by cyber-realist norms. Since cyber-
realist norms aim to establish control over the Internet it is necessary to select a case where 
this outcome is present. Internet control itself can be divided in different practices such as 
surveillance of data streams, active censorship of content, active repression and 
persecution of dissidents, active propaganda and information war and psychological 
operations (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012). Research from the Citizen Lab in Canada 
shows that historically, authoritarian regimes were the first to adopt Internet control and 
surveillance measures and that democratic countries began to follow this trend after 9/11 
(Deibert et al., 2010). This thesis will put forward the argument that cyber-war capabilities 
are another instance of control. 
If authoritarian regimes are front-runners of surveillance and Internet control, then it 
would make sense to pick for example China, Russia or theocratic regimes like Saudi 
Arabia or Iran (Deibert et al., 2010). Some of these states are also known to heavily invest 
in offensive cyber-war capabilities (Lindsay et al., 2015; Geers, 2015). But China and 
Russia present a difficulty which is a reduced accessibility of data, the main criterion for 
case selection in the process-tracing approach. It means that as much data as possible must 
be available and readable (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 82). This concerns both language 
barriers and classification, since cyber-warfare activities are often carried out by 
intelligence agencies and shrouded in secrecy. Therefore, data-access is limited (Kaplan, 
2016, p. chap. 15). To draw a comprehensive storyline and to analyze the sequences in 
detail, diverse forms of evidence must be considered in order to create a detailed picture of 
the process. Thus, China and Russia are not feasible for this study.
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Besides the accessibility problem in China and Russia, there is a theoretical issue 
with authoritarian regimes in general. It could be argued that authoritarian regimes did not 
witness a norm change from liberal and often democratic cyber-utopian norms to cyber-
realist ones. The transition from more liberal conceptions of cyberspace towards a more 
realist perspective did not happen to the same degree. There was not much of a norm 
change because in authoritarian regimes, Internet or media control in general already is the 
norm, not the exception. Therefore, it becomes interesting or puzzling if a liberal 
democracy adopts the very same measures. The case could be made that the ongoing 
militarization of the Internet is another indicator for the current "crisis of liberal 
democracy" or the "right-wing authoritarian turn" we currently can witness in states like 
Poland, Hungary, the USA and more.
A report from Reporters Without Borders concludes that the United States and 
United Kingdom are on their way to become authoritarian in cyberspace because of the 
extended Internet mass surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden:
"The mass surveillance methods employed in these three countries [India, UK, 
USA], many of them exposed by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, are all the 
more intolerable because they will be used and indeed are already being used by 
authoritarian countries such as Iran, China, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain to justify their own violations of freedom of information" (Reporters 
without Borders, 2014, p. 4).
Other human rights organizations come to similar conclusions. According to Freedom 
House, between 2012 and 2015, the Internet freedom in the US declined from 12 to 19 
points (0 being the best) on their index (Freedom House, 2016). They attribute this to 
increased Internet control practices. The assessment that the United States (US) is currently 
on a dangerous path, or on a transition, towards an Internet control regime installed in the 
name of terrorist prevention is not just shared by advocacy groups. As a reaction to the 
Snowden disclosures in 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights argued that:
"Mass surveillance of digital content and communications data presents a serious 
challenge to an established norm of international law. In the view of the Special 
Rapporteur, the very existence of mass surveillance programmes constitutes a 
potentially disproportionate interference with the right to privacy. Shortly put, it is 
incompatible with existing concepts of privacy for States to collect all 
communications or metadata all the time indiscriminately" (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2014b, p. 7).
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Here, the assumed norm change becomes visible: Internet control practices such as 
mass surveillance of data streams contests core norms of international law. In his report, 
the UN rapporteur explicitly names the United States and the United Kingdom as the main 
sources for concern because the majority of Internet traffic is routed through these 
countries. This means that traffic can be potentially intercepted and/or altered by 
intelligence agencies in these countries (United Nations General Assembly, 2014b, p. 6). 
The report even calls some of these surveillance and cyber-war initiatives attempts to take 
"secret control (or "ownership") over servers in key locations on the "backbone" of the 
Internet (United Nations General Assembly, 2014b, p. 8). The report then advises that 
these states review their Internet control practices to make them compatible with 
international law. 
These statements indicate that there is indeed a norm-change going on with the 
emergence of Internet control norms in the United Kingdom and the United States. More 
so, this change represents a norm-regression of liberal norms such as privacy. Therefore, 
the USA is going to be selected the case of interest for analyzing normative change in 
cyberspace. Why chose the US instead of the UK?
The primary reason for the US is a practical one: the Internet was invented in the 
United States and it is the country which saw the first widespread diffusion of this 
technology before any other country (see diffusion statistics in the appendix, Quantifying 
the Internet and the Digital Revolution). It was also the country which adopted first 
Internet policies. This makes it a frontrunner and an example for many other countries and 
implies that Internet norms potentially developed there first and then diffused to other 
countries. The US was also the first country to theorize about cyber-war. Furthermore, 
American academia played a major role in creating this technology. There is a vast body of 
literature on the origins of the Internet which means there is a lot of data to be generated. 
Most of the initial inventors of the technology (who are still alive), are American and live 
in the United States which makes it possible to conduct first hand interviews to determine 
the goal oriented construction dimension. To sum up, the process of normative change 
regarding cyberspace is analyzed within the case of the United States.
1.5 Structure and Logic of the Argument
Now, let me explain the structural logic of the thesis. Explaining outcome process tracing 
studies require a broad array of theoretical elements that explain how an outcome was 
created (see chap. 3. Methodology & Research Design). "Theories are used here in a much 
more pragmatic fashion that is, as heuristic instruments that have analytical utility in 
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providing the best possible explanation of a given phenomenon" (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, 
p. 13). 
I start by synthesizing the dominant explanations and approaches for explaining 
normative change (see chap. 2. Explaining Normative Change). The purpose is not to 
identify variables, but to have a broad, and eclectic framework to explain different parts in 
the causal process at different points in time. This analysis will show that the focus of 
traditional norm-research is to narrow (see chap. 2.1 Norms and Theories of Normative 
Change), and that we need further theories to grasp the complexity of norm-change over 
longer periods of time. 
That is why I will adopt the wider perspective of policy paradigms which includes 
norms, ideas but also frames and policies. I argue that this expanded framework can 
account for more things in the causal mechanism. Particularly, I will fuse the concept of 
advocacy coalitions and that of policy-paradigms (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms and Norm-
Change). This will be combined with recent development in norm-research, i.e. a critical or 
discursive perspective that argues that norms are not singular entities, but represent some 
kind of semantic network or norm-clusters (see chap. 2.2.3 Degrees of Change). 
This expanded notion of norms and paradigms allows to bridge the gap between norms and 
technology. I fuse norm-research and Science and Technology Studies together to explain 
the technological and thus structural aspects of the study, i.e. social construction of 
technical artifacts such as the Internet, the normative implications technology can have and 
additional mechanisms of diffusion. There is a lot of conceptual overlap between STS and 
norm-research and to bridge the gap between the two fields is an important aim of the 
study. Particularly, the element of timing is important: different stages of technological 
diffusion have different implications for norm diffusion with technology.
This timing aspect is particularly important for the methodology of process-tracing, 
which will be introduced afterwards (see chap. 3. Methodology & Research Design). Here, 
I will outline my understanding of causality as well as the overall research design of the 
study.
The empirical case study in chapter 4 has a distinct temporal and methodological 
logic to accommodate the requirements of causal process tracing in a longitudinal fashion. 
The empirical part is structured according to the unfolding of the process and less 
"according to variables and theories" (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 142) as in other case 
study types. Generally, the study adopts a historical perspective from the past to the 
present. Since I am dealing with the evolution of four different paradigms (engineering 
paradigm, cyber-realism, cyber-utopianism/liberalism), the challenge was how to structure 
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the logic of the thesis. The focus on the four sub processes of paradigm and norm evolution 
requires to analyze the same timeframe, a period like the construction of technology from 
four different angles. Structurally, there would be two ways of doing this.
 One way would have been to discuss the combined, linear unfolding of each 
paradigm in a distinct timeframe (or element of the causal chain). Main chapters would 
represent a decade or so and sub-chapters the four individual paradigms. Since I also want 
to focus on different aspects of each paradigm (i.e. paradigmatic components such as ideas, 
norms, problem definitions and blind spots, as well as on distinct outcomes of each, such 
as policies, or technical artifacts), this linear-sequence structure would have become too 
complicated and unfriendly to read. Another downside was that the thesis operates with 
different actors that matter at different points in time and that accommodate different 
central or peripheral positions in the policy process. For the causal mechanism to make 
sense, a shift of the units of analysis is required (as well as the analysis of different types of 
data), which ultimately would have become very confusing with a linear, combined 
structure.
Instead, I chose to structure the thesis in a parallel-sequence: each paradigm is 
analyzed separately from the other, from past to present. This means, the same decade is 
covered from the perspective of the different paradigms. This temporal logic is the basis of 
the four major subsections (4.1 - 4.4). Each subsection discusses the evolution of one 
Internet paradigm in a longitudinal timeline. This means that each paradigm has an 
individual starting point, which will be explained at the beginning of each chapter. 
Chapter 4.1 discusses the social construction of the technical artifact Internet and the 
norms and motivations of the designers (what I call the engineering paradigm) from the 
late 1960s until the mass market diffusion of the World Wide Web in 1993. Since all other 
paradigms react to the Internet, this is a logical starting point. Chapter 4.2. traces the 
evolution of ideas from the early users of the Internet and the formation of the cyber-
utopian paradigm from the 1960s until the present day, with a particular focus on the late 
1980s and early 1990s (where much of the Internet usage modalities or norms evolved). 
The purpose of the chapter is to trace the evolution of the first cyber-utopian Internet 
norms, the idea that the state ought not to have control over cyberspace. Cyber-utopianism 
was the first widely shared meaning and frame of reference for understanding the Internet 
and thus this chapter represents the first part of the norm change in the thesis’s title.
The "hands-off" norm got politically institutionalized in the early 1990s. This will be 
discussed in chapter 4.3, which shifts the perspective from the Internet’s users to policy-
makers and analyzes how the Clinton administration reacted to the Internet. The focus is 
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more on political ideas and policy-making, establishing the "hands-off norm" of cyber-
liberalism, a distinct political-technological perspective that argues for the primacy of the 
private and civil actors in controlling the Internet. This represents the logical starting point 
for a norm-change from utopian to realist norms, which will be introduced in the next 
chapter.
Chapter 4.4. shifts the analytical focus to military and intelligence advocacy groups 
and their perception of digital technologies or what is called cyber-realism. This chapter 
represents the center-piece of the argument and thus has the highest level of detail since it 
includes the evolution of the concept of cyber-war, with its norm of Internet control. It 
focuses on ideas (military doctrines), policies, as well as the construction of counter-
artifacts to the Internet, i.e. the creation of offensive cyber-war capabilities and mass 
surveillance technology. The aim is to trace the origin of the norm of controlling the 
Internet because of national security concerns. The outcome of this process is the cyber-
realist norm that the state (the military and intelligence community) claims the right to 
monitor and control all information traversing and the very functioning of the global 
Internet, even beyond their national jurisdiction. This "norm of control", will be analyzed 
and criticized in high-detail.
The final empirical chapter of this thesis (see chap. 4.5 From Cyber-Utopia to Cyber-
War: The Obama Presidency (2008-2013)) does not talk about one paradigm, but two. It is 
the culmination of the militarization and norm-change thesis, where cyber-realism replaces 
utopianism. Therefore, the interaction of these paradigms within the Obama administration 
will be discussed.
This parallel-sequence structure creates a challenge and a potential downside the 
reader must be aware of. The parallel-sequencing makes the cross-paradigm interactions 
harder to follow. Initially, the plan of the study was to conduct a discourse analysis at 
different junctures, indicating the discursive struggle and framing of the paradigms. Due to 
place constraints, this was left out and the evolution and interaction of paradigms is 
discussed in a narrative fashion. I follow the example of Nina Tannenwald and Jeffrey 
Legro, who have opted for the same approach in their longitudinal studies of tracing the 
nuclear taboo (Tannenwald, 1999) or change of dominant ideas and epistemes in US 
foreign policy (Legro, 2000). Structurally and logically, this thesis was highly inspired by 
their work.
Another issue with parallel-sequencing is that sometimes chapters include a concept 
that is introduced in higher detail in the following chapter, because it belongs to another 
paradigm. This creates a hermeneutic dilemma: to understand a concept during linear-
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reading at a point in time t1, one requires the in-depth knowledge that is provided in the 
chapter which is read later at t2. To reconcile this hermeneutic dilemma, I used two tools: 
First, when a concept occurs that is discussed in high detail later, I provide a limited 
definition or description in a footnote that makes sense for the moment of reading. Second, 
I used a core-technique developed by Internet-engineers who struggled with the same 
problem of physical text, the Hyperlink. When a new concept is introduced, a link to the 
chapter where it is discussed in high detail is provided (like this, see chap. 4.1.4 Artifact: 
The World Wide Web (1989-present)). These links will be clickable in the digital copy of 
the thesis. 
After having introduced about what this thesis will talk about, it is now worth 
mentioning what cannot be discussed due time and space constraints. For example, several 
scholars note that attempts to regulate and control the Internet also come from the 
economic sector. From a certain economic perspective, it makes sense to impose 
restrictions on the Internet, and thus controlling its content, for example in terms of 
copyright infringement and file-sharing (Zuckerman, 2010b, p. 79). These initiatives are 
driven by Internet intermediaries and a vast array of companies. It would be worthwhile to 
analyze how these companies perceive the Internet and the norm change, but since there 
are so many different business models, perspectives and stakeholders, it would further 
complicate the thesis.
Other economic aspects are Big Data, social media and the commodification of data 
generated by Internet users when using online-services such as Google or Facebook. There 
is a synergy between the business-model of collecting user-data and selling advertisement 
on a large scale and the surveillance interest of states. Both surveillance and the 
commodification of data are driven by the same idea to generate as much information 
about a user as possible, since the very same data could be useful for profiling and law-
enforcement (Morozov, 2011, pp. 147-152). Deibert argues "’Big Brother’ and ’Big Data’ 
share so many of the same needs, the political economy of cybersecurity must be singled 
out as a major driver of resurgent authoritarianism in cyberspace" (Deibert, 2015, p. 74). 
This powerful dynamic and interplay of private company surveillance and the intelligence 
community (IC) is an interesting, yet complex and relatively new field of study. It could be 
argued that this aspect could either represent an entirely new paradigm, or a fusion of the 
military-inspired cyber-realism and cyber-liberalism with a neo-liberal flavor (Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2014). However, since this is primarily a work of political science 
and I have no background in economics and digital humanities, I will exclude this topic 
from the thesis and refer to other excellent studies (Lyon, 2014). Other important 
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arguments are the space and time constraints of this thesis. Instead of introducing this 
aspect only superficially, I will exclude it entirely.
Another issue that is left out is the question of digital activism and hacktivism that 
emerged out of cyber-utopian thinking in the mid 2000s, mostly because it is such a 
complex and diverse field of actors. Norm entrepreneurs and advocates such as Wikileaks, 
arguing for total transparency and the free flow of information or hacker groups like 
Anonymous and others are not part of the thesis. It could be argued that although 
Wikileaks and hacktivism saw a peak of public recognition between 2007 and 2011, these 
groups are relatively marginalized nowadays. Additionally, the topic is relatively well-
studied (Jordan & Taylor, 2004; Nissenbaum, 2004; Benkler, 2011; Assange et al., 2013; 
Wong & Brown, 2013) which means there is no immediate need to replicate these 
findings.
Now let us turn to theories explaining normative change in cyberspace.
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2. Explaining Normative Change
One of the core assumptions of this thesis is that ideational factors such as ideas, beliefs 
and norms have an impact on policy and technology. Ideas shape our perception of the 
world, which in turn influences how we act. What we think about technology is influenced 
by our ideas and when ideas change, so do policies. In turn, ideas shape technical artifacts 
such as the Internet. If we want to analyze the shift from more liberal conceptions of the 
Internet towards more authoritative control and a military logic, we need to examine the 
role which ideas play in this transformation and how these ideas shape standards of 
behavior. This chapter conceptualizes the interplay of sets of ideas and norms, called 
political paradigms and technology. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the relationship 
between norms, ideas and policy change in International Relations. This is the first step, 
followed by a theoretical discussion about the conditions of normative change and which 
role agents play therein.
Ideas, norms and politics are intertwined, they drive political change. Think for 
example how the idea of Keynesian economic practice became replaced by monetarist and 
more neo-liberal stances of capitalism in 1980’s Britain (Hall, 1993) or how Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s "new thinking" led to the transformation of the Soviet Union, leading to its 
collapse in 1991 (Risse-Kappen, 1994). It was during the 1990s that ideas, norms and 
identity became key variables in explaining policy change, promoting the so-called 
"constructivist turn" in the discipline of International Relations. This led to an intensive 
"third debate" (Lapid, 1989) within the discipline of IR and resulted in a theoretical 
opening, which allowed sociological approaches and reflectivist thinking to gain traction in 
IR. Reflectivist approaches argue that knowledgeable practices or ideational factors 
constitute subjects and objects alike (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993a, p. 3). Max Weber 
already argued at the beginning of the 20th century that if one wants to understand social 
action, one must analyze not just the objective conditions, but the subjective interpretations 
of those conditions by actors. Weber argued that an action can only be social to the extent 
that meaning is attached to mere behavior (Weber, 1968, p. 12). Meanings, in turn, arise 
with human interaction and are used to make sense of the "ongoing streams of happenings" 
(Scott, 2008, p. 57). Even though there are several branches of reflectivist thinking (from 
moderate pragmatism to post-structuralism and radical constructivism) the underlying core 
assumption of these approaches is that the social reality is not objectively given or "out 
there", but rather only conceivable through our interpretation and language (Adler, 2013, p. 
113). In this view, the process of knowledge construction is based on collective meanings 
that are, via discourse, attached to material objects such as the Internet. Reflexivity in this 
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regard means that "knowledge of the world, when imposed on material reality, becomes 
knowledge for the world – the power to change the world in accordance with collective 
understandings" (Adler, 2013, p. 113). The focus of analysis shifts from material factors 
that prescribe preferences towards ideational factors and the process of meaning creation 
that guides action. Therefore, ideational factors like ideas, world views (Goldstein & 
Keohane, 1993b), paradigms (Hall, 1993), norms (Katzenstein et al., 1996), identity 
(Wendt, 1994), habits (Hopf, 2010) and practice (Adler & Pouliot, 2011) become 
important factors for social action.
What is still missing is a systematic reflection of all the ideational factors and their 
connections. Scholars tend to focus on singular ideational factors like ideas (Risse-Kappen, 
1994; Checkel, 1997; Legro, 2000) or individual norms (Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Klotz, 
1995; Katzenstein et al., 1996; Florini, 1996; Checkel, 1999), but fail to analyze the 
connection between them. The important gap in research is to address the fact that norms 
and ideas in fact do not float freely (Risse-Kappen, 1994, p. 197) but are embedded in a 
normative-ideational context. Norms do not exist in isolation. We therefore need to ask, 
what is the connection between ideas and norms? How are they interrelated? How do sets 
of ideas and norms correspond in bigger frameworks (such as world views, paradigms or 
ideology)?
2.1 Norms and Theories of Normative Change
How can we explain that changes in state behavior lead to totally oppositional policies and 
positions towards an issue over time? How can we analyze policies that become practices 
and ultimately unquestioned standards of behavior? To this end, constructivist scholars 
developed several frameworks to analyze what they call normative change – the 
replacement or evolution of one set of behavioral guidelines and practices with another. In 
this logic, policies change because their underlying normative guidelines and ideas change. 
Before we come to that, we need to define norms.
Within constructivism, norms are generally defined as a "standard of appropriate 
behavior for an actor with a given identity" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Norms 
are instructional units that influence behavior that tell actors, either explicitly or implicitly, 
what a culturally appropriate action in any given situation or for a certain type of identity is 
(Florini, 1996, p. 363f.). They both constitute actors (as a civil-power for example) and 
regulate their behavior. According to Searle, regulative rules constrain "antecedently 
existing activities" and constitutive rules "create the very possibilities of certain activities" 
(Searle, 1995, p. 27). "Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any 
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particular consciously organized social activity – that is to say, they specify what counts as 
that activity" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 22). Constitutive rules operate according to the principle: 
"X counts as Y in context C (an American Dollar bill counts as legal currency in the US)" 
(Scott, 2008, p. 28). The concept of civil powers helps to illustrate this idea (Maull, 2000; 
Berger, 1996). If a state considers its identity to be a civil power, it "agrees" to behave in a 
manner compatible with this identity (i.e. not waging war, relying on civil means of 
conflict-resolution, strong notions of multilateralism etc.). Norms attached to the identity 
of civil powers are for example the taboo of waging offensive war out of self-interest or 
possessing certain types of weaponry (like chemical or nuclear weapons). The norms 
connected to civil power restrain state behavior by defining what is appropriate for that 
civil-power identity and what is not. Identity-based norms are obeyed because they are 
seen as legitimate and not necessarily because they are enforced by a community of actors 
(although this is important as well)
 "Unlike rationality, which is about the efficient means for gaining a predeter-mined 
goal, norms are concerned with the desirability of the means and goals themselves" 
(Goertz & Diehl, 1992, p. 636). In other words, norms influence the goal and preference 
construction of actors as well as the means to achieve them (Florini, 1996, p. 366). They 
delimit the what, but also the how – the range of tools and actions that can be done and 
should or should not be done. Action that is likely to produce suffering is then to be 
avoided. It would be too short-sighted to focus on rational-interests alone. Even national 
interest or hard national security concepts can be understood with a constructivist 
framework (Weldes, 1996).
All these elements require a social element like social pressure, sanctions and stigma. 
Norms are relevant only in normative systems of practice. Norms must be adhered to in 
repeated practice, otherwise they would just be normative guidelines without any 
consequences (like empty words). Repeated, reciprocal interaction creates reciprocal 
expectations and constitute what Emile Durkheim called social facts that exist exogenously 
from any actor and reside within a social group or can become embedded into institutions. 
For example, if a civil power identity coherently acts according to a set of prescribed 
norms (like multilateralism, civil conflict resolution), this creates expectations over time 
within the social group that future behavior of that actor will look similar to current 
behavior. Every action by an actor is evaluated by the rest of the social community 
whether it adheres to the abstract list of appropriate action (or the normative framework of 
the community). The result of this reciprocal process is that only a specific range of action 
counts as norm-following for a given actor and a whole range of other actions become 
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inappropriate (for example engaging in offensive warfare). Over time, groups will develop 
some type of catalogue of actions that are deemed inappropriate. Only then norms become 
"organizing principles or standardized procedures that resonate across many states and 
global actors, having gained support in multiple forums" (Wiener, 2009, p. 183f.). This 
process can be called normalization. Not just norm-following defines the right course of 
appropriate action, but also norm-breaking. Norm-breaking behavior often creates social 
sanctions by other actors, which might change behavior in the first place (Goertz & Diehl, 
1992, p. 638). Over time, this repeated interplay between action, expectation, actual 
behavior and sanctions creates standards of behavior and can in fact lead to the 
institutionalization of social rules, such as in international law.
Norms are only valid for an actor with a specified identity. They not only determine 
how to act, but also who should act. Most international norms are state-centric whereas in 
micro-contexts, norms can be directed at individuals as well. For example, a customer in a 
restaurant (an identity in a given context) is expected by the social context to behave in a 
certain way (order food, eat quietly). Here, it becomes obvious that different disciplines of 
the social sciences have different perspectives on norms. Whereas ethnography and 
sociology focus mostly on micro-level norms, IR focuses often on macro-level norms.
2.1.1 Norm Diffusion and Norm Entrepreneurs
Now that we have defined norms, it is necessary to analyze how they change. The 
mainstream focus of constructivist theories dealing with normative change is on norm 
diffusion (Klotz, 1995; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 1999; Farrell, 2001; 
Acharya, 2004; Wiener, 2007; Kelley, 2008; Ganguly, 2010; Hyde, 2011; Gilardi, 2013). 
Norm diffusion is defined as the transmission of one norm from one context into another. 
The transition of global environmental standards such as a prohibition of whaling, onto 
local policies (Epstein, 2008) would be an example. This diffusion can happen via different 
mechanisms like coercion, dynamics of state-competition, social learning, emulation and 
strategic implementation by norm entrepreneurs like persuasion (Payne, 2001) and framing 
(Snow & Benford, 1992). The aim of diffusion research is to show the link or the 
mechanism that indicates that one norm was influenced by another one. Since I am 
interested in normative change, diffusion research offers many useful insights for the study 
of norms in general. 
One of the most influential frameworks for studying norms is by Finnemore and 
Sikkink, who analyzed the evolution of norms and constructed a norm life-cycle consisting 
of three stages: first norm emergence, where new rules of appropriate behavior are put on 
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the radar by norm entrepreneurs with the help of transnational advocacy networks and 
other organizational platforms that act as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998). Norm entrepreneurs are public promoters of norms who engage in advocacy. 
During the second stage, norm entrepreneurs try to socialize other actors to follow the 
norms until a tipping point, a critical mass of norm-followers is reached. This tipping point 
triggers a self-reinforcing feedback loop, a so-called norm-cascade, through which the 
norm automatically diffuses globally. During this second stage, a norm is adopted by more 
and more actors and thereby creates peer pressure for others to follow. The norm diffusion 
process resembles an "S-curve" of technological development where the rate of adoption 
increases towards a ceiling (many countries adopt the norm), and then flattens (Gilardi, 
2013, p. 453). If enough actors adopt a norm, the third stage, internalization, kicks in, 
where a new norm becomes normalized and taken for granted in a target society (or 
globally, since the model works on both levels). Whereas in the first two stages, norms 
leave an extensive discursive trail, there is a systematic lack of discourse in the third stage 
because the norm is not contested anymore (Wiener, 2007). Internalized norms are taken 
for granted standards of behavior and as such, part of common sense. There is extensive 
research focusing on the tipping point, where a norm is about to become globally accepted. 
Issues of norm emergence and internalization are discussed less often, which is no 
accident. During the tipping point, it can be assumed that the public discourse surrounding 
a norm is at its peak, which means it leaves a highly visible discursive trail (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The situation is more difficult during the emergence stage, and 
even more so, during the internalization stage, where a norm is taken for granted and thus 
not talked about anymore. This and other elements caused a lively debate within IR 
constructivism. The next chapters introduce some critique on the norm-diffusion model 
that I will address in this thesis.
2.1.2 Critique of Deontological Norms
Although norm research has many advantages, there are some shortcomings that need to be 
discussed. In their evaluation of the status quo of the norm literature in 2001, Finnemore 
and Sikkink write that there is a bias towards "nice or progressive norms" in IR 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 403). Within constructivism most studies focus on 
progressive norms such as protecting the environment, promoting democracy, human 
rights, the Responsibility to Protect, weapon taboos and so forth. What is interesting is that 
these norms clearly have a moral dimension. These norms are often centered in the 
international arena while neglecting domestic spaces. They often are cosmopolitan and 
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have a Western-liberal bias (McKeown, 2009, p. 9). But there is more to be criticized. My 
argument is that this bias stems from how norms are conceptualized within IR, which 
predominantly focuses on the dimension of oughtness, while neglecting the role of 
repeated practice and the process of internalization. 
The dominant way to analyze norms in IR is to focus on their normative or moral 
components. "Norms reflect patterned behavior of a particular kind: a prescribed pattern of 
behavior which gives rise to normative expectations as to what ought to be done" (Hurrell 
& McDonald, 2013, p. 69). The oughtness of norms indicates "how an actor should 
behave", therefore making a statement about legitimate behavioral claims (Florini, 1996, p. 
364). It defines the right course of action from a moral position: "When many people 
engage in the same behavior, that behavior comes to be associated with a sense of 
oughtness" (Horne, 2001, p. 6). Finnemore and Sikkink call these prescriptive norms, 
because they prescribe behavior and the quality of oughtness differentiates them from 
other types of rules (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Key here is the normative or 
deontological dimension of social rules which must be followed or else sanctions will be 
the consequence (Goertz & Diehl, 1992, p. 638f). Deontology is the study of moral 
obligation. In that sense norms, are understood as "good" or moral practice. The underlying 
premise of diffusion research is that the rightness and wrongness of social action can be 
determined by actors, and that they can be socialized into norm-followers. In their 
influential article, Finnemore and Sikkink clearly recognize the deontological focus by 
quoting James Fearon:
"Good people do (or do not do) X in situations A, B, C ... " [Because] "we typically 
do not consider a rule of conduct to be a social norm unless a shared moral 
assessment is attached to its observance or non-observance" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998, p. 892). 
Originating from moral philosophy, deontological ethics deals with the evaluation of 
behavior based on the intrinsic motivation or sense of duty and obligation of actors. 
Whether an action is morally desirable or appropriate depends not on the consequences (as 
in Utilitarianism), but on the intrinsic character of an action (which can be determined by 
the Kantian categorical imperative or the golden rule). The right thing to do must be 
internalized by the actors themselves. It can be argued that norm-research and 
constructivism are inspired by the deontological heritage of the enlightenment period, 
which explains the bias.
In this view, global norm diffusion is a development into a better, more civilized 
world and resembles the idea of enlightenment (and of IR idealism). Kant for example 
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argues that humans must be educated (socialized) in order to be able to recognize what 
morally good behavior entails (acting according to the categorical imperative). In his book 
"Perpetual Peace" (1976 [1795]) he argues that if all humans were educated enough, they 
would follow the same normative principles, creating a reasonable and enlightened 
cosmopolitan society, which would ultimately result in peace. Deontological ethics as well 
as norm research tend to see normative principles as universal. Because all humans are 
reasonable beings, they all can discover the same universal truths and act accordingly. The 
process of norm diffusion similarly assumes a teleological norm adaptation (McKeown, 
2009, p. 7) on a cosmopolitan scale (a critical mass of state actors internalized the norm 
and follow their normative imperatives). There is no room for cultural variation and local 
norms (Mackie, 1977) and the local dynamics and domestic processes of norms are black-
boxed (McKeown, 2009, p. 8). 
Critical norm-researchers now argue that this focus on progressivism covers a darker 
and hidden aspect of norms, which is their underlying power dimension (Engelkamp, 
Glaab, & Renner, 2012). Local norms are suppressed and delegitimized by global and 
cosmopolitan norms, which are framed as universal. By trying to educate or socialize local 
actors to follow international norms, power is exercised. Interestingly, the artificial 
distinction between norm-givers (or entrepreneurs) and norm-takers (those who do not 
have internalized the norm) resembles the idea of a classroom where the teacher (norm 
entrepreneur) educates the children, which are seen as a tabula rasa (Bucher, 2014). In 
world politics, cosmopolitan norms are constantly normalized and universalized, which 
reproduces their hegemonic status, as critical theories, postcolonial and feminist studies 
have uncovered (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2013; Engelkamp, Glaab, & Renner, 2013; 
Krook & True, 2012; Epstein, 2014; Epstein, 2008). At the same time, local norms are 
overruled and excluded by international norms, which implies a hidden, undertheorized 
power component. Therefore, the task is to uncover power dynamics of norms and to shift 
the focus beyond the deontological perspective. This includes a critique of classical norm-
diffusion models, which will be explained in the next chapter.
2.1.3 Critique of Diffusion Models
Generally, Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s framework outlines the most relevant elements of 
normative change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). But in recent years, the framework has 
been criticized. The following paragraphs outline theoretical weaknesses of the concept. 
The purpose is to build upon this critique and to develop a more detailed research program.
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First, the deontological aspect of the norm concept must be questioned. Krook and 
True argue that most constructivist research falsely assumes that a norm’s content, its 
essence, is static (Krook & True, 2012, p. 104). Often, diffusion studies assume that static 
norms become transplanted in a different context without alteration. The view that norm-
givers and norm-takers have the same perspective (meaning) of the norm has been 
questioned by Archarya (Acharya, 2004). The same norm might mean different things for 
global and local actors because these are observed from different contexts or viewing 
angles. Krook and True point to the constant reevaluation and discourse about norms and 
their legitimacy (Krook & True, 2012, p. 104). Their normative content is not fixed but in 
constant flux, as post-structuralist scholars would argue. Local contexts matter and global 
norms become transformed through local adaption. This is one of the core insights of IR 
constructivism which is forgotten by mainstream constructivism – all perception is 
influenced by the position from which it happens. Therefore, local contexts matter because 
they shape the to-be-adapted norm. 
Second, norm research in general tends to focus on norms in singular (Bucher, 2014). 
Most papers are about one norm, such as sovereignty (Barkin, 1998), the nuclear weapon 
taboo (Tannenwald, 1999), the anti-whaling norm (Epstein, 2008), or the recent debate 
about whether the responsibility to protect actually is a norm (Fröhlich, 2011). However, 
many studies have problems identifying what the norm actually is, which is due to their 
constant contestation (Wiener, 2007). This indicates that there is not one internal norm-
essence that is accepted by all actors. When looking closer, it often becomes apparent that 
there are different sub-norms at work, or what Bucher calls norm-networks – meaning 
normative ideas and practices that are related to each other (Bucher, 2014). Different 
normative ideas are in contrast to each other and struggle to become dominant. Focusing 
on norm-networks or clusters, of norms that relate to or even reinforce one another is a 
fruitful endeavor that will be used in this thesis.
The third shortcoming in IR scholarship revolves around the question where norms 
come from in the first place (Krook & True, 2012, p. 108). Finnemore & Sikkink’s highly 
influential work on norm dynamics merely touches the issue by pointing to norm-
entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). By pointing to norm-entrepreneurs, the 
question is simply shifted because then we must ask where the norm-entrepreneurs get 
their norms from. Most studies focus on the process of diffusion through norm cascades 
and internalization (for an overview of diffusion studies see Gilardi 2013). The origin of 
norms, often on the domestic level, is under-theorized. Therefore, it is important to 
conceptualize these early factors that influence the development of norms and the first 
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stage of norm emergence. My argument is that in order to understand the development of 
norm-networks, we must take a close look at the core ideas that these norm entrepreneurs 
hold. Research from other disciplines of political science can be helpful here, for example 
the work around ideas (Jachtenfuchs, 1995), policy paradigms (Hall, 1993) or advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier, 2007). Ideas and norms are clearly related. Not just single ideas are 
relevant but coherent sets of interrelated ideas which provide the basis for any social 
action. This is also in line with post-structuralist theorizing about networks of meaning. 
The next main section will do this theorizing (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms and Norm-Change).
Fourth, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) are aware of this and argue that slavery or the 
unequal status of women have been the unquestioned norm in many societies of the past. 
Xenophobia, extreme nationalism, slavery and misogyny were once normal in certain 
societies and are examples of normative systems in the sense that they regulate behavior of 
agents by referring to social standards (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 404). Within the 
context of slavery, it is not appropriate for the slave-identity to rise up against their masters 
(it is not expected). These norms often exercise power over the behavior of actors but they 
have no deontological or normative dimension from our point of perception. But within 
these cultures they were valid. In deontological ethics, slavery as well as mysogyny are 
definitely morally bad. In some normative systems, certain subject categories are 
systematically discriminated while other subjects benefit from this discrimination and try 
to stabilize the status quo. This hidden power dimension of these normative standards is 
forgotten when focusing only on "nice norms". Therefore, it is important to shed light on 
this darker dimension of norms. Post-modernism can help us here. 
Fifth, Finnemore and Sikkink’s diffusion concept is strongly actor-centered, at least 
during the first stages of diffusion. While this focus is plausible during active contestation 
phases and the struggle for normative legitimacy, during norm emergence and 
internalization we must consider structural aspects such as the normative context in which 
norms become embedded or from which they originate. Norms are social facts and they 
can become embedded in institutions and other cultural artifacts. This thesis will argue that 
technology also is a kind of actor, an actant as Latour would call it, that can promote 
norms (Latour, 2005b). In fact, the diffusion of a technology like the Internet also can act 
as a medium for norm-diffusion. My argument is that norms can be transported via 
technology, which is a promising venue for norm-research that has been overlooked. At the 
same time, a technological perspective might be fruitful to explain many other 
shortcomings discussed so far: the early emergence process of norms with the construction 
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of a technical artifact, the diffusion of this very artifact and its possible decay as well as the 
concept of paradigms and the hidden power dynamic of norms.
The sixth and final issue is the measurement of the tipping-point initiating the norm-
cascade, which is mostly used as a heuristic device but seldom measured. I would argue 
that science and technology studies, where the original s-curve model originated from, can 
shed a light on tipping-point dynamics which are embedded in concepts such as path-
dependency and technological diffusion.
After listing all those shortcomings one might get the idea that the norm diffusion 
model is to be dismissed because it is faulty. I would not go that far. The general logic of 
the diffusion model is still valid and it offers all conceptual elements that are worthy 
considering, although some might be expanded. Finnemore and Sikkink’s diffusion model 
is the basis for the framework I will develop in the next chapter.
2.2 Paradigms and Norm-Change
One of the important premises of this work is that human agents act according to ideational 
frameworks, which serve as a roadmap to action. Ideas guide policy decisions, but they 
also guide designs of technical systems such as the Internet. One of the most influential 
concepts for analyzing the change of ideas, practices, norms and even technology is 
Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm change (Kuhn, 1970). This concept is especially 
insightful because it combines several necessary conditions for (normative) change and 
operates on a meso-level (Legro, 2000) between single ideas and broad world-views 
(Goldstein & Keohane, 1993a), which makes it easier to study than ideologies for example.
Paradigms are "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on 
shared by the members of a given community" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). They define what the 
world is for actors and are "a way of seeing the world" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175) by prescribing 
ontological and epistemological assumptions like "what sorts of entities the universe does 
contain [or not]." (Kuhn, 1970, p. 7). This corresponds with the constructivist notion that 
the world is not directly accessible but mediated by our knowledge and the point of 
observation (Adler, 2013, p. 115). Thus, the same thing can be interpreted completely 
differently by competing paradigms. They also define the foci for research. Science is a 
practice of problem-solving and paradigms define legitimate problems, methods (practices) 
including techniques and technologies for doing so. With this practice, paradigms 
automatically create blind spots – they ignore or do not recognize things that are not in 
alignment with the assumptions of the paradigm. By adding the concept of cognitive 
dissonance, paradigms lead to the effect that paradigm-contradicting evidence is ignored. 
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Paradigms clearly include norms, for example standards of appropriate behavior in terms 
of problem-solving (for example using the scientific method and not biblical 
hermeneutics). Rules derive from paradigms, as Kuhn says (Kuhn, 1970, p. 43) and these 
often are taken for granted (called normal science). As such, paradigms not just have an 
ideational component, but also a social one – actors who follow a paradigm have a 
commitment to rules and standards of scientific practice (Kuhn, 1970, p. 11). They are 
constitutive for science, because: 
"Paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the 
directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires 
theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an extricable mixture. 
Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually shifts in the criteria 
determining the legitimacy both of problems and proposed solutions" (Kuhn, 1970, 
p. 109).
Generations of scientists are educated and socialized with a distinct paradigm. Paradigms 
are carried by textbooks, journal articles and also by material culture with the "the 
construction of elaborate equipment, the development of an esoteric vocabulary and skills" 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 164) and costly research institutes. This creates a professionalization 
among practitioners. Paradigms are stronger if they are shared by scientific authorities, 
which often are not questioned by younger scientists. All these factors make paradigms, 
once established, difficult to change. More so, the paradigm is given to the next generation 
of paradigm holders through institutionalized educational channels, such as university 
study programs or career tracks.
Kuhn developed the paradigm concept with science in mind, which definitely is a 
unique cultural context. But the concept has also been adopted for other disciplines. The 
difference to the political sphere is that in the latter the notion of power is intertwined with 
the change of paradigms and that formal institutions of the polity (i.e. like elections in the 
political system) have an influence on the evolution of paradigm. In contrast to scientific 
paradigms, social ones need not be based on any criteria of truth and normally there are no 
mechanisms in place to check truthfulness. The consequence of this missing safeguard is 
that the process of paradigm change works differently (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining 
Change). In science, old paradigms become abandoned because their problem-solving 
capability diminishes and they become incommensurable with newer paradigms. In the 
social world, paradigms can coexist with each other, even though they might be 
incommensurable toward each other (Meyers, 1990). Because of the missing safeguard, 
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there is no way of saying which paradigm is "better" or more truthful. Instead, social 
dynamics determine the stability and legitimacy of paradigms. 
Peter Hall (Hall, 1993) was one of the first who translated Kuhn’s argument into 
political science in order to grasp complex sets of political ideas and norms. Hall argues 
that policies are the product of a system of descriptive ideas and normative standards. He 
calls these systems policy paradigms, which specify "not only the goals and instruments of 
policies, but also the very nature of problems that are meant to be addressed" (Hall, 1993, 
p. 279). Thus, policy paradigms are an interrelated set or cluster of ideas, standards of 
appropriate behavior and policies. Policy paradigms determine social behavior in the field 
of politics by defining standards of appropriate problem-solving, which is a clear 
connection to norm research. The "definition of a problem is always a political act" 
(Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 652) because it defines how actors relate to an issue. It 
influences if and how individuals pay attention to issues and obviously affects solution 
strategies. It makes a difference if something is defined as a "banking crisis" or "debt 
crisis" because it shifts responsibilities. Hall conceptualizes three elements of problem 
solving: first, the overarching goals that guide policy in a field, second the techniques or 
policy instruments used to achieve the goals and finally, the concrete settings or 
adjustments of the policy instruments in a given field (Hall, 1993, p. 278). A goal could be 
to increase social equality, a policy-instrument could be taxes and the settings the level of 
the tax. In sum, the paradigm acts as a cognitive filter that determines the goal of action 
and the appropriate means and ends.
Paul Sabatier builds on the same intellectual sources with his advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF). It is useful because it provides causal arguments about how the policy 
process and paradigm competition work and is not just focused on ideational elements 
internal to paradigms (as Hall for example). Both Hall’s and Sabatier’s frameworks are 
mostly concerned with inner-state dynamics and thus are useful for theorizing norm 
emergence on a domestic level. Policy belief systems or paradigms have three elements 
that build upon each other.
The deep core includes general normative, epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. It tells actors what the world is, how knowledge can be gathered. It represents 
the broad roadmap for action. Known dichotomies such as liberal versus conservative, 
right vs. left or security vs. liberty/privacy operate on this level. Examples are 
anthropological arguments such as the evil nature of man or even technological beliefs 
such as "guns don’t kill, people do", which will be further elaborated on in a following 
chapter (see chap. 2.3.1 Theorizing Technology: Traditional Approaches). These deep core 
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beliefs are socialized and hard to change. Building on top of these are policy core beliefs, 
which are the application of deep core beliefs in a policy (sub)-system. Policy core beliefs 
often "include projections of an image how policy or a policy subsystem "ought to be" 
(Sabatier, 2007, pp. 194-196). In other words, they include norms that shape the design of 
certain policy instruments. Norms shape policy problem definitions and goals, as well as 
the appropriate means-end relation to reach those (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 
1996).
 Secondary beliefs include applications of deeper beliefs, such as budgetary 
allocations or public participation guidelines in specific policy fields. They often include 
rational elements and are easier to change than the other two categories. Generally, 
alterations of secondary beliefs result from learning, new experience and new information. 
Deeper beliefs are harder to change and require external or internal perturbation such as 
shocks, which will be discussed in a later chapter (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change).
Figure 1. ACF Policy Beliefs, Source: (Sabatier, 1998, p. 112)
 The ACF assumes that a variety of policy actors (not just politicians but also 
journalists, military, scientists and civil actors) try to "translate components of their belief 
system into actual policy before opponents do the same" (Sabatier, 2007, p. 197). Different 
actors form advocacy groups around shared beliefs, which are in direct competition to 
promote their particular belief systems. The more (influential) actors adhere to a belief 
system, the better its chances to dominate. They create organizations and strategies to 
influence not just the political process but social discourse in general. The framework is 
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intentionally open to include a wide variety of actors in different structural positions. 
Advocacy coalitions are defined as:
"People from a variety of positions (e.g. elected and agency officials, interest group 
leaders, researcher) who share a particular belief system – that is a set of basic 
values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions– and who show a nontrivial 
degree of coordinated activity over time" (Sabatier, 1998, p. 139).
In this thesis, I use the term policy-entrepreneur or advocate instead of the term norm-
entrepreneur that is often used in IR because it includes advocacy for ideas, norms and 
policies as well.8 The key is that actors desire "to significantly change current ways of 
doing things in their area of interest" (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 650), which means 
changing the status quo and changing the current orthodoxy or policy paradigm. Advocates 
try to translate their paradigm not just into the public discourse but also into the political 
process, also called politicization, which means that an issue becomes an issue of politics 
(Buzan et al. 1997, 23). I use this wider concept because it goes beyond traditional norm 
research. It opens the norm and policy diffusion process to all kinds of policy participants 
(McKeown, 2009, pp. 8-9) like interest groups, political parties, journalists, business, 
military, scientists and epistemic communities, individuals and many more (Sabatier, 2007, 
p. 192). What unites them is the advocacy for a certain paradigm and its norms (which is 
the glue that holds coalitions together). To increase their strength, policy entrepreneurs 
tend to seek allies who hold similar policy core beliefs, because strength in numbers allows 
for better expertise and more efficient influence. Within a policy subfield, a variety of 
competing advocacy coalitions can be expected to try to promote their paradigm as the 
dominant one. 
Modern versions of the ACF include elements of the so-called political opportunity 
structure research, which argues that actors have different resources and access to the 
political process. For example, the openness of a political (sub)-system matters. A policy 
subsystem "is composed of participants who regularly seek to influence policy within the 
subsystem" (Sabatier, 2007, p. 192). Subsystems are a result of functional differentiation 
and specialization of policy actors. The ACF differentiates nascent and mature policy 
subsystems. Mature subsystems include participants "who regard themselves as a 
semiautonomous community who share an expertise in a policy domain and who have 
sought to influence in that domain for an extended period" (Sabatier, 2007, p. 192). 
Foreign or national security policy can be assumed to be a mature subsystem which 
8 An alternative term could be "epistemic community", but since I want to include not just networks of actors 
with specialized knowledge, I use the term policy advocate or entrepreneur (Haas, 1992).
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includes a broad range of already established actors like think tanks, military officials and 
diplomats. It can be assumed that it has a high degree of density and that it is hard for 
outsiders to get inside, which is easier in nascent subsystems. These "are nascent because 
of the instability of the broader political system and the lack of trained personnel" 
(Sabatier, 2007, p. 192). Nascent subsystems often do not have established routines and 
standards of appropriate behavior, which means they can be a fertile ground to study the 
emergence of new norms and paradigms. Internet policy, a theme of this thesis, is a 
particularly young subfield and thus a perfect case for studying norm emergence and 
paradigm change (Hösl, 2016). In general, it can be said that actors with greater proximity 
to the decision-making process have higher chances to embed their belief systems into 
policy.
If this statement is true, it allows to extract the normative components of policy bills 
as well as the underlying policy paradigm through the analysis of discourse surrounding 
their introduction. The ACF will be used in the empirical section as a blueprint to analyze 
Internet-related paradigms and policies that derive from these. The following figure 
summarizes the findings of this chapter and the central elements of a paradigm:
Figure 2. Policy paradigms embedding ideas in policy (own diagram)
Paradigms consist of deeply embedded ideational components such as ideas, beliefs and 
fundamental norms.9 This ideational background guides the behavior of the carriers of this 
paradigm, called advocacy coalitions. These coalitions become policy-entrepreneurs by 
trying to translate their ideas into the political process, called politicization. To do so, they 
need to adapt their ideational components to the social reality by defining what counts as a 
9 From now on, different paradigms will be represented by different colors. One paradigm will be orange, 
another blue. This will be consistent throughout the thesis.
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problem (and what not). This is a selection process and includes blind spots because not all 
problems are seen as such and not all are being resolved. The problem definition process 
sets goals to be achieved, as well as instruments such as policies and strategies/doctrines to 
achieve the goals. Advocacy coalitions try to shape the policy process and public discourse 
by creating policies and technologies, which reflect the paradigmatic elements.
This chapter argued that norms and policy often are interconnected and exist within 
one broader framework of paradigms, which can be measured empirically with the help of 
the advocacy coalition framework. Norms derive from ideas, which both are embedded in 
policy paradigms consisting of different elements (deep core, core beliefs, secondary 
aspects). Policy paradigms are the carrier medium for norms that influence the goal 
construction and influence how actual policy bills will be designed. A conservative policy 
paradigm will include different interpretations of social reality and different problem 
definitions than social democratic or liberal paradigms. Paradigms can be opposite ways of 
seeing the world, operating with completely different ground assumptions, for example 
about the nature of mankind or the nature of knowledge. To shed more light on these 
differences, I will make a short detour to introduce discourse theory.
2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms
This chapter introduces some epistemological premises that are the foundation for the 
constructivist perspective in this thesis and that also represent the foundation for the logic 
of paradigms. I argue that (policy-) paradigms are sets of interrelated ideas (such as 
problem definitions, goals), norms (appropriate ways of problem solving and general 
behavior) and policies that stand in competition with other paradigms. Paradigms are 
transported by advocates and are written down on carrier-mediums in form of texts, 
doctrines, policy documents and more. Discourse theory allows us to understand this text 
and the competitive dynamic between paradigms. It offers some important insights that are 
useful for norm-research, as was already indicated in a previous chapter (see chap. 2.1.2 
Critique of Deontological Norms). Furthermore, it provides some theoretical insights 
regarding the question of power and how paradigms can become dominant. Finally, 
discourse theory and the epistemological premises that are outlined in this chapter provide 
a coherent bridge between political science and Science and Technology Studies, which 
will play an important role in a following chapter (see chap. 2.3 Technological and 
Normative Change).
According to Adler, the primary element of (any) constructivist perspective is a 
metaphysical stance about reality, meaning that knowledge of reality is always mediated 
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through filters such as the context, socialization and language (Adler, 2013, p. 114). This 
means that all observation is made from a non-neutral position and already theory-laden. 
This is very much in line with what I said about paradigms. Because language is our main 
anchor to the world, the social reality can be conceived as a "text" that can be "read" 
(interpreted) by actors. Ludwig Wittgenstein rejected the idea that texts have one fixed 
(objective) meaning embedded in them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 96). Whether Harry 
Potter is interpreted as an imaginative child’s novel or a representation of black magic and 
heresy depends heavily on the social background and cognitive paradigms of the reader. 
This means that it is hard, if not impossible, to reach any objective definition.10 Freedom, 
ideology, democracy, power and other social concepts will always mean different things to 
different actors, depending on their cognitive paradigms, their socialization, history and the 
background discourse.
This focus on language and ideational aspects (ideas, norms) leads to the common 
critique of constructivism that it allegedly denies the independent existence of the material 
or objective world "out there" (Torfing, 1999, p. 45). While constructivists have this 
tendency, this argument confuses the being (esse) of an object, which is historically 
changing and the entity, which is not (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 84-85). This resembles 
Aristoteles useful distinction between matter, meaning the material object, and its form. 
Matter is materially given. A stone is a stone and, depending on its mineral classification, 
its material components stay the same entity, independent of observation. However, the 
form or the being (we could also say identity) of the stone changes according to our 
interpretations and in dependence of social context (Cohen, 2016). The same stone can 
mean an endless array of things for us. It can be a weapon, a symbol for luck or value. In 
principle, it can get any conceivable meaning. The important constructivist insight is that 
the states of being (form, meaning) do not necessarily follow from the mere existence of 
the entity (material object or matter). Or in other words: "matter does not carry the means 
of its own representation" (Torfing, 2005, p. 18). Constructivism questions the assertion 
that the form/being/meaning shows us the essence of an object (Torfing, 1999, p. 46). 
Rather, social forms are what makes matter intelligible. Hence, a piece of land (or even 
technology) can be differently represented as a cultural site, a habitat, fertile farm land and 
so forth and this construction of the land also constructs different subject positions (land 
owners, urban developers etc.) and their paradigms (Torfing, 2005, p. 18). This element of 
10 I do not follow all the implications of strong interpretivism or post-structuralism and thus adopt a moderate 
constructivist position throughout this thesis. Moderate versions of constructivism argue that structures are 
important and that not everything is a matter of discourse. A strong post-structuralist program would also be 
partly incompatible with the version of process-tracing this thesis uses as a method (Bennett & Checkel, 
2014, p. 15).
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construction within the term constructivism means the intelligible construction of social 
forms through discourses. What constructivism constructs is neither matter nor the material 
object, but the form, the being of the very object.
This construction of meaning (form) happens within discourse, which is basically a 
meaning-formation. Discourse can be defined as a "differential ensemble of signifying 
sequences in which meaning is constantly negotiated" (Torfing, 1999, p. 85). The premise 
is that the meaning of words/concepts does not lie within them, but is externally attached 
with a process of signification: establishing a link between signified and signifier.11 This 
process is arbitrary and there is no logical bond between the two. Rather, it depends more 
or less on historical context, social convention or habitualization. Thus, meaning is never 
stable. The same word, during the course of history, can get vastly different meanings, 
depending on its context. The central insight for this thesis is that:
 "Meaning of individual signs is determined by their relation to other signs: a sign 
gains its specific value from being different from other signs. The word 'dog’ is 
different from the words 'cat’ and 'mouse’ and 'dig’ and 'dot’. The word 'dog’ is 
thus part of a network or structure of other words from which it differs; and it is 
precisely from everything that it is not that the word 'dog’ gets its meaning" 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 10).
Discourse theory implies a relational understanding of meaning. One meaning assigned 
to an object always stands in relation to other alternative interpretations from competing 
idea networks or paradigms (Weber, 2013, p. 46). If these relational arrangements change, 
the meaning of a concept changes. The premise of discourse theory is that the meaning 
construction via signification is the same for individual words, but also for social concepts 
such as norms, ideas, paradigms, but even for technology (which will be explained in a 
following chapter 2.3.4 The Social Construction of Technology and its Critique). Thus, 
discourse theory provides a useful bridge between the theoretical camps. Take for example 
this quote:
"The same process - capitalist production and exchange - can be expressed within a 
different ideological framework, by the use of different 'systems of representation’. 
There is the discourse of 'the market’, the discourse of 'production’, the discourse 
11 The concept has origins in linguistics. The smallest element in language is the sign, which is a two-sided 
entity. Signs combine a signifier or form like a sound-image (a vocalized word) with a concept or content 
(the signified) (De Saussure, 1981, pp. 65-57). The gap between being (form) and entity (matter) can be 
traced back to this Saussurean distinction because language is always form, and never substance/essence (De 
Saussure, 1981, p. 113). The meaning of words does not lie within them (there is no essence), but is 
externally attached with a process of signification: establishing a link between signified and signifier. This 
process is arbitrary and there is no logical bond between the two, rather it depends on historical context, 
social convention or habitualization.
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of 'the circuits’: each produces a different definition of the system. Each also 
locates us differently - as worker, capitalist, wage worker, wage slave, producer, 
consumer, etc […] All these inscriptions have effects which are real. They make a 
material difference, since how we act in certain situations depends on what our 
definitions of the situation are" (Hall, 1996, p. 39).
The following graphic visualizes the statement from the above quote. It shows how two 
competing paradigms (one we can call Marxism in blue, and the other Neo-liberalism in 
orange), engage in signification (fixation of meaning) of the same concept called 
"capitalism".
Figure 3. Meaning network (own diagram)
From the neo-liberal point of view, the concept capitalism is linked to a set of signifiers 
such as "free market", "innovation" and "wealth" whereas the very same concept 
"capitalism" within the Marxist paradigm is differentiated (arrows) against a set of other 
signifiers (like "oligopoly", "exploitation of working class" etc.). The difference in linkage 
ultimately produces a completely different meaning of capitalism for the actors that adhere 
to the paradigm. For one group, it is a positive term, for the other the enemy. Thus, 
meaning is relational. What a term means for a paradigm depends on the sum of signifiers 
associated with it. 
The difference in meaning-relations is the reason why Kuhn argues that old and new 
paradigms are incommensurable. They may speak about the same things, but have 
different meanings of these things (Kuhn, 1970, p. 184). These signifiers can include both 
ideas and norms and thus allow for the conceptualization of paradigms as interrelated 
norm- and idea-networks (see chap. 2.1.3 Critique of Diffusion Models). In computer 
science these are called semantic networks. I will utilize the term "norm-cluster" or "norm-
network" of similar or supporting norms on one side, being differentiated against opposing 
norms on the other side. For example, in a liberal paradigm the "norms of noninterference 
to the market" and "norms of private property" stand in close proximity to each other, but 
they stand in opposition/difference to competing norms (such as "collective ownership of 
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private property"). For this thesis, it means that advocacy coalitions with different 
paradigms compete with each other and engage in signification in order to fix meaning (the 
form) of social entities (actors, norms, ideas) or material objects (like technology). 
Discourses try to stabilize what a certain term or concept (for example digitalization) 
means for a society and thus how we should act. This means that they have concrete 
material effects.
But there is another reason why discourse theory is useful for this thesis and this has 
to do with the competition of two or more paradigms. Another assumption of discourse 
theory is that actor coalitions are embedded in a discursive struggle to make their particular 
paradigm dominant. Discourse theory argues that at the core of politics are "hegemonic 
struggles that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership [of a paradigm] 
through the articulation of meaning and identity" (Torfing, 2005, p. 15). Particular 
meanings can become the dominant reference point for social orientation and action and 
therefore are not questioned anymore. If the majority adopts one frame of reference, for 
example understanding capitalism in terms of free-market and privatization etc., this 
preferred reading is temporally fixed. Closure is defined as a "temporary halt in the 
fluctuations of meanings" (Rear, 2013, p. 7). Closure means that discourses and the 
signifying practices come to a halt and that one meaning-network becomes unquestioned, 
common-sense knowledge that requires no further justification. In other words, one 
particular meaning becomes taken for granted or internalized, which is pretty similar to the 
assumptions of the norm-life cycle presented earlier (see chap. 2.1.1 Norm Diffusion and 
Norm Entrepreneurs)
 Another way to put this is the concept of hegemony, a term coined by Antonio 
Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971) which means that there is a "social consensus achieved without 
recourse to violence or coercion, and, like discursive closure, it is achieved through 
articulation" (Rear, 2013, p. 7). Hegemony does not mean leadership or authority (as in IR 
realism), but in discourse theory, hegemony is "the expansion of a discourse, or set of 
discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action […]." (Torfing, 1999, 
p. 101). The idea is that most participants in discourse adopt the same frame of meaning. In 
other words, advocacy coalitions want to expand their particular interpretation of the world 
or things (their problem definitions, their solution strategies) as the dominant frame that is 
adopted by a wider society. This fixation is an exercise of power, because it means 
exclusion of other meanings which become not realized. As such, a discourse is a 
reduction of possibilities. Translating this into power theories – a discourse is a macro 
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form of agenda setting power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). One particular set of meanings is 
represented as universal pattern of recognition within society (Clegg, 1989, pp. 177-179).
This can be facilitated by hegemonic practices, discursive strategies that aim to 
reframe a particular belief set (or paradigm of one advocacy coalition) as universal (a 
guiding principle for everyone). These hegemonic statements often claim that there is a 
simple essence of things like: "the basic mechanism of society is supply and demand" or 
"everything that happens is God’s will", etc.. They work through the backgrounding of the 
contingent nature of social reality: any meaning can be different or contingent during all 
times. No meaning is forever stable because there always are alternatives. Some sets of 
meanings "appear so natural that members of a society fail to see that they are the result of 
political hegemonic practices" (Rear, 2013, p. 8). Even terms like "god" change their 
meaning. For example, understanding "god" in terms of Christian signifiers is a widely 
accepted, taken-for-granted knowledge in Western societies whereas other significations of 
god like "Zeus", "Odin" or "Allah" are mostly excluded from public discourse (Hitchens, 
2009, p. chap. 18). One single perspective is naturalized and objectified while the others 
are marginalized and silenced. Hegemonic statements thus often work with naturalizations: 
a process or a structure is depicted as a natural force that cannot be altered by human 
agency. These meanings appear as if they are objective. Objectivity is a term for things that 
appear as given and unchangeable. 
Objectification is a process by which meanings "come to confront [the actor] as a 
facility outside of himself" (Scott, 2008, p. 125). They have become embedded in 
discourse, practice, institutions and therefore seem to be independent of social actors. 
Attached meanings can survive without actors of a coalition reinforcing it. The meaning 
stands on its own and becomes a social fact in Durkheim’s terms (Hjern, 1984). Hegemony 
in this sense is a consensus, not necessarily based on coercion or violence, but rather at the 
level of "common sense" where the origin of a particular meaning and its intrinsic 
contingency is forgotten. This mean when a debate reaches closure, there is no more 
contestation, no more discourse. Philips and Jørgensen exemplify this phenomenon 
analyzing the social construction of childhood. Western societies perceive the concept of 
"childhood" as if it has certain essential characteristics and social norms ("children should 
learn", "live in a child-friendly environment" and "should have fun and eat candy" etc.). 
This is of course a contingent meaning because in both the agricultural and industrial 
revolution, children were treated as small adults who had to work and suffer like their adult 
counterparts (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 35). That children should not work is a norm 
of the 20th century. 
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The next chapter introduces a final set of theoretical arguments that can be utilized to 
analyze the process of meaning construction of paradigms.
2.2.2 Framing
This chapter introduces a useful heuristic to assess the meaning produced by paradigms 
that is a bit more concrete than discourse theory and thus better suited for empirical 
analysis. Theoretically, this chapter could have been included with the last one, since it 
focuses on the construction of meaning. But since the last chapter was rather long and 
technical, I chose to present the framing approach in a separate chapter.
Of course, norm researchers recognize that norm-entrepreneurs or advocates are 
"meaning managers" and that they "attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm 
leaders) to embrace new norms" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). Advocates want to 
convince a political audience to adopt an issue as relevant and to take action. Therefore, 
they have to translate an issue into an agenda item to gain support, first from their 
advocacy peer group and then later to gain public support for their cause. The overall aim 
is to translate a paradigmatic core policy belief (ACF) or a norm into actual policy:
"The process of translation is directly equivalent to the process of problem 
definition, whereby objective social, economic, and environmental conditions are 
portrayed in ways that increase the likelihood that they will receive the attention 
desired of decision makers" (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 657).
As was shown before (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms and Norm-Change), the problem 
definition is what connects actors, paradigms, norms and policies with each other. 
Therefore, it plays a crucial role in any framing attempt: "How problems get defined – or 
what attributes are made salient in policy discussions – can determine what individuals and 
groups will pay attention to them" (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 652). A problem 
definition is a special type of articulation that fixes meaning. The way something is defined 
has fundamental impact on the question how it is solved – if something is defined as a 
crisis, it indicates urgency and calls for immediate responses rather than the development 
of more sustainable, long term solutions (Conrad, 2004, p. 315). Similarly, if something is 
declared as a war (like "war on drugs"), warlike responses are framed as appropriate. There 
are plenty different plot devices that can be used to signify certain meanings.
Frame analysis is centered on the idea that language is used for demarcating and 
punctuating important aspects of reality by making events and circumstances intelligible 
(Poletta & Kai Ho, 2008). Frame analysis is the methodological deconstruction of 
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signifying practices and hegemonic articulation and thus a useful subset for discourse 
theory (Lindekilde, 2014). The idea is to analyze:
"How ideas, culture and ideology are used, interpreted and spliced together with 
certain situations or empirical phenomena in order to construct particular ideative 
patterns through which the world is understood, and which can be used to mobilize 
support of particular political goals" (Donati, 1992, p. 137).
That is why framing is particularly useful for this analysis, because it helps to understand 
the very process of translating a perceived problem into a general issue that aims at 
normative change. 
Goffman (Goffman, 1974) coined the term frame as "schemata of interpretation that 
enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label the world out there but in ways 
that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constitutions, to garner bystander 
support and to demobilize antagonists" (Benford & Snow, 1988, p. 198). Their function is 
to focus attention and define what is "in frame" and "out of frame" and therefore requires 
special attention. The visual notion of perspective is relevant to understand the process 
because frames represent a new angle of vision or vantage point (Benford & Snow, 2000, 
p. 623). They are strategically used by policy entrepreneurs to highlight certain elements 
and therefore to underscore a meaning, for example from "routine grievances or 
misfortunes to injustice and the need for action" (Snow 2004 quoted inLindekilde, 2014, p. 
7). Frames are "persuasive devices used to fix meanings, organize experience, alert others 
that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to 
ongoing problems" (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 25), which closely connects them to 
the ideational aspects of policy as outlined in the previous chapters. 
The core framing tasks are diagnostic-, prognostic- and motivational-framing, 
whereas the first two are related to consensus mobilization (creating a shared picture) and 
the latter aims at action.
Diagnostic framing refers to problem identification (identifying the cause of misery) 
and attribution of blame. The prime example is the so-called injustice frame, where 
grievances (bad working conditions for example) are reframed as a systematic failure 
caused by someone and not just mere accidents or random events: "since social movements 
seek to remedy or alter some problematic situation or issue, it follows that directed action 
is contingent on identification of the source(s) of causality, blame and/or culpable agents" 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). By signifying some event or situation as "unjust", a 
certain normative position is taken which creates an imperative for action. Justice is a 
social category, not a natural one and justice must be provided, which aims at agency and 
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responsibility. Therefore, the act of framing is an articulation which connects a responsible 
cause with an event and thereby creates a certain meaning (that "x is unjust").
This is related to prognostic framing, which "involves the articulation of a proposed 
solution, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan" (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, p. 616). The proposed solution is directly shaped by the identified problem. 
It constrains the range of possible (appropriate) solutions to tackle the problem and thereby 
includes a certain path dependency – when something is identified as unjust (compared to 
unnatural or inefficient), the solution of the problem will have something to do with the 
category of justice. Frames become relevant for social research when their targets 
(policymakers) accept a frame’s definition of the problem and the solution (Poletta & Kai 
Ho, 2008). When policymakers adopt solutions advocated by advocacy groups it means 
that the issue is acknowledged and their vantage point is taken for tackling a problem.
Lastly, motivational framing resembles the call to arms or a rationale for engaging in 
collective action like forming an advocacy coalition or supporting a social movement. 
Ideally, motivational frames offer some legitimacy and provide reasons for taking action. 
Motivational frames are especially relevant for gaining support and forming advocacy 
networks to gain strength in numbers. Policy entrepreneurs often operate in networks that 
allow the pooling and sharing of resources needed to lobby for new policies. It is of course 
not just the appeal of the frame alone that determines whether it will result in actual policy. 
Rather, the power structure and the connections to government officials matter (Mintrom 
& Norman, 2009, p. 653). The general rule of thumb is, the more support for an issue 
exists, the higher the chances for policy change become. Similarly, the ACF argues that 
networks help participants to seek allies who hold similar core beliefs (Sabatier, 2007, p. 
197) and framing is the mechanism to realize this. The combination of diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational framing can influence both the establishment of core policy 
beliefs within actors for the first time, or the activation of those core beliefs that lead to 
entrepreneurship or support. Issues can be framed in a way that they activate support 
among a target audience that already holds similar core policy beliefs but did not yet 
realize it. Therefore, framing is a necessary part in the formation of advocacy groups in the 
first place. 
Some frames are more powerful than others. A master frame is wide in scope, which 
means it has a high degree of inclusivity. According to Watson (Watson, 2011), master 
frames operate according to a certain grammar – they lift aspects into a new (legal) 
context, into new operational (policy-) fields or subsystems. Watson argues that security is 
a master frame, which is based on the framework of securitization (Buzan et al., 1997). 
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Security speech acts aim at shifting responsibility for problem-solving in policy fields to 
security actors (military, police). In other words, they represent turf-battles or disputes 
between (governmental) organizations about responsibilities and resources in policy fields. 
This is especially relevant for this project, which wants to analyze policy change regarding 
the Internet. The Internet was first framed as a matter of telecommunication and computer 
security and then later became a matter of national security, which marks a decisive shift in 
the operational field. Master frames often correlate with the hegemony of policy 
paradigms. Securitization scholars have repeatedly shown the reference to "security" is a 
common feature of political discourse, because redefines what counts as authoritative 
knowledge and who is in a position to speak. Dunn-Cavelty develops the notion of threat 
frames "whereby particular agents develop specific interpretative schemata about what 
counts as threat or risk, how to respond to this threat and who is responsible for it" (Dunn 
Cavelty, 2007, p. 30). Security frames in this sense work as marginalization devices which 
exclude civil actors from the discourse while promoting security actors. They also create a 
logic of exceptionalism and state of emergency (Watson, 2011, p. 289). Frames as 
exclusion mechanisms point to the fact that not every speaker has authority to claim 
something and that not all societal actors can influence policy changes equally.
This final section discusses the influence of frames and what characteristics they 
should have in order to become dominant. Which frame becomes the dominant one is a 
question of a frame’s credibility and its salience within the target community. Credibility is 
a function of consistency with a paradigm’s ideas and norms. A frame should be congruent 
with the ideas of a paradigm and should not include logical contradictions (internal 
validity). It also must match reality to some degree (external validity). Benford and Snow 
argue that a frame must not necessarily be true, rather must be readable as real (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 620). External credibility is also a function of the speaker who must 
possess a certain authority to speak on behalf of the issue. This is where status and prestige 
matter. Whether a frame is accepted by a target population is function of centrality, 
commensurability and narrative fidelity. Centrality indicates a hierarchy of beliefs and 
values (as mentioned before with core policy beliefs). The more a frame is in line with core 
policy beliefs, the higher the chances that it will be accepted. For that it must be 
commensurable, meaning that a frame must be congruent with a person’s horizon and 
cultural understanding. If a frame is to abstract, it might not get salience. Hansen and 
Nissenbaum for example argue that the discourse on data privacy and data security is a 
highly technical issue which is really abstract therefore quite incommensurable which 
explains the failure of digital activists to mobilize large numbers of support (Hansen & 
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Nissenbaum, 2009). Lastly, narrative fidelity often is important. If frames resonate with 
cultural narratives (for example the idea of the American frontier or the American dream), 
chances of success increase.
For my analysis, the focus on rhetorical framing is relevant because frames are the 
visible end-points of policy paradigms. Because they rely on language and images, frames 
can be perceived as the materialized condensate of normative beliefs which underlie every 
policy paradigm. The underlying assumption is that there is a direct connection between 
the components of a policy paradigm (core policy, principled beliefs, causal beliefs) and 
framing (diagnosis, prognosis, motivation). In sum, the main function of discourses and 
framing attempts is change. Discourses and frames attempt not only to change the meaning 
of a social situation or a technical artifact, they also aim at a change of norms. How change 
works and what conditions must be met for change is the topic of the next chapter.
2.2.3 Degrees of Change
Now that it is clear what paradigms are and by what actors they are carried, we need to 
analyze the notion of change. How do paradigms change internally, how do new ideas and 
norms develop that in turn might influence policies? This chapter also addresses external 
change: how can paradigms get replaced by others?
Peter Hall theorized three orders of policy paradigm change. The basic mechanism is 
what he calls social learning: the adjustment of "goals or techniques of policy in response 
to past experience and new information" (Hall, 1993, pp. 278-279). Actors are in 
continuous dialogue with their environment and are exposed to new phenomena. New 
problem recognitions might arise that create urgency and a need for adaptation, for 
example when a new technology is invented. First order policy change is based on 
alteration of the levels or settings of basic policy instruments, whereas the overall goal of a 
policy and the instruments themselves stay the same. This resembles the normal mode of 
politics where policy instruments (for example the rate of the income tax or the degree of 
child benefits) are slightly adjusted in the light of new situations (for example to 
compensate inflation). This is also called incremental change and is rather the norm than 
the exception (Eckstein, 1988). Second order policy change goes deeper. The hierarchy of 
goals stays the same, whereas the policy instruments to achieve these goals are changed. 
This depends on the perception of dysfunctionalities or anomalies. Hall shows in his 
famous study how Britain adopted a new financial policy of monetary control in 1971, 
where the neoliberal paradigm of Thatcherism replaced the social-democratic paradigm of 
Keynesianism (Hall, 1993, p. 281). The more severe the impact of an external event is 
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perceived, the more likely becomes an overall policy change. Finally, third order change 
alters the goals of a policy and with them the instruments and their settings. It happens 
mainly within a paradigm. The result could be a new goal and instrument adjustment of a 
policy field. Most likely, the underlying problem definitions also change. As a result, the 
content of a paradigm changes. But this change does not necessarily lead to one paradigm 
replacing another one as dominant. The hegemonic paradigm can stay hegemonic if it 
manages to implement the newly reconfigured meaning in the overall discourse, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change).
In contrast to the previous degrees of change, an external dimension of policy change 
is regime change. Within political science, the most obvious way how policies and their 
underlying paradigms change is when a new government comes into office, especially 
from another political party. New officials often adhere to alternate deep core policy 
beliefs and thus are likely to adopt new legislation. Of course, this is dependent on the type 
of political system, which serves as an intervening variable. A change in the dominant 
ideas of political actors creates new policies and norms. Change in this regard is not just 
social learning (as Peter Hall would argue), but also a matter of power, because policy 
belief systems are tied to advocacy groups. These are transporting this belief system and 
defend it in political discourse within a policy field. When a new party gains power it has 
greater possibilities to communicate its belief system to a wider audience. 
Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework there are several intervening variables that 
shape policy outcomes. Stable factors like basic attributes or the problem (for example 
verification issues for cyber-weapons which are a result of the technology itself), the 
distribution of natural resources, fundamental sociocultural values and the the basic 
constitutional structure (Sabatier, 1998, p. 102). Norm research also argues that in more 
static political systems, or even in autocracies where there is almost no influence from the 
civil society, policy change and norm diffusion depends on the social learning of political 
decision-makers themselves (top-down diffusion) (Checkel, 1999, p. 90). Similarly, Cortell 
and Davies argue that the adoption of a norm is influenced by the organization of decision-
making authority (central vs. decentral), the state-societal relations (close vs. distant) 
(Cortell & Davis, 1996, p. 453). More dynamic factors are changes in socioeconomic 
conditions (inflation for example), changes in governing coalitions and spill-over from 
other policy subsystems (Sabatier, 2007, p. 193). Sabatier argues that stable factors rarely 
change in decades and thus are of little importance for policy change in contrast to 
dynamic factors, which are a necessary condition for change (Sabatier, 1988, p. 102). 
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The most drastic version of change is a revolution or a paradigm change as described 
by Kuhn. Paradigm change is a social process that has a revolutionary character – one 
dominant paradigm gets replaced by another. Scientific revolutions: 
"necessitated the community’s rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in 
favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the 
problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the 
profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a 
legitimate problem-solution" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 6).
Scientific revolutions are not just about the change of ideas but also of scientific 
practices and norms. Such radical paradigm shifts produce a Gestalt-switch (a major 
change in meaning or how things are perceived) and with it a normative change (how we 
should act based on this new knowledge). These revolutions lead to the dismantling of old 
paradigms and their norms and the reconstruction of a new paradigm from the scratch.
 So how do these revolutions work? It starts "with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with 
the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that 
govern normal science" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 52). Anomalies basically are puzzles and 
problems that cannot be solved with current instruments or are inconceivable by the 
dominant paradigm. Some anomalies are so disruptive for a paradigm that they lead 
scientists to question their own practices and methodologies. Over time, core assumptions 
of the dominant paradigm become questioned – an anomaly turns into a crisis for the 
paradigm. A crisis is not just destructive, but also the necessity for novel theories because 
scientists begin to follow new tracks of research besides already established ones. During 
these crises we can witness a turn to epistemology and philosophical or metaphysical 
inquiry about the nature of things (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 73-88). This implies that there is a 
discussion going on about the nature of things and about the nature of that anomaly. Out of 
this effort, an alternative set of new problem-solving techniques based on new ideas, new 
premises can arise. Scientists normally are aware that "more than one theoretical 
construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 73) and 
they build a new theoretical construct to deal with the puzzle – an alternative paradigm. 
A viable alternative paradigm is a necessary condition for paradigm change. Ideally, 
the new paradigm is better in problem-solving than the old one and it must have some 
explanatory power to gather followers. In addition, because the new theoretical construct is 
often based on completely new premises, it requires a modification of tools, methods and 
the practice of science in general, hence it establishes new norms. A paradigm change is 
not a cumulative process, 
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"rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction 
that changes some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well 
as many of its paradigm methods and applications" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 85).
Because everything is rebuilt, old and new paradigms are often incommensurable with 
each other. They cannot talk to each other, because even though they use the same 
vocabulary (like force, light etc.) they have different meaning (for example light 
understood as a particle or as a wave). This is the reason why (in the natural sciences) 
inter-paradigm debates cannot be resolved by proof and truth alone (Kuhn, 1970, p. 184). 
This has also to do with the social dimension within science, with the men and women in 
power positions who tend to defend their paradigm (Kuhn, 1970, p. 62). 
Professionalization and functional differentiation of science restricts the scientist’s vision 
and leads to resistance. The paradigm will be modified in an ad hoc manner and try to 
counter its crisis. Kuhn quotes Max Planck: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by 
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 
151). This means that scientific revolution takes time, often a generation and that there is 
an overlapping period when old and new paradigms coexist in the population of 
practitioners. During this time, textbooks are revised and a new generation of scientists 
becomes educated with the new paradigm, slowly replacing the advocates of the old 
paradigm.
This does not imply that counter-discourses and alternative paradigms have vanished. 
They still exist, but their influence is limited. When I speak of paradigm change, I stress 
the notion of hegemony-change – paradigms becoming hegemonic while others get 
excluded. A hegemonic paradigm has greater chances to influence further norm 
development compared to non-hegemonic paradigms. If a new paradigm becomes 
hegemonic, the old paradigm is not abandoned (like old scientific paradigms) but simply 
loses its social influence (Meyers, 1990). Hall for example argues that the neoliberal 
paradigm of Thatcherism replaced the more social democratic Keynesianism in the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s, but the latter still co-exists (Hall, 1993). Ultimately, it is a question 
of power, also understood in institutional terms. There are privileged positions within a 
discourse that make it more probable that a certain meaning is heard by an audience. The 
social construction via the fixation of meaning is always a process of exclusion of 
alternative meanings. In this view, norm internalization is understood as accepting and 
adopting normative instructions of a new paradigm, which means silencing alternative 
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paradigms and their norms (Krook & True, 2012, p. 108). In this case, contingency is 
forgotten, because some meanings become stable while others are silenced.
This chapter explained the different degrees of change or to what extent change can 
happen. The next chapter introduces causal factors that help to explain when and why 
change happens.
2.2.4 Explaining Change
So far I have discussed what paradigms are, how they change and what different degrees of 
change we can differentiate. The question remains, when do they change? How can the 
theory explain normative change? Especially in longitudinal studies, one needs to look at 
temporal variables. Pierson argues that most works in political science have a "snap-shot" 
perspective on political processes. They analyze how variables work by ripping them out 
of their temporal context, assuming that they can magically travel beyond a unique 
configuration of time and place (Pierson, 2000, pp. 72-73). However, analyzing policy or 
paradigm change requires time, which implies a perspective of a decade or even more 
(Sabatier, 1998, p. 98). This chapter introduces several temporal and conditional elements 
that are relevant in analyzing norm and technology change.
A common way in IR to analyze change is to rely on a distinction between normal 
times like the normal problem-solving policy process described earlier (see chap. 2.2 
Paradigms and Norm-Change) and junctures, "where movement along a particular 
trajectory is initiated, and the "mechanisms of reproduction" through which movement in a 
certain direction is perpetuated over time" (Thelen inRast, 2009, p. 395). Junctures are 
sudden changes in ideas, policies or norms. This can have the character of forking-paths. 
For example, during a crisis advocates of a paradigm can become disenfranchised with the 
paradigm or the supporting social group and therefore fork out, creating their own version 
or derivate of the core premises of the previous paradigm. The general argument is that 
decisions of the past influence decisions in the future, creating something that is called 
path-dependency. In a more narrow sense, path-dependency is based on positive feedback 
– an "early movement in a particular direction becomes self enforcing [and] increases the 
cost of switching to some previously viable alternative, discouraging exit" (Rast, 2009, p. 
395). For example, a politician can be become "locked-in" by making a controversial 
decision from which he/she cannot back off. The premise of such arguments is that "early 
stages in a sequence can place particular aspects of political systems onto distinct tracks, 
which are then reinforced through time" (Pierson, 2000, p. 75). This effect can also be 
observed in discourse and language – new events always must be described with an 
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established vocabulary which creates a pre-structuration of new events within the cognitive 
frames of the old. This can be applied to paradigms as well.
Once a paradigm is shared by many (becomes hegemonic), it becomes the status quo 
or a representation of normality. Once something is perceived as normal, it is hard to 
change, because abandoning an already working paradigm is often perceived as risky. The 
burden of proof that the new is actually "better" than the established lies with the new 
paradigm. Baumgartner calls this the power of the status quo:
"If the status quo policy is working reasonably well, and there are more pressing 
problems facing the country, it may well not be worth the risk. On the other hand, if 
a consensus emerges that the status quo is unacceptable, then suddenly the "risky 
scheme" argument may suddenly collapse" (Baumgartner, 2013, p. 252).
The power of the status quo is especially important in the policy-change literature, but has 
also been recognized in the field of International Relations. The longer a paradigm goes 
unchallenged, the more it tends to solidify, because repeated iteration strengthens 
behavioral patterns, thus increasing the cost for change (Kowert & Legro, 1996, p. 470). 
The costs for change might simply be too high, ambivalence about the outcomes may 
hinder progress or even the fear of social ostracism for challenging group beliefs can be 
relevant factors. 
How can the power of the status quo be broken? In IR, wars, crisis, economic 
depression and revolutions are decisive junctures and thus moments for change. John 
Ikenberry argues that:
 
"The importance of crisis stems from the intransigence of political institutions and 
relations. Politicians and administrators are continuously engaged in coping with 
socio-economic challenges; responses are channeled through existing institutions. 
At particular moments, however, these challenges call into question existing rules 
of the game and the repertories of state action" (Ikenberry, Lake, & Mastanduno, 
1988, p. 234).
Dramatic events call into question the constitutive rules of the game, the standard 
appropriate procedures and practices (Florini, 1996, p. 378). In Kuhn’s words, an anomaly 
turns into a crisis of the problem-solving capacity of an established paradigm. The tools, 
techniques and modes of explaining and framing reality become incompatible with the 
unfolding events. This allows alternative paradigms to question the explanatory power of 
the status quo. "Crises are depicted as a type of collective electroshock therapy that jolts 
societies out of the extend modes of thought and gives them new ways of dealing with the 
world [...]" (Legro, 2000, p. 263). For example, Thomas Berger argues the pre-World War 
2. Explaining Normative Change
69
2 paradigm of Prussian militarism became contested after the horrors of World War 2 and 
led to the norm of anti-militarism in post-war Germany (Berger, 1996). Shocks produce 
norms that aim to include the formula "action X should not be repeated" or prevented. 
Another example is the taboo to use nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 1999). Shocks can 
help to "reset" cultural systems of meaning by creating large negative externalities. They 
change the conditions for social behavior by rendering once socially "accepted" behavior 
unacceptable and thus opening a space for new behavioral standards. Crises and sudden 
shocks produce incentives to reevaluate standard procedures and thereby create the window 
of opportunity (Kingdon, 2010) for new paradigms to replace the old, dysfunctional 
paradigm. 
Similarly, Legro (Legro, 2000, pp. 263-266) argues that the collapse of an idea-
system is shaped by two factors. First, the fit between social expectations and the shock 
event (a paradigm’s explanatory power so to speak) and second, whether the subsequent 
outcome is socially desirable (or not). What Legro calls expectations resembles the 
procedure of problem solving of a paradigm based on deep core beliefs. If a paradigm did 
not conceive the cause of a shock because it had a blind spot, there is a clear mismatch 
between a paradigm’s expectation and reality. This questions the problem-solving 
legitimacy of a paradigm. The new shock-event must have certain characteristics: if the 
event produced a favorable or desirable outcome (sometimes called luck), there is no need 
for change. If the shock produces negative effects, like a rise in unemployment or human 
suffering, chances are that this discredits the paradigm. From social movements research 
we know that movements form around perceived grievances like relative deprivation, 
alienation or bad life conditions of minorities (Snow et al., 1986, p. 465). A facilitating 
condition for this process is the severeness of the perceived problem. Non-existential 
problems will be much harder to mobilize, whereas substantial issues that attract/affect 
many people are easier to mobilize. What is important is the congruence between the type 
of shock (like a natural disaster), the domain where the shock happens and the features of 
the paradigm to deal with the event. A prime example is the reversal of Germany’s nuclear 
exit strategy. Initially, the grand coalition wanted to continue to use nuclear energy, thus 
reversing the nuclear exit initiated by the previous social-democrat/green coalition. The 
Fukushima shock called the conservative idea of continuous use of nuclear energy into 
question because it initially framed nuclear energy as safe. The successful mobilization and 
counter-framing of the Green party forced the grand-coalition to abandon the continuation 
plans. This means that there will be events which a paradigm cannot explain and this 
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failure can disrupt the dominant meaning horizon. In sum, a crisis of a paradigm is the 
reversal of closure.
As a result, a new dominant meaning horizon can be reconstructed and new meaning 
generated, often from the very ground. Policy-entrepreneurs/advocacy coalitions engage in 
practices of contestation and shaming of prevalent practices in order to break open the 
status quo, to challenge the established paradigm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). It 
is important to note that shocks are not independent from the social world. A shock is not 
an objective entity, but socially constructed knowledge. In other words, the framing of the 
shock matters. While an earthquake is indeed shocking and horrific in our cultural 
understanding, in other contexts it might be perceived differently, for example as God’s 
justified wrath that cleanses the earth from sin. There will be an extensive discursive trail 
during shocks when competing advocacy coalitions try to frame the event in their terms. 
Advocates of an alternative paradigm will seize the window of opportunity to challenge the 
status quo and establish their alternative set of meanings and norms as dominant. 
Thus, for change to happen, a viable alternative must exist, a competing paradigm 
and a suitable advocacy coalition supporting it (Legro, 2000, p. 254). Key is plausibility 
and internal consistency of the new paradigm, as well as a strong supporting base 
(advocacy coalition) for it. Another factor is prominence. A paradigm and its norms must 
be famous enough in order to reach a wider cultural audience (Florini, 1996, p. 374). The 
more influential the entrepreneur, the more likely it is that the norm will receive 
prominence. If powerful actors, for example the president himself, follow a norm, they 
have more possibilities to promote them actively and chances are that less powerful actors 
start to emulate the norms. That is why hegemonic paradigms have greater chances to 
diffuse their normative assumptions. Furthermore, the new paradigm should fit (match) the 
desires of a target population. It must offer visible benefits or at least appear to be better. 
Kuhn would say it must be better at problem solving. Coming from agenda-setting theory, 
which tries to answer the question of how and when issues are propelled onto the agenda, 
Kingdon argues that within policy subsystems there is a "policy primeval soup" of ideas 
and from time to time some ideas are selected in the form of proposals to float on top 
(Kingdon, 2003, pp. 116-144). In other words, within a political system a set of already 
made policies or preliminary policy ideas exist, which are taken out of the drawer when a 
new situation arises. Kingdon argues that new ideas need a problem (event) to propel them 
to the status of agenda items. They rely on background participants to the political process 
(specialists, lobbyists, academics) which have to be brought to the attention of official 
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policymakers. Critical junctures allow an opening of a window of opportunity, lift issues 
out of the primeval policy soup and bring new problems to the attention of officials. 
This explains why some shocks sometimes do not lead to policy change.12 If no new 
paradigm is established, sometimes we can witness a rebounce-effect whereby the old 
paradigm survives and gets modified (internal change). Lastly, in the social world there is, 
at least theoretically, the possibility of rebouncing of core ideas of a paradigm. This 
concept could be called a renaissance of thought (which is rather seldom in the scientific 
world). Some key ideas of a previous paradigm (for example Franklin D. Roosevelts social 
policy "New Deal") might become popular again and can become implemented in present 
day politics. 
In sum, paradigm change is a function of, 1) the failure of a paradigm, 2) the social 
construction of the shock in discourse and 3) the presence of a competing paradigm. Only 
if an event’s consequences do not match with a paradigm's expectations, it produces 
pressure for collective reflection, especially if the failure is unexpected. Based on social 
psychology, Legro argues that unexpected failure is likely to produce paradigmatic 
innovation because "people are more sensitive to losing something they expect than 
gaining something they did not expect" (Legro, 2000, p. 263). This could be observed 
during the financial crisis of 2007/2008 were a crisis (event) that was not (completely) 
expected by the dominant paradigm (mismatch between expectation and event) led to the 
adoption of new banking regulating laws. Interestingly, the crisis was not severe enough to 
seriously call into question the logic of neoliberal capitalism itself. Reversely, unexpected 
gain does not draw critical attention because nothing bad happened. If failure is expected 
by a paradigm, meaning expectations and the actual event match, paradigm change is 
unlikely because defenders of the dominant orthodoxy will reframe the event in their favor.
2.2.5 Norm Regression and Dark Norms
This chapter is meant to address the initial critique of norm-research and to add a final 
piece of the theoretical puzzle before the theoretical mechanism for norm and paradigm 
change is presented. The question is how do we address norms that prescribe standards of 
appropriate behavior, but which are not necessarily morally good or deontological. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 404) argue in their assessment of 
constructivism that past discourse on nationalism, xenophobia or slavery constructed and 
reified different identities and norms (white master versus black slave) and defined 
12 Shocks may be necessary but not sufficient to change. A shock can be a trigger event, for change but a 
trigger might not necessarily be a shock. While shocks can "reset" cultural meaning systems, mere trigger 
events only lead to the adaption or reconfiguration of existing systems of meaning.
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appropriate behavior for these identities. It was appropriate for the master to possess 
humans, to give orders and to punish them if they were disobedient or simply for 
masochistic pleasure. Constructivist scholars would argue that both actor categories had 
internalized the norms of their respective social class, as well as the class-structure itself. It 
was taken for granted. Since the middle-ages, the concept of serfdom had been the norm 
and had been legitimized in discourse on the divine rights of kings (dei grazia). It was thus 
a norm that many monarchies of that time shared. The question is: how do we deal with 
these kinds of norms? 
Critical norm scholars formulate this critique and try to theorize so-called "bad" or 
"dark norms" (Heller et al., 2012) as well as negative norm dynamics which they call norm 
regression or decay (McKeown, 2009; Engelkamp et al., 2012; Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 
2012; Heller et al., 2012; Heller & Kahl, 2013). These are not ontologically different from 
"nice" norms, but stand in opposition to and actively contest them. The dark norm of 
serfdom contests the notion of individual autonomy, which is a norm in liberal societies. It 
can be argued that they have no deontological dimension in the sense of a moral 
obligation. Rather, they contest the very moral oughtness of nice norms. The re-emergence 
of torture within the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is one prominent example (Liese, 
2009; McKeown, 2009; Sanders, 2012; Williams, 2011). Torture norms are legitimized on 
the ground that in the name of national security there must be an exception from the norm 
that prohibits torture. If more and more states challenge well-established global norms and 
engage in contestation practices (Wiener, 2007), a practice effect could kick in that 
delegitimizes anti-torture norms globally. In recent years, there has been a lively debate 
about how to conceptualize this "reverse norm dynamic, whereby deeply entrenched 
norms, particularly those related to civil and political rights, are challenged and 
discursively put under pressure" (Heller & Kahl, 2013, p. 415). The general argument is 
that there is not just positive norm diffusion, the global spread of human rights, but also a 
reverse process of normative regression (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 343) or 
normative decay. 
According to McKeown, the norm-life-cycle must be completed to include the death 
of a norm (McKeown, 2009). It begins by questioning the assumption that internalization 
is the end point of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life-cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). 
Internalization is no determinism that leads in a single direction (the internalization of a 
norm), because contestation is always possible (as discourse theory assumes). As I have 
shown, shocks and trigger moments can initiate the re-contestation of hegemonic norms 
and practices. During these moments, actors who have not internalized the norms of the 
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dominant paradigms (norm-challengers) begin to question the hegemony or normality of a 
paradigm. First, this process is likely to happen internally within the context of a 
contesting paradigm, but over time this is likely to spill over into public discourse. If this 
creates enough public resonance, the dominant norm can lose salience, first domestically 
but possibly over time also internationally. McKeown does not go into great detail here, 
but I would argue that the conditional factors for norm-change, outlined in a previous 
chapter (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change) also work in the opposite direction. They do 
not just explain how a norm can become dominant, but also why other norms fail. This 
could trigger a reverse, or negative norm-cascade, if enough global actors emulate this 
practice. This effect is especially powerful if former proponents of human rights norms 
(norm entrepreneurs or leaders) question the very norms they promote or act inconsistently 
with them. This will legitimize norm-breaking behavior by other states, creating a 
legitimacy crisis of a norm (Reus-Smit, 2007) which can lead to its death. 
The discovery of bad or dark norms is crucial for this thesis. As has been shown, 
many studies of dark norms focus on torture and the reversal of human rights norms (for 
example refugee and asylum norms). One particular norm that is understudied by IR is the 
norm of mass surveillance that also is an offspring of the war on terror. The idea of dark 
norms and norm-regression is also important because it is compatible with the idea of 
norm-clusters. As I have argued before (see chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between 
Paradigms), norms should not be understood in isolation or without context. Instead we 
should focus on norm clusters supporting a norm, and opposing norm clusters from other 
paradigms. This holistic perspective allows us to have a more complete picture since the 
rise of one norm (dominance) at the same time often coincides with the regression, 
marginalization or exclusion of another one. Just as one paradigm gets replaced by another 
one, norms replace each other. For this purpose the paradigm concept is well suited, since I 
focus not only on one advocacy group with one norm, as many studies do, but on multiple 
advocacy coalitions and norms (and their supporting ideas) at once.
How this combined process of norm and paradigm change works will be depicted in 
the following chapter, which summarizes the theoretical mechanism presented thus far.
2.2.6 Summary of the Theoretical Mechanism
This chapter introduced a wide array of causal factors that are useful to analyze norm 
change and to address the aforementioned critiques and shortcomings of norm-research 
(see chap. 2.1.3 Critique of Diffusion Models). The purpose of this chapter is to fuse the 
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diverse factors together in order to create a theoretical mechanism that can be used for 
process-tracing.
I have argued that norm research has some problems explaining norm-emergence. 
Emergence often is a domestic process (Checkel, 1998). In my terms, norm emergence 
happens within social groups that I have called advocacy coalitions. Norms emerge out of 
repeated problem-solving activities of policy advocates. Problem-solving is the core 
function of paradigms that includes the recognition and definition of problems as a first 
step. The perception or framing of problems matters because paradigms perceive problems 
through their unique lens, from a specific ideational vantage point. The metaphor "If you 
have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail" fits nicely. Problem recognition depends 
on a paradigm's deep-core beliefs like epistemological and ontological ideas about what 
the world is about, what nature is and so forth. In a theoretical sense, problem definitions 
are also ideas that pre-structure action. This necessarily implies blind spots of 
unrecognized ideas. 
After problems are recognized (or not, if they represent a blind spot), the process of 
defining the problem follows. Problem definitions are ideas that frame the definition of 
goals (what to achieve) and the definition of appropriate techniques or instruments (means 
to solve the problems). In the policy field, instruments to solve a problem often include 
new policies, but new technologies can serve the same function (as will be shown in the 
next chapter, see chap. 2.3 Technological and Normative Change). The key insight is that 
the modalities of problem solving define a paradigm. Thus, problems are solved by relying 
on more or less the same tool kit. For example, a military paradigm will try to solve most 
issues by military means. Over time, this repeated problem-solving practice of paradigm 
leads to the creation of standards of appropriate problem solving, which translates into 
norms. Theoretically, it is hard to determine the order of causation: whether norms 
influence the definition of problems, goals and thus policy or whether the repeated practice 
of problem-solving leads to new norms. This is not unexpected when adopting a 
discoursive perspective. Krook and True recognize that norms are works–in–progress and 
that process rather than stability is the default condition (Krook & True, 2012, p. 104). 
There is a relationship between norms and ideas and often it is difficult to separate them. 
Probably it is a circular process (Jepperson et al., 1996). The modalities of problem 
solving, over a longer time frame, become internalized and thus unquestioned standards of 
behavior for paradigm advocates. These norms are tightly woven together with the ideas of 
a paradigm. Paradigms are idea- and norm-clusters. 
2. Explaining Normative Change
75
Paradigms also include a social process. The social component is quite important because 
paradigms require social actors and advocates. At first, these norms of a paradigm are only 
valid or meaningful for the advocates or carriers of the paradigm. Norms and ideas are 
transported, carried or reified by actors that become socialized into norm followers. The 
socialization of new advocates that follow the paradigm is quite crucial. In science, this 
includes the process of university education and degrees. In the social world, this includes 
institutions and career-tracks or even party-politics. This implies that paradigms can 
become institutionalized in organizations and social institutions like political parties, 
bureaucracies, the military, user-groups of technology and any kind of advocacy coalition 
aiming for political change (like NGOs or transnational networks). Norm-research calls 
these "hub-platforms" or arenas (Keck & Sikkink, 1994). Institutionalization is quite 
important to stabilize norms and to objectify them. Institutionalization implies the creation 
of carrier texts that transport the ideas of a paradigm. Textbooks in science and political 
documents like doctrines or manifestos can serve this function. This is in line with Kowert 
and Legro who argue that norm emergence results from the patterned interaction of actors 
and their environment, and social processes in groups such as common heritage, language 
or network structure which might increase chances for norm diffusion in smaller groups 
(Kowert & Legro, 1996, p. 470). 
The important insight is that it makes no sense to observe paradigms in isolation. 
Paradigms and their advocates are assumed to stand in competition with each other. Kuhn 
argued that paradigms are often incommensurable, meaning they perceive the same social 
reality in completely different ways, thus identify different problems and adhere to 
different ideas and norms. A material object or a social phenomenon like a policy or shock 
event means completely different things for the paradigms, because their idea and norm-
network produces different meanings. At the same time, paradigm advocates engage in the 
constant process of meaning construction. The assumed goal of this inter-paradigmatic 
struggle is the hegemony of meaning: the ideas and norms of one particular paradigm 
should become the general meaning horizon for everyone. Paradigm advocates, especially 
within the political sphere, try to alter discourse and to produce change. Their aim is to 
reach discursive dominance or hegemony. This inter-paradigm dynamic is important for 
norm-diffusion both domestically, but also globally.
I assume three different ways how paradigm advocates try to make meaning dominant: 
by the construction of paradigm-infused policies, via rhetorical framing and argumentation 
in discourses and via technological artifacts (which will be introduced in the next chapter). 
These are often interrelated processes. I have described in high detail how the problem-, 
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goal- and instrument-definitions infuse policies which, especially in the political sphere, 
are accompanied by framing efforts to legitimize policies. I argue that we can expect a 
congruence between a paradigms ideas and norms, its policies and the technological 
artifacts it engages with. 
Whether the construction of social meaning and norm-diffusion are successful depends 
on a series of conditional factors such as the credibility, centrality, commensurability, 
narrative fidelity and hegemonic nature of frames and discursive articulations. Other 
factors are the nature of the policy subsystem in which this struggle takes place, whether it 
is pre-structured or not and whether norm-advocates are in a power position or not. I 
argued that paradigm advocates are not just transnational human rights networks but can be 
found at all level of politics, from presidents to military generals. The closer they are to the 
center of power, the higher the chances for successful norm diffusion. Other factors like 
timing and windows of opportunity also should be considered. I have argued that once a 
paradigm is in a dominant or hegemonic position, the power of the status quo and path-
dependency might further stabilize it. Path-dependency also implies an early-mover 
advantage because new issue fields and nascent policy-subsystems are fertile grounds for 
new paradigms because there are no structuration or lock-in effects (no standards of 
appropriate behavior, so to speak). 
If a paradigm reaches discursive hegemony, closure kicks in. This means that the 
meaning articulation and contestation stops and a temporary common-sense is achieved. 
Most, but probably not all of society perceive issues through the lens of the dominant 
paradigm. The general discourse will adopt frames, problem definitions and norms of the 
particular paradigm. The language of the overall discourse and that of a paradigm are in 
congruence. The ideas of a paradigm become a general frame of reference, naturalized and 
objectified, as if they were not contingent anymore. This implies power, because all 
alternative meanings and frames of reference become excluded or marginalized. Once 
closure kicks in, it is hard to change.
Trigger events are often important conditions to introduce change. I have introduced 
different degrees of change, from internal or incremental change where the components of 
a paradigm are altered to different degrees to match new social reality. The adjustment of 
policy goals and their settings is a rather normal and constant mode of change in politics. 
With these degrees of change, the dominant paradigm can maintain its hegemonic position. 
Another normal mode of paradigm and norm change happens when a new government 
enters office that promotes a competing paradigm. Of course, changes of dominant ideas 
and norms happens over longer periods of time with some temporal lag and not just in time 
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with the regime change. Due to the narrative description of change the reader might get the 
impression that idea, norm or paradigm change happens quickly, immediately after shocks 
for example. In empirical reality, ideas and paradigms change slowly and it often takes 
decades to realize this (Jacobs, 2014, p. 57).
 But from time to time, social phenomena appear that present themselves as an 
anomaly for a paradigm. Certain social phenomena irritate it because they do not fit to its 
expectations and are incongruent with its ideas and norms. I called these severe events 
shocks and they must have certain characteristics to induce paradigm change. The shock 
must call into question the core premises and problem-solving modalities of a paradigm. 
This is the case whether the problematic event developed out of blind spots (and thus its 
advocates could not anticipate it). There must be a mismatch of expectations between a 
paradigm and the features of this shock. If these events call into question the core 
premises, they can become an existential crisis for a paradigm. If this is the case, we can 
expect to see an inner-paradigmatic discourse about how to deal with this new reality, 
which might include ontological and epistemological debates.
Another important condition is the existence of an alternative paradigm that can 
challenge the dominant one. If the alternative can mobilize support and frame the event 
accordingly, it can replace the old one. This would be an instance of paradigm change. 
Hegemonic change, i.e. the change of ideas and norms in a political discourse normally is a 
slower process that often follows a paradigm change. The important premise of this thesis 
is that a paradigm change represents an instance of norm-change but of course norms can 
also change without the change of dominant paradigms.
The following graphic summarizes the process depicted in this chapter. 
2. Explaining Normative Change
78
Figure 4. Paradigm change (own diagram)
The figure should be read like a flow-chart from left to right. On the left, we see the 
discursive struggle between different paradigms, indicated by different colors, which 
engage in framing of a trigger event (or any social phenomenon). If a shock occurs, there 
are two possible causal pathways. In one instance, the orange paradigm adapts to the 
trigger event which leads to incremental change. The orange paradigm remains the 
dominant one (indicated by the color). If the shock represents an anomaly for the orange 
paradigm, and the green one uses the window of opportunity, it can induce external 
change. The green one replaces the orange paradigm, indicated by the color transition. 
Note that I will use a similar color coding through the entire thesis. Color transitions 
always mean the change of paradigm, ideas or norms.
If a challenger paradigm replaces an old one, an instance of norm-decay or regression 
might be observed. The norms promoted by the old paradigm can die out if they are not 
maintained and advocated anymore. Thus, the norm life-cycle only make sense if we 
broaden the scope to analyze the dynamics of competing norms promoted by competing 
paradigms. 
This ideal-typical process plays out over time and is discursive from beginning to 
end. There are of course feedback loops that alter core paradigmatic beliefs. It is not 
necessarily a linear process. This process only becomes visible if one extends the analysis 
period beyond snap-shot studies and opens the analysis for competing norms and 
paradigms, which stand in opposition. The following graphic visualizes the process of 
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norm and paradigm diffusion (which I use interchangeably for now) I have described in 
this chapter by amending the life-cycle.
Figure 5. Diffusion of Norms (own diagram)
It describes the life-paths of two competing norms that are carried by two competing 
paradigms. It shows the salience or the adaptation of a norm by several actors. During the 
emergence stage, a norm has a low salience (of only a few actors in one advocacy group) 
until it reaches a tipping point of followers. The process leading to this point is discursive 
and can be explained with the concepts I have introduced. If successful, this leads to a self-
reinforcing feedback loop (like in path dependency), resulting in a peak: the maximum 
diffusion is reached. This need not represent a 100% of all actors or state adopting a norm. 
Because different norms stand in opposition, the success of norm 1 results in the loss of 
appeal for norm 2. As long as some degree of support remains, norm 2 will not die out. It 
is simply not dominant or influential, which might change over time. 
Now, traditional norm-life-cycles assume that norm 1 is internalized after the peak 
(turning into norm 1’), maintaining a high salience but becoming taken for granted. But as 
McKeown and others argue this is just one possible path not a determined process. Norms 
are neither static nor stable. Shock moments or gradual degradation might lead to a norm 
erosion (the reduction of followers). If the shock moment is in line with the expectation of 
norm 2 but unexpected for norm 1, the latter might lose salience. This is a window of 
opportunity for norm 2 advocates to contest norm 1, to establish its chain of significance as 
dominant. During this juncture at t7, there is the possibility for a hegemonic change. If this 
change is successful, norm 1 is replaced and there is the possibility of norm death. 
However, norm 2 is never stable and there might be another contester on the horizon.
The next chapter will introduce concepts that allow for the theorization of norms and 
technical artifacts. Since this thesis is about norm diffusion concerning a socio-technical 
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system, the Internet, it is necessary to introduce concepts from Science and Technology 
studies to IR. These help us to further refine the theories presented thus far.
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2.3 Technological and Normative Change
"Every object tells a story if you know how to read it." 
Henry Ford
While the previous chapter talked about the social construction of social norms, it is now 
necessary to talk about the construction of matter. Anthropologists and archeologists 
understand better than political scientists that technological artifacts are carriers of culture, 
ideas and norms. A technological artifacts is "a discrete material object, consciously 
produced or transformed by human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or 
cultural environment" (Suchman, 2003, p. 98). It can be argued that artifacts and culture 
can be examined with the same theoretical frameworks (Scott, 2008, p. 84). The aim of the 
overall chapter is to analyze the relationship between technology and social behavior, 
meaning and the development of social norms. This is done by arguing that technology is 
not separated from the social world bur rather embedded in it. The relationship of 
technology and the social world is one of reciprocal influence. What technology is and 
how we perceive it is a matter of meaning construction in discourses. I argue that the 
mechanism for social construction of norms and identity is similar to the development of 
technological construction. Additionally, already existing norms have an influence on the 
goal orientation that underlies technological construction. The paradigms of the inventors 
matter in creating technology. Their paradigms become embedded in technological 
artifacts and thus become mediated by them. As a result, the use of technology recreates 
the embedded norms, but sometimes also creates new ones.
2.3.1 Theorizing Technology: Traditional Approaches
Most people hold a commonsensical definition or narrative of technology that sees 
technological development as a linear reaction to human need (Häußling, 2014, p. 115). In 
this narrative, the necessity to survive against hostile nature drives technological invention 
of better tools. Nature and the artificial (technology) are seen as oppositional concepts. 
Technology is essentially seen as neutral and instrumental to human conduct. Artifacts are 
desocialized, which means that the social side (like power components, norms) is reduced 
to its (more or less) obvious function (Pfaffenberger, 1992b, pp. 494-497). Instrumentalists 
often claim that technology is value-free or neutral. An example is the argument "guns 
don’t kill people, but people do". Human agency gives technology its determination (to 
kill) and thus is the main driver for social change. A hammer can be a means of 
construction or a means of warfare, depending on the usage. Likewise, disasters or 
accidents "result from faulty design or control, or from faulty operation, not from anything 
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inherent in the technology itself" (Tiles & Oberdiek, 1995, p. 16). Technology is seen as 
something distinct from the social world. Instrumentalists, too, decontextualize and 
dehistoricize artifacts which obstruct studying the historical development and their social 
embeddedness. 
After screening the most important IR literature, Herrera argues that technology is 
either overlooked and treated as an "ad hoc exogenous variable – an unseen force" 
(Herrera, 2003, p. 566) or, especially in theories with a materialist ontology and rationalist 
epistemology (IR realism and neo-liberal institutionalist theories), treated as a 
deterministic force. For example, Kenneth Waltz argued in his "Theory of International 
Politics" that new military technologies increase military power of actors in the 
international system (Waltz, 1979, pp. 127-128). Technological development generates 
(external) pressures, because it alters the distribution of power and thus forces other states 
to adapt. If state A develops intercontinental ballistic missiles, state B has to develop a 
similar technology to catch up and to adapt to the new situation (arms race & security 
dilemma).13 Technological determinist theories argue that technology is the independent 
variable that causally effects the social world in terms of security, global order or the 
nature of warfare. Especially in IR-realism we often find a pessimistic version of 
determinism that states that technology is out of human control and that it produces 
negative (and often unintended) effects in the social world, for example alienation, 
enslavement or security dilemmas. Technology is seen as something outside the social 
world, out of control of human agency. Once the genie is out of the bottle – nuclear 
technology as the prime example – it will spread and determine world order. For example 
it is often agued that the strategy of mutually assured destruction (that dominated the Cold 
War and held whole populations as hostages), is a direct result of the structural logic of 
nuclear ballistic missiles (Potter, 1978). 
The opposite of pessimism is technological optimism, as can be seen with Robert 
Keohane, who argues that interdependence between actors increases with the emergence of 
new information technology (Keohane, 1979, pp. 85-109). Technological optimists assume 
that technology causes positive changes within the social world. Advances in medicine 
increase life expectancy and so forth. An extreme version of this can be called utopism, 
where technology alters human conduct to the better, like for example in Star Trek.
13 Sociologists call this "technological push" and it is assumed that technological change is based on supply 
and not on demand for technology, which normally emerges later (Häußling, 2010, p. 626). The opposite 
concept is "demand pull", where customer articulate demands for a problem solution and mobile 
development efforts.
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In optimist and pessimist versions of determinism, technological development is seen 
as a succession of steps that serve a single rationale (McCarthy, 2013, p. 473). The 
endogenous rationale of a technology determines the social world. In this perspective, 
nuclear weapons include a certain rationale (an essence or a metaphorical ghost in the 
machine) which automatically leads to specific social outcomes, for example the logic of 
nuclear deterrence. There is an implicit teleological assumption included. Technology 
seems to develop in a single linear, incremental process, from bows, to canons, to rifles, to 
nuclear missiles and so forth – a certain development will result in a distinct outcome, 
either instantaneously or over time. At the core of the teleological argument is a logic of 
reflexive technization – problems created by technology (or humans) are believed to be 
solved by more and better technology (Weyer, 2008, pp. 11-14). For example, a new 
weapon (missiles) might be countered with a new defensive (missile shield). This creates 
technological pushes and thereby an infinite progress. The role of human agency is 
negligible. "It is all about the object […]" which is the reason why this school of thought is 
sometimes called "anti-humanist" (Matthewman, 2011, p. 15).
Both determinism and instrumentalism assume that technology exists independent of 
any social context, and therefore is free from any social predisposition. Based on this 
perspective, technology is discovered. It is like finding an uninhabited island that was there 
all along, we just did not see it yet. A technological discovery just "pops" into existence. 
Innovations are independent from social relations and historical context. This is a 
somewhat pre-Kuhnian understanding of science and technology (McCarthy, 2013, p. 
474). Both determinists and instrumentalists fail to recognize that technology is embedded 
in social structures which influence its development and use. Technologies are developed 
with a usage scenario in mind and are not just discovered. Some types of guns are designed 
for more efficient killing. The social shaping of technology during development, usage in 
different contexts and discourse is relevant and needs to be considered (Williams & Edge, 
1996).
I will argue for a social shaping perspective that is compatible with IR 
constructivism. Here, it is argued that technology and the social world cannot be separated 
– technology is social through and through and not exogenous. Social determinism 
reverses the causal argument – the social determination shapes the design and use of the 
technology and thereby can control its effects. This perspective assumes neither an 
autonomy of technological development nor an existence independent from the social 
world. From this perspective, technology is always value laden and therefore cannot be 
neutral at all. Additionally, some technology intentionally was developed with power 
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projection and social exclusion in mind. Jeremy Bentham’s circular prison (panopticon), as 
theorized by Michel Foucault, was intentionally designed as an automated power-
projection apparatus that acted on those it sheltered (Foucault, 1979, pp. 195-231). The 
inmates in this circular prison are under constant surveillance, which aims at altering their 
behavior to automated norm-following.
Material artifacts and architecture are not just social, they are political and can 
express or even act out power. It is important to study not just the technical artifact, but 
also the designer and the design process. Constructivists claim to open the black-box of 
technical development to analyze the construction process that is socially determined by 
the intentions, paradigms, biases and norms of the inventors, which is why this is a more 
humanist perspective with a focus on human agency (Matthewman, 2011, p. 15). Social 
norms play a role during construction usage and discourses on technology, which is why 
this is compatible with the theories presented so far. However, on the extreme end, social 
determinism can tend to forget the technical artifact altogether because it focuses only on 
the social construction of technology. In some studies, materiality is a residue and all that 
matters is the form of an artifact. Bruno Latour argues against this perspective because it 
forgets the "things of things" (Latour, 2000, p. 112). This needs to be avoided. A social 
constructivist perspective on technology often operates with a special definition of 
technology, which is introduced in the next chapter.
2.3.2 Defining Technology
In order to grasp the social dynamic of technology we need a wide definition that 
recognizes that technology operates at multiple levels – it is not just the technical artifact 
and its material components, but also design, use by different actors and general 
relationship with the socio-economic context and discourse it is embedded in.14 Hughes’ 
study on Thomas Edison shows that several factors (economic, political, social, scientific 
and technical) must create a seamless web for technological invention like the electrical 
light bulb to be successful (Hughes, 1987). The competition between Thomas Edison’s and 
Nikola Teslas’s paradigms of electricity and thus competing designs of electrical systems, 
called the "war of the currents" (Alternating Current vs. Direct Current), shows the range 
of options and choices of alternative pathways a technology can take (McPherson, 2012). 
Science and Technology Studies deal with this complexity by adopting a systemic 
14 An alternative would be a limited definition of technology that focuses only on physical objects or artifacts. 
One of the drawbacks of this limited version is that many technologies now become digital and virtual and 
therefore loose their material features (also bio- or nano-technology) (Matthewman, 2011, pp. 9-12).
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perspective, not just focusing on individual artifacts but on socio-technical systems – the 
interplay of social and material factors. I will work with this definition in this thesis.
A focus on socio-technical systems is to argue against the thesis of necessity of 
invention, because these systems are not inevitable in the sense that they are the only or 
best solution to a problem. These systems are sociogenic15 and should be treated according 
to the logic of survival of the fittest – some are successful while other development paths 
die out. This perspective abandons the neutrality thesis of technology, which isolates 
technology from its social context thus claims that it is value free or without politics 
(Winner, 1993). It is also an argument against reductionist arguments like "nuclear 
weapons are neither moral nor immoral – they are just piles of chemicals, metals and junk" 
(Williams, 1984, p. 100).16 While technically true, this is an intentional reduction of 
reality. Reductionism tries to artificially (and ideologically) separate technology from its 
usage context and how, why and where it developed in the first place. It is a version of 
hegemonic articulations. Politicians often use this rhetorical frame to justify the use of an 
ambivalent technology like nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 2005, p. 11) or arms exports, 
although it is absolutely clear that nuclear weapons were developed in an enormous war 
effort to effectively kill thousands of people in a single strike. 
The the relationship between the social and the artifact plays out during different 
stages, which will be central for this analysis: First, during the construction and the design 
process of the artifact, where the intentions, norms, values and paradigms of the 
inventor(s) are crucial. Most technologies are built for a reason, while others are solutions 
for unknown problems that, through reframing, become adapted in totally unintended ways 
and contexts. Other inventions are accidents that represent blind spots by the designers. 
Therefore, we to need include the social context of construction. Critics of the social 
shaping perspective argue rightfully that it is not enough to focus just on the construction 
because power is exercised while using a technology (Winner, 1993).
Second, the social use of a material object varies. It depends on who uses it, why an 
agent uses it, when and where it is used. Most technologies are dual-use, which means that 
they can be used for different purposes. The technologies for Uranium-enrichment can be 
used for building nuclear weapons or for civil energy. More so, not every agent can use 
every technology. Some technologies (such as the Large-Hadron Collider at CERN) 
15 Sociogenic means that something is caused by social influences.
16 "Reductionism ignores the intentions, values and social understanding of those who design, develop, 
market and control technology; it also overlooks the understanding of users, consumers, beneficiaries, 
victims, and those deeply affected by technology whether they are aware of this or not. Finally, this 
reductionist temptation has a corollary that only the users of technology are responsible for harm, since all 
technologies are inherently without value" (Tiles & Oberdiek, 1995, p. 55).
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require experts while others can be used intuitively by almost everyone. As such, human 
agents have different skills for using technology, which can be increased via learning. This 
means that there is an exclusion mechanism. The note that different actor (-coalitions) 
engage differently with technology is quite important when it is diffuses globally. 
Additionally, there are different points in time to consider. When a product becomes 
mainstream, its usage might vary from its first prototype, because a wider audience uses 
the object in creative and unforeseen manners. The development of usage scenarios are a 
matter of cultural norms and habits because they charge technical artifacts with collective 
significance, with meaning. As such, technology encourages the development of norms 
and is influenced by them as well, because of its social side. The technological object 
"automobile" led to the socio-technical system of "traffic" which includes not only cars and 
roads but a whole set of social rules, like driving on the right side of the road, stopping at 
certain road signs, using a seat belt while driving or even in terms of unregulated 
cooperation. When the "right of way" is unclear at a cross-road, drivers engage in sign 
language communication to determine who goes first. In these cases social behavior is 
coordinated without any rules or sanctions involved. Whoever has driven a car in the the 
United Kingdom stumbled upon the problem of driving on the left side of the road, which 
represents a major perturbation of appropriate behavior for continental Europeans. Clearly 
there are norms at work here. These norms are either included in technological design but 
are learned by practice of use.
Third, discourse and talking about technology frames its meaning (Weyer, 2008, p. 
40). How a technology is represented and understood in discourse by competing advocacy 
coalitions matters. This can be grasped with the theories introduced before. The post-
structuralist theorizing in the chapters before has shown that artifacts get their meaning in 
relation to other artifacts and that there is a discourse in place in which meaning is 
negotiated. The next step will be to shed a little light on the question how technology has 
been theorized by the social sciences before in order to provide the theoretical background 
for non-science and technology scholars.
2.3.3 The Politics of Technology Debate
Within Science and Technology Studies it is a conventional wisdom that technological 
artifacts have a social or political dimension. This and the following chapters deal with the 
question how to conceptualize the relationship between technology and the social. 
Langdon Winner started this debate in the 1980s with his famous study "Do Artifacts 
have politics?" about the bridge design in New York during the 1930s (Winner, 1980). 
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Winner argues that the architect intentionally designed the bridges to prevent lower-class 
people, who relied on busses which could not pass underneath them, to enter certain parts 
of town. The bridge design acts out politics of exclusion (Joerges, 1997, p. 4). Winner 
seems to argue that the technological and social world are distinct entities and that there is 
a correspondence between the two (Hutchby, 2001, p. 443). This somewhat positivist 
notion assumes that with the help of scientific means, we can discover the true power 
essence of the technological artifacts and compare it with an observed outcome. That is 
why Grint and Woolgar call Winner’s perspective technological essentialism (Grint & 
Woolgar, 1997).17
The critique is that intentionality is hard to prove because it requires a clear-cut 
causation between an actor’s intention (i.e. the will for social discrimination), a 
technological design (a way to covertly achieve discrimination) and intended outcome (that 
this technology actually does what it is supposed to do to the target group). Disjunctures 
between intent and outcome exist because technologies almost always have multiple 
effects depending on the context in which they are used (Matthewman, 2011, p. 79). Even 
if we agree that Robert Moses' bridge design was intentionally discriminatory, it does not 
follow that this meaning is shared by the target audience (the people of New York). One 
can see a low bridge design as discriminatory, as the result of a cost-benefit calculus 
(lower bridge with less material = cheaper), erroneous architecture (like the Pisa tower) or 
carelessness or as a combination of all of these. Which interpretation is more true and 
which was the intent of the designer? Constructivism argues that perception of 
technologies is location-based, depending on different cognitive paradigms, a phenomenon 
called interpretative flexibility:
"[…] associated with the design and interpretation (use) of technological artifacts; 
there is no unique (necessary) way of designing (or interpreting and using) 
technology; designs and interpretations (uses) vary across time and between 
different groups and cultures" (Woolgar, 1991, p. 30).
The assumption behind interpretative flexibility is that there are by nature different 
competing meanings about technology, but only a few become dominant ones. In terms of 
17 "The invocation of a causal factor implies that it is possible adequately to describe the key features and 
characteristics of the entity in question. But this runs counter to the principle of interpretive flexibility 
associated with the social shaping of technology. The construal of a technology as a causal factor seems to 
imply that there are definitive, identifiable features and characteristics of that technology, whereas the central 
thrust of social shaping is to suggest that such features and characteristics are contingent, that any such 
features we would wish to attribute to a technology are the temporary upshot of a series of complex social 
(definitional) processes, largely due to the efforts of particular social agencies (groups)" (Grint & Woolgar, 
1997, p. 31).
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discourse theory, interpretative flexibility refers to the field of discursivity. This is why the 
social shaping perspective is compatible with the IR-constructivist theories outlined in 
previous chapters.
This critique leads to the important reconceptualization of technologies as texts 
(Woolgar, 1991) that can be written and interpreted. The social side of technology, like all 
social phenomena, can be studied as if it were a text, introducing all the problems and 
possibilities of hermeneutics into Science and Technology Studies: 
"[…] technologies should be treated as 'texts’ which are 'written’ (i.e. configured) 
in certain ways by their developers, producers and marketers, and have to be 'read’ 
(i.e. interpreted) by their users or consumers. The writers of these technology-texts 
may seek to impose particular meanings on the artifact, and to constrain the range 
of possible interpretations open to users" (Hutchby, 2001, p. 445).
The author of a text can try to put a certain meaning in the text, but whether the reader 
recognizes this and in fact is being discriminated against, is a different question. The 
agency of actor coalitions who engage in discursive struggle about the initial shaping and 
later interpretation of technology are of special interest. That means that technology is 
never free of meaning but always embedded in a net of prior knowledge. In sum, the 
material and the social side of an artifact cannot be separated but rather, they are one single 
thing as the figure shows: 
Figure 6. Technical Artifact (own diagram)
The material dimension means that the entity has a certain design and shape and is 
made out of matter that has certain affordances (physical properties). The software code 
that underpins software or Internet protocols is also a somewhat material category, 
although it blurs the distinction a bit (see chap. 2.3.7 Digital Technology: Software and 
Code). The social side, the form or being is interpreted. It includes preferred meanings that 
have been established during the construction, social norms of usage and usage context as 
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well as subject positions. The next chapter will explain how this social dimension works 
exactly.
2.3.4 The Social Construction of Technology and its Critique
As I have shown, IR has an incomplete understanding of technology and particularly IR-
constructivism, with its focus on language, discourse and norms tends to neglect the 
material side of world politics. Therefore, I will introduce insights from Science and 
Technology studies to complement the IR-constructivist program. 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) is a hybrid of social constructivism and 
sociology of knowledge. It argues that technology is social through and through (Bijker, 
Hughes, & Trevor, 1987). SCOT is a reaction to a strong technological determinist 
treatment of technology and claims to open the black box of technology, which means a 
closer look at the construction of artifacts within certain social contexts. In contrast to 
other approaches, it is highly compatible with the theoretical elements I have introduced so 
far.18 It helps us understand how norms and technology are intertwined and how paradigms 
shape the perception, construction and reconfiguration of artifacts and their socio-technical 
systems over time. It also helps us study the diffusion of technology and norms embedded 
in them. However, due to legitimate critique on the SCOT program, I will amend this very 
framework.
SCOT rejects many basic and commonsensical assumptions about technology, for 
example that its development is a linear process driven by an internal (necessity) or 
external logic (demand-pull or technological push). SCOT is highly influenced by Thomas 
Kuhn’s work on paradigms. The history of technology creates the illusion of a linear 
development because forking paths and dead-ends do not make it into history books. Pinch 
and Bijker argue with Kuhn that technology should be the explanandum and not the 
explanans which is taken for granted (Bijker et al., 1987, p. 24). Technology is 
conceptualized, planned and innovated by an interplay of competing human agents and not 
simply discovered. What technology is and what it means is the result of a discursive 
18 For readers coming from an IR background, Häußling (Häußling, 2014) gives a splendid introduction to 
various research programs within STS. Technic-determinist approaches (Jaques Ellul) are incompatible with 
the constructivist underpinnings of this thesis. Other viable approaches would have been a system-theory 
inspired perspective (Niklas Luhmann), which was not chosen due to its internal complexity and empirical 
challenges. Cultural studies (Lewis Mumford) offer valuable insights, but have a different macro-focus. 
Finally, there is Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005b). Although I agree with many of 
ANT’s insights, for example that technology acts as an actant or the rejection of linear development models, 
epistemologically this social theory is not really compatible with the frameworks I have offered so far. ANT 
is (in)famous for abandoning major concepts of sociology like the micro-macro or agent-structure dichotomy 
(Latour, 1996). Also, ANT is challenging methodologically, focusing on meaning construction in process, 
which is not possible for past inventions or places with access restrictions (Latour, 2005a).
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struggle of different actors with diverging sets of meanings and expectations (paradigms) 
which help agents to "make sense of the artifact and the particular problems they face with 
it" (Bijker et al., 1987, p. 37). Because of interpretative flexibility, social groups have 
different interpretations about the meaning of technology and "the meanings given by a 
relevant social group actually constitute[s] the artifact" (Bijker, 1995, p. 77). 
Pinch and Bijker illustrate this process of social construction in their study on the 
different developing paths of the modern bicycle. They ask how the dominant design of 
bicycles changed from large front-wheelers (called Penny-farthing) to a design with equal-
sized, air-pressured tires (which is much safer and more comfortable). Between 1818, 
when the first two-wheel Draisienne was patented, and 1870 two competing designs were 
developed, which initiated a discourse on bicycles. The Penny-farthing was predominantly 
used and advocated by upper-class males ("dandies") to show off their skills in public 
parks as a form of entertainment. It could be argued that their use was similar to modern-
day skateboards. The competing design was the equal-size bicycle which was more useful 
in a working-class context (transport) and could be used by women as well. Large front-
wheelers were incompatible with the female dress-code of the time. The Penny-farthing 
excluded women because of its technological design and influenced norms that it was 
inappropriate for "ladies" to ride a bicycle (Bijker et al., 1987, pp. 17-50). Because it had 
several advantages and could be used by more diverse user groups, the air-pressure design 
became hegemonic in discourse and reached closure, so hegemonic in fact that this design 
of the bike is still dominant today. Closure in STS means that interpretative flexibility ends 
and a technological artifact gets a stable identity, a dominant design and usage modality. A 
dominant design refers to a kind of production standard, a way to produce things. While in 
the early stages of technological development, often there is no standard and 
experimentation by competing manufacturers goes on and over time one design will 
become dominant. A certain development path gets locked-in.
For SCOT, social equals technical construction. Different social groups (engineers, 
sport-enthusiasts, dandies, workers, women) engage in articulatory practices that aim to 
reduce interpretative flexibility of artifacts by fixing the meaning of technology. At the 
same time, the artifact constitutes or reimburses social identity, for example that of upper-
class dandies or that of women as fragile as well as norms guiding the appropriate behavior 
of these identities. Pinch and Bijker explain the process of stabilization of meaning with 
the concept of technological frames that define problems, problem-solving strategies, 
theories, tacit knowledge, testing procedures, design methods, user practices, and 
exemplary artifacts (Matthewman, 2011, pp. 95-96).
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"A technological frame structures the interactions among the members of a relevant 
social group and shapes their thinking and acting. It is similar to Kuhn’s concept of 
"paradigm" with one important difference: "technological frame" is a concept to be 
applied to all kinds of relevant social groups, while "paradigm" was exclusively 
intended for scientific communities. A technological frame is built up when 
interaction "around" an artifact begins. In this way, the existing practices does 
guide future practice, though without logical determination. The cyclical movement 
thus becomes artifact → technological frame → relevant social group → new 
artifact → new technological frame → new relevant social group → etc" (Bijker, 
2008, p. 685).
Here, we can see similarities between the theoretical debates of advocacy coalitions 
and their competing paradigms within STS. Technological and political frames share the 
same logic and the same function, but deal with different problems. If technologies are 
treated as text, we can adopt all the theories that have been discussed so far. Furthermore, 
it can be assumed that the logic of paradigm change works according to the same 
parameters. Thus the argument is that different advocacy coalitions hold different 
paradigms that shape their interpretation of a technology (technological frame). Paradigms 
are in a discursive struggle, trying to attach their preferred meaning to an artifact by trying 
to convince their competitors in discourse with help of the social framing strategies 
discussed earlier (see chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms). 
Figure 7. Social Construction of Technology (own diagram)
According to SCOT, this means that there is no essence, no ghost in the machine that 
makes some artifacts automatically and objectively political. Rather, technological artifacts 
can become politicized in certain contexts, depending on cultural and societal elements. A 
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simple shoe for example does not seem to be that political in Western countries. However, 
it can become political in the Middle East when it is thrown at political leaders. This points 
us to the idea that the political qualities of technical artifacts are a function of several 
elements: the goal oriented construction and the values underlying the invention, the 
technical realization of the product (problem solving), the meaning construction and 
discourse around the object and the intended and actual use by users in certain contexts 
and practices. All these elements will be analyzed in the following chapters and also 
structure the empirical part of this thesis.
Constructivism is not without its critics. One of the big problems of the concept of 
interpretative flexibility is to decide when it stops. Even though the bicycle is a relatively 
stable, locked-in concept now (with two rubber wheels and a metal frame), the design is 
still contested by bike-enthusiasts because there have been further developments (new 
materials, new braking systems, new suspension forks etc.) or even new bike-designs (like 
recumbent bicycles). It is always somewhat arbitrary to set a point in time and declare a 
meaning and a technological design is temporally fixed and taken for granted. This 
problem is increased with digital technologies, which will be introduced a little bit later 
(see chap. 2.3.7 Digital Technology: Software and Code). Digital artifacts have no fixed 
material structure because they can be updated and modified relatively easily. There is no 
apparent solution to this problem and therefore the researcher is responsible to make 
his/her decision about closure moments as transparent as possible. 
 Geoffrey Herrera argues that constructivist approaches focus only on the emergence of 
technologies, but not on their effects or political implications after they have left the 
workshop (Herrera, 2003, p. 573). Similarly, Langdon Winner criticizes SCOT by saying it 
neglects the marginalizing and power effects that technology can have (Winner, 1993). 
This criticism is valid and I am sympathetic towards it, but it is not a critique of the 
constructivist logic and epistemology per se, but rather of its political implications. The 
problem can be solved easily with modified research designs, not just by looking at 
technological emergence, but also use and diffusion, as I will outline in the next chapter. In 
IR, critical constructivists already addressed this issue by pointing to power effects of 
social constructions, aiming to deconstruct taken-for-granted meanings in order to 
emancipate (Collective, 2006). 
A general critique against constructivism is the relativism argument claiming that 
anything goes, as long as it is socially constructed (Herrera, 2003). In this view, a nuclear 
weapon can have any meaning, from being peacemaker to a weapon of mass destruction. I 
have addressed this critique earlier (see chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between 
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Paradigms). A similar critique is offered by proponents of the Actor-Network-Theory 
which argue that there is an overdetermination of the social and neglect of the "thingness 
of things" (Latour, 2000, p. 112). SCOT tends to favor the social over the hard material of 
artifacts.
"At the extreme end of social constructionism (what we could call social 
determinism) material artifacts are forgotten altogether. Everything focuses on the 
social. The functionality and physicality of technologies disappears. Materiality is 
relegated to a residual category. Technologies are merely social constructions. This 
means that they exert no agency of their own, they have no effects. Their 
significance is only symbolic" (Matthewman, 2011, p. 18).
We should take Latour’s criticism seriously and avoid the extreme notions of social-
determinism and focus on the "thingness of things", the material artifact itself. The 
material structure of artifacts has some influence on the possibilities of meaning 
construction in discourse, as well on norms that develop out of using that technology. 
Some artifacts simply cannot be used for certain things because of their material 
properties. A hammer simply cannot have the function of an electron-microscope. This 
means that artifacts have different probabilities for meaning attachment. The artifact itself 
limits the interpretative flexibility. This means that in contrast to social determinism, the 
causality can go in both directions – the social determines the technical but in that process, 
there is a feedback loop from the technical to the social.19 Verbeek calls this co-shaping 
between the social and technology: "What humans are and what their world is receive their 
form by artifactual mediation. Mediation does not simply take place between a subject and 
an object, but rather co-shapes subjectivity and objectivity" (Verbeek, 2005, p. 130). The 
invention of the railroad illustrates the cognitive shaping capacity. Verbeek argues that 
train traveling altered the perception of the landscape (distance itself) and also time, 
because suddenly it was possible to bridge long distances in short time which had never 
been possible before. Suddenly, time became more important, because trains needed 
precise schedules and standardized times. This co-shaping perspective is important because 
it assumes that new ideas, norms or paradigms develop out of using a new technology. 
Thus, paradigms do not always determine the interpretation of a technology but technology 
often leads to new paradigms. Galilei’s invention of a new telescope for example provided, 
19 This problem is similar to the structure-agency debate in IR (Wendt, 1987) and sociology (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998). Anthony Gidden’s concept of structuration also is helpful because he theorized the bi-
directional nature of the structure and agency (Giddens, 1984). The advantage of STS is that it deals with 
tangible things like material culture. Whereas constructivism in IR often deals with ideational things that 
cannot be touched and thus, theoretically are more open to interpretation. This means that IR does not only 
benefit from imports from STS, but also vice versa.
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for the first time, the empirical data to validate the heliocentric paradigm proposed by 
Copernicus.
To study the probability of certain interpretations, Gibson imported the socio-
psychological concept of affordances to STS, which is used to describe the limitation of 
interpretative flexibility (Gibson, 1979). Affordances are defined as "functional and 
relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for agent action in 
relation to an object" (Hutchby, 2001, p. 444). Affordances are a perceived property of a 
technical artifact that gives clues towards its use. This means that in the case of constructed 
matter, technological artifacts have a preferred reading built into them. This is not to be 
confused with determinism or essentialism, but rather a matter of probability which is 
affected by an objects' material features. Affordances do not change relative to the position 
of the observer. The edibility of a substance does not depend on hunger. Eating the wrong 
fruit can kill a human, independent of social constructions. Thus, Hutchby argues that there 
are some material effects that cannot be talked away: "the fact that a bullet fired from a gun 
has effects on flesh and bone that are intrinsic to the gun and bullet, and cannot be altered 
by social constructions" (Hutchby, 2001, p. 447). A bullet-firing mechanism has 
destructive properties per design and therefore it is very likely that humans will interpret a 
gun as killing device rather than a means of telecommunication (although a sound-based 
signal system is conceivable). If this was not the case, archeologists would not be able to 
determine the probable use of material artifacts they dig out. This does not mean that this is 
the only possible interpretation.
Another element that reduces interpretative flexibility is the concept of utility. 
Artifacts are designed to do things more efficiently and better. They might aim at 
maximizing utility. It is theoretically possible that I can use a fork to eat soup, but it is 
highly inefficient. A spoon does a better job. Therefore, it is more likely that a spoon is 
used for eating soup (which is a result of its design). Design delimits possibilities of action 
and interpretative flexibility. Interestingly, the word derives from the latin "designare" 
which means to signify, which is in line with Saussurean linguistics introduced earlier (see 
chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms). I use the Oxford english dictionary 
definition of design: "A plan or drawing produced to show the look and function or 
workings of a building, garment, or other object before it is made" (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2017). Design is not understood as the way something looks, but rather how it 
works. It refers to functionality as well. But the design process is just the first step. The 
second step is made by the user. According to Hutchby, this works similar to 
conventionally paired actions like invitations and responses: a practice demanding a 
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reciprocal action (Hutchby, 2001). He criticizes that the SCOT approach falsely inverts 
this relationship – technologies are seen as formless first moves in the sequence and that 
the second move, the interpretation defines what the technology is. Rather, we need to look 
at both, material properties and the realm of possible readings. 
This discussion implicates that it is not enough to look at the process of construction 
alone, but do adopt a holistic perspective on technology that includes usage and discourse 
as well. We also need to consider the possibility of co-shaping of artifacts while they are in 
use. The next chapter introduces a temporal model that accounts for this.
2.3.5 Phase Model of Technological Diffusion
We have already established that technology does not pop into existence out of thin air, it 
is not exogenous to social development and it is not teleologically determined. Rather it is 
a process where different social, economic, political and technological factors come 
together which shape the socio-technological system. 
Weyer proposed a multi-tiered model of technological diffusion – from invention to 
mainstream diffusion a technology (Weyer et al., 1997, p. 31). 
Figure 8. Phase Model of Technology (own diagram)
This model helps to explain who influences a technology, when and how, both technically 
and socially. The construction is carried out over time by changing actors which have 
competing visions (paradigms) about technology and who are in a discursive struggle over 
dominant technical designs and social meanings. Whereas the SCOT approach mostly 
analyzes the first closure moment of technology, this model allows us to theorize later 
points in time (the effects of a technology). The model assumes three development periods: 
1) emergence/construction, 2) stabilization of a design and a prototype and 3) diffusion to 
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the mainstream (market diffusion). At the end of each phase, there is some kind of closure 
that has path-dependency effects towards the next phase. Technology diffusion is no 
automatic process but social. The model adopts neither social nor technological 
determinism (Weyer et al., 1997, p. 34).
The model is based on the investment-cost S-curve20 and includes designers, 
marketers and users of a technology. It argues that these matter during the different stages 
of technical and social construction. In the early stages, the influence of the designers on 
the social meaning construction is higher, but as soon as a technology reaches a mass-
market, the users engage in the construction of meaning and social norms as well. While in 
the beginning, there naturally is a limited coalition of users who speak about the artifact, 
over time, as mainstream diffusion kicks in, more users will engage with the technology. 
This opens up the discursive space and more and different actors will negotiate the 
meaning of the artifact and also might establish new usage-scenarios. 
It is important to note that during each juncture there is the possibility of failure: a 
visionary idea might not be developed. A finished prototype might not make it to the 
market because of insufficient start-up capital or socio-economic factors that prevent 
success. With each juncture, alternative technical solutions to social problems are 
evaluated and a certain design is favored over others. Design A might be adopted and sold 
at the market, whereas alternative design B is abandoned or re-modified and re-introduced 
in a different context. This is called a forking path of technological design. An alternative 
design can become a spin-off project initiating an individual path trajectory. Historically, 
the alternative forks are often forgotten (Zeppelins for example are a "forgotten" fork on 
the pathway of aviation). Forks are like railroad switches, that changes the direction of the 
train (Rueschmeyer, 2008, p. 234). The aforementioned war of the currents between 
Nikola Tesla and Thomas Edison is such an example of closure: Edison had the greater 
resources and the better support network (including political access) to make (the inferior) 
DC-electrical current a standard during the early days of electricity in the United States. 
Edison also engaged in the social meaning construction by framing the competitor as an 
evil technology that can kill people, utilizing AC to power the first electric chair (King, 
2011). The direct current mass-diffused through the market and established a dominant 
pathway. DC became the dominant design for electrical currents in the US: Tesla’s AC 
current forked and developed on a different path, becoming more dominant in Europe. 
20 It means that before a technology becomes profitable, it requires initial investment. At some point, 
diffusion kicks off and a product becomes profitable. Over time, the product reaches peak diffusion and then 
sales decline, until the product disappears, often because it becomes replaced by a successor technology.
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Within the social context of climate change and the need to preserve energy, the AC 
current finally replaced DC current, even in the US.
2.3.5.1 Emergence/Construction
This chapter aims to highlight the construction/emergence and design process of 
technology and what role paradigms play therein. The first step in technological life-cycles 
is the process of invention where the influence of the designer to shape the artifact is at its 
highest. An act of construction is never neutral or value free but rather resembles the 
cultural features of the context and the personal biases and paradigms of the inventors that 
often become embedded in technological artifacts. So why are technologies invented and 
constructed in the first place?
Technology often deals with the realization of certain goals (called goal-oriented 
construction). Technological devices are designed to perform a function that helps to solve 
problems, like survival in a hostile environment. The goals could be manifold, for example 
making processes more efficient, more reliable, more precise or even to realize something 
in the first place, like flying or traveling to the Moon (Häußling, 2010, p. 624). This need 
not always be rational. Some technologies, like toys, self-deactivating machines or 
sculptures are invented for no obvious necessity reasons. Many inventions are solutions 
looking for problems, meaning that the inventor does not yet know what practical 
implications an invention will have and whether it has any commercial potential. This 
sometimes only becomes obvious during the stabilization or diffusion phase. 
The invention or construction phase is not a straightforward process from goal to 
design, to a working prototype, to market diffusion. Chance is an important factor in every 
innovation process and many inventions, like Penicillin, were made by accident. A design 
seldom falls from the sky like Isaac Newton’s apple. Rather, often a trial and error process 
leads to a design (deductive tinkering). During this conceptual phase, important decisions 
are made. What is the nature of the problem (cause) to be solved? Where does it occur, is 
there a pattern? The norms and ideas of the designer and the context of invention pre-
structure goal-formation and the appropriate solution strategies to solve the problem, as 
was shown before (see chap. 2.2.3 Degrees of Change). Remember that a problem is 
defined as such only when there is a social group for which it constitutes a "problem" 
(Bijker et al., 1987, p. 30). What actually constitutes a problem worth solving depends on 
the inventor’s socialization and world view (or paradigms).
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"Just as artists naturally express their artistic values in their art, so do the makers of 
technologies. If, for instance, price is more important than safety in the minds of 
the manufacturers, their products will undoubtedly embody that trade-off" (Tiles & 
Oberdiek, 1995, p. 46).
Organizational cultures and the structural context of innovation also matter. It makes a 
difference whether a technology developed within a military or a civil context. The result 
is a core invention, a central idea that represents the identity of the artifact but is not yet 
the prototype. According to Weyer, this core consists of two elements, a technical 
configuration like a construction principle and a social configuration (Weyer et al., 1997, 
p. 37). This is where norms come in.
The technical-instrumental configuration can be called a design or construction 
principle that often is only known by the inventors of a product. Therefore, their voice is 
important in researching this goal. A design principle could be to make a system as reliable 
or as easy to use as possible. To speak in a metaphor – the intention and subjective beliefs 
of the initial designer are engraved into his invention; he puts the ghost into the machine 
by shaping the object. This is where the technological bias or affordance for certain 
practices and values comes from. Of course there are alternative ways of solving the same 
problem (again, think AC and DC currents). This means that a design decision always is 
the reduction of possibilities, the exclusion of alternative designs. This is similar to 
discursive articulations and one might even argue that design is a discursive act. For 
example, most tools are developed for right-handed humans, and exclude "lefties". More 
so, a design decision shares the characteristics of an articulation in discourse theory.
The second component is the social configuration or an anticipated arrangement of 
relevant actors (both creators and users). Often it is not just one inventor but a social 
network of supporters. This means that group dynamics should be researched as well. The 
designer(s) anticipate(s) both usage scenarios and potential users as well as the appropriate 
roles for the users, as the Penny-farthing example showed (see chap. 2.3.4 The Social 
Construction of Technology and its Critique). This is where power components and norms 
come in. The design implicates that a technology should be used in a certain way, 
implicating norms of practice. Here it becomes clear that during the process of 
construction, different actors matter at different points in time. The construction process 
according to an integrated functionalist and social constructivist argument looks like the 
following figure, which combines insights from the previous theory chapters: 
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Figure 9. Relationship of Paradigms and Artifacts (own diagram)
The designer holds a certain pattern of ideas and norms which I have called paradigms 
and which outline the problem an artifact is designed to solve, the technical solution to the 
problem (which becomes the design) and the anticipated usage modalities (user 
subjectivities) as well as the preferred meaning. During the construction process, this 
paradigm becomes embedded into the artifact, more precisely in its social dimension 
(matching orange color). The artifact temporally means what the designer intended and 
includes the norms he/she envisioned. Often this is a bidirectional process. The artifact can 
influence the paradigm, especially because during the next phase, stabilization, where new 
ideas are developed.
2.3.5.2 Stabilization
Stabilization is the process from experimentation and tinkering with ideas towards a 
working prototype. To be successful, an artifact's usage context must be widened and 
therefore, it must be transferred and translated from the workshop to a market of 
customers. Inventors often have no business or marketing experience and therefore, much 
depends on establishing the right connections to the industry. This is often realized by 
cooperation or partnerships, which connects inventors and strategic actors. During the 
stabilization phase, the loose and informal inventor network is expanded and often other 
actors come in (politics, military, corporations and hardware suppliers), which results in a 
recombination of relevant actors and their social structure surrounding the artifact (Weyer 
et al., 1997, pp. 40-46).
Resource exchange and bargaining processes between the actors further influences 
the design process. Different interested actors debate about the vision and the artifact itself, 
which means that there is a discourse within the network about the design and its meaning, 
norms and target social context. For example, an artifact that was initially intended for the 
consumer market might be interesting for the military, which then demands ruggedization 
of the design, making it more robust in combat. This might alter the design and function of 
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the artifact again. At some point, central design features are chosen. Although the identity 
of the socio-technical core remains the same, certain adaptions and refinements happen in 
this stage in order to allow a marketization of a product. 
For a successful stabilization several conditional factors matter: 1) the technological 
design of a product must be good enough to reach a wider audience. If it is buggy or 
unintuitive, it will most likely fail because users will not adopt it. 2) The entrepreneurship 
of the company or funders matters. It is a quite complex endeavor to bring a product to 
mass production and to distribute it worldwide. There are production, transportation and 
marketing costs involved, which often are too high for small start-up companies. 
Therefore, their product must convince potential donors as well as a target audience, which 
might not be the same. Thus, the initial design of a product comes under scrutiny during 
this phase, because if a potential donor demands changes, it alters the technology. 3) The 
mainstream must be receptive for a new technology. Sometimes the time is not "ripe", so 
timing matters as well as the cultural technological background context. The crucial test is 
to see if a product works outside laboratory conditions. Lots of projects never reach the 
end of the stabilization phase because of incomplete innovation. If the social network can 
successful stabilize the socio-technological core, its stabilization leads to marketing 
success and the diffusion to the mainstream begins (Weyer et al., 1997, pp. 40-46).
2.3.5.3 Diffusion to the Mainstream
Diffusion of technology aims at finding or creating a market for the artifact, thus initiating 
a demand-pull and a self-sustaining user demand for the new artifact (see chap. 2.3.2 
Defining Technology). The problem most technology face is that most users are 
conservative: they do not adopt a technology just because it is new. Users need to be 
convinced that the technology is useful and better than alternatives. This is often the 
function of marketing and discursive framing of a technology. The creation of a usage 
vision, narrative and new usage scenarios is key here (Weyer et al., 1997, p. 47). This is 
often done with pilot studies or public presentations. This is also a de-contextualization: 
the new artifact must be successfully embedded in new usage contexts outside the 
workshop and the place of invention. Without a new usage context, technology is less 
likely to successfully diffuse. Weyer gives the example of satellites, which were developed 
and stabilized in the context of NASA and the military but became adopted by the 
television industry which drove the mainstream adoption. The transmission of television 
was a new usage context (Weyer et al., 1997, p. 47). This opens up the possibility for the 
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creation of new norms as well. The key challenge is that the new artifact must fit to new 
contexts and users. 
Social embeddedness is a key condition for an artifact's success. It means that the 
technology must be compatible with the demand of new impact constituencies, i.e. users. 
Another term could be resonance. This is a two-fold process: the technology must offer 
new usage scenarios that resonate with a target audience while at the same time being open 
for feedback and change based on the user’s input. This means that technology must be 
open enough to "listen" to its users in the sense that its design cannot be too radical that 
potential users do not know how to use it. This is done by making technology simpler in 
use or by framing it in terms of older but familiar technology.21 However, it is often the 
case that society adapts to a technology and not vice versa (Weyer et al., 1997, pp. 50-52).
If a technology diffuses successfully it has the chance to become a dominant design 
or a quasi-standard. If this is the case, a technology becomes a template for other artifacts 
that begin to mimic its functionality, look and feel (isomorphism). How this occurs is hard 
to predict by theory. A whole field of innovation studies deals with this question which 
cannot be answered in this thesis (Fagerberg, Mowery, & Nelson, 2006). 
What can be stated is that when technology is used in the real world, different 
unforeseen things can happen because of deviant or unintended use, which can be the 
source of new innovation. The wider the audience, the more possible usage scenarios 
emerge and the higher the chance for usage variation and deviant use – a criminal will use 
a smartphone for his purposes and an academic will use it to enhance his research. This 
means that deviant usage scenarios produce new external effects such as threats that 
emerge when a large variety of users engages with a product. It can be hypothesized that 
the more negatively the impact of a technology is perceived, the more likely a political 
reaction becomes. The threat of cyber-crime only became possible because the usage 
practices of the average user produce systemic insecurities of computer systems (see chap. 
4.4.1 Background: Growing Awareness of Computer Insecurity (1967 - 2011)). This will 
bring new players like security experts, the police and the military to the discourse. These 
new actors will try to alter the course of the technology according to their paradigms and 
working logics. Different new advocacy groups like different political parties, economic 
actors or security actors such as the military are likely to influence the course of 
development. Politicians will adopt new laws aiming to steer or to regulate the 
development of this new technology, shaping the social impact it might have. Therefore, 
21 The term "horsepower" for example frames the capability of a motor car in reference to the technology it 
replaced, i.e. horses.
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we have to include the advocacy coalition framework and the influence of politics at this 
stage. I have already outlined how to conceptualize techno-political paradigms and 
policies.
2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks
Let’s take a closer look at how the diffusion process adds politics and norms to an artifact 
and how these social dynamics between different actors during different stages works. I 
will incorporate ideas from Pfaffenberger, who dealt with the normative implications of 
technology from an anthropological perspective (Pfaffenberger, 1992a). The advantage of 
this theory is that it incorporates the usage dimension of technology as well as the role 
norms and discourse play therein. Also, he shares many premises outlined so far, for 
example that designers, either intentionally or unintentionally, embed norms in their 
artifacts (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 283). Construction for him is both technical and social. 
It is not just a technical process but also a discursive one, since these technical features are 
discursively legitimized. He gives the example of Ford’s assembly line which:
"[…] was not only a novel and efficient method of assembling automobiles; by 
taking control away from the worker and centralizing it in management’s hands, it 
also protected American society from the potentially chaotic and disruptive work 
force of Southern and Eastern European immigrants by forcing them to accept a 
work life of regimented, disciplined docility" (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 283).
He calls this interaction of the technical and the social a "technological drama […] a 
discourse of technological "statements" and "counterstatements" (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 
283). This is not a strait linear process but includes three different steps of acts: 
technological regularization, technological adjustment, and technological re-constitution. 
Technological regularization refers to the design process. During the goal-oriented 
construction a design constituency (the designer or a group of them) "creates, appropriates, 
or modifies a technological production process, artifact, user activity, or system in such a 
way that some of its technical features embody a political aim that is, an intention to alter 
the allocation of power, prestige, or wealth in a social formation" (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 
285). In other words, technical construction is a bi-directional process in which both 
norms and the design alter each other. This socio-technical construction creates subject 
identities, the social-configuration, vis-à-vis the object (the user, the administrator, the 
dandy etc.) who have different possibilities of influence. It constructs the appropriate usage 
modalities of different actors, for example their degree of autonomy. Pfaffenberger 
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theorizes a list of different strategies for regularization of which I can name only a few 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a, pp. 291-294).
For example exclusion, where access to the technology and its social context is 
denied to persons who are of a certain race, class, gender, or fit into certain achievement 
categories (women and the Penny-farthing). Differential incorporation, where technology 
is designed in a way that social categories, like stratification, are incorporated (for example 
the Volksempfänger radio). Similar is polarization, which means that a spin-off artifact is 
created to incorporate class, gender or other categories (think pink guns, marketed for 
women). Segregation, where access to an artifact is restricted, for example with a pay-wall 
so that poorer users cannot afford all functions and centralization, where user autonomy is 
limited by some central administrator or access to artifacts is centralized (like the early 
mainframe computers at universities, see chap. 4.2.1 Background: the practice of 
computing in the 1950s). Marginalization is a technique where persons of a subordinate 
class get inferior versions of an artifact to reinforce status distinctions. In slave societies, 
servants often were not allowed to have cushions on their chairs (Pfaffenberger, 1992b, p. 
503). With delegation, a technical feature of an artifact is deliberately designed to make up 
for presumed moral deficiencies in its users and is actively projected into the social 
contexts of use (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, pp. 291-294). Delegators are technical features that 
enforce norm compliance and appropriate behavior. The engine of modern cars often does 
not start if the seatbelt is not buckled-in. 
Pfaffenberger argues that the technological design is not enough to create normative 
or power effects, but that these technical features must be "discursively regulated by 
surrounding it with symbolic media that mystify and therefore constitute the political aims 
[…] the function of which is to regulate social behavior so that the artifact’s political 
intentions come to life" (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 294). In other words, there must be a 
discourse or a narrative that legitimizes why these delegators are in place and this is what 
creates the politics of artifacts. Here, Pfaffenberger comes close to discourse theory (see 
chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms). The power-relationship between 
those actors and technology is established by what Laclau and Mouffe would call a 
hegemonic technology discourse, which excludes alternative meanings and exercises a 
certain type of discursive power. Such a technology discourse establishes a dominant way 
of understanding artifacts. The social side of artifacts, including their norms of appropriate 
use, must be activated, our acted out in discourse. The idea is that social context enacts the 
power potential of technology is an anti-essentialist statement – the power essence is not in 
the artifact, but results of the interplay of artifact and social context. Norms or power 
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intentions might be embedded in artifacts, but they only exist as power potentials and as 
such belong to the field of discursivity and are a matter of interpretative flexibility. The 
intention of the designer might have been discrimination, but if this discrimination is 
actually perceived by impact constituencies (the actual users of technology), is a matter of 
context and discourse.
The second phase of the technological drama is called technological adjustment which 
represents compensating strategies by the impact constituencies that use a technology 
(after or during market diffusion). Adjustment aims at making the implications of 
regularization either bearable or to get rid of them. Pfaffenberger theorizes three variants of 
adjustment: counter-signification, counter-appropriation and counter-delegation. All these 
can be seen as counter-articulations, directed at altering the hegemonic paradigm to 
different degrees.
Counter signification can be seen as a normal mode of discursive struggle about 
establishing a different meaning. "Counter signification decomposes and rehistoricizes the 
meanings embodied in artifact" (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 300). Basically it is substituting 
one discourse for another by establishing a different fixation of meanings. One strategy can 
be to undermine moral authority of an artifact, which resembles the idea of injustice frames 
from frame-research (see chap. 2.2.2 Framing). Other strategies can include framing, 
highlighting contradictions and ambiguities within the hegemonic frame of the designers. 
The aim is to unmask the power relations. Pfaffenberger calls these little acts of subversion 
counterstatements and they aim to alter the social context that regularization creates 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 285). Generally speaking they try to contest the hegemonic 
discourse (like the efficiency of Ford’s assembly lines) with counter evidence and 
reframing (inhuman work conditions). As a result of such strategies, a new technical frame 
can emerge, which leads to new problem definitions and solution possibilities. Counter 
statements articulate different ideas and normative ideas and bring them together in 
networks of meaning. Therefore, counter signification often is the first step in the 
establishment of counter-paradigms which reinterpret how technology should be used and 
what it means. If social organization is successful, a user network adhering to a certain 
paradigm can be the result. Other strategies could include gaining access to the artifact or 
system from which they have been excluded and thereby trying to reshape it. Counter 
signification stays at the level of text and discourse. 
Counter appropriation often includes socio-spatial strategies to gain access to a 
technology which is prevented by exclusion strategies. The strategy "involves a 
reinterpretation of the dominant discourse in such a way that their access to the technology 
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is morally legitimated. It may also involve attempts to acquire and to operate the artifacts" 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 302). The 1830s "Swing Riots" and acts of political sabotage 
could represent hostile attempts of counter appropriaton.22
Counter delegation is particularly interesting for this dissertation because it happens on 
the material dimension; it changes the technical design of an artifact to alter regularization 
strategies. It includes tricking the aforementioned delegator techniques. In the digital 
world, hacking, understood in its original sense as someone who opens up technology to 
see and learn how it works, resembles counter delegation. (see chap. 4.2.1 Background: 
Hacker-ethic and Technical Optimism (1960s)).
Regularization effects normally require some time to become visible. Adjustment 
happens when dissatisfaction with a technological artifact occurs, for example if it does not 
work how it should or if its malfunction is so severe that it has a social impact (like 
accidents). Therefore, adjustment strategies require problem recognition by impact 
constituencies, i.e. the users of a technology. The framing literature has shown that 
problem recognition depends on the severeness of the problem (see chap. 2.2.2 Framing). 
As such, we can discern two possible outcomes of market-diffusion (see following figure): 
either users do not perceive a negative impact from regularization and as such they follow 
the usage modalities and intentions that have been laid out in the design. In that case they 
act according to the inventor’s logic (they enact the paradigm, depicted in orange) and in 
this case, nothing happens. The alternative case is more interesting because it can lead to 
technological change. Counter articulations are put forward by impact constituencies, i.e. 
deviant users of a technology who resist the regularization embedded in artifacts for 
various reasons. Here, the social side and actor perspective becomes central again. It is not 
just the designer that has visions about how a technology should be used and what its 
functions should be. Users have something to say, too. 
22 Pfaffenberger offers the example of women in aviation. The dominant paradigm during the early days of 
aviation was male-dominated. It was only appropriate for men to fly and the pilot identity was constructed as 
some kind of noble daredevil or "aces" with a certain moral code including bravery and chivalry. This is 
because early pilots often came from the nobility (think Baron von Richthofen). When women like Amelia 
Earhart started to challenge this, they reframed the discourse of high-risk aviation to something that is safe 
enough that women can do it  (Pfaffenberger, 1992a, p. 302).
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Figure 10. Technical Adjustment Process (own diagram)
The figure shows the impact of a technology on its users. If users simply adopt the 
artifacts as intended by the designers, they often adapt to the preferred meaning (indicated 
in orange). In other words, the norms and ideas embedded in the artifact potentially 
resonate with the user. The user affirms, internalizes and potentially reifies these norms. If 
this is the case, norm diffusion through technology can be successful.
 If a design does not fit the expectations of those who use it (because it is badly 
executed) then they will resist the regularization (indicated blue). Thus, deviant users 
become a relevant category for analysis. Sometimes they feel patronized by technology, 
sometimes they think they can execute functions better than the artifact lets them or they 
simply have a certain experimental attitude towards technology. More so, often impact 
constituencies of course hold their own paradigms and expectations and there can be 
incompatibilities with the hegemonic one. Alternatively, the impact of regularization can 
lead to the establishment of a whole new paradigm that is a reaction towards the 
hegemonic one, a counter discourse which can result in a social-movement.
Adjustment is a feedback mechanism that aims at reconstituting the technical artifact, 
but primarily its social side (its form or signifiers) and not primarily its technological 
design (although this is possible). Counter articulations that aim at the technological side 
are called technological reconstitution:
"In technological reconstitution, impact constituencies actively reshape 
technological production processes or artifacts guided by a self-consciously 
"revolutionary" ideology, producing what I call counter artifacts. This ideology is 
produced by means of a symbolic inversion called antisignification" (Pfaffenberger, 
1992a, p. 304).
2.3 Technological and Normative Change
107
It resembles the category of the other that challenges the design-paradigm, which is at 
the same time the very reason why the counter paradigm exists. Several elements come 
together here. 
Loose networks of deviant users come together to form advocacy coalitions and engage 
in a variety of technological changes. One can be the establishment of counter-contexts of 
artifact use. As we have seen, designers intend a usage context but it happens that a device 
becomes placed into a new context. Another can be the creation of counter-artifacts or the 
severe modification of dominant designs. Here the technological cycle begins from the 
start. A counter-artifact is a new instance of goal oriented construction. The counter 
artifact’s design compensates the regularization effects from the previous one. This is the 
very idea of technological development. Counter-artifacts and counter-contexts also tend to 
produce new actor categories and subject identities which form in relation to context and 
artifact. More so, new actors in different contexts are also the fertile ground for the 
development of new ideas, norms and even paradigms. This in turn influences the 
discourse, which also evolves. With new artifacts, new regularization strategies and the 
reshaping of discourse begin. The new artifact, if it succeeds, has opportunities to become 
hegemonic itself. This is the very instance of a change of dominant technological 
paradigms and, at the same time, a change of the dominant design. Paradigm change 
produces change in technology, which is the very core argument of this dissertation. 
The following figure shows that with the impact of an artifact on the market 
(mainstream diffusion), new usage modalities begin to emerge. There are those who follow 
the logic of the inventor’s paradigm (orange) and those who do not (blue). Deviant users 
are important, because they engage in contestation practices in terms of discursive 
adjustment, but also in terms of re-constitution, the creation of counter-artifacts (artifact 2). 
These counter-artifacts include the perceived problems the group has with the dominant 
artifacts and thus resembles their norms and values. Pfaffenberger reminds us that the 
reconstitution of an artifact itself is a new form of regularization. Not only is a new 
technology constructed, but also new usage visions and power potentials get implemented 
in the new technical design, which are inspired by the new paradigm. A new usage context 
and new subject positions are constructed at the same time. Also, political values, norms 
and technology co-shape during this reconstruction.
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Figure 11. Technical & Political Reconstitution (own diagram)
 At the same time, the reconstituted artifact often includes elements of the old one as 
well (indicated by the orange/blue color transition). The same steps of the goal-orientation 
process and paradigm formation can be seen here. If all goes well, the new artifact can 
reach mainstream diffusion and can itself have an impact on its users. This creates a 
forking development from the original paradigm, an alternative development path for a 
technology.
 In the figure, I have also included the findings from the previous chapters (see chap. 
2.2.1 Policy Paradigms). If an artifact reaches mainstream diffusion, often political actors 
begin to engage with a technology as well. The struggle between different technical 
communities often gets politicized, too, especially when an artifact has political impacts or 
if policies try to regulate the technology market. This means that there can be a 
correspondence between technical paradigms and political paradigms, or even an entire 
assimilation, for example when technical developers or companies engage in the political 
process, like forming technical advocacy groups or when technology companies begin 
lobbying efforts. So during mainstream diffusion, it is not just designers and users who 
engage in the meaning adjustment and technical reconstitution, but also politicians and 
political advocacy coalitions. Policy thus could be a fourth way to change the course of a 
technology. This will become clearer with software code and law.
2.3.7 Digital Technology: Software and Code
The aim of this chapter is to add the digital component, which is the very basis for 
understanding normative change of the object of study: the Internet. It offers, for now, a 
basic introduction to what the Internet is. A more detailed description will follow in the 
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case study (see chap. 4.1 Engineering the Internet). For now it is sufficient to understand 
the Internet technology as a multilayered entity consisting of material and digital or 
software elements. 
Digital technology transcends dichotomy of matter and form and overcomes many of 
the limitations of the material artifacts. Software can be copied and cloned without quality 
loss. It can be distributed quickly, constantly changes its form and can get new possibilities 
with updates. Furthermore, all these theoretical elements I have discussed so far culminate 
in software, as this chapter will make clear. Software programming is also the best 
example for why we can treat technical artifacts as texts. Software code is written in a 
programming language that has its own grammar and syntax. Software is basically text that 
does something (act) and what it does is determined by the code. In computer science, code 
is generally understood as a set of instructions or commands that can be executed by a 
computer and that is written by a programmer in a programming language (such as Java, C 
or C++). Code tells the computer what it should do and how it should use its available 
resources in order to produce a result. The result of code can be manifold, but we see the 
outcomes on our computer screens, from operating systems to programs, video-games, 
software for managing electricity grids, finance or even cyber-attacks. Code limits the 
range of possibilities for human interaction with a digital technology and pre-structures 
agency. The Internet itself is built on a series of different code elements which govern how 
information (for example E-mails) is handled and transmitted around the globe with the 
help of physical hardware such as routers and fiber optic cables. In sum, code delimits the 
range of possibilities of what humans can do with computers and as such it has various 
degrees of power over us, directly and indirectly. This is relevant because code is written, 
or man-made by other humans and as such it is never neutral. 
Lawrence Lessig was one among the first scholars who theorized about the relevance 
of code. In his influential book "Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace" he argues that:
"Code codifies values, and yet, oddly, most people speak as if code were just a 
question of engineering. Or as if code is best left to the market. Or best left 
unaddressed by government" (Lessig, 2006, p. 79).
Code is an invisible hand governing the workings of computers and cyberspace, which 
is a man-made system of interconnected computers. The arrangements of codes, sometimes 
called architecture, define how something works and what can be done with it. For Lessig, 
"code is a regulator in cyberspace because it defines the terms upon which cyberspace is 
offered" and that the people who live on the Internet are subject to that regulation (Lessig, 
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2006, p. 84). But it is not just about regulation but also about values and norms, which are 
developed and implemented (and in fact written) in code.23 
Lessig gives two (historical) examples of competing software architectures for 
networking that represent and enact completely different paradigms and norms through 
programming code. The Chicago Model is a network architecture that does not have any 
entry barriers in order to connect. You simply login and you are connected to the 
worldwide Internet. No password or registration is required. Access is free and 
communication within the network anonymous (that means no data is stored about a 
computer’s web surfing history), because it was decided to be this way by the 
administrators of the network. Lessig argues that the Chicago network architecture 
intentionally reflected the norms of the first amendment and that of a liberal policy 
paradigm. The architecture allows anonymity and freedom of information because of an 
intentional a policy decision of the universities dean (Lessig, 2006, p. 33). Paradigm-
inspired network policies shaped network architecture and the norms of usage. The free 
and open Chicago model, with its respect for the first amendment, was the norm of Internet 
networking during the early 1990s, when this technology began to spread worldwide. It 
was the default setting how to run a network. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the network architecture of Harvard university:
"At Harvard, the rules are different. If you plug your machine into an Ethernet jack 
at the Harvard Law School, you will not gain access to the Net. You cannot connect 
your machine to the Net at Harvard unless the machine is registered—licensed, 
approved, verified. Only members of the university community can register their 
machines. Once registered, all interactions with the network are monitored and 
identified to a particular machine. To join the network, users have to "sign" a user 
agreement. The agreement acknowledges this pervasive practice of monitoring. 
Anonymous speech on this network is not permitted—it is against the rules. Access 
can be controlled based on who you are, and interactions can be traced based on 
what you did" (Lessig, 2006, p. 34).
23 There is open code (open source) where everyone can access it and read and change it, and there is closed 
code (proprietary) which is not accessible. Open code is one of the powerful ideas of the open-source 
movement with its General Public License which guarantees users of software "the freedoms to use, study, 
share (copy), and modify the software" (Stallman, 1985). One benefit is that hidden power structures, for 
example malware embedded in programs or secret key-loggers that monitor and save everything that is typed 
on a keyboard, becomes visible if we can look at the code realizing these features. This also means that this 
limits the risk of backdoors in software, where a third party (say Russian hackers or the NSA) could gain 
access. As a result, open code supports the idea of democratization of government: everyone can access and 
read it and therefore can check whether control, espionage or surveillance is built into a software. Winner 
would say, and many open-source advocates would agree that open source is democratic software whereas 
closed source is, at least in tendency, authoritarian because one company (or the state) controls what the 
software does.
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Hierarchical control, observation and other panoptic elements (Foucault, 1979) are 
parts of the core design principles of how the Harvard network architecture works. It 
makes human behavior within the network highly controllable and regulable, often without 
their knowing. Code can exercise various types of power over the users because it forces 
them to do something they would not have to do in the Chicago model. If you refuse, you 
cannot continue the login-process and therefore cannot use the service. Thus, code can 
represent a regularization or exclusion strategy.
Code regulates or controls both access to a system but also its usage or operative 
dimension. This is particularly interesting because usage and practice also create norms. If 
a meaningful behavior is repeated over time by enough people, it can become a standard of 
appropriate behavior. Code clearly can realize politics in Winner’s terms (Winner, 1980). 
For example, network architectures can install Firewall-software on the router-hardware 
that prohibits access to certain websites and thus acts as a delegator. Political or social 
censorship can be an intentional design feature of a network architecture, as the Chinese 
Internet architecture shows (MacKinnon, 2009). Users will get used to this and develop 
new norms, for example new types of type-language (Emoji) as a counterappropriation 
strategy to bypass censorship, which can be observed in China. 
Code can discriminate against users, for example by increasing the connection speed 
for those who pay a premium fee or by limiting speed for those who don’t pay 
(segregation). Political, social or economical inequality can be intentionally built into 
network architecture. In order to do that, the network must be able to determine who 
someone is on a network, what he/she is doing and from where he/she is doing this 
(Lessig, 2006, pp. 45-54). The Chicago model does not provide this information, whereas 
the Harvard model does. Thus, it reflects a completely different set of norms and its design 
supports certain political paradigms of surveillance and control. From a libertarian 
paradigm, the features of the Chicago model like the lack of identification of users and the 
lack of content control are standards of appropriateness, but from a law-enforcement 
perspective this is dangerous. Because of the lack of control, everybody could do 
everything on the Chicago net, from watching pornography, gambling to recruiting radical 
Islamists for terrorist attacks. Banning certain types of information on the network with the 
help of firewalls like in the Harvard Model is more attractive to law-enforcement, 
intelligence agencies or even companies who earn money with gathered user-data from the 
network. What these examples tell us is that power, control and norms in cyberspace is a 
matter of network architecture design. This leads Lessig to the idea that code and its 
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architecture is a kind of law (Lessig, 2006, p. 77), because how something is build and the 
logic it is based on determine what can be done with it.
Software code is not only man-made but also highly changeable and amendable. Lessig 
adopts a hybrid position between technological determinism and social determinism that is 
highly compatible with the theoretical framework explained in this dissertation. Digital 
technology can be political because it can reflect political values (control vs. 
libertarianism) in its architectural design. This architecture can exercise power over 
humans because it acts as a constraining structure for behavior. But Lessig adds another 
important insight: if code is law, than control of code is power.
"How the code regulates, who the code writers are, and who controls the code 
writers—these are questions on which any practice of justice must focus in the age 
of cyberspace. The answers reveal how cyberspace is regulated. My claim in this 
part of the book is that cyberspace is regulated by its code, and that the code is 
changing. Its regulation is its code, and its code is changing" (Lessig, 2006, p. 79).
Exercising control over the code and the programming of the code becomes a means of 
power in the digital age. Programmers, as the main inventors and engineers of digital 
technology deserve special attention in this regard because "code writers enact—the 
instructions imbedded in the software and hardware that make cyberspace work (Lessig, 
2006, p. 72). They can reshape the programming code in order to reflect a different set of 
norms and values, which in turn will affect how this software works and can be used. A 
current example is the encryption debate that I have analyzed elsewhere (Schulze, 2017). 
In 2014, smartphone manufacturer Applemactivated (with a code update) the device 
encryption of its 1 billion iPhones currently in use. With a flick of a switch advocated for a 
norm that devices should be encrypted to prevent illegal third party access from hackers, 
but also from law-enforcement.
This examples show the magnitude of code change and the importance to closely 
watch the change of code on platforms and services that have a huge public reach. One 
change of code can make a difference between most fundamental values. Lessig therefore 
argues that regulating code itself becomes a political issue in the 21st century. Politics and 
policies can influence code design for example with laws, demanding certain standards or 
government access (Moore & Rid, 2016). Governments can force companies, by legal 
means, to implement certain code and design decisions, for example by planting so-called 
"backdoors", intentional security vulnerabilities into a system to allow law-enforcement 
access. The militarization of cyberspace thesis translates into a national-security driven 
policy that is shaping code (Deibert, 2003).
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2.3.8 Summary
In this chapter it was argued that technology can be analyzed with the same tools as norms 
because technology is part of the social world. IR-scholarship only offered a limited, 
biased perspective. I differentiated two perspectives on how technology is treated by IR 
and the social sciences, called technological determinism (with both optimistic and 
pessimistic flavors) and social determinism. I argued that we need the logical aspects of 
both branches and combine them in an approach that came to be known as the study of 
socio-technical systems, which analyzes technological artifacts within their social 
structure. This perspective also resolved the politics of technology debate ignited by 
Winner in 1980. Technology has not one essence that can be discovered, but rather what 
technology means (interpretative flexibility), how it is used and if it produces a power-
effect is a matter of social context. Therefore, it is necessary to perceive technology similar 
to texts that can be read and studied. This SCOT perspective is compatible with the rest of 
my analytical framework presented so far and allows for bridge-building between the 
disciplines. The essence of this line of thought is that what technology is and how it is 
constructed is defined by the technological frames which constitute the object. Every 
technical artifact has two sides – its material dimension and its social side, which is not 
fixed, but a matter of discourse. The same technology can mean a variety of things 
depending on the social structure it is embedded in. SCOT analyzes not only the physical 
construction of the object but also the social construction of the meaning. The mechanism 
is similar to what I said about discursive power in the first theoretical chapter.
But there is more, as critiques of SCOT point out. The risk of SCOT is social 
overdetermination, which must be avoided. The material shape of an object matters and it 
is not true that "anything goes", as relativist research logic might suggest. Not all artifacts 
can get every meaning. Therefore, it is important to look at the outer corners of the realm 
of social construction and reconsider the physical object. For that, the concepts of design 
and affordances were introduced. These limit the range of probable interpretations and thus 
interpretative flexibility. Technological design often is a very intentional process and the 
designer actively chooses how an object is built, thereby actively limiting interpretative 
flexibility. The construction aspect matters and must be considered during analysis. 
Another reason for the importance of initial design is path dependency and the co-shaping 
of social structure – once established, a technology cannot be abandoned and exercise 
social power. I take the critique of the SCOT approach seriously and argue that a critical 
constructivist perspective that focuses on a technology's power relations is necessary. This 
2.3 Technological and Normative Change
114
is because socio technological systems are built upon social norms and create them as well. 
One way to disentangle this interwoven relationship is to compartmentalize technological 
systems in two steps.
First, goal oriented constructions means that one should analyze the background of 
the design process and the designer at the initial stages of the construction process. The 
designer matters because his ideational paradigms shape the construction of the material 
object, his norms and ideas define what problem a device shall resolve, what intended 
usage functions it has and how it works. Power effects can be introduced at this stage, but 
whether they are realized depends on the usage context and its operative dimension. 
Second, the operative dimension, which often is neglected by SCOT. To compensate this 
deficiency, I included Pfaffenberger’s framework that explicitly deals with normative and 
power-effects technologies can have. Power is pursued via technological means, it must be 
acted out in social contexts. Power and norms embedded in technology leave a discursive 
trail of framing strategies that legitimize regularization processes such as exclusion, 
compartmentalization and so forth. These must be studied as well. One key element of the 
technical drama discourse is that the fixation of meaning of technology is not a linear 
process but also has to face resistance, as most discursive power relations. What a user 
does with a technological artifact is very important because resistance and deviation tactics 
can be deployed in order to circumvent the power relations. Technological discourses are 
situations where power relations are exercised and they also alter the general structure of 
the technological system and its macro development over a longer period of time.
To grasp this long term evolution, the phase model of technological emergence based 
on the works of Weyer was introduced (Weyer et al., 1997). This model maps the diffusion 
of a technological system in different development steps. Within each step, socio-technical 
drama discourses happen at the micro level and conclude with temporary closure moments, 
when both a technical design and a social meaning of that designed are fixed or locked-in. 
This closure serves as the fundament for the next development step and thereby combines 
elements of path dependency and social construction without falling into the trap of 
overdetermination. It also includes the possibilities of counter-artifacts creating forking-
paths. 
For this analysis, the construction and the mainstream diffusion stage are the most 
important. I argue that during the mainstream phase the different theoretical concepts I 
have outlined in this paper can be combined into one coherent framework for analysis. The 
mainstream diffusion includes the politicization of an artifact, which initiates the political 
struggle of advocacy coalitions that have been outlined before (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms 
2.3 Technological and Normative Change
115
and Norm-Change). During the mainstream stage, political actors are likely to enter the 
stage of the drama and will aim to alter the course of the technology according to party or 
organizational logics. The military for example is likely to see potential in a technology if 
its physical affordances allow it to be used in warfare. Other actors like economic interests 
will also discover the new technology and will try to generate profit with it or create new 
markets, which in turn can alter the development. Policies are a way to influence 
technological design as well, which is often overlooked by STS. Lessig made the point that 
the governance of a technology shapes its usage modalities and it norms, by giving the 
example of different network architectures that incorporate surveillance or censorship. 
Regulating software code is a means of power in the 21st century because defines how 
users engage with the technology and what norms can develop.
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3. Methodology & Research Design
To analyze the question why norms of Internet control, mass surveillance technology and 
offensive cyber-war capabilities spread, the study uses causal process-tracing (CPT), 
sometimes also called explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, p. 
19). I follow the methodology as outlined by Blatter and Haverland (Blatter & Haverland, 
2012) but will include elements of Beach and Pedersen (Beach & Pedersen, 2012) and 
Bennett and Checkel (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).24
Process-tracing is a type of within-case inference that is particularly suited to explain 
how an outcome (dominance of the norm of Internet control in policy discourse) came into 
being. Thus, it is a Y-centered perspective, explaining variance in the outcome. In my case 
this is a norm change from utopian to cyber-realist norms (in contrast to X-centered co-
variational or comparative approaches). The aim is to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the case and a minimal sufficient explanation of the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, 
p. 18). "Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, 
with no redundant part" (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, p. 63).
One of the epistemological assumptions of process-tracing is that of configurational 
causality, meaning that multiple factors work together to create an outcome. Many social 
phenomena have not one, but several causes (Ragin, 2008). The combination of factors 
leads to outcomes. Therefore, a wide array of theories can and should be used in CPT 
studies, which explains why I introduced a relatively wide set of potential causal factors in 
the previous chapter (see chap. 2. Explaining Normative Change). In contrast to co-
variational approaches, the ambition is not to theory-test any individual theory or 
hypothesis, but to use the outlined causal factors in the theories heuristically as parts of the 
explanation in a causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, p. 13). This is in line with 
the goals of this work, which is to learn more about the case, i.e. the norm-change in the 
US and not that much about theory. Process-tracing is perfect for building bridges between 
different theoretical and disciplinary camps (IR, policy analysis, sociology, STS), but also 
between structure-centric or agency-oriented theories, which is one of the ambitions of this 
project (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, p. 23). CPT studies often do not set out clear hypotheses 
in the beginningy, but rather at the end of the empirical study. Theory and case-work is a 
much more iterative or abductive process, in contrast to more deductive co-variational case 
studies (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 169). This is because of another 
assumption of CPT: the same outcome can be produced by different causal configurations 
24 I recognize Bennett’s and Checkel’s contribution, especially Jacbob’s chapter on idea change (Jacobs, 
2014), however the book came out with the majority of the research design already drafted.
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(equifinality) and the effects of the same causal factors can be different in heterogeneous 
contexts. As such, any CPT-study must pay attention to potential, case-centric factors 
explaining an outcome inductively. It is unlikely that theory can predict every minute 
detail in a case and as such, inductive factors will matter in the empirical study that can be 
used for theory building (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 81). 
Additionally, an epistemological assumption is that causality plays out in space and 
time, sometimes even decades. CPT operates with a mechanistic understanding of 
causality. The central concept is that of a causal mechanism: "a set of interacting parts – an 
assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is 
not so much about 'nuts and bolts' as about 'cogs and wheels' – the wheelwork or agency by 
which an effect is produced" (Hernes, 1998). 
Figure 12. Causal Mechanism
A causal mechanism links the cause (X) with the outcome (Y). The cogs and wheels (Nn) 
transmit causal force often over longer time periods. Causal mechanisms can include 
material factors, such as technological change but also ideational ones like the 
transformation of ideas and norms that structure reality, which this thesis is about (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2012, p. 53). It includes the possibility to study large time-frames in a 
longitudinal fashion and thus is well-suited for the study of norm-emergence and diffusion. 
The notion of path-dependency, a causal factor initiated in the past producing effects in the 
future, is central to CPT (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). Path-dependency implies 
that either a specific temporal order of causal factors is crucial for an outcome Y, or causal 
conditions have to be present at a certain point in time to create an effect. These long time-
frames make it necessary to divide the empirical section into different parts. A useful 
analogy is that of a causal chain: "in which specific causal conditions form the necessary 
and (usually together with other conditions) sufficient preconditions for triggering other 
necessary and sufficient causal conditions or configurations at a later point in time, and this 
causal chain leads at the end of the process to the outcome of interest" (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, p. 94).
A causal chain represents the combination of different causal mechanisms in a 
temporal sequence (N1-N3 and N4-N6) and create sequence outcomes (O1, O2) that can 
be combined at different junctures (equifinality), which then in term create a new causal 
mechanism, leading to other conjunctions until the outcome appears. 
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Figure 13. Causal chain
Thus, the above graphic presents the combination or fusion of different causal mechanisms 
into one long-term causal chain. Therefore, a few chapters will describe the long-term 
sequences (storylines) of macro-events leading to certain critical junctures or causal 
conjunctions, in which "multiple causal conditions work together […] at a specific point in 
time or over a short period of time to produce the outcome of interest" (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, p. 94). These junctures often lead to a change of the causal pathway. For 
example, in the graphic, two causal pathways are fused together in an additive fashion at 
causal conjunction. These junctures are then analyzed in more detail considering 
perceptions and motivations of actors. 
It is important to note that these junctures can widely differ from each other, 
incorporating diverse causal factors, actors and contextual conditions (case-specific causal 
factors). Blatter and Haverland argue that causal factors can operate at different levels 
(macro or micro) and interact with each other (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 97). In one 
juncture individual decisions might determine an outcome while in another structural 
constraints might be more important. This means that during each juncture, the analytical 
focus might change and therefore different types of evidence might be used. Therefore, the 
logical step is to zoom into these junctures and analyze the motivations and perceptions of 
actors (confessions), looking for smoking-gun evidence that confirms the existence of parts 
in the causal mechanism as outlined in the theory. 
The analysis of causal factors does not resemble variable-scoring (or so-called data-
set observations as in large-N and covariational studies), but tries to determine necessary 
and sufficient conditions of individual causal factors and the parts of the chain. Therefore, 
every element within the chain must be tested whether it is a necessary or sufficient form 
of causation.25 The test includes the question whether Y would have occurred without X, 
thus i.e. applies counterfactual reasoning.
25 In formal logic, sufficient conditions are those in which a causal factor X (rain) is a necessary condition for 
Y (wet street) to happen. If X (rain) happens, Y (wet street) occurs, every time. However, X must not be the 
only cause for Y which means that Y (wet street) can occur without X, for example by another cause Z (street 
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CPT has a drawback that needs to be discussed. The CPT approach does not strive to 
for statistical generalization as most quantitative studies understand it. Causal mechanisms 
that produce an outcome are most likely context dependent or case-specific, meaning that 
even if the same mechanism could be found in another country or case, the outcome effects 
might be different. That means that generalization of findings to a population of similar 
cases with similar outcomes is not possible in the strict sense. However, CPT can be used 
for possibilistic generalization, which means that the conditions producing an outcome 
might be generalizable (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 31f.). In other words, the causal 
mechanism in its totality might not be generalizable, but elements of the causal arguments 
might be further used for theory building. The value of CPT lies within theory generation 
and the development of a wide range of potential causal mechanisms that might be used, if 
adapted, in other cases. This generating of hypothesis will be done in the conclusion of the 
thesis (see chap. 5. Conclusion).
The next step is to introduce the research design and to address the questions, of how 
this process-tracing analysis proceeds exactly and what steps are taken to increase 
intersubjective verifiability. Process-tracing often does not represent a linear-research 
design. Instead, in process-tracing studies theory-screening and empirical work often is not 
separated but done in parallel. The researcher starts with theories that can potentially 
explain the outcome but also gains familiarity with the empirical case, which often reveals 
the need for further theorizing. This is sometimes called "soaking and soaking" (Bennett & 
Checkel, 2014, p. 18) and is what I have done in this thesis (see chap. 2. Explaining 
Normative Change). Out of this process I developed both the concrete research question 
and the case selection, which often are synthesized relatively late in the research process 
(compared to large-N studies). 
After this conceptual work and case selection, I determined the macro-developments 
and structural factors of the process of norm emergence and diffusion, critical junctures 
and turning points where the path-development changed, as well as key actors and their 
motivations and their perceptions (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 112). I did this first for 
the general history of the Internet, consulting historical documents and the written histories 
of other researchers (Abbate, 2000; Burman, 2003; Hafner & Lyon, 1998; Mosco, 2004; 
Naughton, 1999). I traced the origins of thinking about digital technologies to Norbert 
cleaner). X is sufficient for Y, which is formally expressed as X→Y. Necessary conditions are those in which 
if X (the raven is black) is the case, then Y (the bird is a raven) is true as well. Y always occurs if X exists. 
Which means X (black) is a characteristic of Y (being a raven), but not the only characteristic, because other 
black birds must not be ravens. So the opposite must not be the case. This is expressed as Y→X which means 
Y is implied with X (or X is necessary for Y) (Gabriel, 2006).
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Wiener in the late 1940s (see chap. 4.1.1 Background: Cybernetics). It was logical to start 
an analysis of different "cyber" paradigms with the invention of cybernetics. 
Then I determined the important milestones and junctures of the Internet in line with 
the theory of technological developments. The Internet’s construction period, and thus the 
first juncture, happened between 1966 and 1976 and the stabilization and early use took 
place during the 1980s. The mass diffusion started in 1992. The 1990s represented a 
primary focus point of analysis because of the mass diffusion of the technology, which 
created new issues and problems and thus points of interaction between the paradigms. 
This also marked the time when political and military actors became aware of the 
technology and when Internet paradigms formed. Another focus is on the mid 2000s, 
particularly because of the increased relevance of the technology in national security 
contexts with the war on terror. This is where the militarization of cyberspace gained 
headwind and accelerated. The analysis ends in 2013, because the Snowden leaks 
represented a major juncture the long-lasting impact of which is not yet completely clear, 
although much indicates a further strengthening of cyber-realism (Bennett & Checkel, 
2014, pp. 26-27). Admittedly, many new important developments were triggered with the 
Snowden leaks that might be interesting to dive into more deeply, but time and space 
constraints are powerful arguments to end the analysis there. The reader might ask, why 
such a long time frame? I follow Jacobs (Jacobs, 2014, p. 57) and Legro (Legro, 2000, pp. 
256-258) who convincingly argue that idea, norm and paradigm change happens slowly 
and thus can only be observed adequately over longer periods of time.
Since I utilize Manjikian’s initial conception of cyber-narratives, including a cyber-
utopian, a cyber-liberal and a cyber-realist reading, but add the engineering perspective, I 
had to analyze not just one process, but four parallel ones. The process of norm diffusion 
and the diffusion of the Internet consists of (at least) four different branches or sub 
processes that interact at different points in time. To increase coherence and to assess the 
independent causal effects of ideas or paradigms on different actors, it makes sense to 
switch levels or units of analysis (Jacobs, 2014, p. 63). The assumption is that different 
actors have different exposure to ideas of paradigms. If those who do not follow a 
paradigm repeat its ideas nevertheless, we can infer societal dominance from this very fact. 
The thesis will operate with the following levels of analysis: it focuses first on the 
designers and inventors of the Internet (micro), analyzes the impact with the early users 
and then shifts to the level of political and military decision-makers to assess the political 
impact of the technology and the different paradigms. To complement the picture, the 
public opinion and overall discourses is included. I will only focus partly on the 
3. Methodology & Research Design
121
international dimension, because the main focus is on norm emergence and diffusion inside 
the US.
After having outlined the overall process in a large mind-map, I began collecting 
source material for each paradigm. Kuhn argued that paradigms are transported by 
textbooks, journals and educational material. Thus, the primary data selection criterion 
was whether a text talked about the Internet or related technologies from a distinct 
paradigmatic point of view. Another criterion was how important a document was, for 
example if it appeared often in the literature (snowball technique). Additionally, to make 
sense of the process and the motivations of actors, I included interviews, memoirs and 
statements such as speeches of the key actors and paradigm-carriers to get some insights 
on perceptions (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 106). Because of the diverse nature of 
actors, the data sources are not standardized and include a vast array of sources from 
ethnographic research, statistics to pop-cultural references, which is common in process-
tracing studies (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 106). The following table summarizes the 
data sources:
Table 1. Paradigm Holders and Carrier Sources
 A complete corpus of the carrier texts for each paradigm will be presented in the appendix 
(see chap. Corpora). 
During the next step, the data was analyzed qualitatively using content analysis, 
identifying relevant problem definitions, solutions strategies, normative components, 
framing strategies (in line with the theory). To streamline the analysis of the paradigms, I 
drafted the following guiding questions that were applied to each paradigm and that 
structure the table of contents.
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• What does the literature say about the dominant actors in each period?
• Who are the paradigm holders?
• How is the paradigm generating new followers?
• Which of these are politically active and engage in norm entrepreneurship?
• What is the historical and social configuration, i.e. the structural background, of 
these actors that might determine their thinking? 
• Are there any social norms guiding the social interaction?
• What are the carrier media for the paradigm? 
• What documents reflect the thought process?
• What are the dominant elements of the paradigm?
• What is the central problem, for those actors, what solution strategies do 
they develop?
• How do they perceive the technology in question? 
• How do they frame it rhetorically?
• What are the central norms of each paradigm?
• How does the paradigm pre-structure the interaction with the artifact?
• Are there any blind spots of the paradigm?
• What are these actors doing? What is the outcome of this process? 
• Is it a policy, a technological artifact or discourse? 
• What are the characteristics of those?
• What paradigm contents (ideas, norms) become embedded in the policies or 
artifacts?
• How do paradigms change over time?
• Does the paradigm exert political influence or any discursive power, shaping public 
discourse?
• What are trigger events or shocks (juncture) that alter the paradigm?
I analyzed each paradigm independently, starting with the engineering paradigm, 
continued with cyber-realism and finally analyzed cyber-utopianism/liberalism. I screened 
the source material for answers to these questions. The questions served as a coding-
scheme which I used to analyze the key documents in a qualitative fashion (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 55). The analysis partly relied on MaxQDA, but also consisted of 
traditional note-taking and highlighting. By asking these questions to the texts, I 
inductively created categories, for example ideas, were all the ideas of a paradigm where 
collected and summarized. For example, cyber-realist documents repeatedly spoke of 
something like that "the Internet transcends state-borders", which creates border-protection 
issues. I coded it as "death of distance problem" (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of 
Cyber-Realism). This allowed me to draft a comprehensive list of all the elements the 
paradigm consisted of: ideas, norms, policies, technical artifacts and the respective changes 
over time. This allowed me to summarize the paradigms and to assess their overall societal 
impact in terms of public discourse or policies. An overview of the findings is presented in 
the appendix (see chap. Paradigm Summaries). 
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In the next step, I checked whether these paradigm ideas corresponded with the 
ideas of political administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. An 
important question is how I determined the influence and reach of a paradigm. This was 
done by simply accounting for the number of appearances of certain ideas. The more often 
ideas of a certain paradigm appear in documents of a political administration, the more 
influential the paradigm is. For example, early National Security Strategies of the US 
barely included cyber-realist ideas, which dramatically increased during the mid 1990s 
(see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)). 
Theoretically it can be assumed that during the early stages of a paradigm, only a few ideas 
will appear in each document and the more these ideas develop, the more they will appear 
in the carrier texts or even will make it to the title of policy documents. 
Other good indicators are political speeches and the number of actors utilizing ideas 
of a certain paradigm. A paradigm is more influential if a diverse set of actors, from 
academia to business to policy-makers utilize its ideas. 
Especially media reception is a great indicator for assessing the societal impact of a 
paradigm. The assumption is that if ideas of a paradigm make front-news, they are widely 
influential. That is why I sometimes refer to influential media publications and front-pages 
of newspapers (see chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway 
(1993)). Another good indicator for the relevance of the paradigm are Google Ngrams 
(Google, 2016), i.e. how often certain key-words appear in scanned library documents. 
This showed the overall relevance of paradigmatic key-concepts in public literature. For 
the period after the year 2000, I also utilized Google Search Trends that count how often a 
search-term was searched for in Google (Google Trends, 2016). 
The tricky part was to assess the dominance of one paradigm, especially when two 
were present within one administration. To grasp this, I describe these nuances as 
accurately as I can (see for example 4.4.4 Politics: Turn to Realism - Critical Infrastructure 
Initiative (1996-1999)). Finally, I base my judgement about the relevancy of certain topics 
and ideas on the judgement of other scientists who studied similar issues. Thus, I try to 
triangulate the relevance of certain ideas and norms by cross-checking it with secondary 
literature and polls.
The downside of this approach is that there is no way to quantify the findings (as I 
initially intended to). I cannot accurately determine to what degree a paradigm is important 
but can only provide ordinal measurements based on good judgement and the heuristic of 
idea-appearances. It is always a bit tricky to assess the dominance of certain ideas within a 
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political administration that releases thousands of documents each month on a wide array 
of topics. There is no way to study them all. 
Another issue is that the quantity of texts is not always the best indicator for the 
importance of an issue, especially if the issue is highly classified, like cyber-security and 
cyber-war. Important documents are secret and intelligence agencies extensively use 
deception to shield their capacities from foreign agencies. As with any process-tracing case 
study, the potential risk is a "omitted sources" bias, i.e. that I missed an important part of 
the causal mechanism or that I overlooked other important sources. This risk can never be 
fully avoided, due to space and time constraints.26 Data-triangulation with other studies 
that deal with the different parts of this analysis (for example the history of the Internet or 
the evolution of cyber-warfare) were used to present a a picture as complete as possible. 
Another risk was "selection bias" of sources that confirm the assumed causal mechanism 
while ignoring those which falsify it (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, p. 124). The way I tried to 
solve this was by testing whether identified parts in the causal mechanism were necessary 
for the outcome and to check for counterfactuals: would the same have happened with 
another administration? Admittedly, this is always somewhat interpretative. 
There is also an issue with research designs studying ideas. The paradigm 
perspective only allows to see positives, i.e. ideas that fit to a paradigm whereas tracking 
negatives like "forgotten ideas" or "blind spots" is more tricky. That is one of the reasons 
why use four distinct paradigmatic perspectives because they partly reflect on each other's 
blind spot, providing some external critique.
The analysis will begin with the paradigm held by the ARPANET inventors during 
the late 1960s and also will introduce the basic design features of the Internet. Since the 
Internet is the technical artifact this thesis is about, and whose norms are changing, it 
makes sense to start with the construction and the characteristics of this artifact. This 
provides the fundament and basis for everything else.
26 Bennett and Checkel argue that a causal mechanism can never be complete and will always be provisional 
because causality cannot be observed directly (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, pp. 11-12).
    4. Case Study
Now let me introduce the logic of the individual chapters of the following empirical 
section. To be intelligible and comparable, most chapters feature similar elements. Each 
chapter starts with an entry quote, a motto that highlights a certain aspect of the chapter, 
often deriving from the very paradigm the chapter is about. The meaning and context of 
the quote will become clear throughout the chapter. Since I focus on different concepts, the 
headings of the subsections matter. That is the reason why most of the chapters have a 
similar naming scheme. The naming convention highlights different parts of the theory 
which serves as the ordering principle. Chapters labeled with "juncture" offer deep insights 
and thick analysis of turning points in the causal pathway, while chapters labeled with 
"background" present macro-structural developments and thus comprehensive storylines 
(see chap. 3. Methodology & Research Design). A clear-cut separation of "thick analysis" 
and "comprehensive storylines" was not always feasible, so that some chapters might 
include both. Chapters titled with "ideas" will trace the evolution of ideational concepts of 
each paradigm. I will focus on problem definitions, the perception of the Internet 
technologies in positive or negative terms, and the framing, i.e. the social construction of 
the technology. "Norm" chapters will do the same with norms. "Blind spot" chapters offer a 
discussion of things not anticipated by each paradigm, which often represent a point of 
contestation for other paradigms. "Artifact" and "policy" chapters are treated as the 
outcome of the ideational process in a time period. This is based on the theoretical 
assumption that ideas influence technologies and politics likewise. They manifest norms 
and ideas. These chapters show how norms and ideas became embedded in technology. 
Finally, at the end of each chapter, an in-depth, critical analysis of the paradigms’ contents 
follow, discussing potential biases and blind spots. Each chapter is concluded with a short 
summary of the causal mechanism that was presented. These summaries are then used for 
the final analysis and the depiction of the causal mechanism in the conclusion.
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4.1 Engineering the Internet
"We reject kings, presidents and voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code." 
Motto of the Internet developers
This almost rebellious introduction quote can be seen as the informal motto of the creators 
of the Internet. How the Internet was created is the topic of this chapter. Today we 
experience the Internet as a seamless, unitary network and invention, but in reality, it is not 
one thing. The Internet is a meta-infrastructure, a network27 that consists of interconnected 
networks. This network of networks has three dimensions: the physical layer of computers, 
routers, switches and transmission lines (copper & fiber-optic cables, wireless), a digital 
layer consisting of software code (called protocol) that regulates digital data-transmission 
over this hardware and an application or content-layer, which represents the things we can 
use the Internet for, like surfing, E-mails or mobile applications (Libicki, 2009, p. 12). All 
these layers and elements have been invented over time. As such, the Internet neither has a 
primary inventor nor has it precise point in time when it was invented. The Internet was a 
collegial effort among an international research community. It is an evolving artifact that is 
co-shaped by its users and its designers. 
As such there are different origin stories or multiple histories (Peter, 2004). Internet 
historian John Naughton discerns two interrelated development phases. First, the prototype 
phase (1967-1972), where the Internet’s predecessor called ARPA-Network (henceforth 
ARPANET) was built to interconnect mainframe computer systems within the context of 
the US Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) (Naughton, 2016). This laid out the 
technological groundwork for the second phase between 1973-1983, which can be called 
the internetworking phase. It is important to analyze both artifacts because one led to 
another and the latter incorporated ideas from the former. There is no clear cut between the 
two because the Internet inherited many design features from the ARPANET. "You can 
mark the birth of the Internet back to the ARPAnet", as one of the inventors argues 
(Crocker, 2009). The final development phase was the global diffusion of the Internet with 
help of the World Wide Web, an application that made the Internet more visual and easier 
to use.
The purpose of this analysis is to trace the evolution of norms surrounding the socio-
technical system Internet and its technical and philosophical predecessor called 
27 "A computer network is a set of computers communicating by common conventions called protocols over 
communication media. Computers in a network are called network nodes, and those that people use directly 
are called hosts. Computer network protocols usually involve the exchange of discrete units of information 
called messages over some form of physical medium, such as coaxial cable, microwaves, or a twisted pair of 
copper wires" (Quarterman, 1989, p. 6).
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ARPANET. The goal is to identify the major paradigm that defined the goals and uses for 
technology and therefore shaped the initial construction of this technology. The theoretical 
argument is that paradigms include norms that become embedded in the material 
affordances of technological artifacts. The questions that guide this chapter are: what core 
ideas and norms became embedded in the Internet architecture, what are its technical 
affordances and what norms developed with its construction and usage? 
To analyze these norms and ideas I will focus mostly on the hardware and software 
layer, because software protocols govern how data is exchanged and thus determine the 
technical affordances of this technology. The term protocol refers to "any type of correct or 
proper behavior within a specific system of conventions" (Galloway, 2006, p. 7). It is 
therefore quite similar to the definition of norms as standards of appropriate behaviors, but 
protocol is software code that organizes how computers (the hardware) interoperate for 
example, how they establish connections and exchange messages (Lessig, 2006, p. 5). It is 
a kind of common language for different technical artifacts that also influence social 
behavior: "Protocols govern how specific technologies are agreed to, adopted, 
implemented, and ultimately used by people around the world" (Galloway, 2006, p. 7). 
Protocols determine functionality, technical affordances and the practice of using this 
technology which then can lead to new social norms. This is also the reason why an 
analysis of protocols is key for determining norms within the technical artifacts 
ARPANET and its successor, the Internet (represented through its TCP/IP protocol). 
Computer scientists would analyze protocols by looking at the programming syntax, 
the source code. As a political scientist, I will focus on the inventors and early users, 
scientists and engineers of the technology and their science and engineering paradigm that 
shaped the goal oriented construction of these protocols. They are key actors who used the 
technology and realized its potential. They were the first to establish the meaning of the 
networking technology and thereby influenced the early norms of using this system. In 
other words, the engineers initiated a particular causal path-trajectory that had future 
implications. To trace the ideas of inventors, I will mostly rely on historical primary 
sources such as official documentations and reports, the preserved research note-exchanges 
between the inventors and their oral histories. These sources are the carrier medium of the 
engineering perspective on the Internet. I will also use the rich written histories by 
secondary authors.
The analysis proceeds according to the technical diffusion model outlined in the 
theory. I begin with the goal-oriented construction of the ARPANET. I will deduce the 
ideas that led to the construction (see chap. 4.1.2.1 Ideas) and the norms embedded in the 
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system (see chap. 4.1.2.2 Norms Shaping the Construction of ARPANET) by looking at 
the central artifact, the Network Control Program (protocol). Then I look at the early user-
reception of this technology and analyze how the users of the ARPANET changed its 
initial meaning and function (see chap. 4.1.2.4 Co-shaping the Meaning of Networks). The 
same structure is replicated for TCP/IP (see chap. 4.1.3 Constructing the Internet (1972-
1991)), the central protocol that governs the Internet we use today (see chap. 4.1.3.1 
Artifact: Internet Protocols and Norms). The core argument is that the Internet reflected 
academic ideas such as the free sharing of information, collaboration and a general 
skepticism towards central control structures. It was intentionally build to be global and 
without central control. Afterwards, I will deal with the conditions for the stabilization and 
the mainstream diffusion of the technology by answering the question of how TCP/IP 
could become a dominant technology. This has two parts: the software-dimension (see 
chap. 4.1.3.2 The Diffusion and Dominance of the Internet) and the hardware dimension, 
called the Internet backbone (see chap. 4.1.3.3 The Internet Backbone). Finally, I turn to 
the visual Internet or the World Wide Web, a key artifact that enabled non-IT-experts to 
use the Internet and thus was crucial for its worldwide success (see chap. 4.1.4 Artifact: 
The World Wide Web (1989-present)). After this more historical part I introduce blind 
spots, i.e. things the inventors did not anticipate, which ultimately created the cyber-
security and cyber-war problems that we have today. As such, this chapter is the crucial 
link to the other paradigms (see chap. 4.1.5 Development Blind Spots). Before we jump 
into this discussion, we need to clarify some terminology that is often used, even in the 
title of this thesis, but seldom reflected upon: What is this thing called cyber anyway?
4.1.1 Background: Cybernetics
No analysis of cyberspace or modes of thought therein – paradigms – should start without 
mentioning Norbert Wiener (*1894–†1964). Wiener coined the term "Cybernetics" from 
which other concepts such as cyber-space, cyber-war etc. derive their name. Wiener 
developed the concept during World War 2 while working on the "anti-aircraft problem", 
the problem how to shoot down modern high-speed airplanes. This problem required on 
the one hand, complex mathematical calculations to predict the position of the plane, and 
on the other hand, a feedback mechanism that aligned the position of the gun accordingly, 
a process way too complex for a human to calculate. This problem led Wiener to formulate 
a theory of Cybernetics, "the science of control and communication in the animal and the 
machine" (Wiener, 1965). 
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According to Rid’s excellent history, cybernetics has three main concepts. First, 
control. A system or organism that controls or steers its environment. That is what the 
prefix cyber means, deriving from the Greek word κυβερνήτης, meaning steering, 
navigation or governance. Second, feedback or learning which predicts future behavior. 
Finally, the fusion of the human and machine into a system. For Wiener, the anti-aircraft 
gun and the human operator were not distinct entities but one system. Other examples of 
cybernetic systems would be a prosthetic hand or the cockpit of a Jet, where pilot and Jet 
form a symbiosis (Rid, 2016, pp. 69-75). These ideas together formed a "computational 
metaphor" or the argument that humans and society could be the thought of information 
processors or machines. This was the foundation for the term information society (Turner, 
2006, p. 22). This thought implied a vision of automatization: since humans, animals and 
computers were all systems operating according to cybernetic principles (control and 
feedback), the latter could take over human functions. The idea that machines will, some 
day, take over control was born in 1948 with Norbert Wiener (Rid, 2016, pp. 26-63). 
Wiener’s widely regarded 1948 book Cybernetics (Wiener, 1965) became a hype 
across the sciences until the late 1970s and even infused popular culture (see chap. 4.2.4 
Artifact: The WELL and the Social Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)). The 1950s 
and 1960s saw an unprecedented growth of machines taking over human work, from 
microwave ovens to production robots. Wiener’s systemic or holistic thinking was also the 
basis for Talcott Parsons’ and Niklas Luhmann’s system theory or the idea that technical 
systems could serve as models for society. According to Turner, the appeal of cybernetic 
thinking came from the fact that it connected various disciplines: computer-science, social 
sciences (psychology, sociology) but even aspects of American culture (Science Fiction) 
and counterculture of the late 1960s (see chap. 4.2.2 Ideas: Stewart Brand and the Counter-
culture (1960-1970)). Cybernetics facilitated interdisciplinary collaboration and research 
and provided a coherent conceptual framework to connect various networks of social 
actors (Turner, 2006, p. 24). It can be argued that cybernetics was a meta-theory during the 
early 1950s-1970s.
Interestingly, in his later work, Wiener speculated about two potential outcomes of 
automatization: a dystopian vision of enslavement and suppression and a utopian one of 
human liberation and empowerment (Rid, 2016, pp. 26-63). The dystopian vision predicted 
that automatization would destroy jobs and lead to unemployment. Wiener feared that at 
one point, computers could begin to act on their own or worse, could be utilized by power-
hungry politicians as a means of social control (Turner, 2006, p. 24). The utopian vision 
saw the potential to realize Marx’ "utopian praise of un-alienated labor, of human 
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flourishing through creative and self-actualizing productions" (Beebe, 2010, p. 885). This 
dual vision of cybernetics explains why this chapter starts with Wiener. Here, both 
dystopian and utopian lines of thought had already been conceived and began to branch out 
with different advocacy groups. Wiener is also important because various actors involved 
in the social construction and framing of the Internet referred to his ideas. Cybernetics in 
that sense is the foundation both for cyber-realism and its technologies of control and 
surveillance, but also cyber-utopianism. One cyber-utopian, a man named J.C.R. Licklider, 
is regarded by many engineers as the spiritual father of the Internet idea. Licklider shaped 
the organizational structure at the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the place where 
the Internet was invented. This will be the topic of the next chapter.
4.1.2 The Social Construction of the ARPA-Network (1966-1972)
To study socio-technical systems such as the Internet, we should consider the context of 
invention first (see chap. 2.3.2 Defining Technology). This is the purpose of this chapter. 
The Internet developed within the context of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA, later renamed to Defense Advanced Research Agency or DARPA).28 The context 
of invention is important because it enabled the creation of a costly, experimental 
networking system that was nonproprietary and thus open to use. 
ARPA was founded as a reaction to the Sputnik Shock that revealed a so-called 
"science gap" (Taylor, 2008, p. 9). As a reaction, President Eisenhower dramatically 
increased federal research & development (R&D) spending (Congressional Budget Office, 
2007) and founded ARPA in 1957 to catch up with the scientific and military development 
of the Soviet Union. Eisenhower gave ARPA a relative broad mandate for basic research 
focusing on "high-risk and high pay-off" technologies (Lukasik, 2011, p. 13) and a large 
military budget, especially compared to civilian research centers such as the National 
Science Foundation (NSF). In the early days, ARPA was the best of both worlds: it had a 
large budget and a relatively free-wheeling style of management, giving program managers 
and research directors a relatively free hand to pursue projects without much interference 
or oversight, as long as they produced results that had military appliances. One of these 
areas was computing, which particularly benefited from the mixture of a large budget and a 
free hand to experiment (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 22). 
ARPA established an Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) and began 
funding expensive computer research around the US with the aim of creating centers of 
28 The "defense" part was added and removed repeatedly during its history so I use ARPA and DARPA 
interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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excellence or an "intergalactic network" of elite research, as the first IPTO director J.C.R. 
Licklider (1962-1964) called it (Taylor, 2008, pp. 10-11).29 This was the first notion of 
something like a computer network. Licklider established a very informal management 
style: "IPTO managers maintained close personal contacts with their colleagues in the 
computer research community, providing an informal circle that was commonly known 
among computer researchers as the 'ARPA community’" (Roland & Shiman, 2002, p. 22). 
The "ARPA-style" continued with other directors. Stephen Lukasik (director of ARPA 
between 1970-1975) summarized: "what distinguished the agency from other parts of 
government was its freewheeling style, flexibility in management and contractual 
arrangements, enforcement of the highest level of excellence from its contractors, and 
openness to technical ideas from all directions" (Lukasik, 2011, p. 6). 
One general problem of computing in that era was that mainframe computers30 were 
custom-built for specific applications (like ballistics calculations or graphics) and thus 
highly incompatible with each other. Hardware and software differed dramatically. A 
program written for one machine would not work on another and if computer scientists 
wanted to use particular programs, they either had to rewrite the program themselves or 
jump in a plane and fly to a computer site where the program could be run (Abbate, 2000, 
p. 1). This was expensive, often resulted in duplicated research and thus was highly cost 
inefficient (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 40f.). For Robert Taylor, a later program manager at 
IPTO between 1966 and 1969, who was tasked with supervising computing research, this 
computer incompatibility was a cumbersome and inefficient process. Taylor used three 
different terminal computers to manage the computer projects at three different sites that 
all required different command inputs:
"There was one other trigger that turned me to the ARPAnet. For each of these 
three terminals, I had three different sets of user commands. I said, oh, man, it’s 
obvious what to do: If you have these three terminals, there ought to be one 
terminal that goes anywhere you want to go where you have interactive computing. 
That idea is the ARPAnet" (Taylor, 1999).
29 J.C.R. Licklider (*1915-†1990) is regarded by many ARPA engineers as the origin of the Internet idea. He 
had read Wiener’s papers and can be regarded as an early cyber-utopian. In 1960, Licklider published an 
influential, cybernetic-inspired paper called "Man-Computer Symbiosis", a technological optimist and 
cybernetic manifesto of the future Licklider outlined a utopian vision that computers had the potential to act 
as an extension of the human brain, that they could amplify human intelligence and transform the way we 
think (Licklider, 1990).
30 "Mainframes are a types of computers that generally are known for their large size, amount of storage, 
processing power and high level of reliability. They are primarily used by large organizations for mission-
critical applications requiring high volumes of data processing" (Technopedia, 2016).
4.1 Engineering the Internet
132
Out of his personal annoyance with this process, he developed the goal of the system: 
money and time could be saved if these different computer centers would be connected to 
each other. Researchers at computer site A should be able to log into the mainframe 
computer at site B and execute the program there remotely, from afar. Mainframe 
computer A would "host" the application for B, and thus these machines were called "host-
computers". This idea of sharing resources between computer centers was the primary 
reason for the creation of ARPANET. In the long run, it was assumed that this would bring 
researchers closer together and would facilitate cooperative research projects over long 
distances (Heart et al., 1981, pp. II-2).
Because of ARPA’s free-wheeling management style, Taylor had no difficulties to 
convince his supervisors to provide relatively large funds to launch an experimental 
network, as this following smoking gun episode shows:
"I had no proposals for the ARPANET. I just decided that we were going to build a 
network that would connect these interactive communities into a larger community 
in such a way that a user of one community could connect to a distant community 
as though that user were on his local system. First I went to Herzfeld [ARPA 
director] and said, this is what I want to do, and why. That was literally a 15 minute 
conversation. And he said, "You’ve got it." He said, "How much money do you 
need to get off the ground?" I think I said a million dollars or so, just to get it 
organized. There was no ARPA order written or anything for months, maybe even 
a year later" (Taylor, 1999).
What makes this noteworthy is the fact that at this time it was not even clear that a 
computer network would actually work. The ARPANET program had the character of a 
feasibility experiment and was treated as such (Kleinrock, 1990). It can be doubted that 
this highly uncertain endeavor would have started without the generous funding and the 
basic research orientation at ARPA (sufficient condition).
What should have become clear by now is that the goals of ARPANET represented 
scientific goals of resource and information sharing between research centers that 
coincided with the goal of budget efficiency of a government agency. ARPA was a 
military research center, but the ARPANET was dominated by civilian actors and their 
ideas (Segeberg, 2004). In theoretical terms, Taylor was an impact constituency unsatisfied 
with the status quo in the practice of computing. He engaged in a technical reconfiguration 
campaign altering the dominant use of computing of the time (Pfaffenberger, 1992a). A 
unique factor with ARPANET is that the designers of the system designed it for 
themselves. This allowed a constant feedback loop, which was especially supported by 
ARPA’s management style. This special development context had an important influence 
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on the shape and design of the system, because it enabled particular ideas. It initiated a 
special pathway: the network was designed by computer scientists for computer scientists. 
Economical (a business model, proprietary standards or patents) or security considerations 
(authenticating users on the system, encrypted communication) were not important (see 
chap. 4.1.5 Development Blind Spots). That ARPA funded this experimental network 
(where no one knew whether it would in fact work), is a key condition for its success and 
its open design (Kleinrock, 1990). What were the key ideas and norms that only could 
develop in the ARPA context?
Two elements are particularly noteworthy: first, the ideas that became embedded in the 
Network Control Program that regulated data-exchange within ARPANET and second, 
how these ideas were conceived and realized in a social process among graduate students 
that wrote this protocol. Both factors had path-dependent implications for the future and 
will now be analyzed in more detail.
4.1.2.1 Ideas
In 1966, Robert Taylor hired Lawrence ("Larry") Roberts to create a computer network to 
allow resource sharing between ARPA-funded mainframe computer centers (Abbate, 2000, 
p. 44) and the invention phase began (see chap. 2.3.5.1 Emergence/Construction).31 
Roberts had to design the system from scratch because "we didn’t even know what 
computer networks were really […]" (Cerf, 1990). Roberts wanted the system to be as 
open as possible for all kinds of computer hardware, reliable, quick and sufficiently large 
(Hafner & Lyon, 1998, pp. 104-105).
Roberts turned to computer science colleagues at different universities to overcome a 
central challenge: since these incompatible mainframe computers spoke different 
languages, each individual machine had to be reprogrammed to understand the others. This 
was technologically not feasible. Instead, the problem was sidestepped by building a 
subnetwork of cheap, identical mini-computers called Interface Message Processors (IMP) 
that would communicate with each other (Naughton, 1999, p. 90). Thus, the mainframe 
computer at each site only had to communicate with their personal IMP, which then passed 
the message to an IMP at another site, which then translated the message for the 
mainframe computer there. For the hosts, the subnetwork was invisible. They thought to be 
directly in touch with the other machines (Roland & Shiman, 2002, p. 18). This basic 
subnetwork topology was so fundamental that it still exists today: our IMPs are modems 
and routers.
31 A list of key Internet milestones and security incidents can be found in the appendix.
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This subnetwork of incompatible host-computers and IMPs connected over 
traditional phone lines was conceptualized and built over the span of three years at four 
computer sites: The University of California at Santa Barbara, the Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI), the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Utah. The 
physical network hardware, the IMPs, were developed by Bolt, Beranek and Newman 
(BBN) after IBM and other prime manufactures turned down the ARPA contract, arguing 
that such a network would never be economically be feasible (Naughton, 1999, p. 131). 
Figure 14. ARPANET Host-Computer and IMP Subnetwork, Source: (Heart et al., 
1981, pp. III-2)
The software protocol that managed the message transfer was written by graduate students 
at the four university sites.
For the software protocols, Roberts and his colleagues picked up theoretical ideas that 
had been floating in the computer science community of the time: a distributed network 
topology, switching of digital packets and dynamic/adaptive routing of packets (Kleinrock, 
1961; Baran, 1964; Davies, 1965). The first idea was to use a distributed network topology 
or architecture. Roberts initially thought to create a centralized star network (Pelkey, 2014, 
p. chap. 2). 
A post office that collects all letters that have been sent at a central location and then 
delivers these letters to their designation at the edges represents a star network. Roberts 
initial idea was that all host-computers would be connected to a central computer which 
would facilitate the networking functions and message exchange between all other 
machines (see figure). 
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Figure 15. Different Network Topologies outlined by Baran (Baran, 1964, p. 2)
This idea was met with resistance by his colleagues and particularly Robert Taylor who 
did not like the idea because:
"[…] there was a strong element in the culture, in those days, mid 1960s that was 
reflected in me. I didn’t trust large organizations. This is part of the movement of 
the 60s. I didn’t trust large organizations. I didn’t trust centralized control of 
anything. Small is beautiful" (Taylor, 2008, p. 44).
This episode was the first glimpse of something like a political idea or social norm 
influencing a design decision. Taylor essentially acted as a norm entrepreneur arguing that 
no single institution or organization shall be able to control the operation of the network. 
This was a reference to the emerging counter-culture of the 1960s (see chap. 4.2.2 Ideas: 
Stewart Brand and the Counter-culture (1960-1970)). The alternative would have been a 
decentralized system, like the phone network of the time, where a few, densely connected 
clusters would then be interconnected. Paul Baran worked on the same issue of network 
topology at RAND, but with a national security perspective. Dealing with the question of 
how communication could be maintained after a nuclear first strike, he argued that 
distributed networks would be most likely to survive.32 The idea of a distributed network is 
32 The US-Air Force researched different solutions to the threat of a nuclear first-strike. "Survivable 
communications" was a buzz-word of that time. The problem Paul Baran was working on was how the US 
government could be able to launch a retaliatory strike if the telephone network, linking the White House 
with the army bases was disrupted or destroyed (the "command" aspect) and how to maintain control over its 
troops and authority after a first strike (control) (RAND, 1964). Creating decentralized or distributed 
command centers with redundant communication routes was the solution. Baran calculated that each node 
should at least have three other connections which provide a suitable level of redundancy in case of a nuclear 
attack (Baran, 1964). For RAND, a computer network served the purpose of national security and not 
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that each node has multiple redundant connections to its neighbors, so if one fails (or gets 
destroyed by a nuke), a reserve line exists. The US highway system represents a distributed 
network (Galloway, 2006, p. 35).
A highly decentralized or distributed system was chosen for ARPANET, but with this 
decision came a problem that was known from analog telephony. Switching is the process 
of establishing a phone connection between caller, (manual) operator and recipient. Analog 
audio signals degrade with each switch. The more switches between caller and recipient, 
the worse the audio quality gets. This could be witnessed with international phone calls 
back in the day (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 57). The more distributed a network, the more 
switching was required and the worse the audio signal got.
Therefore, the ARPANET engineers had to use digital data transmission, a series of 
bits.33 Digital communication was quicker, could be stored more easily and allowed for 
higher bandwidth (i.e. more transmissions over the same line at the same time). Whereas 
an analog line could carry only one phone call at the same time, several digital 
communications could be sent at the same time over the same cable. There was another 
catch. Digital communication does not flow in a constant stream of information, like 
analog audio, but happens in bursts. Large portions of data are sent at the same time 
followed by silence. Inactive lines were a waste of capacity. The problem of uneven data 
flow had been discovered before in the telegraphy system of the 1930s. During rush hours, 
more people than the line could handle wanted to send messages. The telegraphy solution 
to this problem was a technique called store-and-forward switching (Abbate, 2000, pp. 11-
13). Messages were sent to the telegraphy offices (the nodes), were temporarily stored and 
forwarded when the lines were inactive (during night-time), which was a more economical 
use of available bandwidth.
 This led to the idea to divide digital messages into smaller "message blocks" (Baran, 
1964) or "packets" (Davies, 1965). The analogy would be that instead of sending an entire 
book in one shipment, the individual pages of the books would be glued to post cards (the 
packets) and then sent individually. The receiver would re-assemble the book out of the 
pos cards at the end-point of the transmission. This implied that the post cards would not 
all travel the same way. The network individually determined the path over which the 
packets would be sent with a routing-table. The nodes in the network would constantly 
freedom of research and exchange of ideas. This more military perspective on networks shaped Baran’s 
assumptions of how such a network should look like and operate (its protocols).
33 A bit, or binary digit, is a unit in computing which can have two values: 1 (on) and 0 (off). Different 
combinations of 1s and 0s are transcoded into alphabetical letters. For example, the succession of the 
following 8 bits "01000001" represents the letter "A". A message block (packet) of 1024 bits therefore can 
store a message consisting of 128 alphabetical letters. Assuming that the average English sentence is 20 
letters long, one packet carries the information of roughly 6 sentences.
4.1 Engineering the Internet
137
check whether its neighbor nodes were active (feedback) and if not, would instead send 
packets in another direction (Naughton, 1999, p. 103). Thus, packets would be sent 
randomly over the network, depending on the free capacity of the distributed data lines, 
which means they travelled on a hard-to-predict path. This was called adaptive or 
distributed routing.
The sum of these ideas was called packet-switching, which is the core idea that both 
ARPANET and the later Internet share. This refers to Weyer’s core invention that was 
described earlier (see chap. 2.3.5.1 Emergence/Construction). It means that the data flow in 
the network is not determined by one centralized watchtower, but by the individual nodes 
in the network. This network architecture allowed "to control the communication without 
centralizing it" (Taylor, 2008, p. 44). The network would govern itself and the end-points, 
i.e. the hosts, could not execute any control over the network. Thus, the control of the 
network was decentralized. This idea was "most critical" (Taylor, 2008, p. 57). A message 
sent over the network would exist only at the beginning and the end of the transmission. 
While in transit, it was chopped up in packets which travelled over random paths. Thus, a 
message could not easily be intercepted. This made traditional wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance more difficult. With digital transmission, it was not possible to plug into the 
cable with an Alligator-clip and listen to the messages. When packet-switching spread 
globally with the Internet in the 1990s, this became a central concern of intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies, which will be discussed in a later chapter (4.4.7.3 Artifacts: 
NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). For ARPA engineers, 
surveillance and eavesdropping was not a concern because they could not predict that an 
idea invented in the late 1960s would still be in use 30 years later. They chose packet 
switching only for pragmatic reasons: it was a feasible, robust and innovative solution to 
the problem of incompatible computer systems.
These theoretical ideas had to be implemented into a working software protocol that 
defined how packet-switching was going to work. This implementation process happened 
in a special social context with a special configuration of actors, which will be introduced 
in the next chapter.
4.1.2.2 Norms Shaping the Construction of ARPANET
The Network Control Program (or protocol), implementing the packet-switching idea was 
written by a set of graduate students at the four host-universities, who formed the so-called 
Network Working Group (NWG). According to the theoretical model (see chap. 2.3.5 
Phase Model of Technological Diffusion), it is important to analyze the social 
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configuration, the context of invention, which is the purpose of this chapter. The ARPA 
developers represent the organizational platform or the key-advocates for norm-emergence 
(Townes, 2012, p. 51). 
Steven Crocker, one of the designers, describes the situation these young computer 
scientists found themselves in: 
"There was no senior leadership. There were no professors. There was no adult in 
the room, as it were. We were all more or less in our mid-20s and self-organized. 
Out of that emerged ... a strong sense that we couldn’t nail down everything. We 
had to be very ginger about what we specified and leave others to build on top of it. 
So we tried to focus on an architecture that had very thin layers that you could 
build on top of — or go around" (Crocker, 2012).
This social configuration, another instance of the freewheeling ARPA management 
style, imposed pragmatism on them. They had to design the protocol as open and 
transparent as possible to allow future modification. Thus, openness represented the core 
norm during the development process. 
"The openness in the design and the openness in the design process were driven by 
a strong understanding that we didn’t know everything and hence needed to leave 
the door wide open for others to build on what we were doing. You can describe 
this as an academic ideal if you want, but it can just as easily be described as 
engineering pragmatism" (Crocker, 2015).
 Being computer scientists, they invented a peer-review mechanism to collect and 
brainstorm ideas which they called "Request for Comments" (RFC). Originally these were 
"temporary, informal memos on network protocols" and the "intent was only to encourage 
others to chime in, but I worried we might sound as though we were making official 
decisions or asserting authority" (Crocker, 2009). This documented their work progress 
and allowed every participant in the group to suggest modifications to the protocols. The 
RFCs were sent to everyone by post (later by E-mail).34 This mode of collaborative work 
reflected strong equality norms among peers and not competition: "Everyone was welcome 
to propose ideas, and if enough people liked it and used it, the design became a standard" 
(Crocker, 2009). In other words, it represented a meritocracy, similar to the hacker ethic 
that developed around the same time (see chap. 4.2.1 Background: Hacker-ethic and 
Technical Optimism (1960s)). The network protocol was a cooperational effort and thus 
belonged to no one. It was not proprietary intellectual property but was perceived as a 
commons. What they developed was for the sake of all and thus public in principle. "We 
did not think of protocols as finished products, and we deliberately exposed the internal 
34 They also have been digitally archived (RFC Archive, 2016).
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architecture to make it easy for others to gain a foothold" (Crocker, 2009). The source code 
was openly published for everyone interested and could be modified by everyone in the 
group (because all were programmers). 
 Naughton summarizes the importance of these RFCs and this mode of production in 
the history of the Internet:
"What these kids were inventing, of course, was not just a new way of working 
collaboratively, but a new way of creating software. The fundamental ethos of the 
Net was laid down in the deliberations of the Network Working Group. It was an 
ethos which assumed that nothing was secret, that problems existed to be solved 
collaboratively, that solutions emerged iteratively, and that everything which was 
produced should be in the public domain. It was, in fact, the genesis of what would 
become known much later as the Open Source movement" (Naughton, 1999, p. 
138).
This peer-to-peer mode of production, as it was later called (Benkler, 2006), initiated a 
path trajectory that is fundamental for the entire history of the Internet. The same modus 
operandi was used when creating the Internet and it is still present in today’s Internet 
governance structures (Hofmann, 2005) with the motto "We reject kings, presidents and 
voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code" (Clark, 1992). 
The important condition is that the free-wheeling ARPA management style supported 
and actively endorsed this: "There was the culture of the funding by ARPA and the 
research by the principal investigators and by the graduate students that fostered the open, 
shared, trusted, ethical, free exchange and spirit of that period" (Kleinrock, 2015). 
Lawrence Roberts strongly supported this and participated in this process as well. 
Having talked about the social mode of construction, the next step is to illuminate the 
outcome of this process, the artifact called the network control protocol (NCP).
4.1.2.3 Artifact: The Network Control Program
To realize those goals and to reflect the norm of openness, the NWG built the Network 
Control Program in layers. Each layer would perform only one function and would be 
separated from the rest. Lower layers would manage packet switching and transport of 
data, higher level layers would run the applications (remote access to computers). This 
layer model became an industry standard because each layer could be tested, checked for 
errors (de-bugging) and reprogrammed individually without distorting the rest of the 
functions, which allowed the system to be highly adaptable and scalable. Layering also 
reduced technical complexity of the system and allowed it to be built in a decentralized 
way at different host-sites at the same time.
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The NWG wanted the application layer to be as open as possible, allowing all kinds 
of different applications (i.e. the stuff that could be sent over the network). "The openness 
of the protocol design process was motivated by wanting to promote the widest possible 
adoption and the widest base for future innovation" (Crocker, 2015). In other words, the 
designers intentionally did not prohibit what could be sent over the network, thus allowing 
all kinds of possible applications and usage scenarios. The network was supposed to 
empower users to develop new applications and therefore, the network did not care about 
the content being sent over it, just like the highway system does not care whether the 
traffic consists of business people or families going on vacation. The network remained 
neutral or indifferent in regard to the content. Later, digital natives and cyber-utopians 
interpreted and framed this openness as a freedom of speech norm (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms 
and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism), but it was not explicitly conceived by the designers 
as such.
"In general, we didn’t view the Arpanet as having any moral issues one way or the 
other. It’s not that we didn’t think about such things, but I think the general view is 
that technology is a tool, and it can be used for good or evil. The tool itself is not 
inherently good or bad" (Crocker, 2015).
The developers clearly adopted a pragmatic, technology-as-a-tool perspective which 
argues that the social agent determines the technology by its use. If the designers had 
wanted to limit usability, they could have implemented functions that would prohibit 
certain applications from running but they did not because they wanted it open, flexible 
and adaptable. This decision would later open the door for applications in the legal gray 
area (like sharing of copyrighted material or computer malware).35 
Because computers were incompatible (and sometimes did not even have the same 
character set of signs) another important decision was made, which still has huge 
implications today: the intermediary nodes, the IMPs or routers, would only read the 
address of a packet, but not the message itself. The content of a message would be 
readable only at the target computer, which reassembled the chopped up packets (Abbate, 
2000, p. 123). This becomes clearer if we use a post card analogy (see chap. 4.1.2.1 Ideas). 
The IMP would only read the data required to establish communication (i.e. address field) 
which was written in the first 32 bits of an individual packet (the so-called header). The 
protocol did not care what was written on the message field of the post card (like it is 
35 The NWG itself developed a wide variety of applications that could be run on the network like file-
transfers (File Transfer Protocol or FTP) and remote-login (TELNET). In fact, file-sharing was implemented 
quite early in the technological design of the ARPANET and was one if its earliest functions and basically a 
core functionality of a computer network (Abbate, 2000, pp. 106-108).
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supposed to be in the post office as well). Again, cyber-utopianism later picked up this 
idea, interpreted and framed it as a privacy feature (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas 
of Cyber-Utopianism). But again, this function developed out of technological feasibility, 
pragmatism and the goal of openness and adaptability and not necessarily for political or 
moral reasons.36 If the IMP (which was running the NCP) would read all messages coming 
through, it would require more computing power proportional to the total size of the 
network. This would make them more expensive and prone to error. Therefore, it was more 
efficient if the IMP or router did not read every message passing through.
To sum up, ARPANET reflected academic or engineering norms: "[…] The style of 
design and cooperation mirrored the academic notion of information sharing as coin of the 
realm" (Cerf, 2015). The early protocol design of the ARPANET represented four core 
norms that were inspired by a scientific/engineering paradigm held by the inventors. First, 
anything can be sent. Second, no intermediary could read what was sent (which resembles 
postal secrecy). Third, all traffic was handled equally. All packets were equal, no matter 
what their content was. Finally, the network topology and the subnetwork idea reflected a 
strong mistrust of central control: "the network could not/should not depend upon a 
centralized control structure, but rather on a distributed control structure that no one (or a 
few) parts of the network controlled the rest, but that all portions shared the control" 
(Kleinrock, 2015). No central authority, no corporation or state should control the entire 
network. It is important to stress that these norms were not embedded for political reasons, 
but rather because of pragmatism. They were the best technical solutions to a problem. 
None of the inventors could foresee the future and no one anticipated the privacy or 
freedom of speech issues that emerged later. The engineers can be seen as passive norm 
entrepreneurs: they shaped the social and technical dimension of the artifact ARPANET 
without intentionally promoting a moral agenda with their technology.
Figure 16. Engineer Paradigm influencing ARPANET Design (own diagram)
36 "The privacy issue was not one that drove the original design, as I recall […]" (Kleinrock, 2015).
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 However, their mode of peer-production necessitated openness and their academic 
background supported the idea of free information exchange, network neutrality and 
mistrust in central control. In other words, social norms and academic ideas might not have 
been dominant during the construction, but they were there to some degree. Their 
pragmatic decisions pre-structured the path for later discourse. The cyber-utopian 
paradigm perceived these structural features as intentional moral decisions that became 
embedded in code (interpretative flexibility). When the first discourse about the 
implications of this technology developed in the 1980s, the social implications of these 
design decision became visible. These passive norms became signified as norms with the 
widespread diffusion of ARPANET’s successor, the Internet, because cyber-utopian 
advocates framed them as such. But there is another important instance of co-shaping the 
meaning of technology. The early users had an impact here as well.
4.1.2.4 Co-shaping the Meaning of Networks
This chapter argues that not just the ideas of the inventors were important, but that user-
feedback helped to establish the meaning, purpose and technical utility of the network. In 
fact, Naughton argues that the ARPANET is an interesting instance of co-shaping of 
technology, where the users gave the technology a concrete utility and meaning that had 
not been intended by the developers (Naughton, 2016, p. 9). What the ARPANET meant 
and what it could be used for emerged out of the practice of using it. This also led to the 
creation of several norms that were not anticipated by its designers. This user feedback was 
possible because the ARPA management style explicitly endorsed it. 
The NWG finished the final specifications for the protocol in December 1970 and 
most of the ARPANET’s initial physical infrastructure of IMPs, Hosts and telephone 
cables (the so-called backbone)37 was in place by the end of 1971 and run by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) (Abbate, 2000, p. 78). This represents the phase where the 
system stabilized (see chap. 2.3.5.2 Stabilization). Robert Taylor left ARPA to Xerox in 
1969 and Lawrence Roberts became head of IPTO. Since then, the technical diffusion of 
ARPANET across US computer research centers had begun. Roughly one computer center 
per month was connected to ARPANET, excluding those universities without ARPA 
contracts. By July 1977, 58 host-sites had been connected to ARPANET, and the first 
37 "An Internet backbone refers to one of the principal data routes between large, strategically interconnected 
networks and core routers on the Internet. An Internet backbone is a very high-speed data transmission line 
that provides networking facilities to relatively small but high-speed Internet service providers all around the 
world" (Technopedia, 2015).
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international links to Norway and London had been created (Heart et al., 1981, pp. III-80-
91).38
In the beginning, the ARPANET was used "primarily as a facility for 
experimentation with packet-switching" (David, 2001, p. 7), a solution for a problem yet to 
find. Besides that, there was not much to do. In the fall of 1971, it was estimated that the 
network carried only 2% of its intended capacity, which implied that no one really used it 
(Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 175). Particularly the feature of resource-sharing was seldom 
used. Roberts decided in 1971 that direct access of terminals and new emerging mini-
computers to ARPANET, without the need for a host-computer, would be a good idea 
because it would bring more users to the net. This was a reaction to the computer-
revolution that began to emerge around the same time (see chap. 4.2.3 Artifact: 
Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)). It led to the widespread diffusion of personal 
computer technology to enthusiasts and early or adopters (Abbate, 2000, p. 138). Around 
the time there existed around 50000 computers at universities and private companies (Rid, 
2016, p. 141). This new spectrum of users articulated their demands and norms about 
computing: they wanted to connect their machines to ARPANET and did not want to rely 
on large mainframes (Heart et al., 1981, p. 117). A new actor formation and a new cyber-
utopian paradigm were forming. This is an important contextual factor that was crucial for 
the success of ARPANET. 
ARPA endorsed more users on the network. There weren’t any formal rules or 
acceptable use policies. The only access requirement was that you had a username and 
password that was registered with one of the networking sites, but local administrators 
tended to give access out freely (Abbate, 2000, p. 85). Unauthorized users (called network 
randoms) were tolerated as long as they did not do any harm (because they increased 
traffic). This lack of security has to do with the engineering paradigm that influenced the 
development of the net (see chap. 4.1.5 Development Blind Spots). The early adopters of 
the network formed an epistemic community of computer scientists (initially there were few 
military applications) because technical access and use barriers were quite high. In order to 
use the ARPANET, you had to be a trained computer scientist. There was only text on the 
net (no images, audio or video) and "browsing" was done by typing in computer 
commands manually. You had to have precise knowledge about what you were looking 
for, where to find it and if you found it, how to use it. This remained the status quo until 
the invention of the graphical web browser software Mosaic in 1991 (see chap. 4.1.4 
38 One example of early military use of ARPANET was to transmit data from the NORSAR seismic array, 
used for detecting underground nuclear tests from the Soviet Union, from Norway to the US (Townes, 2012, 
p. 50).
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Artifact: The World Wide Web (1989-present)). For the impact constituents, the users, the 
experience was so frustrating that they started to develop new applications and to engage 
in the design process themselves.
One episode is insightful. While running network diagnostics, an unusual amount of 
intra-node traffic at MIT was detected, the same place where the hacker ethic formed (see 
chap. 4.2.1 Background: Hacker-ethic and Technical Optimism (1960s)). BBN realized 
that MIT users had turned (hacked) their IMP into a hub for local-area networking, sending 
data and personal messages between local computers at MIT. ARPANET was designed to 
connect long-distance research communities. "The notion of using the IMP as a local 
connection was quite a surprise, to the extent that it became just common and had not been 
envisaged" (Heart, 1990). This discovery represents an anomaly in the Kuhnian sense: the 
network was used for something that the dominant engineering paradigm did not 
anticipate. 
One of those "killer-applications" was Network E-mail, introduced in 1972 by Ray 
Tomlinson. Its traffic began to dominate the ARPANET, thus manifesting the dramatic 
desire/need for people-to-people communication. This was a "major shift" (Kleinrock, 
2015). The official completion report states: E-mail "changed significantly the feel of 
collaborative research with remote groups" (Heart et al., 1981, pp. III-113). The service 
was relatively easy to use and way quicker and more affordable than telephone. Mail also 
became quite popular with ARPA management and Roberts began funding E-mail hosts at 
BBN and other locations, which gave users E-mail accounts (similar to what Mail 
providers nowadays do). The ARPA-director at the time, Stephen Lukasik (1970-1975), 
was a strong advocate of E-mail who used the ARPANET for managing internal affairs 
(Lukasik, 2011, p. 14). He lobbied much of ARPA's management and other agencies and 
departments to use this technology, acting as a norm entrepreneur (Lukasik, 1991). With 
E-mail also came the first newsletters and mailing lists (one-to-many or many-to-many 
communication) which had a huge impact on the formation of virtual communities and the 
development of social norms therein. ARPA itself created the ARPA Newsletter 
(published by SRI in 1973) which contained information on log-in sites, new hosts and 
new applications. Mailing lists disseminated information for all subscribers and they 
formed around various topics, professional as well as recreational.
In sum, what the users did was to engage in a reconstitution-process to alter the 
technical function and social meaning of the ARPANET (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the 
Frameworks). By inventing attractive new applications such as E-mail or even games, they 
altered the meaning of the technology step-by-step and created standards of appropriate 
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behavior within the computer network. Suddenly, they were able to share their ideas and 
research data with help of electronic mail and file-sharing. Communicating via mailing 
lists became a standard of appropriate behavior within the research community. The 
repeated practice of thousands of users established E-mail communication as a norm of 
computing that changed what the network was and meant. This changed the meaning of 
ARPANET from being a remote sharing network into being an information technology, a 
notion that was novel at the time (McLuhan, 1964). This perception of the ARPANET 
diffused among educational channels and into the public. 
In 1972, ARPANET was presented to the public at the International Conference on 
Computer Communications, which is described as a "watershed moment" (Cerf, 1990) for 
the ARPANET. To prepare for the conference, Roberts engaged his team and contractors 
to develop useful applications and usage scenarios for the ARPANET (Kleinrock, 1990, p. 
25). This means that many of the usage scenarios for the network came after its 
construction, representing a solution in search for problems. "There were simple 
demonstrations of e-mail, and text editing, and file transfers, and remote log-ins, and things 
like that" (Cerf, 1990). User innovation such as Tomlinson’s E-mail was key in making the 
technology interesting and demonstrated its utility to the general computer public. The 
ARPANET presentation of 1972 indicated a major change in the perception of networking 
technology and what networks actually meant and could do. It transformed the 
experimental and unproven concept of packet-switching networks into something real and 
tangible.
This episode aligns nicely with the theory (see chap. 2.3.5.3 Diffusion to the 
Mainstream). In theoretical terms, the presentation of 1972 represented a closure moment 
that reduced interpretative flexibility and changed what networking and networks actually 
meant. The whole presentation changed the computing discourse of that time by 
establishing a dominant discourse on computer networking. Terms like packet-switching, 
sharing, decentralization, E-mail and layering became key signifiers in computer science 
discourses of the time. Networking became the next big thing and "the future" as several 
electronics magazines stated (Electronics, 1972). The ARPANET presentation altered the 
meaning of networks from experimental resource sharing to factual information sharing of 
social actors (Kleinrock, 1990, pp. 24-25). E-mailing, a norm that developed out of 
deviant practices showed that the most "valued resources of the net were people, not 
computers" (Abbate, 2000, p. 111). The norm that it was appropriate to use this network 
for information exchange then diffused to the mainstream.
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This change of meaning had several distinct outcomes. First, computer makers and 
developers suddenly realized that a new networking market was emerging (Abbate, 2000, 
p. 186) and rushed to develop their own marketable solutions. The ARPANET, with its 
innovative packet-switching, adaptive routing and layered protocol in fact became the 
dominant design for computer networking and later a de-facto standard for networking (see 
chap. 2.3.4 The Social Construction of Technology and its Critique). Quarterman shows 
how the 1972 presentation led to an international diffusion of packet-switching technology 
and thereby jumpstarted new developments such as local area networking (LAN). More so, 
the quantity of networks increased, creating new types of incompatibilities (Quarterman, 
1989). 
Second, the ARPANET changed the way scientists worked and what types of projects 
were feasible.39 The network greatly contributed to the formation of virtual communities 
on message boards or online forums that later became important (see chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: 
The WELL and the Social Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)). These networks 
allowed information sharing for non-professionals and can be highlighted as the birthplace 
of the net-community with its network-citizens, netizens. Because ARPA was funding the 
majority of American computer science and most of these institutions got access to the 
ARPANET, this dominant design and the social norms of peer-to-peer collaboration 
quickly spread through the educational channels and were discussed in computer science 
textbooks and journals, representing carrier media for the paradigm (Roberts, 1988, pp. 
149-151). This could only happen because the ARPANET specifications were made public 
in the RFC’s: everyone could look them up and replicate the technology. 
Third, more users became aware of the networks and wanted access, including the 
military. One of the early uses of the ARPANET were DARPAs seismology (for 
verification of nuclear tests) and climate programs. Additionally, policy-makers such as 
Albert Gore began to recognize this technology (see chap. 4.3.2 Politics: Bill Clinton and 
Albert Gore as Internet Advocates (1992-2000)). In sum, this led to an increase of users of 
the ARPANET and represented a beginning decontextualization of the technology from 
academic contexts to the business or military world. The mass diffusion of networks 
created a new, but also an old problem, the incompatibility of different networks. This 
39 In 1977, Paul Baran and David Farber invented a new type of research cooperation when writing one of the 
first research papers collaboratively over the ARPANET. They argue that packet-switching networks are 
going to replace the dominant communications paradigm of circuit-switching (telephony). They predicted 
that networks soon will be used for "mundane applications: automated hotel reservations, credit checking, 
real-time financial transactions, access to insurance and medical records, general information retrieval, and 
real-time inventory control in business" (Baran & Farber, 1977, p. 1066), which would fundamentally 
transform the economy.
4.1 Engineering the Internet
147
issue played a major role in creating the Internet, which will be introduced in the next 
chapter.
4.1.3 Constructing the Internet (1972-1991)
The evolution of the Internet does not end with the successful ARPANET experiment, 
because one successful computer network does not constitute an inter-net. The term inter 
in Internet can mean two things. First, an inter-network connection bridging two or more 
computer networks and second, an inter-national connection that makes it truly global. 
This chapter is about how the ARPANET became the international inter-network that we 
still use today. To realize this, a new set of protocols had to be constructed, thus 
representing another instance of goal-oriented construction (see chap. 2.3.5.1 
Emergence/Construction). The general argument is that the new Internet Protocol inherited 
many ideas and norms of ARPANET, since it was constructed in the same peer-to-peer 
manner and within the same organizational structure of ARPA. However, the problem of 
connecting different computer networks posed new challenges that required new ideas. 
After Taylor left ARPA in 1969, Lawrence Roberts became head of IPTO in 1972 
and hired the former BBN programmer and developer Robert Kahn to manage the different 
networking projects that ARPA had started after the ARPANET’s success. IPTO 
researched new applications for networks, such as a satellite communication net 
(SATNET) or the ALOHANET where the goal was to connect the Hawaiian Islands with 
radio-waves. These other networks represented forking-path developments of packet-
switching (see chap. 2.3.5 Phase Model of Technological Diffusion). Kahn was faced with 
different networks which, although they used packet-switching, were fundamentally 
incompatible because they used different data rates, different packet sizes and speeds 
(Cerf, 2014). Each network thought it was the only one in existence because it had not 
been designed to recognize others. Kahn described this core problem that led to the 
Internet in an interview:
"Here I am sitting with the notion of multiple networks, and I’m trying to think, 
how would we actually do anything interesting with them if we don’t connect 
them? Because the computers were all very big. If I have a radio net, what am I 
going to do with the radio net? I can maybe plug a terminal into a little interfacing 
computer, but I’ve got to get to some big machine to do anything interesting. So I 
had the problem of trying to figure in those nets, and I had a basic architectural 
approach to deal with it, which is what became the Internet" (Kahn, 2004).
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In other words, a new networking protocol was needed that managed packet-
handling between incompatible computer networks. Kahn followed the path outlined by 
his IPTO predecessors and adopted the same informal management style. He approached 
his old friend Vinton Cerf, with whom he had worked on the ARPANET protocol. Cerf 
was active chairman in the NWG, which after the 1972 presentation became international 
and renamed itself to International Packet Network Working Group (INWG).40 By 1972, 
several competing networks were being developed in Britain, in France (project Cyclades) 
and at private firms such as Xerox, where Robert Metcalfe was working on another 
fundamental technology called Ethernet (Metcalfe, 2004). INWG was the international 
networking forum for idea-exchange between computer network experts and networking 
initiatives around the world. It maintained the informal RFC tradition (called INWG 
notes). Theoretically speaking, the norms and ideas that diffused through ARPANET 
resonated with Cerf and Kahn (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks) and thus they 
internalized and reified these norms. Out of this idea exchange between the international 
actors, emerged "A Protocol for Packet Network Interconnection", as Kahn’s and Cerf’s 
from 1974 paper was called.41 
In this paper, they called this new inter-networking protocol Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and named the network of networks they planned to build the "Internet". 
TCP/IP is the software protocol that governs how the Internet works. Between 1974 and 
1979 the protocol was refined several times through the process of RFC and peer-to-peer 
collaboration with international scholars (Kahn, 1995, p. 14). The first successful test was 
in 1977 when a packet-radio network in San Francisco, the ARPANET and the SATNET, 
were connected and exchanged packets with each other. In 1978 researchers proposed 
"splitting the TCP protocol into two separate parts: a host-to-host protocol (TCP) and an 
internetwork protocol (IP). […] IP would simply pass individual packets between 
machines (from host to packet switch, or between packet switches); TCP would be 
responsible for ordering these packets into reliable connections between pairs of hosts" 
(Cohen, 1978, p. 179). Henceforth the protocol became a protocol-suite or protocol-stack 
named TCP/IP. Throughout 1979, Cerf and Kahn lobbied the DoD to make TCP/IP a 
defense department standard for their computer networks (Pelkey, 2014, p. Chap 9.6). 
40 Cerf: "The INWG group was about 25 people or so, which ultimately grew to, you know, a mailing list of 
several hundred" (Cerf, 1990). However, as Pelkey (2014, chap 6.3) remarks, the initiative to make NWG 
international came from European researchers after the ICCC conference: "they agreed they needed to meet 
again and function much like the Network Working Group, NWG, of ARPANET."
41 According to Naughton, they tossed a coin and Cerf came out as the first author (Naughton, 1999, p. 162). 
Since then he is regarded by many as "the father" of the Internet. In reality, many people sponsored important 
ideas. Cerf and Kahn simply collected all the free-floating ideas and wrote them up. Cerf modestly mentions 
Louis Pouzin, Hubert Zimmerman, Robert Metcalfe as influential contributors to the design.
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Additionally, they planned that the ARPANET, still based on the NCP, would be migrated 
to TCP/IP (to support satellite links), a process that eventually took until 1 January 1983. 
Cerf describes the period between 1983 and 1985 as a consolidation period for TCP/IP 
(Naughton, 1999, p. 168), which corresponds with its technical stabilization (see chap. 
2.3.5.2 Stabilization). During this time frame, more and more actors picked up TCP/IP as a 
standard for their networks or built computer hardware and software to support TCP/IP.
This new version was partly a path-dependent construct that further developed ideas 
from ARPANET, but it also added new components which will be introduced in the next 
chapter. There I will explain how it worked and what its core ideas and norms were. After 
that follows a chapter on the spread of TCP/IP that led to the WWW in the 1990s.
4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet Protocols and Norms
What were the new characteristics of TCP/IP? Generally, "the basic design of protocol 
layers and documentation and much of the upper structure was done as part of the 
ARPAnet and continued without much modification as the Internet came into being" 
(Crocker, 2009). In other words, the Internet protocol inherited many design features (on 
the technical side: packet switching, distribution, adaptive routing, layering) and norms 
(open source ethos and RFC mode of working and lack of business or security features) of 
the ARPANET, but because of its different scope, had to implement new design elements. 
This is a prime example of path-dependency.
The fundamental difference between ARPANET and the Internet is that the latter 
would connect multiple independent networks with heterogeneous architectures, like radio 
or satellite communications or networks owned by private actors, thus constituting a meta-
network (Leiner et al., 2015). Therefore, it occurred to Kahn that it would require an open 
architecture, which means that the protocol would not put any constraints on the types of 
network or devices that it included. Openness thus is both the key design principle of the 
Internet (see chap. 2.3.5.1 Emergence/Construction) and also the key social norm: all 
networks, no matter of shape, size, function (private, military, civil) or technology (radio, 
satellite, wired) should be includable. An alternative interpretation of this idea is: "One of 
the primary norms of the Internet is that anyone can talk to anyone" (Crocker, 2015). In 
contrast to ARPANET, the Internet was intentionally designed to be a communication 
medium that supported communications between heterogeneous devices and networks 
(Cerf, 2014).
The general problem was that computer networks at the time had no language to 
refer to others. Each network operated like it was the only one in existence. Cerf and Kahn 
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could not enforce changes in individual networks to recognize others (Cerf & Kahn, 1974). 
What they did was to put a black box between the individual computer networks that 
disguised itself as a host-node in each. From the perspective of a single network, this 
special gateway computer looked like any other node that received packets. Packets of 
network A (with specialized packet sizes, bandwidths etc.) would be send to that gateway 
node and it would remodulate the packets to fit the general requirements of the next 
network B. The gateway computer performed the function of routing packets. Cerf 
describes the transmission of data in the network in an easy, understandable way using the 
post card analogy: 
"This is kinda like post cards in envelopes. So if I think of the underlying network 
as being a thing that carries envelopes and the addresses on the envelopes are 
unique to each network and I put a thing, we called a gateway, in-between the 
networks. When a computer generates an Internet packet we will have it stick that 
post card into an envelope and address that envelope in the next network’s 
addressing structure. It goes through the network, the network has no idea that it is 
anything special: looks like any other packet, right? Like any other envelope. But 
when it gets to the destination’s gateway, the gateway pulls the thing out, opens up 
the envelope, throws it away, and says 'what’s in there?’ and says 'holy-cow, it is an 
internet post card, what am I supposed to do with it?’. It looks in the routing table 
and says 'send it to this network over here’ and it says 'ok, I know how to do that! I 
will create a new envelope for that network, stick the post card into it, seal the 
envelope and send it into the next net.’ This thing is called encapsulation and 
decapsulation. And that is how we hopped the Internet protocol packets through all 
these different networks. It’s as simple as that" (Cerf, 2014).
The intra-networks42 handled their internal packet-switching operations and the 
gateways did the inter-networking part between heterogenous networks. They had to 
invent a system that allowed a packet from one network to find an address in a different 
network and this was solved with IP-addresses, which basically work like postal-addresses. 
Each device in the network gets an address towards which packets are sent. Each gateway 
acts as a decentralized post office sorting the messages for different postal areas 
(networks). 
The encapsulation idea has important consequences: the local networks do not need 
to know about the location of the target host because it was the gateway’s job to figure that 
out (Abbate, 2000, p. 129). The design of IP implicated that "no single node on the Internet 
knows definitively where a destination is, merely that it is 'over there.’ Each node does 
know the exact location of every node it is connected to, and may pass its messages to 
42 Networks within the larger structure of the Internet.
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whatever machine is closest to 'over there’" (Galloway, 2006, p. 44).43 As a result, the 
nodes within the Internet have no idea that they actually participate in a larger meta-
structure (the Internet) because they only see their neighboring nodes, but not what lies 
beyond. In other words, every device/computer on the Internet is potentially connected 
with every other device on the net without knowing it. This is the essence of 
interconnectivity that the Internet created. The Internet itself is not aware of its totality; it 
has no internal "awareness" or intelligence of all the individual nodes and subnetworks it 
consists of. The network is "stupid" (Isenberg, 1997) because it conceals its own innards 
(Galloway, 2006, p. 65). This technical affordance lies at the core of the so-called 
attribution problem44 that underlies the logic of cyber-war (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem 
Definitions of Cyber-Realism) and is important to keep in mind for understanding the later 
chapter on the evolution of the military perspective towards the Internet, called cyber-
realism. It is also an instance where Latour’s "thingness of things" matters (Latour, 2000).
 The lack of central intelligence was an intentional decision, but not because of 
normative concerns: "[…] We didn’t want each computer at the edges of the nets to know 
how many nets you have to go through to get to the destination" (Cerf, 2014). When using 
the Internet, the user does not need to know that his/her data traverses a multitude of 
different computer networks. For the user, the Internet appears to be one network while in 
reality it consists of thousands of different networks. The implication of this is that when 
we send a message that message is chopped up in packets, repackaged and send "over 
there" randomly to nodes until the packet finds its destination. This may not always be the 
most direct route, because packets might cross multiple networks. If these networks are 
physically located in different countries, it happens that packets cross different 
jurisdictions, because they don’t recognize borders. It can happen that it is quicker to send 
the packets from Berlin to Munich via networks in the US or China. The user does not 
normally see this process (unless he uses software called trace-route). Because everything 
happens in a millisecond or so, it appears as if the message was send directly from Berlin 
to Munich while actually it travelled two-times around the globe. This very feature is a 
central security issue for military-actors (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-
43 Take for example the networks A-B-C-D-E. Gateway A only knows that it is connected to Gateway B and 
if it gets the task to send something to a computer in network E, it does not know were E is (Cerf 1979, in 
Abbate 2000). It passes the packet to its closest connection which is B. B does the same with C and D. 
Finally D is familiar with E and therefore delivers the packet. Theoretically, the message hops around the 
network until it arrives in the vicinity of the target and if it cannot find it, after a number of hops, it deletes 
itself and the sender retransmits. If ABCDE are gateways in different networks, at each hop a recapsulation is 
done.
44 It refers to the problem that the origin of a cyber-attack seldom can be traced back to its origin. The 
encapsualted cyber-attack caries only information about the last gateway it passed so if it has been artificially 
rerouted around the globe, the origin cannot be determined.
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Realism), but was framed by cyber-utopians as the erosion of state borders (see chap. 4.2.8 
Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism). Again, this will be important later on.
Recapsulation also has important privacy implications that were discovered in the 
1990s. Recapsulation conceals the content of the packet it wraps up, much like an envelope 
protects the content of a post card from being read by the postman while in transfer 
(resembling postal secrecy). It is important to stress that privacy protection was not a 
concern for the engineers. Who would threaten privacy in this closely-knit community of 
scientists anyway?45 This privacy feature developed because it was a good and pragmatic 
solution to engineering problems. Privacy was a by-product but not necessarily 
intentionally developed. Given enough computing power, the gateways could have been 
designed to read the content of the decapsulated messages but this would have made the 
network more expensive and complex. Intelligence agencies nowadays lobby for a 
technology called Deep-Packet Inspection (DPI) that enables reading a packet’s content 
when it crosses a gateway (Parsons, 2013).
 More so, the Internet Protocol is actually blind to the integrity of the data it transports 
and the only thing that TCP does is to check whether the messages arrives in one piece 
(Galloway, 2006, p. 42). The only machines in the network that know the content of a 
message (chopped in packets) are the sender and the receiver at the outer edges of the 
network. This became known as the end-to-end principle, which is the central idea of the 
Internet.46 "The motto was, don’t rely on anything inside those nets" (Naughton, 1999, p. 
162). The end points, not the gateways, are responsible for regulating data flow. If a packet 
gets lost in the network (or is garbled through radio transmission), the sender at the end 
would retransmit the package automatically at random time-intervals (Hafner & Lyon, 
1998, p. 227). The logical alternative to this end-to-end design would be a network that 
had internal intelligence (Isenberg, 1997): "the hardware at each intermediate node in the 
network could be given the necessary capacity (data storage, applications that can react to 
interruptions and recreate messages, etc.) to perform this function" (Gillespie, 2006, p. 5). 
This alternative model became known as virtual circuit model and was implemented in the 
competing x.25 inter-networking standard proposed in 1976 (Abbate, 2000, pp. 148-156). 
Another implication of this end-to-end design is the norm of distributed control: no 
single node in the network can control the entire network operation. There is no central 
45 As Crocker remarks: "In the early days, the use of the Arpanet was restricted to those who were working 
on ARPA sponsored projects. The development of TCP/IP was aimed at connecting different networks 
together, hence the term "Internet", with the intention of making networking available to as many people as 
possible" (Crocker, 2015).
46 "The Internet’s protocols themselves manifest a related principle called 'end-to-end’: control [or location of 
network functions] lies at the ends of the network where the users are, leaving a simple network that is 
neutral with respect to the data it transmits, like any common carrier" (Gillespie, 2006).
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watchtower that can monitor the entire network, or that distributes IP addresses (which has 
implications for surveillance and espionage). Additionally, there is no central routing table 
as in the ARPANET (Mueller, 2005, pp. 720-721). The Internet has a high degree of 
distribution because adaptive routing algorithms manage routing. Thus, control over the 
network is highly-decentralized, or distributed. Cyber-utopians later called this a self-
generating mechanism (Zittrain, 2006). The Internet allows no central or hierarchical 
control. Therefore, it cannot be shut down from one central position. However, individual 
parts of the network can be shut down by severing ties (or fiber optic cables) or 
overloading the gateways that connect to the larger Internet.47 Like with the ARPANET, 
espionage in form of simple wiretapping at one location was circumvented through of 
packet-switching (Abbate, 2000, p. 120). Surveilling the entire data-flow within the 
network was made extremely hard, which presents the key problem for intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement actors that want to monitor Internet communication. The 
idea of bulk-data collection on the Internet is a logical solution to this problem and has its 
origin with the idea of decentralization (see chap. 4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take 
Norm of Internet Control (2001 - ))
These individual elements constitute another core norm which is called net-
neutrality. Because the Internet was designed to be open, adaptable, general purpose and 
with distributed control, the network is neutral to the data it sends: all data packets are sent 
with the same speed and are treated the same, no matter if packets contain video 
information, text or E-mails. Everything is equal and no instance within the network can 
control traffic flow and data transmission speeds. All services run with the same quality 
(David, 2001, pp. 16-17). This technical affordance lies at the heart of the current net-
neutrality debate in which commercial actors argue that a network of two speeds is 
desirable for different services such as video-streaming (see chap. 4.5.2 Ideas: Cyber-
Utopianism under Obama and Clinton)
Finally, because of the open source ethos of the international community of 
developers, TCP/IP was designed as a commons. In a distributed network, all nodes share 
the responsibility for maintaining stability. Because the network would manage itself and 
network functions are a shared task it was not relevant who the owner of this network was. 
The documentation was as open as possible because everybody ought to be able to use and 
re-use it. Anyone could write an application that could use TCP/IP. No one had to be asked 
47 Physical network shutdowns would become a political weapon used by state actors during the Arab Spring 
(Roberts et al., 2011) and since then feature prominently in the cyber-war arsenal of military actors (Geers, 
2015).
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for permission or a license. There was no limited copyright. TCP/IP was never patented 
and the protocols have fallen into the public domain (Mueller, 2005, p. 736). Cerf explains: 
" […] TCP-IP protocols were never patented. In fact, they were made available as 
widely as possible to the public as soon as possible. In fact, it’s a little unusual that 
this happened because it was funded by the U.S. Defense Department, and 
normally one would have expected, not only would these have been rather close 
held, but they could even have been classified, except that all the work was done in 
the open with university researchers, principally coming from the computer science 
departments. The openness of those protocols and their availability was key to their 
adoption and widespread use" (Cerf, 2000).
This is a quite clear smoking-gun confession that the open-source norms are 
fundamental for the Internet. More so, the Internet was never classified either, although it 
developed in the context of ARPA (Townes, 2012, p. 54). The Internet actually is the 
manifestation of the open source idea and academic norms. In sum, the theoretical 
construction process looks like this: 
Figure 17. Norms shaping TCP/IP (own diagram)
 Galloway summarizes the key technical norms of TCP/IP: "The ultimate goal of the 
Internet protocols is totality. The virtues of the Internet are robustness, contingency, 
interoperability, flexibility, heterogeneity, pantheism. Accept everything, no matter what 
source, sender, or destination" (Galloway, 2006, p. 42). This openness in documentation is 
a key reason for the quick mainstream diffusion of TCP/IP and its becoming de facto 
standard.
4.1.3.2 The Diffusion and Dominance of the Internet
This chapter explains the diffusion of TCP/IP to mainstream users and traces the causal 
conditions for its success. TCP became operational in 1977 and the first two networks that 
were interconnected were ARPANET and the satellite network SATNET, which included 
international hosts in Norway (1973) and in 1985 Italy and Germany (Townes, 2012, p. 
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51). Quarterman estimated that in 1983 there were roughly 50 networks connected to the 
Internet. In 1989 the number grew to 500 (Quarterman, 1989, p. 282). This growth was 
facilitated by the 1970s digital revolution with the advent of the personal computer (see 
chap. Quantifying the Internet and the Digital Revolution). This dramatically changed the 
computer landscape: researchers and private persons started to buy smaller computers for 
individual use instead of relying on big university mainframes for the computing.48 
Additionally, the Ethernet technology developed by Robert Metcalfe in 1973 – a 
forking-path development to accommodate packet-switching for the radio-network 
ALOHANET – began to spread rapidly during the 1980s. Local Area Networks (LAN or 
Ethernet) became standard at universities and companies49 because they were relatively 
cheap to set up and dramatically increased collaborative working. It can be said that LAN 
is the Internet’s little brother or as its inventor calls it: "The Ethernet is basically the low-
level plumbing for the internet. […] every internet packet goes through a number of 
Ethernets before it gets from its source to its destination" (Metcalfe, 2004). Because 
TCP/IP was designed to be highly adaptable and scalable, it was compatible with LAN 
technologies and allowed the inclusion of the growing number of local area networks (in 
universities, private companies and even private homes) into the larger Inter-network. This 
collection of smaller networks gradually became called the Internet (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, 
p. 244). The existence of thousands of small LANs created grassroots pressure for the 
INWG to adhere to their very own openness idea and convinced them to modify TCP/IP to 
better support smaller networks. Computer users at DARPA-funded universities wanted to 
connect their smaller local networks to the ARPANET. Private companies wanted to 
connect their local business networks to larger ones. In fact, most pioneers of the Internet 
argue that the spread of LAN and the grassroot pressure it generated was a sufficient 
condition for the success of TCP/IP because, in contrast to other protocol competitors such 
as X.25, it supported LAN, which gave it an advantage for widespread adoption (Leiner et 
al., 2015). 
48 According to data from the US Census Bureau Current Population Survey (1984 and 1989), in 1984 8,2 
million US households had a personal computer, while in 1989 the number almost doubled to 15 million 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Pelkey adds the numbers for business: " […] IDC estimated an installed base 
domestically of 27 million personal computers in business environments in 1987 with only 11% connected in 
LANs. They projected the number of personal computers in business environments to swell to 38 million by 
1989 with 28% of them attached to LANs – a 65% growth rate over the 6.6 million personal computers 
attached to LANs in 1988" (Pelkey, 2014, p. chap. 12).
49 According to Pelkey: "[in] 1985 there were 560,000 installed Ethernet LAN connections. Assuming five 
LAN connections, or computers, per network gives an estimated 100,000 Ethernet networks. In 1986, there 
were 650,000 Ethernet LAN connections shipped, likely doubling the number of Ethernet networks. The 
same would hold true for 1987 when 1,260,000 Ethernet LAN connections shipped" (Pelkey, 2014, p. chap. 
12).
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The other important factor for its success is openness. The TCP/IP specifications 
were openly available and because of DARPA’s good connections to the computer science 
departments across the country, the design quickly spread. Thus, like Thomas Kuhn says, 
the knowledge of the paradigm was transferred to the next generation of scholars through 
textbooks and social interactions. TCP/IP was open. Everyone could reuse and re-modify 
it, which served the interest of the computing community. In the early 1980s, DARPA 
began to commercialize the technology to support commercial Internet products. As a 
result, the TCP/IP protocol was made available for all major computer companies and by 
1990, most computers supported it. The ARPANET’s old Network Control Protocol was 
updated to TCP/IP in 1983 and the hundreds of ARPA host-sites now supported TCP/IP 
(Leiner et al., 2015). DARPA started to support UC Berkeley to modify its UNIX 
operating system (BSD) to include TCP/IP in 1980. Before Windows, Unix was the 
dominant computer operating system for personal computers within the research 
community. This helped enormously to establish TCP/IP as de-facto-standard (Leiner et 
al., 2015) and indirectly influenced the emergence of grass-roots networks such as 
USENET (established in 1980), FIDONET (1983) or the WELL (1984), which Naughton 
calls the "poor man’s ARPANET" (Naughton, 1999, p. 169). This is one of the key 
conditions for the mainstream diffusion of the Internet in the 1990s. All these systems were 
applications that could run on top of TCP/IP (application layer). Out of these grass-roots 
initiatives developed a cyber-utopian computer culture, inspired by the hacker-ethos and 
the fundament for cyber-utopianism (see chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: The WELL and the Social 
Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)). These cyber-utopians decontextualized the 
technology and thus were essential for norm-diffusion within the Internet and the concept 
of a cyber-space, a distinct space inside the computer. 
This greater user base allowed TCP/IP to become the dominant technology for 
internetworking, although the competing X.25 protocol was proposed by powerful 
advocates from the telecommunications industry.50 TCP/IP had an early-mover advantage 
and was already established, while X.25 was a mere theoretical and yet-to-be-proven 
standard (Abbate, 2000, pp. 154-155). All this indicates that the time was ripe, the market 
was receptive for an internet-working standard and that DARPA’s entrepreneurship and 
advocacy played an important role during the early diffusion phase (see chap. 2.3.5.3 
Diffusion to the Mainstream). The user base was an important factor, too. TCP/IP was 
more attractive because it allowed all kinds of applications, which facilitated a great 
50 Other competing network protocols were IBM’s System Network Architecture, Xerox Network Services 
and Digital Equipment Corporations’S DECNET (Townes, 2012, p. 59).
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social-embeddedness in new usage contexts. It was intentionally designed to be general 
purpose (and not just military): "it was not designed for just one application, but as a 
general infrastructure on which new applications could be conceived, as illustrated later by 
the emergence of the World Wide Web" (Leiner et al., 2015). Today one would use the 
term platform. The World Wide Web is simply one application that runs on the same 
TCP/IP infrastructure while E-Mail, Voice-over-IP or even the so-called "dark-net" are 
different applications. In other words, the Internet and the World Wide Web are not the 
same: the Internet (TCP/IP) represents the railroads and the WWW is what is transported 
over them. 
Before we turn to the WWW it is necessary to illuminate changes in the physical 
architecture and the governance of the technology that appeared in the mid 1980s and set 
the foundation for global diffusion.
4.1.3.3 The Internet Backbone
ARPANET was decommissioned in 1990 because its hardware was outdated. It became 
replaced by the NSFNET or National Science Foundation Network launched in 1986 
(Abbate, 2000, p. 194). This mode of succession corresponds with one technology 
replacing an older one (see chap. 2.3.5 Phase Model of Technological Diffusion). 
NFSNET’s purpose was to physically connect NSF-funded super-computer research sites 
in the US, to create another network of networks. The program was directed by Dennis 
Jennings and represents a forking-path driven by ideas similar to ARPANET's resource 
sharing ideals: super-computer users should be able to remotely connect to super-computer 
centers to do calculations and work collaboratively (Merit Networks, 1995, pp. 16-19). The 
protocol running on this hardware was chosen to be TCP/IP because it was free, 
nonproprietary and sufficiently tested. In other words, the design of NSFNET represented 
similar ideas and norms developed at ARPA. Thus, it is an example of how norms diffuse 
with technology and resonate with new target audiences that chose to adopt these norms 
and thus reinforce the standards of appropriate behavior and use outlined in the design (see 
chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). This reinforced the causal trajectory initiated by 
ARPANET and its academic norms.
Super-computers, which can process vast amounts of information, rely on high-speed 
hardware. In 1988, the network hardware connecting these super computers was updated to 
T-1 (1.544 megabits per second) connection speeds, way more powerful than ARPANET’s 
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obsolete 56 kilobit/s telephone lines (National Science Foundation, 2016).51 The powerful 
underlying physical hardware of NFSNET (high-speed lines and modernized packet 
switches) was called the backbone and connected thirteen regional networks in the US and 
later overseas (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 20). The software part, the 
TCP/IP protocol, remained mostly identical. The whole system became fully operational in 
1988 and since then has carried a majority of the traffic of the different inter-connected 
networks. This is a significant transition in stewardship of the Internet. Since the 1970s, the 
physical nodes (Hosts and IMPs) of the Internet were in control of DARPA and thus under 
military stewardship. When NSFNET took over, stewardship was given to a civilian 
agency. Interestingly, this was only possible because of generous civil-research funding 
initiated by Congressman Albert Gore with the Supercomputer Network Study Act of 
1986, as a later chapter will show (see chap. 4.3.2 Politics: Bill Clinton and Albert Gore as 
Internet Advocates (1992-2000)).
NSFNET vastly diffused Internet access to non-military, non-DARPA users. 
Theoretically speaking, NSFNET further decontextualized Internet use from the DARPA 
into a wider science context (see chap. 2.3.5.3 Diffusion to the Mainstream). The old 
ARPANET was an elitist club of DARPA funded universities and DoD institutions. 
Tensions were growing between those computer scientists who had access to the network 
and those who did not. The non-military public had limited access and thus a large part of 
the research community was excluded, which represents a somewhat unintentional 
exclusion strategy (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). The use of services such 
as E-mail and community interaction were already the norm and "had greatly enhanced 
research productivity and had generated a strong community spirit among ARPANET 
sites" (Denning, Hearn, & Kern, 1983, p. 3). Those universities who could not access these 
services had a competitive disadvantage. The impact constituencies at these universities 
engaged in counter-appropriation, lobbying to gain access to the system. NSFNET gave 
these disconnected research centers access to the Internet and thus significantly expanded 
the Internet’s use base. In 1985, there were roughly 2000 computers in the system and in 
1993, 2 million (National Science Foundation, 2016). 
A large-enough domestic and international user-base was sufficient condition for the 
success of the Internet because it increased the utility of the network and spawned a whole 
set of new services and applications (Townes, 2012, p. 58). This is sometimes called the 
innovators dilemma, resembling the chicken-egg problem. Robert Metcalfe argued that a 
51 South Korea currently has the fasted average Internet speed at 26.7 megabits per second while the US 
scores around 12.6 mbit/s (Akamai, 2015).
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computer network increases its value the more users are connected to it, which in turn 
attracts more users, ever increasing its value. The challenge for every new technology is to 
convince new users to adopt it although there is no utility yet because there are no users. 
This is sometimes referred to as Metcalfe’s law although there is no solid mathematical 
proof for it (Metcalfe, 2006). However, the NSFNET provided a large enough user-base to 
make the Internet useful (Abbate, 2000, p. 188). Because the Internet was designed to be 
open for all kinds of applications, this laid the foundation for later innovations such as the 
World Wide Web and the creation of web-browsers (the first web-browser Mosaic was 
created within the context of NSF). 
More users made it important to organize behavior within the net so the NSF 
enforced an "Acceptable Use Policy" which aimed to enforce a proper, scientific use of the 
NSFNET and therefore established several norms. It was acceptable to use the network for 
international communication and research exchange but should not be used for "for-profit 
activities" or "illegal or specifically unacceptable use" (National Science Foundation, 
1992). Interestingly, the social configuration at ARPA that led to the informal, voluntary, 
open source governance style of NWG became replicated with the wider Internet 
community at the universities (path-dependency). The NSF community chose to mimic 
ARPAs organizational infrastructure that was a result of the open source development 
ethos, indicating path-dependency. It created the Internet Activities Board (IAB) with two 
subsidiary task forces Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF) and Internet Research Task 
Force (IRTF) in 1986 (Abbate, 2000, p. 207). The IETF that still exists today is responsible 
for the short term Internet developments such as new standards. The IRTF focuses on long 
term issues (Kahn, 1995, p. 19). The culture of request for comments and distribution via 
E-mail for consensus finding is still in place today (DeNardis, 2015). Because of the 
decreased relevance of DARPA for the Internet, the NSF became a major player and 
steward in Internet governance until the technology was completely privatized in the mid 
1990s.
But NSFNET also had an international impact:
"The NSFNET backbone glued together the international networks—almost all 
traffic from abroad would transit the NSFNET. With that kind of connectivity 
available, other countries were prompted to build their own networks so they could 
get connected too. Many of them used NSFNET’s three-tiered structure—
backbone, regionals, campus networks—when they started to build their own 
networks" (Merit Networks, 1995, p. 34).
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It set an example and provided the de-facto hardware standard for other countries to 
build new regional networks. Since NSFNET runs on the freely available TCP/IP, many 
other states opted for this example, initiating a technical norm-diffusion by emulation. 
Over 6000 networks were connected to NSFNET in 1992, and one third of them came 
from over-seas (Merit Networks, 1995, p. 35). One important over-sea connection was 
CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire), where the World Wide Web was 
developed around the same time.
4.1.4 Artifact: The World Wide Web (1989-present)
This chapter introduces the final piece of the puzzle that shaped the meaning and usage of 
the Internet, the World Wide Web (WWW) or the visual Internet. It helped to diffuse 
TCP/IP globally and gave non-computer experts the possibility to use the Internet. The 
WWW is both an instance of theoretical decontextualization of a technology (see chap. 
2.3.5.3 Diffusion to the Mainstream) as well as its partial reconstitution (see chap. 2.3.6 
Combining the Frameworks)
The core problem of the Internet during the 1980s was its terrible usability. 
Everything was text and although the net contained a lot of interesting information, from 
various newsgroups, bulletin-boards and virtual communities (see chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: The 
WELL and the Social Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)) to file-sharing (of games 
and programs mostly), the data was hard to find. There was no search engine and you had 
to know where the information you were looking for was stored, then manually log onto 
the system and dig through the directories there. Surfing the web was basically old-
fashioned command-line typing (like MS DOS) while the personal computer already got a 
graphical, windows-based point and click interface in 1984 with the Apple Macintosh. 
This problem of information storage and retrieval struck Tim Berners-Lee (*1955), 
an English engineer working at the CERN nuclear research center in Geneva. CERN had a 
high personnel fluctuation, which created problems of information storage and retrieval: 
"The technical details of past projects are sometimes lost forever, or only recovered after a 
detective investigation in an emergency. Often, the information has been recorded, it just 
cannot be found" (Berners-Lee, 1989). In other words, CERN had no efficient institutional 
memory that stored what was going on within its doors. Berners-Lee’s goal was "keeping 
track of relationships between all the people, experiments and machines, I wanted to access 
different kinds of information, such as a researcher’s technical papers, the manuals for 
different software modules, minutes of meetings, hastily scribbled notes, and so on" 
(Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 15). To solve this problem, he wanted to create a shared 
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"information space" where all the researchers with their incompatible PCs could access 
each other’s information. This was his dominant metaphor for understanding the WWW. 
He thought of it as a network of associations based on the scientific thought process. This 
thought-process is non-linear, non-hierarchical and based on association of different 
concepts (theories and data) with each other. Ideas in an academic paper are linked 
together by footnotes and references. Theoretically, one text continues in another one when 
the researcher jumps between references. This resembles not one insulated text, but a 
hyper-text. Hypertext, or the idea of non-sequential/non-linear text, had been conceived 
already with Vannevar Bush (Bush, 1945) and been picked up at ARPA-funded 
researchers in the 1960s, among them famous names such as Ted Nelson (see chap. 4.2.3 
Artifact: Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)) and Douglas Engelbart (inventor of the 
mouse). The initial vision was:
"Suppose all the information stored on computers everywhere were linked, I 
thought. Suppose I could program my computer to create a space in which anything 
could be linked to anything. All the bits of information in every computer at 
CERN, and on the planet, would be available to me and to anyone else. There 
would be a single, global information space. [...] Being able to reference anything 
with equal ease, a computer could represent associations between things that might 
seem unrelated but somehow did, in fact, share a relationship. A web of 
information would form" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 4).
But Hypertext was just one part of the story. Berners-Lee bundled it together with 
TCP/IP to create not just a local information space, but potentially a global one. From the 
very beginning he had not just CERN in mind, but potentially the entire research 
community, which all relied on different hardware and software. He chose TCP/IP for the 
very same reason it was invented: it allowed incompatible networks and computers to talk 
to each other and exchange data. Because TCP/IP was nonproprietary, he could simply use 
it.52 To create this information space, Berners-Lee, together with his colleague Robert 
Cailiau, invented the World Wide Web. 
Following good scientific practice, he wrote an official proposal in 1989 (Berners-Lee, 
1989) with a request for comments (mimicking the INWG working procedure). In 1990 the 
proposal was modified and reformulated and Robert Cailliau (CERN senior management) 
jumped in as co-author. In their joint paper, they outlined the World Wide Web: "Texts are 
linked together in a way that one can go from one concept to another to find the 
information one wants" and this network of texts is called the Web (Berners-Lee & 
52 Following TCP/IP’s footsteps, Berners-Lee released the WWW and its related technologies to the public 
domain in 1993, making it one of the most important open source artifacts (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 73).
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Cailliau, 1990). The information of these texts, the files so to speak, were to be stored not 
centrally on one machine but rather decentralized. The system was designed to link various 
files stored on different computers, utilizing TCP/IP. 
Berners-Lee wrote a server software that would host or "serve" the information (a web-
site) and a client software that could retrieve information (the browser). Berners-Lee and 
Cailliau also developed HTML (the Hypertext Markup Language), a common programing 
language that is relatively easy to use and allowed the indexing of media within the World 
Wide Web. With these tools, he created the first hypertext page (info.cern.ch) in 1990, 
which is still online today. This made the Internet tremendously easier to use. 
More importantly, in August 1991, he made these tools available for free on this 
website (and thus on the Internet as a whole) and provided a documentation on how to use 
them. This move "exposed the Web to a very critical academic community" (Berners-Lee, 
2000, p. 46). Because scientists could repurpose the system for their own needs, the 
reception was widely positive. Other scientists began to create own web servers to store 
their files and materials. This is an example of successful decontextualization and social-
embeddedness: HTML resonated with a wider user community (see chap. 2.3.5.3 Diffusion 
to the Mainstream). Berners-Lee linked to them and created one of the first web-
repositories or news hubs on the Internet. Berners-Lee tracked the activity on his server 
and "The rate was incredible, still doubling every three of four months, growing by a factor 
of ten every year, from one hundred hits a day in summer of 1991, to one thousand in the 
summer of 1992, to then thousand in the summer of 1993" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 75). 
The final piece of the puzzle came in February 1993, when Marc Andreessen, working 
at a super computer center connected to NSFNET, wrote Mosaic, the very first graphical 
browser to access websites, and distributed it for free. The central appeal of Mosaic was 
that it was free of charge, easy to install and use and required no learning because it had a 
simple point-and-click interface that even allowed images, pretty much like modern-day 
browsers. Since the release of Mosaic, which later turned into Netscape, Internet usage 
skyrocketed because suddenly it was easy to use even for non-experts (see chap. 
Quantifying the Internet and the Digital Revolution). The Internet, being driven by text and 
command lines during the 1980s, suddenly became visual (Internet History Museum, 
2016). Quickly, other formats such as audio and video followed.
Let’s consider the norms and Berners-Lee initial vision of the system, and the dangers 
it might face once more. The WWW follows the path set out by TCP/IP and the 
ARPANET community (path-dependency). It shares the commitment to openness, both 
technically in terms of compatibility and usability, but also in terms of the social process: 
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The Web was constructed in peer-to-peer fashion but was also designed for this very 
purpose (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 203). Thus, the case can be made that the norms that 
became embedded in TCP/IP resonated with Berner’s Lee who internalized them and 
reified them with his invention.
Berners-Lee chose a system with minimal rules: "I would have to create a system with 
common rules that would be acceptable to everyone. This meant as close as possible to no 
rules at all" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 16). Besides being minimalist, the other core property 
was "It had to be completely decentralized. That would be the only way a new person 
somewhere could start to use it without asking for access from anyone else. And that 
would be the only way the system could scale, so that as more people used it, it wouldn’t 
get bogged down. This was good Internet-style engineering." (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 16). 
Berners-Lee intentionally designed the Web without central control or a central gateway 
hub that had to be consulted before anyone could publish anyone. According to him, this 
was a philosophical, i.e. paradigmatic decision because being a scientist he promoted the 
free exchange of information: "For people to share knowledge, the Web must be a 
universal space across which all hypertext links can travel. […] Information must be able 
to cross social boundaries as well." (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 164). There should be no 
central control and no censor. This was also a technical decision. Centralized systems can 
easily get congested. They do not scale and do not grow as well as decentralized ones. In 
sum, "there was no central computer "controlling" the Web, no simple network on which 
these protocols worked, not even an organization anywhere that "ran" the Web. The Web 
was not a physical "thing" that existed in a certain "place". It was a "space" in which 
information could exist" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 35). This hard to grasp nature of the Web 
creates a lot of interpretative flexibility which opens it up for endless interpretations and 
meanings, which is one reason for the cyber-utopianism of the 1990s (chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: 
The WELL and the Social Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)). 
Berners-Lee argued reparably that the openness and universality were the key norms 
behind the project: everyone should be able to access the Web (regardless of computer and 
operating system) and everyone should be able to publish anything (and potentially modify 
anything, given prior authorization). But he also designed it to have a social effect: 
"When I proposed the Web in 1989, the driving force I had in mind was 
communication through shared knowledge, and the driving "market" for it was 
collaboration among people at work and at home. By building a hypertext Web, a 
group of people of whatever size could easily express themselves, quickly acquire 
and convey knowledge, overcome misunderstandings, and reduce duplication of 
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effort. This would give people in a group a new power to build something together" 
(Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 162).
In other words, the WWW was designed to be an information space and a tool for 
collaborative work and the creation of communities of interest. It should increase creativity 
by linking knowledge together in a global, universal information space open for all who 
wish to access it. "This was the ultimate in openness in technical design and that culture of 
open processes was essential in enabling the Internet to grow and evolve as spectacularly 
as it has. In fact, we probably wouldn’t have the Web without it" (Crocker, 2009). In other 
words, had the technology not been open but proprietary, the Internet may look quite 
different today.
Berners-Lee warned quite early that "the Web could splinter into various factions – 
some commercial, some academic, some free, some not. This would defeat the very 
purpose of the Web: to be a single, universal, accessible hypertext medium for sharing 
information" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 76). With the politicization and commercialization of 
the Internet in the late 1990s, he witnessed that it turned into a "battleground": "Many 
people in business, government and society at large would like to "control" the Web in 
some way" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 124). This, according to Berners-Lee is the single threat 
the Internet faces because it would pervert its initial logic and destroy its intended utility: 
the global and equal access of information. Thus, in 1996, he strictly opposed US Attempts 
to exert control over Internet content by censoring pornography (see chap. 4.3.5 Junctures: 
Policy Attempts to Control the Internet (1993-1996)). The idea that the Washington would 
decide what would be "indecent for everyone in the world was indeed sinister" (Berners-
Lee, 2000, p. 113). 
This indicates one of the central tensions that a universal information system creates: 
information that is regarded as harmless in one culture (say nudity or religious content) is 
considered indecent or amoral in another. But Berners-Lee argues that this is not a problem 
of the Internet itself, but of cultural sensitivities. Demanding to censor the system for every 
user on earth would act against the global purpose of the system. Thus, "keeping the 
medium and the content separate is a good rule" in political discourse (Berners-Lee, 2000, 
p. 130). The solution to the pornography dilemma is not to censor some information for all, 
but decentralize censorship to the end points: the user’s computer, i.e. parental filtering 
software. 
Even today, Berners-Lee is politically active, advocating against corporate control of 
the Internet, for example obstructing the principle of net-neutrality in the EU (Berners-Lee, 
2016) or against pervasive Internet-surveillance of states. Thus, in contrast to most of his 
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ARPA colleagues, Berners-Lee is an active norm-entrepreneur arguing for free speech and 
open networks. His activism allowed Berners-Lee to be more sensitive to the politicization 
of the Internet technology and potential new developments that might affect the Internet 
that had not been envisioned by the designers. The next chapter will analyze the blind 
spots of the engineering paradigm that had political implications as the technology diffused 
globally.
4.1.5 Development Blind Spots
According to Kuhn, paradigms always create unanticipated blind spots. Legro argues that 
these are crucial to explain the demise of a paradigm, if a shock occurs (Legro, 2000). That 
is why I will talk about paradigm blind spots for each of the paradigms (see chap. 2.2.4 
Explaining Change). 
ARPANET, the Internet and the WWW were invented by computer scientists with 
the needs of scientists in mind. The goal was to establish connectivity, but not necessarily 
secure or economically feasible communications. Robert Metcalfe summarizes the blind 
spots as following:
"The problem was we were grad students designing the Arpanet, and there were 
lots of things unimportant to us. Our goal was to get connected. We didn’t care 
about security, because who would threaten it? We were a small family then, so we 
didn’t really anticipate that anyone would be malicious. The other thing we left out 
was economics. Since we were being paid, we just didn’t put any economics in the 
Arpanet. Eventually that was overcome in the 90s with the development of 
economics – like advertising for example. But still, the Internet is recovering from 
the lack of early attention to security and economics" (Metcalfe, 2006).
For this thesis, the lack of security is the most notable affordance of the technology and 
the prime indicator that ARPANET and TCP/IP served academic and not military purposes 
(Townes, 2012, p. 54). While the Internet’s openness for all kinds of applications spawned 
millions of useful applications and services, it also enabled the malicious use of the 
network as well as cyber-warfare activities that disrupt, manipulate or destroy information 
in networks (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015, p. 332). The problem is multi-faceted and complex 
so I will focus only on the most important issues. 
First, the original Internet lacked a good authentication mechanism that assures that an 
IP address is genuine. Unlike phone numbers, IP-addresses are non-permanently assigned 
to users which means that the same user can have multiple IP addresses over time (which 
makes it complicated to attribute an IP to a user). More so, IP addresses can be spoofed 
easily. Thus, a malicious actor can claim to be someone he isn’t. Until the invention of 
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SSL encryption in 1995, there was no way to make sure that a party on the Internet is 
indeed the party that it claims to be (Hallam-Baker, 2007). This lack of authentication, 
together with the lack of network intelligence (end-to-end principle) produces the 
attribution problem that makes it so hard to determine the source of a cyber-attack (see 
chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism). 
Second, the Internet lacks secure or encrypted communication that further prevent 
eavesdropping or surveillance. When thinking about network topographies at RAND in 
1964, Paul Baran proposed to build an encryption system at the node level (Baran, 1964). 
Each switching node would encrypt the message blocks send forward. This would add 
another level of security and complexity and was indeed logical for a military-inspired 
network carrying classified information. Most military networks have encryption in place.
53 However, this security feature was not adopted for the ARPANET and the later Internet. 
IMPs would not read packet messages but they were still sent in plain-text which could be 
theoretically reassembled by someone who would collect all packets traversing a network. 
This is the reason why one should not send sensitive information over public WiFi 
networks. In 1967, an ARPANET engineer named Willis Ware wrote a paper on "Security 
and Privacy in Computer Systems" where he worried about unauthorized network 
intrusion, say by the Russians (Ware, 1967). As he approached Lawrence Roberts with the 
question of security, Roberts response was to focus on creating a working prototype first 
and worry about security once the experiment is a success (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap.1). Later 
the security question probably got forgotten. Security and network controls did not feature 
prominently within the engineering paradigm. 
Why? ARPA Director Stephen Lukasik argues that the academics working on the 
projects were "too naïve and honest to conceive of REAL BAD GUYS" (Townes, 2012, p. 
54). More so, restricting access or available information on the network would in fact 
violate the very goals of the system. ARPANET developed within the context of DARPA, 
but civil, not military scientists were in charge of designing the network. The peer-to-peer 
construction model created trust among the epistemic community of users and thus the 
question of security was secondary. This is an explanation for the lack of security. If the 
network would have been developed not peer-to-peer, but top-down by a more military 
orientated agency, it most likely would have been developed for clearer military purposes 
and thus would have stronger access and content controls in place. In other words, ARPA’s 
53 MILNET, a spin-off or fork-development from ARPANET that emerged in the early 1980s added this 
additional security. MILNET would get re-equipped with encryption and better user access controls (in line 
with military norms) while the ARPANET remained open (Abbate, 2000, p. 143).
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free-wheeling style was both the source of the Internet’s success but also of some of its 
problems.
The lack of economic considerations is also important. A network developed by a 
private company, say AT&T54 most likely would feature some element of billing, to make 
users pay for network use to compensate for the operating costs of such a network. Since 
ARPA funded the operations of ARPANET, a sustainable business model for networking 
was no requirement. The competing X.25 protocol, invented by the telecommunications 
giants allowed such a billing mechanism that tracked which sites a user would visit for 
how long and what content he/she was looking at (Abbate, 2000, p. 160).55 Such a network 
would allow for better surveillance of users. This issue became prominent in the early 
2000s, when copyright infringement because of file-sharing became a problem for 
copyright-holders (David, 2010). But since the Internet was developed by academics that 
relied on the idea of free flowing and easily accessible information, the idea of restricting 
certain files on the network or to limit access for certain user groups was completely 
incommensurable. 
Lastly, Internet developers designed the network for a small epistemic community and 
never anticipated the world-wide diffusion. This envisioned usage scenario is important 
(see chap. 2.3.4 The Social Construction of Technology and its Critique). When Kahn and 
Cerf wrote the specification for TCP/IP in 1974, they estimated that there would be 
roughly 2-3 competing networks (like the ARPANET) per country. They also estimated 
that 4.3 billion potential IP-addresses (and thus devices on the network) would be more 
than enough (Cerf, 2014). At the time, the world population had not even reached four 
billion inhabitants and there were no smartphones and no laptops in every household. It is 
estimated that with the ongoing trend called the "Internet of things", by 2020, about 50 
billion devices will be on the net (Cisco Systems, 2016).
4.1.6 Summary
Let’s summarize the causal mechanism presented in this chapter. The goal-oriented 
construction of the Internet started with ARPANET, exhibited path-dependency with the 
TCP/IP Internet and culminated in the World Wide Web. Of course, the development is 
still going on, but for the thesis these first steps were the most crucial ones because they 
54 American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
55 The X.25 protocol for internetworking was promoted by the International Telecommunications Union was 
built with access controls and cost-accounting in mind (Abbate, 2000, p. 160). Such a network was more 
centralized and could be controlled centrally by system operators. The intelligence was located at the 
gateway, which allowed for better monetarization because cost-accounting could be easily build in at the 
switch-level (Abbate, 2000, p. 160).
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exerted causal influence into the future. I will summarize the causal mechanism in a 
narrative fashion and will present the most important parts in a summarizing table at the 
end.
The context of innovation at ARPA was a necessary condition for the later success 
and shape of the Internet. Additive causal factors are that ARPA provided large enough 
funds and through its flexible management, enough academic freedom to create an 
experimental network (part 1).56 This equifinality of factors facilitated the construction of 
the network in the first place. It can be easily argued that without ARPA, no Internet, or at 
least not in the form it has nowadays. This can be proven by referring to the original 
inventors of packet-switching, like Paul Baran at RAND, who did not receive funding to 
build a prototype network because it was deemed to be unfeasible by the Defense 
Communications Agency (Abbate, 2000, pp. 20-21). Donald Davies, who developed the 
same concept, also could not convince the British Post Office (who owned the necessary 
transmission lines) to fund a similar network experiment in the United Kingdom (Davies, 
1986). 
The Internet was created by scientists for scientists and thus reflected academic or 
engineering key ideas and norms (Townes, 2012, p. 44), such as openness (in terms of 
participation, source code and envisioned content and use) and peer-review (RFC). These 
norms became embedded in the core invention called packet-switching as a by-product to 
pragmatic problem-solving and not because of intentional advocacy. The discussion of 
alternative network protocols such as X.25 has shown that had the network been developed 
by a private company, it would have included different billing or accounting features (see 
chap. 4.1.5 Development Blind Spots). In other words, the social configuration of actors, 
during the conjunction of construction, was a necessary condition for the design and the 
norms of the network (part 2). The creators of the Internet acted as passive norm 
entrepreneurs that put certain material affordances into the technology that became later 
realized and signified by the cyber-utopian users (see next chap. 4.2 The Evolution of 
Cyber-Utopianism). These affordances had a high interpretative flexibility but at the same 
time implicated a certain preferred interpretation: the fact that everything could be sent 
resembled freedom of speech that intermediary nodes would not read packet-content 
resembled postal secrecy and privacy, net-neutrality represented general equality and the 
decentralized topography represented mistrust in central control by states or large 
corporations. The social side of these artifacts was socially constructed by the users post-
hoc during the mainstream diffusion, representing a conventionally paired action as 
56 A visual summary of the engineering paradigm is depicted in the appendix.
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outlined in the theory (see chap. 2.3.4 The Social Construction of Technology and its 
Critique). The designers themselves saw the technology as neutral and did not want restrict 
usage scenarios or appropriate applications. 
The users and early adopters played an important role in this reconstitution process 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a). Because inventors at the same time were the users and because 
ARPA management was particularly open to user feedback, the meaning of the network 
was co-shaped by its users (part 3). Had ARPA not been as open and flexible, this 
feedback-loop would not have been possible (necessary condition). What the ARPANET 
meant was co-shaped by users and inventors with the practice of using the system. The 
impact constituencies of the system began to reconstitute the artifact by developing new 
applications such as file-transfer, E-mail or forums (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the 
Frameworks). This established new norms of usage, for example that it is appropriate to 
communicate over this network instead of using remote-login. This process was enabled 
because the system was designed to open for new usages and ARPA leadership was 
supportive as well. Thus, the meaning of the ARPANET as a resource-sharing network 
changed into being an information communication technology. This meaning spread 
outside the ARPA community when the network became public in 1972. 
Because the ARPA protocol documentation was open and non-classified, its 
specifications could easily spread through the research landscape and became embedded in 
textbooks in computer science. Thus, it became the dominant technical design for 
computer networks in the 1970s. The introduction of the Personal Computer had an 
additive causal effect that increased the user-base and spawned the creation of hundreds of 
new packet-switching networks. Without this user-base solving the chicken-egg dilemma 
of new technologies, the network would likely not have been a success. At the same time 
the spawning of hundreds of new incompatible networks was the necessary condition for 
the Internet’s problem definition: how to interconnect these new, incompatible networks. 
To solve this problem, the TCP/IP protocol was created much in the same collaborative 
fashion as ARPANET. TCP/IP inherited the core features and norms of ARPANET, 
namely packet-switching but extended its logic. Path-dependency is a central explanation 
for the design of the Internet (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). 
TCP/IP maximized decentralization with the end-to-end principle, implicating that no 
single node should be able to monitor or control the entire network of networks (part 4). 
Surveilling messages in the network was complicated because of packet switching and 
because the network had no internal intelligence of its operations. At the same time it 
interconnected every node with every other. This pragmatic technical decision allowed 
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great interconnectivity and scalability, but was also a necessary condition for the 
attribution-problem that lies at the core of cyber-war. This issue would be later become a 
national security problem for military actors. At the same time, cyber-utopians perceived 
this lack of internal intelligence as a privacy feature that created anonymity, which 
represents an example of how the same technical affordance creates different social 
meanings for actors adhering to different world views or paradigms. This will be further 
illuminated in later chapters (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism).
TCP/IP could successfully mass-diffuse through the market because it was open-
source, scalable and adaptable to incorporate new types of networks such as Ethernet and 
others that spawned during the 1980s (part 5). Its open design was a necessary condition 
for its success. Because the designers never patented it and perceived the technology as a 
commons, TCP/IP could be easily embedded in computer and networking hardware of the 
1980s without the need for licensing or royalty fees. This allowed social-embeddedness in 
new usage contexts outside of DARPA. Thus, TCP/IP was adopted by users in a grassroots 
fashion while the competing X.25 protocol lacked this momentum. The NSF adopted 
TCP/IP for its NSFNET, which began to replace ARPANET in the late 1980s, taking over 
large portions of the routing infrastructure while updating the capacity of the network (part 
6). This new powerful backbone was a necessary condition for global diffusion. It opened-
up the Internet to a wider national and international university landscape and quickly 
increased the user-base to around 2 million. This user-base was large enough to make the 
network useful and this is a necessary condition for its worldwide diffusion. The creation 
of NSFNET and its social governance of the technology are yet another instance of path-
dependency and a necessary condition for the invention of the World Wide Web, the 
graphical representation of the Internet. 
Tim Berners-Lee, although coming from a different context, adhered to similar 
academic norms as the ARPA community (namely openness, universality, decentralized 
control, free-speech). He is just another example of how norms diffuse together with 
technology (TCP/IP) and resonate with new users. His main vision was to design a 
coherent, global information space with Hypertext. He developed the necessary tools like 
HTML in a similar fashion like the ARPA engineers which, again, was a primary condition 
for the success of HTML. Berners-Lee's invention made the Internet visible and allowed 
non-technical users to use it. This is another necessary condition for the mass diffusion of 
the Internet that kicked-off in 1993. In sum, these necessary conditions in combination are 
a sufficient condition for the mass diffusion of the Internet (part 7).
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The following table represents the causal-mechanism in a reader friendly format. The 
key take-away messages that are important for following chapters are depicted. I follow 
the graphical advice from Beach and Pedersen who suggest to depict causal mechanisms as 
actors engaging in activity (in italics) (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, pp. 38-40). The same 
schema will be used for all of the summary chapters.
Table 2. Causal Mechanism of the Social Construction of the Internet
Part 1 ARPA bureaucratic culture, flexible management 
and military budget enables creation of 
experimental packet-switching network (1960s).
Part 2 Unique social configuration of academics/engineers 
designs the network to reflect academic norms and 
ideas. Security blind spots become built in.
Part 3 ARPANET users coshape/reconstitute the meaning 
of the network by adopting new applications and 
usage scenarios. ARPANET meaning changes to 
being Information and Communication 
Technology.
Part 4 Open, scalable protocol design and convincing 
usage scenarios enable mass diffusion of 
ARPANET through ARPA research sites. 
Context Beginning of Personal Computer revolution & 
internetworking.
Part 5 Kahn and Cerf design TCP/IP protocol in a path-
dependent fashion. They embed similar norms into 
the protocol and maximize decentralization of 
control.
Part 6 Computer industry and more NSF research sites 
adopt TCP/IP because of its openness, scalability 
and open-source features, making it the dominant 
design and enabling further mass diffusion (1980s).
Part 7 WWW reifies Internet norms, makes Internet easier 
to use, increases its appeal and thus enables world-
wide diffusion beyond the academic sphere (1991).
Outcome Successful mass diffusion of the Internet.
One of the curious facts of the Internet is that decisions that were made in the late 
1960s have implications today. Arguably, the decision to decentralize power and control 
over the network could be interpreted as an instance of Winner’s politics of artifacts 
because it is the primary point of contestation between cyber-realists and cyber-utopians 
(see chap. 2.3.3 The Politics of Technology Debate). The fact that the Internet cannot be 
controlled by a single actor is the primary motivator for cyber-realists to adopt censorship 
or surveillance legislation, trying to reestablish state-control over this medium. This 
happens because of security reasons, because it also enables malign usage which was not 
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anticipated during the construction. The lack of control enabled the user-struggle to defend 
"their" cyber-space against state encroachment, which will be the topic of the next chapter.
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4.2 The Evolution of Cyber-Utopianism
"On the Internet, nobody knows you are a dog."
The New Yorker, July 5, 1993 
This famous quote from a comic strip in the New Yorker can be described as a central 
metaphor or cultural meme for the Internet in the 1990s. Not only was it widely received 
and influential, it also shaped the initial perspective that the Internet is an intransparent 
space, a so-called cyber-space that enabled online conversations with total strangers that 
one had never met before. Your chat partner could be a dog because you could not see him 
or her. The Internet was seen as an anonymous space. That we still use the peculiar term 
"cyberspace" is no accident, but the result of a somewhat intentional framing effort by the 
Internet’s first users. This chapter changes the perspective from the goal-oriented 
construction of the Internet to early usage, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s. It 
introduces the early users and thus impact constituencies, sometimes called the "digital 
natives" and their paradigm in respect to the Internet, called cyber-utopianism. It focuses 
more on the reception and interpretation of the technology in wider social contexts. A 
disclaimer upfront: Internet utopianism is not advocated by a coherent, homogeneous 
group (in contrast to the engineering community or cyber-realism). The paradigm has (at 
least) two origin stories that began to overlap in the 1970s. One developed out of the 
practice of using early computers in the 1950s. A utopian version of what computers could 
potentially do was first conceived by a small elite of mostly well-educated, middle-aged, 
white males at American universities we now call hackers.
The other utopian vision developed out of cybernetics in the early 1950s and like its 
spiritual predecessor, attracted a wide variety of advocates, from left-wing critical 
theorists, hippies from the American counter-culture, but also academics from sociology, 
media-studies, digital-humanities, history or even futurology. Utopianism also is not a 
mode of self-description of a social group, but a discursive label attached by out-group 
actors, sometimes even to discredit a certain naivety. As such, the boundaries of the 
paradigm and those who carry it are not completely clear. The combining element is that 
these diverse actors shared similar antagonisms, the fear of state encroachment and a 
positive notion of technology that could be used for human enhancement. They also 
developed similar norm-clusters, predominantly that the Internet should be governed in a 
self-regulated way by its "inhabitants". They favored strong libertarianism and free speech 
and argued that the Internet should be decentralized to avoid central control or surveillance 
by one single authority.
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Cyber-utopianism is deduced from academic literature on the matter and other data 
sources such as influential books or online articles. This is due to the fact that the field is 
so diverse, but at the same time well studied within digital humanities or Internet studies 
(Dutton, 2013b). Due to practical constraints, this is going to be a shorter chapter. Its main 
contribution is to trace the meaning construction of the Internet, understood as a 
cyberspace in the early days of its diffusion. As such, this chapter presents the utopian part 
of the thesis’s title and the first part of the norm-change this thesis is about. 
It shows how cyber-utopian norms emerged out of two distinct sets of ideas, the 
hacker (see chap. 4.2.1 Background: Hacker-ethic and Technical Optimism (1960s)) and 
counter culture that were combined by a central norm entrepreneur called Stewart Brand 
(see chap. 4.2.2 Ideas: Stewart Brand and the Counter-culture (1960-1970)). Brand also 
developed two important technical artifacts that played a major role in the social 
construction of cyberspace (see chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: The WELL and the Social 
Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)). Utopian ideas and norms developed within the 
usage context of these artifacts and became dominant in regulating state behavior towards 
the Internet in the 1990s. The general argument of this chapter is that the digital natives 
adopted a positive vision of technology out of their usage practice and could spread their 
vision, their technological frames, to a wider discourse once the Internet with the WWW 
started to diffuse worldwide in 1992 (see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic 
Frontier (1990s)). Their cyber-utopian ideas and norms what the Internet should be and 
how it should be governed were picked up by the media, economic actors (see chap. 4.2.6 
The Californian Ideology (1995-2001)) and ultimately by the Clinton/Gore administration, 
which the next major chapter is about (see chap. 4.3 Cyber-Utopian Liberalism and the 
Politics of Cyberspace (1990-2000)). Cyber-utopianism was highly influential during the 
1990s, mostly because of its optimist narrative and the economic investment boom, called 
the dot-com bubble, that followed. The crash of the dot-com bubble is a critical juncture, 
or a shock for cyber-utopianism (see chap. 4.2.7 Junctures: Dot-com Bubble (2000-2001)) 
that disenchanted some of its ideas and contested its norms. This was not completely 
unexpected if one summarizes the key ideas and norms of this paradigm, which happens 
after the description of the general utopian storyline (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas 
of Cyber-Utopianism). In this chapter, I include the theoretical findings and present an 
overview of the paradigm with its norm-cluster. Afterwards, a critical discussion of the 
shortcomings of utopianism follows (see chap. 4.2.9 Critical Analysis & Blind Spots of 
Cyber-Utopianism). 
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The next chapter will introduce a bit of background regarding the practice of using 
computers in the early days, which is important to understand the development of 
technological optimism and utopism.
4.2.1 Background: Hacker-ethic and Technical Optimism (1960s)
The history of information communication technologies began in the military context of 
World War 2. Computers, or mainframes, were huge and expensive machines (between 
$500.000 and several million dollars) that filled up special, air-conditioned rooms 
(Pfaffenberger, 1988). Only a few universities and research centers could afford them and 
were often dependent on funding from the Defense Department. In the 1950s, the practice 
of computing basically meant "doing arithmetic fast" (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 24). Users 
had to learn to use each machine and operating commands individually. Because of these 
factors, the practice of computing was limited to a small science elite, a computer 
priesthood within science and/or the military (Levy, 2010, p. chap. 1). Tim Berners-Lee 
remembered: "a computer was still a sort of shrine to which scientists and engineers made 
a pilgrimage" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 8). Social norms were enforced within this context, 
for example that it was only appropriate for the trained elite to touch, modify or repair the 
computer. Games and personal use were a taboo. Access to these devices was highly 
restricted and controlled by central authorities. In theoretical terms, the use of the 
computers was highly centralized: "mainframe computers emerged as the symbol par 
excellence of centralized corporate authority, a way of gaining enhanced managerial 
control over the minute details of the organization’s performance" (Pfaffenberger, 1988, p. 
42). This began to change in the 1950s when computers began to become powerful enough 
to allow time-sharing, i.e. the parallel use of computing power between different users at 
the same time. This made computers interactive and transcended the meaning of computers 
as mere number crunchers and framed them to supporters of the thought process, as social 
machines (Naughton, 1999, pp. 73-76). This was a radical thought at a time where most 
people thought computers were big calculators and when only around 5371 computers 
existed in the US (Rid, 2016, p. 117). 
This new collaborative mode of computing facilitated the creation of a special 
epistemic community of computer users and led to the creation of new ideas and norms of 
computing. According to Levy, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 
late 1950s was the place where a new hacker-culture evolved. In his influential book, Levy 
(Levy, 2010), describes the struggle of young IT-students, tech-aficionados and tinkerers 
from the Tech Model Railroad Club at MIT to get access to the universities’ mainframe 
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computers, often during night-times (counter-appropriation). A "hack" was MIT lingo for 
"elaborate college pranks that MIT students would regularly devise, such as covering the 
dome that overlooked the campus with reflecting foil" (Levy, 2010, p. chap.1). 
Ethnographer Gabriella Coleman describes hacking as "turning a system against itself […] 
the process of using existing code, comments, and technology for more than what their 
original authors intended […] Hacking is where craft and craftiness converge" (Coleman, 
2013, p. 98). Nowadays, the term hacking is connoted mostly negatively (Vegh, 2002). If 
one types "hacker" into a Google image search, one sees criminals wearing ski-masks 
doing illicit activities in front of a computer. The criminalization of hacking has to do with 
the securitization of cyberspace (Coleman, 2014), as will be introduced in later chapters 
(see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)). Originally, 
hacking described a playful, artful and positive disposition towards technology 
characterized by exploration and curiosity. It shares similarities with the practice of 
engineering and science, namely solving complex problems. In this context, the word 
"hack" meant a clever, not obvious solution to a problem in computing. The main purpose 
of hacking was curiosity and the joy coming from great solutions. Levy even argues that 
hacking is an end in itself which often serves no obvious function except testing the limits 
and possibilities of a system (Levy, 2010, p. chap.6). Repurposing a mainframe computer 
designed for being a machine to support military action into a device for fun, for example 
by playing Chess or games like "Space War" (1962), were early examples of a "great 
hack", according to Stewart Brand (Brand, 1972). The playful and positive attitude towards 
computers and technology in general led to the realization that they could be used for more 
than just waging war. In theoretical terms, counter-signification and appropriation of 
technology lies at the core of hacking (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks).
The practice of hacking and writing software code in this special context of 
mainframe computing created a special ethos and gave computing a new meaning and 
created a particular computing-paradigm with its own social norms. According to Levy, 
this hacker paradigm had the following norms. 
"Access to computers and anything which might teach you something about the 
way the world works should be unlimited and total. Always yield to the Hands-On 
Imperative! […] All information should be free. […] Mistrust Authority Promote 
Decentralization. […] Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus 
criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position. […] You can create art and beauty 
on a computer. […] Computers can change your life for the better" (Levy, 2010, p. 
chap.2).
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Let’s decipher these. The norm that "access to technology and computers should be 
open and unlimited for everyone" stems directly from the highly-centralized context of 
mainframe-computing. Demanding open access to these systems was an act of political 
resistance and an attempt in reconstituting computing (Pfaffenberger, 1988). Hackers and 
computer programmers in general internalized the cybernetic argument that computer 
programs could do things that humans could not, like solving complex mathematical 
formulas or storing human knowledge. They could be used for a greater good, for example 
human development and the pursuit of knowledge, as for example ARPA’s J.C.R. 
Licklider wrote (Licklider, 1990). As such, writing software code represented the increase 
of human knowledge and capacities which ultimately was seen a form of human 
empowerment. For that to happen, access to a system was imperative.
The dictum that "information has to be free" directly stems from the access 
requirement. Hacking is a practice of obtaining information about the inner workings of a 
system, both its hardware and software. Prohibiting that access makes hacking impossible 
(Coleman, 2013, p. 68). Sharing of information is quite crucial for the practice of complex 
computer programming in general. Hackers and programmers need to share information of 
how to solve highly specialized problems or how to write complex algorithms. Sharing this 
knowledge with peers is a matter of efficiency (writing code that another one has already 
written is a waste of time) and general creativity: computer programs often built upon the 
code of other programmers (Levy, 2010, p. chap.2). Programmers learn from each other by 
looking into each other’s source code. Sharing either partial solutions, or even complete 
programs (or documentation of the source code) with others for free is a practice with 
many advantages. 
Out of the hacking practice, a sharing norm evolved: "Code passed back and forth 
between the members of the community – if you made an improvement you were expected 
to submit your code to the community of developers. To withhold code was considered 
gauche – after all, you benefited from the work of your friends, you should return the 
favor" (Friedman, 2005, p. 106). This fosters collaboration and leads to the creation of a 
community based on the idea that sharing computer source code is for the greater good.
This sense of community also creates a mistrust of authority trying to restrict access 
and information. Centralized bureaucracies with the power to restrict usage of technology 
where the natural antagonism for the hacking community. Conservative corporations such 
as IBM, universities or the military held the monopoly of computing in the 1950s. Turner 
argues that the late 1950s were an era of mistrust in hierarchized systems of authority and 
the military-industrial complex that even President Eisenhower articulated in his 1961 
4.2 The Evolution of Cyber-Utopianism
178
farewell address (Turner, 2006, p. 42). The hacker ethos argued for decentralizing access 
to computers. This has to do with the modus-operandi of writing software code in a 
collaborative fashion based on the idea of a meritocracy that judges the individual skill of 
hackers based on the merits – the software code produced. Like science, programming is 
first and foremost a peer-to-peer collaboration. It is egalitarian in the sense that everyone 
can write code and the technical outcome, the hack, is the only criterion that counts (at 
least idealistically). From this conception of community and selfhood follows a deep 
mistrust of authority and hierarchical systems that do not judge individuals based on merit, 
but on arbitrary, seemingly non-rational criteria such as race or degrees.
Finally, hacking is a prime example of technological optimism and an early version of 
cyber-utopianism. From all these norms derives the thought that computers and technology 
can change the life of the hacker, and potentially everyone, for the better. This is an 
affirmation of J.C.R. Licklider’s (Licklider, 1990) empowerment thesis or that computers 
and mankind can form a symbiosis. The same prognostic frame reappeared in the 1990s 
with the Internet, which was said to empower the lone individual vis-à-vis centralized 
authorities such as the military or the state (see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the 
Electronic Frontier (1990s)). But software would not just empower the individual, it was 
also a form of self-expression. Hackers argued that the mind of the hacker would live in its 
source code just like the spirit of Beethoven would live in his sonatas (Levy, 2010, p. chap. 
6). This is the reason why many in the free software movement treat code as an expression 
of free speech and strongly advocate against intellectual property and Internet censorship.57 
At the same time, it is a reference to the cybernetic idea that computers and human minds 
are both information machines that operate according to similar principles. As such, 
hacking is a highly idealistic ethic similar to Weber’s protestant work ethic (Himanen, 
2001) but more focused on the benefits of technology. It projects the utopian idea that 
everyone potentially can become a hacker, and if everyone would be, the world would be a 
better place.
How did this hacker ethic, the early version of cyber-utopianism, diffuse and gain more 
supporters? It is important to stress that this hacker ethic developed at multiple computer 
sites in the US in the 1950s. The beginning diffusion of the computer created similar 
working environments with similar constraints at other locations. Levy argues that the 
57 The founder of the Free Software Foundation, and MIT hacker Richard Stallman formalized this idea in 
the GNU manifesto of 1985. Stallman argues: "When we call software "free," we mean that it respects the 
users’ essential freedoms: the freedom to run it, to study and change it, and to redistribute copies with or 
without changes. This is a matter of freedom, not price, so think of "free speech," not "free beer " (Stallman, 
1985). "The Golden Rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people who like it" 
(Stallman, 1985). Out of this idea developed the General Public License, an alternative to copyright.
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hacker ethic and its modality of software production spread together with software they 
created and distributed to peers (Levy, 2010, p. chap. 6). By sharing programs, hackers 
indirectly recruited other peers to adhere to the same social norms of sharing, resembling 
the mechanism of a gift economy.58 Especially video games like Space War, had a wide 
appeal and thus attracted more users to computers and potentially exposed them to other 
hackers and their ideas (Brand, 1972). This is an important theoretical argument: hacking 
norms developed out of the practice of computing in this special historical configuration. 
Hacker norms became embedded in technical artifacts – computer code and software – and 
spread together with software. Social actor-networks played a special role here (Latour, 
2005b). Hacking norms also spread because of networking actors, acting as norm-
entrepreneurs: hackers that left MIT and went to other universities, held workshops or 
conferences or started to publish computer magazines, presented the idea of hacking to 
like-minded groups. With the invention of computer networks such as ARPANET, another 
channel for paradigm and software diffusion was created. Stanford Research Institute, one 
of the first host-sites of the ARPANET, was another prime spot for the development of the 
early hacking culture and thus it is no accident that the design of ARPANET reflects some 
of the ideals of the hacker-ethic (see chap. 4.1.2.2 Norms Shaping the Construction of 
ARPANET). Lastly, those university students who first engaged in hacking in the late 50s, 
later often became leaders of the revolution of the personal computer in the early 1970s 
and 1980s (see chap. 4.2.3 Artifact: Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)). They 
thereby transported the ideas of their youth into future business models and products like 
the personal computer. Physical publications, such as special magazines, played an 
important role in diffusing techno-optimist ideas, leading to the creation of a cyber-utopian 
paradigm, as the next chapter will show.
4.2.2 Ideas: Stewart Brand and the Counter-culture (1960-1970)
The hacker community set the foundation of technological optimism at a time when 
computers were widely unknown to the public. But utopianism had another source in the 
social movements of the 1960s that formed around Berkeley, the same Californian region 
where ARPANET was conceived a few years later.
I cannot outline all the motivations for these diverse movements in high detail but the 
Vietnam War and the fear of nuclear annihilation, especially in the context of the Cuban 
58 Originally developed by Marcel Mauss, the gift creates permanent social structures of exchange because it 
generates obligations to return the favor (Mauss, 1990).
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missile crisis of 1963, were important factors.59 For the New Left, technology had a 
negative meaning. They saw computers as dehumanizing technologies, instances of a 
centralized bureaucracy and ultimately as a symbol of the Vietnam War which they 
opposed (Turner, 2006, p. 2).60 
For the New Communalists or the counterculture, cybernetic ideas and utopianism 
had a special appeal. The two movements defined similar problems and had similar 
antagonisms – "militarism, racism, sexual discrimination, homophobia, mindless 
consumerism and pollution" (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). The New Left engaged in the 
political struggle, changing politics from within, by joining parties or committees. The 
New Communalists and back-to-the-landers, in contrast, sought to change society by new 
modes of thinking and escapism. Consciousness and the individual mind became central 
concepts for their political struggle (Reich, 1971). Their strategy was to change the 
individual self and lifestyle locally, which over time would usher in social change globally. 
Their goal was to create and change a global consciousness. By creating new forms of 
living and social organization – self-sustained, agricultural communes – they tried to 
achieve this end. Hence, they turned away from politics to everything that changed the 
self: psycho-active drugs, music, transcendental art-performances but also extravagant 
academic concepts such as libertarianism, cybernetics or post-modernism (Turner, 2006, 
pp. 36-61).
Especially cybernetics had a special appeal to them. According to Thomas Rid, a 
positive vision of the future based on machine automation became popular in the 1960s, 
mostly among academic and literary circles (Rid, 2016, pp. 133-134). Sociologists started 
to theorize about an "information society" that, in the near future, would replace the 
industrial mode of production. Machine automation would lead to a new industrial 
revolution that would lead to the abolishment of human labor. Machines would take over 
most monotone functions which would produce more economic growth and reduce 
unemployment. This resembled Karl Marx' idea who argued a century before that because 
of automatization, mankind could focus on its own intellectual development. Instead of an 
agricultural there would be "cybercultural revolution" (Rid, 2016, pp. 133-134). 
59 Misiroglu lists several hundred social movements from that time period in her encyclopedia (Misiroglu, 
2015).
60 Turner gives a splendid overview over academic thinking that diagnosed an increasing centralization and 
hierarchization of society, where means of information and power were centralized among elites. The ideal 
type of this mode of governance would be the military with its strict hierarchy. This "critique could be heard 
echoing throughout the 1960s in works as varied as Jacques Ellul’s The Technological Society (1964), John 
Kenneth Galbraith’s The New Industrial State (1967), Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), 
Lewis Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine (1967), Theodore Roszak’s The Making of a Counterculture 
(1969), and Charles Reich’s The Greening of America (1970)" (Turner, 2006, p. 28).
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In popular culture, the cyborg – the machine-enhanced human – became a popular 
concept (Vydas, 1965). It was believed that with mechanical modification, human 
limitations could be overcome, a process that might lead to a self-controlled evolution. The 
cyborg transcended the boundaries of what it meant to be human, the borders between the 
consciousness/simulation and the natural/artificial (Haraway, 1983). It was also the age of 
AI research – artificial intelligence – at many universities like Stanford, which basically 
fueled the same cyber-mythos: in a not so distant future, intelligent machines will take over 
control (Hope, 2015). For believers, it was not a question of if, but when. Cybernetics was 
the new avant-garde of the time. Herbert Simon argued in 1965: "machines will be 
capable, within 20 years, of doing any work a man can do" (Simon, 1965). This powerful 
prediction frame had been uttered repeatedly since the inception of AI research in 1957 and 
can be even seen today in debates about "Big Data" and "deep learning" (Najafabadi et al., 
2015). This indicates a high narrative fidelity and commensurability that only increased the 
attractiveness of cybernetics as a form of individual transcendence and as such it was 
appealing for the counter-culture and compatible with their mind set.
In 1964, famous media theorist Marshall McLuhan coined two concepts that deeply 
influenced Internet utopianism of the 1990s: the concept of new media with socializing 
effects and that of the global village, both of which would be facilitated through 
cybernetics (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism). For McLuhan, 
cybernetics allowed the re-tribalization of society into tribal forms of organization. 
Tribalism resonated well with the New Communalists and gave their ideas academic 
credibility. At the same time, new media (cable TV) made people more aware of what 
happened at the other side of the globe. Electronic technology allowed to "extend our 
central nervous system itself in a global space, abolishing both space and time" (McLuhan, 
1964), acting as extensions of man, as the title of his famous publication indicated.61 For 
McLuhan, technology offered the possibility of human transformation on a global scale. 
Whereas the industrial revolution fragmented and alienated mankind, the age of 
cybernetics would interconnect humans (Rid, 2016, p. 141). This, of course was highly 
coherent with counter-cultural thinking.
Those academic publications were not necessarily known to a wider, non-academic 
or even hacker audience. Stewart Brand, a hippie entrepreneur, made techno-optimist and 
cybernetic ideas available to a wider audience. In his excellent study, Turner calls Brand a 
central networking hub, a broker connecting highly diverse communities together: the 
young computer-science community (consisting of students, the hacker community and 
61 My highlights in italics.
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later ARPANET users), social sciences (cybernetics, sociology and particularly systems 
theory), Protohippies and New Communalists, the San Francisco psychedelic scene, 
technologists (high tech-companies and industry), journalists and even parts of the 
government (Turner, 2006, p. 5). Brand traversed between different communities in the 
San Francisco Bay area and created two particular technological artifacts that fostered 
collaboration between these communities: The Whole Earth Catalog62 (published between 
1968 and 1972) and later, the first electronic social network, the Whole Earth 'Lectronic 
Link or the WELL (1985-present). Both had an enormous intellectual impact across 
Silicon Valley. The Catalog won the National Book Award in 1971 and sold over a million 
copies (Turner, 2006, p. 80). 
 Brand conceived the Catalog as an "information technology" at a time before the 
Internet existed. Brand defined the design principles of this artifact as: 
"We are as gods and might as well get good at it. So far, remotely done power and 
glory—as via government, big business, formal education, church—has [sic] 
succeeded to the point where gross defects obscure actual gains. In response to this 
dilemma and to these gains a realm of intimate, personal power is developing—
power of the individual to conduct his own education, find his own inspiration, 
shape his own environment, and share his adventure with whoever is interested. 
Tools that aid this process are sought and promoted by the WHOLE EARTH 
CATALOG" (Brand, 1968).
Based on the countercultural narrative, hierarchized mass bureaucracies and the 
establishment were presented as the problem and the answer to this problem was individual 
empowerment, education, self-reliance and a do-it-yourself-mentality. "Ask not what your 
country can do for you. Do it yourself," we said, happily perverting J.F.K.’s Inaugural 
exhortation" Brand once said (Brand, 1995). The answer to a centralized bureaucracy was 
decentralization, the creation of multiple power centers and thus the flattening of 
hierarchies in more egalitarian forms of governance, reflecting the notion of liberal-
individualism and self-reliance of the hacker ethic and the anarchist spirit of the commune. 
A core cybernetic idea promoted by Brand was that technologies can improve 
individual life, a concept that later evolved into the Californian Ideology of companies like 
Google and Apple (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). Former Apple CEO Steve Jobs, who also 
studied at Berkeley around that time, was an avid reader and described the Catalog as "a 
Bible of my generation […] like Google in paperback form, 35 years before Google came 
along. It was idealistic and overflowing with neat tools and great notions" (Jobs, 2005). 
Tim Berners-Lee argued that it was "the first book that made all this Internet stuff 
62 Henceforth "the Catalog".
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accessible to the public" (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 76). The catalog’s function was to provide 
its readers with information how to manage and enhance their (communal) life with 
technology. Technology was understood broadly, meaning ideas, publications and 
techniques, but also technical artifacts such as computers which were reviewed (even by 
the users) and all of which could be ordered within catalog (see chap. 2.3.2 Defining 
Technology). Technology had the function of personal enhancement, thus artifacts were 
positively reframed as deeply personal, even spiritual devices. This explains why 
cybernetic trans-humanism had an appeal in the counter culture.
The catalog featured many cybernetic publications and included a feedback 
mechanism for readers to share their experiences, announce communal projects and give 
reviews about technologies, reflecting the idea of peer-to-peer collaboration (Brand, 1968). 
The catalog did not just depict a personal, rebellious image of technology but also of the 
reader itself. In other words, it constructed the user or reader identity, as a "cowboy nomad 
figure" or a "Longhunter",63 pretty similar to native Indians, which were idealized by New 
Communalists because of their tribal lifestyle (Turner, 2006, pp. 86-91).64 These actors 
were presented as being on some kind of "personal frontier" in an "outlaw area" or 
"ungoverned space". The notion of the frontier and the separate, ungoverned and 
uncontrolled space featured prominently in the intellectual concepts of New Communalists 
of the time and later inspired the concept of cyberspace as an "electronic frontier", the 
hacker or cyber-punk as the "digital native" resisting the hierarchized mass bureaucracy 
(see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)).
The catalog featured a range of topics and concepts like peer-to-peer collaboration, 
the idea of decentralization or flattening of hierarchies and the idea of information-sharing 
and dissemination for human development that resonated both within the American 
counter culture, but also with the emerging digital community of hackers and tech-
enthusiasts. Through the Catalog and its feedback or forum-function, very disparate groups 
engaged in social and ideational exchange. This led to the fusion of counter-cultural, back-
to-the-land ideas with techno-optimism of the young computer culture. Thus, the separate 
causal paths, the hacker ethic and the counterculture were added together to from one 
causal pathway into the future. The outcome of these equifinality factors was a coherent 
paradigm. 
63 An explorer who roams the 18th century frontier for long times.
64 The readers of the Catalog where mostly white, middle-class males with higher education and native 
Indians or women did not play any major role in this community (Turner, 2006, p. 97).
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"Together, the creators and readers of the Whole Earth Catalog helped to synthesize 
a vision of technology as a countercultural force that would shape public 
understandings of computing and other machines long after the social movements 
of the 1960s had faded from view" […] "In this way ideas born within Whole 
Earth–derived network forums became key frames through which both public and 
professional technologists sought to comprehend the potential social impact of 
information and information technologies. Over time, the network’s members and 
forums helped redefine the microcomputer as a "personal" machine, computer 
communication networks as "virtual communities," and cyberspace itself as the 
digital equivalent of the western landscape into which so many communards set 
forth in the late 1960s, the "electronic frontier" (Turner, 2006, p. 6).
The Catalog acted as carrier medium and helped to spread cybernetic ideas but also 
technical optimism and utopianism and synthesized these into a new computing paradigm. 
The centerpiece of almost every utopia is a vision of a future society that had overcome 
problems and issue of the present (Levitas, 2010, p. 1). It is therefore no surprise that this 
utopianism of the counterculture and hackers featured concepts that stood in opposition to 
the perceived problems of the time: a hierarchized, inegalitarian and even oppressive 
society (in terms of minority rights) of the 1950s living under the constant threat of nuclear 
annihilation. What is new about cyber-utopianism is that the solutions to these problems 
were perceived to be digital technologies. This paradigm reframed the meaning of digital 
technology from anonymous machines of centralized authorities into decentralized, 
personal artifacts for individual empowerment and enhancement. This inspired the idea of 
the personal computer, which will be introduced in the next chapter.
4.2.3 Artifact: Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)
The story of how hierarchized mainframe computers became a personal computer has been 
told in detail elsewhere (Pfaffenberger, 1988; Schmidt, 1997; Ensmenger, 2010). I will 
only give a cursory overview. The argument of this chapter is that cyber-utopian ideas, 
originating in the hacker ethic and the spirit of the counter-culture became embedded in the 
personal computer, which created the myth of personalized technology of individual 
empowerment and democratization. In the early 1990s, the very same ideas were attached 
to the Internet by cyber-utopians as well, representing a genealogy or evolution of ideas.
For most people in the 1970s, a computer represented a "relentless, peremptory, 
repetitive, invariable, monotonous, inexorable, implacable, ruthless, inhuman, 
dehumanizing impersonal Juggernaut" (Nelson, 1974). Several computer aficionados 
attempted to change this image because for them, computers represented a means of 
empowerment. In the Silicon Valley at the time, various grass-roots initiatives like 
"Community Memory" or the "Peoples Computer Company", cyber-utopian advocates and 
4.2 The Evolution of Cyber-Utopianism
185
norm-entrepreneurs so to speak, began initiatives and publications to educate a wider 
audience about the benefits of computers. The Peoples Computer Company, inspired by 
the Whole Earth Catalog both in terms of design and message, issued a publication in 1972 
arguing in capital letters:
 
"COMPUTERS ARE MOSTLY USED AGAINST PEOPLE INSTEAD OF FOR 
PEOPLE USED TO CONTROL PEOPLE INSTEAD OF TO FREE THEM. TIME 
TO CHANGE ALL THAT WE NEED A... PEOPLE’S COMPUTER COMPANY" 
(Peoples Computer Company, 1972). 
This represents a diagnostic frame. Ted Nelson, one famous hacker of the time published a 
widely-regarded book Computers lib that had similar ambitions: "This book is for personal 
freedom and against restriction and coercion. A chant you can take to the streets. Computer 
power to the people! Down with the Cybercrud! (Nelson, 1974).65 Their vision was to 
democratize computer usage (Pfaffenberger, 1988). In line with the hacker ethic, they 
argued that if more people would use electronic technology and would see their benefits, 
this would serve a greater good. In their publications, they argued that new technology 
could enhance participation in the democratic process, thus outlining one of the earliest 
visions of something like electronic voting or what during the 1990s would be called "e-
democracy" (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism). They argued 
that computers could be tools for political networking of advocacy groups, exchange of 
political ideas and thus were inherently political. Thus, these publications and arguments 
represent motivational frames to help the counter-culture to engage with computers and to 
deconstruct their prior negative attitude towards computers (see chap. 2.2.2 Framing). At 
the same time this represents a counter-signification strategy aiming to change the meaning 
of computers.
The idea to democratize computers was institutionalized with the Home Brew 
Computer Club, formed in 1975 in the Silicon Valley. It was a club of technology 
aficionados, hackers, professionals (Stanford & ARPANET staff) from IT companies (like 
Xerox PARC who also called for "shift in our thinking about what is a computer: we were 
to scrap the bulky mainframes that filled rooms and imagine a computer on a desk" 
(Mosco, 2004, p. 21). The founder, Fred Moore stated that the goal of the club was 
"information sharing" based on norms of peer-to-peer collaboration and meritocracy 
(Levy, 1993). Out of the home-brew community developed the first truly personal 
computers, most prominently the Apple 1 and Apple 2 (1977), the computers that ushered 
in the Personal Computer or digital revolution. Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, cofounders 
65 I was unable to define the term cybercrud.
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of Apple, were home-brew regulars and also hackers, engaging in the widespread practice 
of "blue box" phone phreaking, a hacking technique of hijacking the dial-tones of the 
phone network to make free of charge calls (Brand, 1995).
Inspired by countercultural ideas and their personal fascination with technology, they 
too saw the computer as a means of empowerment of the masses and social change. 
Stewart Brand once described the computer as the new LSD, a technology that could open 
minds (Turner, 2006, p. 139). These ideas (and the desire for profit) led to the construction 
of the Apple computer, a completely open system that allowed tinkering and modification. 
In other words, the norms and ideas of the counter culture and hacking became embedded 
in the technical artifact. Counter-artifacts like Apple 1 and 2 and other early personal 
computers (like the TRS-80 or the Commodore 64) of that era reconstituted the mainframe 
computer and transported the ideals and norms of the hacker ethic, presenting it to a wider 
audience.
 In 1983, roughly 10 percent of the American households had a PC (see Quantifying 
the Internet and the Digital Revolution) and Time Magazine labeled the PC the "Machine 
of the Year" (TIME Magazine, 1983). According to Friedman, the PC gave ordinary 
citizens the tools that had been monopolized by large companies and the government 
before, like spreadsheets for individual investment, electronic banking and the creation of 
digital content such as "words, music, numeric data, maps, photographs and eventually 
voice and video" (Friedman, 2005, p. 56).
Of course, with the mainstream diffusion of the PC came the "economization of the 
counter culture" (Mosco, 2004, p. 42). The original hacker spirit got blurred because 
suddenly these companies had to pursue business interests (thus keeping their source code 
secret or proprietary). In 1984, when Apple released its most famous computer, the 
Macintosh, they utilized the democratizing narrative as a PR strategy to increase sales 
(Pfaffenberger, 1988). The Macintosh was marketed as a people’s computer, with an easy-
to-use graphical interface with content-windows (that are still used today) that could be 
used potentially by everyone, even without programming skills. The award-winning 
"1984" commercial depicted an Orwellian Big brother, a symbol for IBM and centralized 
computing, speaking on a big screen to mindless, enslaved workers. The screen got 
smashed by a female athlete (representing Apple), thus liberating the workers from their 
indoctrination. The narrative or myth of the democratizing potential of the personal 
computer suddenly became mainstream during the Super Bowl in 1984, with millions of 
watchers and became also part of the Apple brand with its "think different" marketing 
campaign (Berger, 2008, pp. 54-57).
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The goal of this small chapter was to shed light on the origin of one key-frame of 
cyber-utopianism, namely the idea that technology can be a democratic and personal tool. 
Based on the post-structionalist insight that matter does not carry the means of its own 
representation, it is farfetched to assume that a computer could inherently bring democracy 
(the Soviet Union, too, used computers and was the very opposite of a democracy). The 
frame that computers could empower individuals and thus transform the social world had 
to be socially constructed and this is exactly what the Whole Earth Catalog and the early 
hacker community did. They were meaning managers, constructing the meaning of the 
technical artifact, but also the identity of its users and successfully so. This utopian 
technological frame resurfaced in 1994, when Vice President Al Gore argued that the 
Internet would be a tool to spread democracy worldwide (see chap. 4.3.3.2 Global Framing 
of the Internet). In other words, the same frame was attached to the Internet. The most 
recent instance of this idea was the Arab Spring in 2011, where it was argued that social 
networks like Twitter allow for political collaboration and civic unrest (Stepanova, 2011). 
Critics could now argue that the computer is different from the Internet. The bridge 
between the two was the WELL, the first social network, introduced in the next chapter.
4.2.4 Artifact: The WELL and the Social Construction of Cyberspace (1980-1990)
The Whole Earth Catalog was sold until 1972 and inspired a wide range of new 
publications addressing similar cyber-cultural topics like Mondo 2000 and Brand’s follow-
up project CoEvolution Quarterly (Rid, 2016, p. 279). Science Fiction books picked up 
cybernetic ideas and themes of the counter-culture in a genre called cyber-punk. This mix 
of concepts enriched cyber-utopianism and gave it a new direction. It helped to construct a 
vision of a separate, virtual space, the cyberspace, which in the 1990s became a key-frame 
for explaining the Internet.
Around 1983, Brand came in contact with emerging online teleconferencing systems 
that had been spawning after the ARPANET presentation in 1972 (see chap. 4.1.2.4 Co-
shaping the Meaning of Networks). These systems allowed real-time interaction, feedback 
and thus potentially virtual hacker conferences, collaboration, sharing of ideas and free 
information with a computer, independent of location. Brand teamed up with Larry 
Brilliant, an expert in the new emerging market of computer-networking, to construct the 
Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link henceforth "the WELL", one of the first digital social 
networks, launched in 1985 (Ryan, 2013, p. 82). With a dial-up connection and a PC one 
could login into the WELL, which basically resembled a BBS (Bulletin Board System) 
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messaging board or early online forum. In technical terms, BBS boards are applications 
that run on top of TCP/IP. 
The WELL’s black and white login screen (computers at the time often could only 
depict up to 4 colors) said: "You own your own words", a reminder of the norms of free 
speech and content-ownership but also of social responsibility. There, users could create 
forum-threats and discuss a wide array of topics, and share information freely among their 
digital peers. The technical artifact the WELL was a self-governed online commune, a 
creative network of thought (Rid, 2016, p. 240). Inspired by the Catalog and the hacker 
ethic, its design principles were: 
"That it be free. This was a goal, not a commitment. We knew it wouldn’t be 
exactly free but it should be as free (cheap) as we could make it […] It should be 
profit making […] It would be an open-ended universe […] It would be self-
governing […] It would be a self-designing experiment […] The early users were 
to design the system for later users. The usage of the system would co-evolve with 
the system as it was built […] It would be a community, one that reflected the 
nature of Whole Earth publications" (Turner, 2006, p. 143).
It would be self-governing in the sense that no administrators, as it would become a 
common practice during the 1990s, would edit or censor the content. As such, it 
decentralized authority to the users who were responsible for maintaining ethics. Like in 
modern social networks, users could hide content they did not want to see. Fred Turner 
describes the governing mechanism as the "Communalist preference for nonhierarchical 
forms of social organization with a cybernetic vision of control" (Turner, 2006, p. 145). 
For Brand, the WELL was a revival of the failed back-to-the-land movement of the 1970s, 
reviving the dream of a shared consciousness, but this time digital. The idea that different 
users from all over the US could meet online and discuss their shared interest was unheard 
of in the 1980s and even throughout the early 1990s. It bridged long distances and made 
real-time communication possible. Physical distance and space suddenly did not seem to 
matter anymore. To be able to communicate with someone at the other end of the US had a 
profound impact on its users.
The WELL’s user base was a knowledgeable, digital avant-garde of male and female
66 technology professionals, hackers, journalists and even writers and social scientists like 
Manuell Castells (who coined the term network society), Howard Rheingold (who 
developed the term virtual community based on his experience in the WELL) and John 
Perry Barlow, later founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation or EFF (see chap. 4.2.5 
Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)). These were socialized with the 
66 It was estimated that 40% of the user base was female (Turner, 2006, p. 151).
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WELL, drew their experience and knowledge of digital networking from it and later 
transported their experience into the 1990s discourse of the unfolding Internet. They acted 
as translators or sense-makers or as "bricoleur—someone who, following Lévi-Strauss’s 
usage, pulls together the bits and pieces of technology’s narratives, to fashion a mobilizing 
story for our time: what Nerone (1987) has called the heroic narrative with didactic effect" 
(Mosco, 2004, p. 36).67 Narrative research teaches that the first story occupying a new 
social phenomenon often is the most important one because it sticks and thus shapes future 
narratives (Gadinger, Jarzebski, & Yildiz, 2014). The practice of using the WELL 
established new frames like the virtual community, the electronic frontier, the social 
network and cyberspace, which are key cyber-utopian frames that construct meaning of the 
Internet in the 1990s.
In 1987, Howard Rheingold firstly coined the term virtual community (Rheingold, 
1993). Rheingold argued that the WELL made new forms of human interaction possible. 
Because the screen provided a visual abstraction, individuals could encounter each other 
without prejudice and in a non-random fashion: human interaction would be a conscious 
decision based on shared interest. The physical body, race and gender were said to become 
irrelevant in this digital meeting space. The limitations of the physical world (like 
geography or body features like skin color) suddenly did seem irrelevant (disembodiment) 
(Turner, 2006, pp. 159-161). In cyberspace, there were only digital subjects, representing a 
new form of being and thus creating a new type of identity. This refers to the co-shaping of 
subjectivity and objectivity, outlined in the theory chapter (see chap. 2.3.4 The Social 
Construction of Technology and its Critique). It is also in line with Kuhn’s idea that 
paradigms address questions of ontology and epistemology (is the digital world different 
than the analog one?). 
The WELL and other networks (like FIDONET, USENET that emerged around the 
same time) were a digital and non-physical location, a separate space inside the computer 
where one would meet (Naughton, 1999, p. 188). The dualism of being online and offline, 
in the "real" world, emerged. Being digital (Negroponte, 1995) was a new, almost 
transcendental form of existence. The WELL was also seen as a tool for changing 
consciousness. Love and friendship could become digital, without even meeting someone 
physically. This could create new forms of social relationships (Rheingold, 1993, p. 
Introduction). For Rheingold and others, another crucial factor with potential for social 
change was the possibility of digital collaboration with strangers for entertainment, 
personal development, work but also for political action.
67 See for example Brand’s article in Time Magazine explaining the Internet in 1995 (Brand, 1995).
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The notion of a separate, digital space became appealing in the early 1980s, 
especially within the Sci-Fi genre called cyber-punk. In 1982, novelist Vernor Vinge 
described an imaginative future where people lived in a separate reality, a virtual space 
inside the computer and data networks. This alternative reality could be entered with 
computer terminals (Vinge, 2001). One year later, Sci-Fi author William Gibson coined the 
term cyberspace, at the time an essentially meaningless word that, according to him, was 
chosen just because it had a "nice ring to it" (Rid, 2016, p. 259). Gibson did not even own 
a computer at the time. Cyberspace thus was a signifier void of meaning. It had to be 
constructed and attached to it post-hoc. In 1984, Gibson published the cyber-punk novel 
Neuromancer, where hackers, the heroes in these stories, fought against an almighty, 
centralized and digital surveillance state. He describes cyberspace as: 
"A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, 
in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts […] A graphic 
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human 
system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the non space of the 
mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding […]" (Gibson, 
1984).
It is important to note that cyberspace in many cyber-punk novels is described as a post-
industrialized and technocratic landscape of either authoritarian or corporate control. The 
antagonists in these novels are either Orwellian surveillance states or large, multinational 
corporations that run societies through puppet-governments.68 The narrative is pretty much 
in line with the techno-skepticism of the New Left, as described in a previous chapter (see 
chap. 4.2.3 Artifact: Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)). Pärna argues that the 
cyberspace neologism made the "Internet interesting and accessible to people who were 
not necessarily specialists in computing or engineering" and that cyber-punk ideas were a 
"way to understand new technologies and to appreciate their potential" (Pärna, 2010, p. 
73). SciFi acted as an imaginaire, a lens through which non-tech experts could understand 
68 Interestingly, within this context, the term cyber-war first appeared in the public domain, which normally 
is attributed either to Jon Arquilla (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993) or James der Derian (Der Derian, 1992), in 
the early 1990s. But it was already described in 1979 by cyber-utopian publication called Omni (Rid, 2016, 
p. 357). It outlined the idea of a cybernetic war of hardware against hardware with impacts on social life. The 
article predicted – two years after the release of the Apple-II computer – that in 1999 there would be 1 billion 
interconnected and palm-sized computers (that number actually would be reached around 2010). In this 
future, the computer would drive all kinds of weaponry like flying, autonomous robots shooting laser-guided 
missiles from the sky. A cybernetic war would mean the intrusion into these computer systems, a war 
characterized by speed, precision, automation and espionage. War would be automated and fought without 
humans (Ventre, 2016, p. 75). The computer would ultimately become a weapon of the military-industrial 
complex. For cyber-utopian believers, this dystopian vision of the future had to be prevented. Resisting the 
centralized state-war machinery was key. Using hacking tools and technology against them by making them 
available for everyone as means of self-defense, was the solution (Rid, 2016, p. 361).
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the early Internet. It therefore had a high degree of narrative fidelity. More so, cyber-punk 
was consistent with counter-cultural and hacker ideas (internal credibility in terms of 
framing theory), so these ideas were commensurable with each other.
The cyberpunk literature reflected a general cultural trend of the 1980s that began to 
see the impacts of the computer revolution and realize potential dangers and negative 
effects (see chap. 4.4.1 Background: Growing Awareness of Computer Insecurity (1967 - 
2011)). Cyber-utopian ideas even reached cinema with movies such as Tron (1982), 
Wargames (1983) or even Terminator (1984), that depicted the negative impact of a 
technology out of control. But for the early computer network avant-garde of the WELL, 
the positive effects still outweighed the negative ones. The hacker tended to defeat the 
adversary in these stories. These cyber-metaphors had a special appeal to readers of Whole 
Earth and the Hacking culture – because "computer scientists and technicians are almost 
universally science-fiction fans" (Brand, 1995) – and began to fill it with a more positive, 
utopian meaning. Networks like the WELL or early online-video games like Lucasfilm’s 
Habitat (1986) resembled a graphic representation of data and computer networks. They 
visualized a different, positive cyberspace, not one of power and domination, but of peer-
to-peer collaboration. 
Arguing with discourse theory (2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms), 
meanings attached to the WELL by the early user base (its advocates), were projected onto 
the empty signifier called cyberspace: real-time and increased speed of communication, 
the death of distances, the disembodiment of actors based on a perceived anonymity and 
the decentralized governing principle that gave the impression that centralized authorities 
like states are irrelevant. The same revolutionizing potential that was attached to the 
Personal Computer was attached to the Internet: that it would flatten hierarchies, lead to 
democratization, personal empowerment and to a social transformation. In other words, the 
WELL and other early social networks became representations or dominant meanings for 
the word cyberspace. More so, the term cyberspace with its cyber-utopian meaning became 
a metaphor for the Internet in general, reducing its interpretative flexibility. In theoretical 
terms, this framing process represents a counter signification by the early impact 
constituencies, the users of the Internet. This happened during the stabilization phase of 
TCP/IP and shows how the original artifact got decontextualized and how a new actor 
network of users established a new meaning (see chap. 2.3.5.2 Stabilization). Interestingly, 
this deviant use of the network indeed led to the creation and stabilization of a new 
paradigm, cyber-utopianism.
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In sum, the WELL had two important cultural impacts. The first impact was 
technological. It was a prototype of early messaging boards that inspired a series of 
descendants and set a technological path that led from services like AOL, Geocities (1994), 
the Microsoft Network (1995) and MySpace (2003) to Facebook (2004). Nowadays, social 
networks are everywhere. The second impact was ideational and normative. It introduced a 
series of mental frames that became powerful in giving meaning to the early Internet. 
These norms and ideas developed out of the practice of using the WELL. The self-
governing ethos with flat hierarchies was a common feature on messaging-boards during 
the 1990s. This meaning became dominant, reaching closure in the early 1990s with the 
public and political framing of early Internet advocates, which will be introduced in the 
next chapter.
4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)
The early 1990s were a timeframe where many of the causal pathways depicted in this and 
the previous chapters converged (equifinality). Right around the same time when the 
World Wide Web was created, John Perry Barlow – counter culturalist, utopian, libertarian 
and singer of the Hippie band Grateful Dead – began to apply the cyberspace metaphor to 
the newly evolving landscape of internetworked computing. In June 1990, he founded the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), together with two other utopians John Gilmore and 
Mitch Kapor (developer of the famous LOTUS spreadsheet software). The idea to create a 
digital rights/Internet activist NGO to promote civil liberties in cyberspace came from a 
WELL article called "Crime & Puzzlement" that Barlow wrote and that is regarded as the 
ideological founding document of the EFF. The aim was to "raise and disburse funds for 
education, lobbying, and litigation in the areas relating to digital speech and the extension 
of the Constitution into Cyberspace" (Barlow, 1990). It was written against the background 
of a perceived governmental encroachment onto cyberspace in terms of computer security 
legislation adopted in the mid 1980s (see chap. 4.4.1 Background: Growing Awareness of 
Computer Insecurity (1967 - 2011)) that led to more and more stories of arrests of young 
computer hackers. This represents the perceived problem and diagnostic frame for cyber-
utopians.
In this article, Barlow adopted the narrative that the early Internet resembled the 19th 
century West. "It is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse 
(unless you happen to be a court stenographer), hard to get around in, and up for grabs. 
Large institutions already claim to own the place, but most of the actual natives are solitary 
and independent […]" (Barlow, 1990). In other words, cyberspace resembled the frontier, 
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the Wild West and its native and rightful inhabitants. The digital natives, as they were 
called later (Prensky, 2001), were the users from the WELL and other communities. 
Cyberspace was depicted as a lawless space, where crackers (malign hackers who hack for 
personal gain) trespass onto other's territory (breaking into systems). The central 
government was framed as an alien actor, not a natural inhabitant of cyberspace, an 
"arriver". 
Being a Libertarian, Barlow diagnosed a problem, central to the cyber-utopian 
paradigm: the negative trajectory of the state entering cyberspace. Crime on the Internet 
(the word cyber-crime was not yet invented) would become a welcome excuse for the 
government to exercise more and more control over cyberspace, for example in terms of 
censorship. What communists, terrorists or child abductors were in the past, would now 
become the hacker: "The perfect bogeyman for Modern Times is the Cyberpunk!"69 
Barlow argued that the digital natives must preempt this future scenario of state control by 
getting ahead of the curve. Being aware of the idea of path-dependency, Barlow argued 
that "any chaotic system, is highly sensitive to initial conditions", which means that the 
digital natives must shape the initial conditions of cyberspace by shaping the early public 
discourse about it (motivational frame). It is indeed an insight from Science and 
Technology Studies that the early meaning given to an artifact influences its further 
diffusion (Weyer et al., 1997). Barlow argued that the digital natives should become active 
explainers and meaning-managers: "If we come on as witches, they will burn us. If we 
volunteer to guide them gently into its new lands, the Virtual World might be a more 
amiable place for all of us than this one has been" (Barlow, 1990). Herein effectively lay a 
motivational frame to engage other digital natives to defend civil liberties by guiding and 
educating external actors. He also articulated the norm of "inappropriateness of leaving 
our civil liberties to be defined by the technologically benighted" (i.e. politicians). A 
common assumption of the time was that politicians simply did not understand the 
technology. The aim thus became to illuminate and educate the public and to protect the 
Internet from the ignorant state.
EFF’s co-founder Mitch Kapor argued in a very similar article that cyberspace 
represented the early United States with settlers creating the republic. "Cyberspace seems 
to be shaping up exactly like Thomas Jefferson would have wanted: founded on the 
primacy of individual liberty and a commitment to pluralism, diversity, and community" 
(Kapor, 1993). This libertarian notion of a Jeffersonian cyberspace, including the primacy 
69 Vegh has analyzed the criminalization of the hacker through popular discourses and finds that the post 
9/11 counter-terrorism discourse changed the meaning of hacking from positive to negative (Vegh, 2002).
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of the self-determined individual versus the colonializing state, shaped utopian thinking 
throughout the 1990s.
In the context of government attempts to regulate and control cyberspace with the 
Communication Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 (see chap. 4.3.5 Junctures: Policy Attempts 
to Control the Internet (1993-1996)), Barlow wrote the famous "Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace" which he published at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
1996. There, he argued: "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty 
where we gather" (Barlow, 1996). The counter-cultural antagonism between the 
Longhunter, the digital native versus the hierarchized and industrialized government, 
becomes immediately apparent. The declaration framed cyberspace as separate from state 
authority and control: "I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us" because "Cyberspace does not lie 
within your borders". This argument is based on the globe-spanning and border-crossing 
characteristics attributed to the decentralized network called the Internet (with its end-to-
end principle). Barlow picked up the ideas of the ARPA engineers that the Internet was 
like a global commons, over which no single state authority should have control (see chap. 
4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet Protocols and Norms). The Internet is framed as an intangible 
thing, like air. It is framed to be a place of the mind, where matter is irrelevant (completely 
ignoring the physical attributes of the networking infrastructure). The consequence of this 
argument is that it is assumed that borders do not stop cyberspace. 
"Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere 
and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live". The disembodiment thesis resurfaced here. 
The body, it is argued, is distributed across multiple jurisdictions much in the same way as 
the Internet itself is. In other words, the body exists in a no-place, aligning neatly with the 
Greek translation of the word utopia – no place. Not just are there no physical bodies, but 
also there is no matter, which is turned into the argument that material concepts such as 
"property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based 
on matter, there is no matter here" (Barlow, 1996). 
The laws of the state, but also the laws of nature that govern the movement of matter, 
are argued to not apply in this new space. Instead, a peer-to-peer mode of governance is 
proposed: "Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them 
and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance 
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will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different" 
(Barlow, 1996). This is very much in line with the communal spirit of the counter culture 
and the idea of the virtual community of the 1980s. The state interference into these 
communes is described as an act of hostile colonialism. 
Finally, the declaration of independence picks up a theme that has been gaining 
traction in academia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely the idea that the information 
or network society (Castells, 1999) that will replace the industrial society. Together with 
the advent of globalization, the argument goes that the state is increasingly becoming 
replaced by transnational actors such as large corporations but even the emerging global 
society (a similar narrative as McLuhan presented it in the 1960s). Barlow argues that the 
industrial state is becoming obsolete. Governments lose control and authority over the 
Internet, which transcends its borders and makes physical coercion impossible. Therefore, 
the central norm of cyber-utopianism is that the central state ought not to interfere with the 
Internet. The state should keep its hands off cyberspace. It should not control, not regulate, 
not censor this ungoverned territory.
All of this represents an influential narrative of cyberspace in the early 1990s that 
was picked up by a wide range of academic and non-academic publications like Mondo 
2000, Reality Hackers or even the newly founded digital native outlet Wired.com (1993). 
These publications repeated the narrative of the disembodiment of the digital self, the 
outlaw area called cyberspace in which a battle against government hierarchies are fought. 
Wired’s inaugural issue is full of frames that the "digital revolution" is bringing a profound 
cultural transformation, "social changes so profound their only parallel is the discovery of 
fire" (Wired, 1993). 
The case can be made that cyber-utopianism succeeded to some degree in the initial 
framing of the Internet in terms of libertarian and countercultural frames. Even parts of the 
government and big-business corporations adopted frames from this narrative throughout 
the 1990s, as the next chapter will show.
4.2.6 The Californian Ideology (1995-2001)
Cyber-utopian ideas had a widespread appeal and were picked up by economists, venture 
capitalists and particularly CEOs of Silicon Valley computer firms that argued that there 
was an utterly "new economy" forming because of the Internet. As is shown in the timeline 
in the appendix (see Table 9. List of Internet Milestones and Security Incidents), the 
commercial services on the Internet, like e-shopping, began to kick off in 1995, after the 
invention of the HTTP-Cookie, which allowed to store user information across websites 
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and thus enabled shopping baskets. The cookie introduced the forgotten economics 
(engineering blind spot) into the Internet (Metcalfe, 2006). Secure, encrypted online data-
transmission (Netscape’s SSL encryption, released in 1995) was the second crucial artifact 
(and sufficient condition) that made it possible to buy material objects such as books in the 
digital world (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 97). Amazon sold its first book online in 1995. Wells 
Fargo bank launched online account services and Ebay formed the first virtual second-
hand market place. These inventions opened the Internet for commerce and marked the 
commercialization of Internet services, together with deregulation policies (see chap. 
4.3.5.3 Policy: Internet Censorship with the Communications Decency Act (1996)), the 
privatization of the Internet (see chap. 4.3.4 Artifacts: Privatizing Control over the 
Internet) and increasing commodification of digital goods (digital music with mp3 in 1996, 
digital images, videos, news-content, data etc.). The combination of causal events 
(equifinally) produced an investment frenzy at the Stock-Market, called the "dot-com 
boom". 
Netscape, the market leader of browsers at the time, entered the stock market in 1995 
and immediately gained 108% in value (Shinal, 2005), becoming the largest initial public 
offering (IPO) in the history.70 Other companies like Yahoo! (Est. 1994) achieved similar 
results, placing its founders David Filo and Jerry Yang in "Newsweek’s 'sixty richest 
people in the world" (Kaplan, 1999). These rapid success stories turned the public’s 
attention towards this new thing, the Internet. "It also sent an undeniable message to the 
commercial world: The web was big business. The gold rush was on" (Berners-Lee, 2000, 
p. 106). This beginning commercialization of the Internet began to fuse economic ideas 
and norms with cyber-utopianism, creating a distinct branch or forking path of utopianism 
called cyber-liberalism (McEvoy Manjikian, 2010). It builds on the same ideological 
foundation and shares many utopian core-assumptions, but has a distinct economic flavor.
After initially dismissing the Internet, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates argued in his 
revised 1995 book: 
"We stand at the brink of another revolution. This one will involve unprecedentedly 
inexpensive communication; all the computers will join together to communicate 
with us and for us. […] we may be about to witness the realization of Adam 
Smith’s ideal market, at last. […] Just about everything will be done differently" 
(Gates, 1995, p. 37). 
70 Netscape pioneered the unusual business model of giving their product, the Netscape Navigator, away for 
free on the Internet. Their approach was to commercialize services once Netscape had a sufficient user base. 
This created a substantial risk for any investor because Netscape product, as well as many other companies 
who copied the business model, did not generate any profits (Berners-Lee, 2000, p. 83).
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Influential CEOs like Gates suddenly gave utopian hippie ideas external credibility and 
authority. The centerpiece of this cyber-liberalism is the idea that the Internet will create a 
new kind of market, dubbed "the new economy" that is fundamentally different from the 
old, industrial logic (indicating a "then vs. now" frame). This new economy is said to 
operate according to a decentralized networking logic and thus transcends globally. Gate’s 
book was highly influential among business elites and occupied the New York Times’ 
bestseller spot for weeks.
Similar frames can be found in the unofficial founding document of this paradigm, 
the widely regarded "Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the 
Knowledge Age" (Dyson et al., 1994), published by the Progress and Freedom Foundation 
(PFF), a neoliberal think tank with various political connections to the Republican Party 
(among them Newt Gingrich). Most of the financial supporters of PFF nowadays come 
from the Fortune 500 IT-Companies (Mosco, 2004, p. 107). This document systematically 
connects utopian ideas (self-governance, erosion of state authority, individual 
empowerment, new frontier etc.) with neoliberal thought, such as deregulation and a small 
state. For cyber-liberalism, cyberspace is not a commons, but a market. "To create the new 
cyberspace environment is to create new property – that is, new means of creating goods 
(including ideas) that serve people" (Dyson et al., 1994). The idea that user 
data/information is a commodity that can be sold is conceived in this context. The 
distributive, decentralizing and empowerment features are not only said to erode 
hierarchies, but also monopolies into systems of prototypical competitive markets, 
resembling Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of creative capitalist destruction. The assumed 
positive effects are:
"Cyberspace will play an important role knitting together in the diverse 
communities of tomorrow, facilitating the creation of "electronic neighborhoods" 
bound together not by geography but by shared interests. Socially, putting 
advanced computing power in the hands of entire populations will alleviate 
pressure on highways, reduce air pollution, allow people to live further away from 
crowded or dangerous urban areas, and expand family time" (Dyson et al., 1994).
To enable this, the appropriate role of the government lies in "removing barriers to 
competition and massively deregulating the fast-growing telecommunications and 
computing industries." The argument is that the "egalitarian explosion" of the Personal 
Computer was only possible because:
"government has stayed out of these markets, letting personal computing take over 
while mainframes rot (almost literally) in warehouses, and allowing (no doubt more 
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by omission than commission) computer networks to grow, free of the kinds of 
regulatory restraints that affect phones, broadcast and cable" (Dyson et al., 1994). 
The norms of cyber-liberalism are similar to utopianism. The government should 
promote dynamic competition while keeping its "hands-off". Government control harms 
the growing digital market and will make the US uncompetitive globally. This includes the 
demand for cheap, but essentially open access to the Internet: "Price-and-entry regulation, 
in short, is the antithesis of dynamic competition". Second, it should support "the key 
principle of ownership by the people – private ownership – should govern every 
deliberation. Government does not own cyberspace, the people do" (Dyson et al., 1994). 
This is a variation of the open-commons theme with the difference that cyber-liberalists 
argue for commodification and the creation of property rights in this yet uncharted frontier 
territory (in contrast to hippie utopians). Other arguments where demands for reduced tax 
burdens for IT companies and the reconfiguration of the large, hierarchized government 
into a smaller, decentralized network structure. 
According to Mosco, the Magna Carta "extended the cybernetic and countercultural 
analogies current in the social worlds of the Whole Earth and Wired, linked them to a 
libertarian political agenda, and ultimately used them as symbolic resources in support of 
the narrow goal of deregulating the telecommunications industry" (Mosco, 2004, p. 228). 
Countercultural norms found its way into lobbying strategies of large corporations and 
generated industrial pressure against state control of the Internet, which resonated with the 
goals of cyber-utopians and influenced US policymaking in the 1990s. Additionally, 
Silicon Valley companies created new influential lobby companies like TechNet.
The genealogy of the signifier "new economy" is interesting. Jeff Madricks’s process-
traced the evolution in business publications of the 1980s, where it initially described the 
increased relevance of the service economy, but then disappeared (Madrick, 2001, p. 10). 
In 1996, the term reappeared with a completely new meaning: new economy meant 
Internet (Madrick, 2001, p. 10). Madricks argues that Wall Street analysts, journalists and 
scholarly futurologists (among them cyber-utopians such as Manuell Castells, Nicholas 
Negroponte and Kevin Kelly)71 picked up the term and turned it into a social metaphor or 
diagnostic frame to explain the uptick in the US economy in 1996. Their assessment was 
71 Kelly’s book "New Rules for the New Economy" is particularly interesting. The argument is: "This new 
economy has three distinguishing characteristics: It is global. It favors intangible things—ideas, information, 
and relationships. And it is intensely interlinked. These three attributes produce a new type of marketplace 
and society, one that is rooted in ubiquitous electronic networks." From these perceived Internet attributes, 
Kelly deduces management strategies like mimicking flat hierarchies, imitate packet-switching in the real 
world transportation processes and much more. He essentially argues: "The dynamic of our society, and 
particularly our new economy, will increasingly obey the logic of networks" (Kelly, 1998, pp. 10-11).
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not based on empirical, economic analysis but wishful thinking based on anecdotal 
evidence. In other words, inexperienced journalists ascribed causality to the Internet, 
arguing that it was responsible for the economic growth. Again, the digital avant-garde 
acted as meaning-managers, bricoleurs and sense-makers of the Internet and had a 
widespread public impact. At the end of 1996, Bloomberg declared the "Triumph of the 
New Economy" the pillars of which where: rising exports and the globalization and second 
business investment in information technology (Mandel, 1996). The narrative of the new 
economy "included just about everything: changing labor markets, the NAFTA trade 
agreement and globalization, corporate restructuring, the decline of unionization and of 
course information technology. In effect, a second industrial revolution appears to be 
washing over the land […]" (Madrick, 2001, p. 11). 
Based on a "then and now" frame, it was assumed that the new economy operated 
according to own rules or laws, different from the old ways. The New Yorker argued "the 
New economy has put a premium on the values of networks, and there are genuine 
differences between the economics of software and the economics of hardware" 
(Surowiecki, 2000). Wired Editor Kevin Kelly argued that the Internet economy would be 
the "beginning of prosperity as we have never known it" because wealth would not just 
increase but be distributed to everyone: "The good news is, you’ll be a millionaire soon. 
The bad news is, so will everybody else" (Kelly, 1999). But not just Internet gurus like 
Kelly predicted a long-boom, but also esteemed economists spoke of "a vast economic 
expansion that could go on for decades, spreading prosperity around the world and lifting 
billions into middle-class lifestyles" (Schwartz, Leyden, & Hyatt, 1999, p. 108). James 
Glassmann predicted that, because of the Internet economy, the Dow Jones Index would 
reach 36000 points in the new future (Glassman et al., 1999).72 The rhetoric of the new 
economy also influenced politics, as a report from the Department of Commerce, which 
had been drafted before, but ironically released immediately after the burst of the dot-com 
bubble shows (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000).
The belief that the Internet is both, a benign emancipating force and a digital utopia 
which could make everyone with a clever idea rich culminated in the so-called Californian 
Ideology (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). According to Barbrook and Cameron, who first 
described this phenomenon, it combines the "free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the 
entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies" (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). It represents the fusion 
of cyber-utopian visions with a conservative logic. It could be argued that this is an 
economical spin-off from utopianism, held primarily by private companies and 
72 While writing this the Dow Jones Index reached 19700 points.
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corporations around the Silicon Valley area. One the one hand, it is based on many of the 
counter-cultural, hacking and cyber-utopian concepts described in the previous chapter 
(like the emancipatory potential of personal computing devices that allow individuals to 
express themselves, which shares the liberal-selfhood concept of the hacker culture). 
On the other hand, it adopted "the laissez-faire ideology of their erstwhile 
conservative enemy" (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996), including economic ideas and business 
models. Liberty, freedom and self-determination meant foremost the liberty of individuals 
on the market place (economic liberalism). For example: "In place of counterproductive 
regulations, visionary engineers are inventing the tools needed to create a free market 
within cyberspace, such as encryption, digital money and verification procedures" 
(Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). Potentially everyone could become a high-tech 
entrepreneur, creating products that make people’s lives better. This deep core belief still 
lives on in Silicon Valley companies like Apple, Google or Facebook, which claim that 
smartphones, intelligent algorithms (machine learning or Big Data)73, social-networks, 
apps, fitness-trackers and all sorts of digital gadgetry are designed to improve people’s 
lives. Existing power structures like state regulation should not stand in the way of this 
new digital market, which is why many of these companies are often accused of engaging 
in creative tax-evasion strategies. Counter-cultural mistrust of authority combines with 
neoliberal ideals of a small state, creating a "bizarre mish-mash of hippie anarchism and 
economic liberalism beefed up with lots of technological determinism" (Barbrook & 
Cameron, 1996). Instead of rebelling against the establishment, these tech entrepreneurs 
argue that individual freedom can only be created by technology, like for example the use 
of encryption to protect private conversations. The interesting impact of the Californian 
ideology is that it increased the public appeal of cyber-utopianism and thus expanded its 
influence beyond the counter culture and hacker community. Because banks and 
corporations adopted the narrative, cyber-utopianism increased its external credibility and 
the "everyone will be rich" narrative had a certain fidelity and appeal.
According to Madrick, the social metaphor of the new economy "only functioned, 
however, because people believed it was true. That is to say, they believed it was an 
economic concept largely because the media and Wall Street treated it as one—indeed, 
told them it was one" (Madrick, 2001, p. 2). It was a self-fulfilling prophecy that was 
highly compatible with the general idea of the American dream. The general economic 
73 The current hype about big-data is an evolutionary outcome of the Californian ideology and its 
commodification of digital services and data. With the rise of the Web 2.0, the idea that data can be 
monetized became prevalent in economical discourses. It could be argued that this represents a new 
paradigm, which is studied in higher detail elsewhere (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2014).
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euphoria exerted hegemonic power, although the claims were not based on solid empirical 
evidence.74 Explanatory factors for the success of the narrative were that new economy 
stories were bestsellers and resonated with American beliefs. Pärna analyzed that stories 
featuring the narrative of the computer nerd becoming rich, among them self-made 
millionaires such as Microsoft’s Bill Gates, Apple’s Steve Jobs, Yahoo’s Jerry Young or 
Amazon’s Jeff Besos, appeared particularly often in business publications of the late 1990s 
(Pärna, 2010, pp. 140-144). Stories like the documentary "the Triumph of the Nerds" 
(1996) reignited the American dream with the "from rags to riches" concept. But this new 
"American dream" was only a short one, as the next chapter will show.
4.2.7 Junctures: Dot-com Bubble (2000-2001)
The cyber-liberal narrative of the new economy (see chap. 4.2.6 The Californian Ideology 
(1995-2001)) led to an investment frenzy at the stock markets. It was assumed that 
Internet-related technologies would create new electronic markets (like Ebay), new 
commodities (advertisement, Big-Data) and new services. This belief derived from the 
utopian ideas that had been attached to the Internet by media journalists and Wall-Street 
analysts. Scholars who analyzed the rhetoric of business magazines of the time discovered 
that it was full of magic (Mosco, 2004, p. 42), myth (Madrick, 2001), faith or religious 
beliefs (Pärna, 2010). 
"In fact, it promised miracles. A new economy meant that historical precedent was 
meaningless. It also induced enormous business investment in high technology, 
including Internet services that were ill founded. Corporate executives leaped into 
these new technologies so as not to be left out. Many of these were not carefully 
reasoned decisions […]" (Madrick, 2001, p. 15). 
Investors assumed the new economy had unique characteristics and thus began to invest 
carelessly in stocks related to digital technologies, as the NASDAQ technology index 
shows. It was assumed that access and connectivity were the primary imperatives, so 
"massive amounts of fiber optic cable" were laid "which dramatically drove down the cost 
of making a phone call or transmitting data anywhere in the world" (Friedman, 2005, p. 
72). Friedman goes on and speculates that this drove down the costs of fiber optic cables 
which, almost by accident, enabled the global diffusion of high-speed Internet. Other 
drivers were emerging electronic markets and online-retailers (like pets.com). Investors 
74 Nowadays, consensus seems to be that the "rate of productivity growth between 1995 and 2000 was by no 
means unprecedentedly strong" because the young Internet economy "accounted for less than 2 percent of all 
transactions in 2000" and that the mid 1990s growth had more to do with the lowering of workers wages 
which increased corporate profit margins (Madrick, 2001, pp. 1-12).
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bought stocks and invested in these start-ups without checking if they had a sustainable 
business model that could generate profit. In fact, many of these new Internet companies 
were not generating profits but were loosing money constantly. This was rationalized by 
investors by referring to the unique characteristics of the new economy, were old economic 
principles did not seem to apply. Careful voices warned of a bubble, but were not heard.
The burst of the dot-com bubble between March 2000 and October 2002 ended the 
assumed long-boom (Schwartz et al., 1999) only 5 years after it began. NASDAQ lost 78% 
of its value (Beattie, ). In just one month, nearly a trillion dollar was lost (Geier, 2015). 
Major Internet brands like Yahoo, Amazon and Ebay lost tremendous values and many 
firms went bankrupt. While there were 457 IPO in 1999, there were only 76 in 2001 
(Beattie, ). The dot-com-bust had effects beyond the stock market. Companies had to lay 
off 66000 workers and many websites were closed. 31 million Americans said they were 
affected by the crash, as a Pew study found (Horrigan, 2001, p. 2). The survey also showed 
that it was generally believed that the cause for the bubble was the greed of investors who 
took to many risks.
Figure 18. NASDAQ Index 1994-2004, Source: (NASDAQ, 2016)
While the financial impact of the dot-com bubble was limited (because Internet 
economy in reality only made up a few percent of the overall economy at the time), the 
ideational impact was more severe. 
"Business gurus had confidently promised a blooming future for this branch of the 
economy because it was so dynamic, and Internet companies had been celebrated 
as the ultimate realizations of free market dreams. This swift, 180-degree change in 
values exposes a sudden loss of faith in the Internet" (Pärna, 2010, p. 142). 
The burst of the bubble presented itself as a shock to both investors and cyber-liberal 
utopianism itself. The dot-com crash led to a loss of faith and dramatically damaged the 
utopian narrative. It discredited the expectation of endless growth and the magical powers 
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of the Internet that seemed to resist traditional economical models. This proved to be a 
dangerous myth. A similar study reflects this: "Many of those who use the Internet have 
second thoughts about the meaning of the dot-com failures. In February 61% of Internet 
users thought weeding out Internet companies was a good thing; in August, half (50%) of 
users felt the same way" (Rainie et al., 2001). 
It is important to state that this disenchantment happened only a few months after the 
Y2K-bug, which was the first instance where an interconnected world showed new risks 
and problems (see chap. 4.4.5 Discourse: Y2K and Critical Infrastructure Failure). The 
synchronicity of the two causal factors is important here. Both cases negated the general 
cyber-utopian narrative that the Internet is a benign force with only positive effects. In 
contrast, the dot-com crash and the critical infrastructure panic of Y2K showed potential 
negative effects and blind spots of the digital revolution. At the same time, the dot-com 
crash had an undesirable outcome (financial loss), which further discredited utopianism 
(see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). The final blow to cyber-utopianism came with 9/11 
when the counter-terrorism narrative overshadowed everything else and presented cyber-
realism as a powerful competing narrative to utopianism. Within this narrative, the Internet 
is framed as a safe-haven for terrorists, removing the remainders of cyber-utopianism from 
public discourse. "History, geography, and politics returned with a vengeance" (Mosco, 
2004, p. 141) although utopianism believed of all this would change. Before we turn to 
that, let’s summarize the key ideas and norms of utopianism.
4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism
This chapter will summarize some utopian frames that developed on different forking-
paths with different actor formations over time. Because of time and space constraints, it is 
impossible to give a full description of all the cybernetic and utopian ideas presented in 
Wired and like-minded cyber-utopian carrier mediums in the early 1990s. Arguments 
developed within the hacker- and counter-culture, culminating in the WELL, were picked 
up in the 1990s by scientists, economists, journalists, educators and many more. While 
explaining the emerging and complex Internet to the general masses, journalists turned to 
the experts: hackers, IT-specialists and the digital Avantgarde of the WELL, in order to 
make sense of this new technology. This allowed cyber-utopian ideas and norms to spill 
into public discourse and to emerge as the hegemonic meaning for the Internet between 
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1993/94-2000, until the dot-com bubble disenchanted the narrative (Pärna, 2010, p. 69).75 
This can be quantified by referring to Google Ngrams.
Figure 19. Google NGram Analysis, Source: (Google, 2016)
Ngrams measure the frequencies of keywords in English book publications scanned by 
Google , which makes them an indicator for the relative dominance of terms. In this 
example, I have used keywords from each of the paradigms. The utopian metaphor of 
cyberspace clearly dominates, but other utopian terms such as "new economy" and the 
cyber-liberal/utopian term "information superhighway" (introduced in chapter 4.3.3 Ideas: 
Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway (1993)), are relatively important as well. 
Observe that the cyber-realist term cyber-war (see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the 
Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)) is highly marginalized and becomes important 
only after the year 2000, which lies outside the Ngram data-set.
The following discussion will present the cyber-utopian narrative and core 
arguments, but will not judge their plausibility, which will follow in another chapter (see 
chap. 4.2.9 Critical Analysis & Blind Spots of Cyber-Utopianism). The core of utopianism 
is the diagnostic frame that a digital revolution is going on, a rapid succession of different 
ages, historical waves (Toffler, 1980)76 or stages in history (past, present, future). 
Normally, revolutions are sudden changes within in a short period of time, but the digital 
revolution is rather slow, going on for the last 30 years. This frame has a function: "the 
designation of a particular time of human history as an identifiable "age" is meant to 
highlight its distinctiveness from the past. It signals that a transformation has taken place in 
75 Pärna for example counted that "between 1993 and 2002 the American magazine Time featured the 
Internet and its many visionaries and heroes on its cover on at least twenty occasions" (Pärna, 2010, p. 71).
76 According to the Tofflers, history is a succession of rolling waves, the first being the agrarian society. The 
second wave’s characteristics are said to be Fordist factory production, factory-model of mass education, the 
nuclear family and general giant-corporatist institutions producing core norms such as obedience and 
punctuality. The third wave will replace the industrial society with an information society, driven by 
electronics and computers (Lewis, 1980). Knowledge and information becomes the central resource of the 
Information Age and those who utilize knowledge will benefit. This will result in more network-like forms of 
organization, putting stress on the nation state with majority rule (Weiss, 1996).
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the way human activity is conducted and/or defined" (Harknett, 2003, p. 17). The industrial 
society then, the new network or digital society now. According to Mosco, the "then" and 
"now" frame functions like a switch and as a denial of the past with its antiquated models 
of governance and social order, prioritizing new ways instead (Mosco, 2004, pp. 32-35). 
This revolution concept became powerful because it resonated with a narrative 
emerging at the end of the Cold War that the "world as we knew it" (Pärna, 2010, p. 78) is 
gone (9/11 being a second of these historical switches). For political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama, it was the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) and a Great Disruption 
(Fukuyama, 2000) and for Daniel Bell the "End of Ideology" (Bell, 2000). In many of these 
books, technology is depicted as the major driver: "new forms of information technology 
(IT) promise to create wealth, spread access to information and therefore power around 
more democratically, and foster community among their users" (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 182). 
In other words, "the Internet hype transmuted the unease about uncertain times that 
characterized the post-Cold War years into a very hopeful narrative of a new and better 
way of life" (Pärna, 2010, p. 80). Furthermore, it resonated well with the general frame of 
the globalization. The early 1990s presented themselves as an excellent window of 
opportunity for cyber-utopianism.
This revolution frame has two elements. First, change is seen as benevolent, resulting 
in a positive future. "Not only is technology good, not only is it indispensable, but […] it 
alone can achieve all that human beings have been seeking throughout centuries: liberty, 
democracy, justice, happiness (by a high standard of living), reduction of work, etc" (Ellul, 
1990, p. 30). This optimistic future is defined ex-negativo, based on perceived current, 
negative conditions (like hierarchy or inequality) and thus potentially open to various 
interpretations (interpretative flexibility). This explains the huge bandwidth of utopian 
arguments. For educators, the Internet is all about better education and for business it is all 
about economic transformation and so on. 
Second, this change is framed as a natural, irresistible force. Director of MIT Lab 
Nicholas Negroponte argues in his book Being Digital (1995): "the change from atoms to 
bits is irrevocable and unstoppable" (Negroponte, 1995, p. 4) and "like a force of nature, 
the digital age cannot be denied or stopped" (Negroponte, 1995, pp. 228-229). He 
envisions digitalization as a form of evolution with natural selection. Others called it a 
"tsunami of transformation" (Tapscott, 1995, p. 4) or argued "massive and unstoppable 
changes are under way" (Mitchell, 2000). All these are examples of naturalizing 
hegemonic articulations.
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What changes will the Internet bring? What are its effects? Two major outcomes are 
predicted: the Internet causes shifts in the power distribution and therefore global 
governance. It empowers smaller, individual or networked actors and reduces the ability of 
the central state or large bureaucracies to exercise control. Political scientist Joseph Nye 
(who is not a whole-hearted utopian), picks up this cyber-power thought: "a power 
transition among states and a power diffusion away from all states to non-state actors" 
(Nye, 2011, pp. 113-115). The power structure of the state is becoming obsolete or is at 
least incompatible with the new mode of network-governance. Centralized bureaucracies 
are said to lose control over information flows on their territory and citizens. The Internet 
is all about the loss of control. Decentralized network structures are said to take over 
control (Castells, 1999). Networks, a hype concept of the mid 1990s,77 are described as a 
hybrid between centralized, top-down-control organizations (like the state or the military) 
and flexible markets with loose affiliations (Powell, 1990). Many publications of the time 
focus on the assumed positive effects of networks, like flat hierarchies and quick 
information exchange (Börzel, 1998). The world is becoming more flat, as the Financial 
Times/Goldman Sachs business book of the year 2005 argues (Friedman, 2005).
A related argument is that because the Internet changes power structures, it also 
changes (global) governance (Steele & Stein, 2002, p. 35). For example, information 
technologies encourage reciprocal communication, from which the democratic process 
will benefit (Kedzie & Aragon, 2002, p. 123). The Internet is framed as a tool for 
democracy (Gore, 1994b). It could increase voter participation (vote-click) and can short-
circuit political processes for lobbyism or advocacy (Hague & Loader, 1999; Shapiro, 
2000). Common metaphors are "global village", "virtual town square" or "a new public 
sphere", which are created by virtual communities on the Internet (Stebbins, 2012, p. 111). 
Some even go so far and argue that the Internet will create a Jeffersonian vision of direct 
democracy (Dyson et al., 1994). This frame was particularly popular in policy circles. The 
assumed end of this process will be a global cosmopolitan society in the Kantian sense 
(Dahlgren, 2015). The empowerment thesis also leads to an increased focus on non-state 
actors like NGOs or globalized organizations (WTO, IMF) in global problem-solving 
(Matthews, 1997, pp. 51-52).
77 From the mid 1970s, sociologists started to describe a new form of social organization with flat hierarchies 
and quick information exchange; the social network (Granovetter, 1973). Manuell Castells coined the term 
network-society (Castells, 1999), a decentralized society, which was inspired from the social organization in 
platforms like the WELL. In 1990, Walter Powell argued that the network resembled a third mode of social 
governance between pyramid-organizations and unstructured but more flexible markets (Powell, 1990). 
Börzel offers a good literature review on the term (Börzel, 1998).
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Closely related to the change in (global) governance is the idea of the end of 
geography or physical space. Senior Editor of The Economist Frances Cairncross wrote a 
whole book called The Death of Distance. "No longer will location be key to most business 
decisions. Companies will locate any screen-based activity anywhere on earth, wherever 
they can find the best bargain of skills and productivity" (Cairncross, 1997, p. xi). This will 
lead to greater interconnectedness and interdependence of economies and societies and 
thus "increase understanding, foster tolerance, and ultimately promote worldwide peace" 
(Cairncross, 1997, p. xv). The potentials of the Internet are economic growth, better, more 
transparent international relations and a global coming-together of citizens, who now can 
communicate with whoever they want on the globe. Similar arguments are also made by 
management consultant Kenichi Ohmae in his book The Borderless World (Ohmae, 1999) 
and MIT media professor William J. Mitchell in his e-topia (Mitchell, 2000).
It is also argued that the Internet will change our information processes like 
education and thus make us essentially smarter and better informed citizens. Instead of 
going to a library or calling an information desk, even highly detailed information is now 
available for free on the Internet. This is "fundamentally reshaping the flow of creativity, 
innovation, political mobilization, and information gathering and dissemination" 
(Friedman, 2005, p. 95). Instead of one-to-many communication (in the past), the Internet 
allows many-to-many communication, which in the end benefits democracy (Benkler, 
2006, p. 216). It will erode the monopoly of state media and make propaganda inefficient. 
Information can be cross-checked easily because it is available everywhere on the Internet 
and citizen-journalism will create a critical, public opinion. The Internet provides the tools 
to make everyone a content provider (Mueller, 2010, p. 35). This will lead to more open 
and transparent societies. Authoritarian societies are said to be incompatible with the 
Internet. The dictator’s dilemma is a common argument: either authoritarian states 
introduce the ICT to gain economic advantages (which negates their monopoly over 
information) or they block them and fall back economically (while maintaining the 
information monopoly) (Shultz, 1985). Newsweek even argued that the Internet could 
overthrow dictatorships (Levy, 1995).
All these effects will occur because they are said to reflect attributes of the 
technology itself, as utopians claim. In other words, TCP/IP and WWW are understood in 
a particular way. The assumed effects of the Internet are based on two of its perceived 
characteristics: its decentralized network architecture (end-to-end principle) and its 
distributed routing. These features are said to have decentralizing and distributive effects. 
Among 1990s utopians, there is a strong belief that the Internet inherently resists state 
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control. Deibert argues that at the time it was "assumed that cyberspace was immune to 
government regulation because of its dynamic nature and distributed architecture" (Deibert 
& Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 339). John Gilmore from the EFF argued in the early 1990s: 
"The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it" (Harvard Cyber Law). 
Although this claim was quickly disproved, it had a widespread impact, for example on 
President Bill Clinton, who argued that trying to control the Internet "That’s sort of like 
trying to nail Jello to the wall" (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016). Clinton directed this statement at 
Chinese Internet censorship efforts. This quote is key evidence for the normative constraint 
of the "hands-off" norm even among political elites. Another variant of this argument is the 
so-called Streisand-effect: once some information is online, it cannot be taken back 
because it can be copied or, as one unknown source once said:"You can’t take something 
off the Internet - it’s like taking pee out of a pool" (Harvard Cyber Law). Information 
technologies have broken down the information monopoly a state could have in the past 
over its territory, for example in terms of propaganda. 
One reason for that argument is the idea that the Internet transcends borders 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2008, pp. 13-29) and thus makes geography and space irrelevant (death 
of distance). Political scientist Anne-Marie Slaughter argues for example that "the 
emerging networked world of the twenty-first century, however, exists above the state, 
below the state, and through the state" (Slaughter, 2009). This is based on the assumption 
that packet-switching and dynamic routing send messages randomly over the net, 
sometimes even through other jurisdictions. 
Another argument put forward, particularly by civil-libertarians and cypherpunks,78 
is that the Internet increases privacy and civil liberties because it provides anonymity that 
protects from state oppression. Remember the entry quote "On the Internet, Nobody 
Knows You’re a Dog." This idea stems from the disembodiment thesis79 of the counter-
culture, which states that you can encounter someone online without knowing his/her 
physical attributes (but based on an IP address and other signatures such as metadata). 
Even today, many politicians still argue that the Internet provides anonymity for terrorists. 
This argument is of central concern for national security actors: "trends in individual 
empowerment, network organizations, and destructive potential lead to the potential for 
great harm delivered anonymously" (Harknett, 2003).
78 An anarchist branch of hackers following the idea of total transparency and the overcoming of state 
secrets, culminating in Wikileaks (Assange et al., 2013).
79 An extreme version of the disembodiment thesis is Ray Kurzweil’s book "The Age of Spiritual Machines" 
where he argues that neural interfaces between and machines and humans allow backup copies of the brain, 
thus immortalizing humans (Kurzweil, 1999).
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Lastly, the Internet is seen as a self-governed, generative organism (Zittrain, 2006). 
This is based on the do-it-yourself attitude of early communalists who argue for peer-to-
peer governance based on mutual interests and not top-down hierarchical control 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2008, pp. 13-29). It is also uttered repeatedly in Barlow’s declaration of 
independence: cyberspace is "an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective 
actions" (Barlow, 1996).
From these normative description follows one central norm promoted by utopians: 
open access, or as MIT Media Lab Researcher Ethan Zuckerman calls it: "[t]he Internet is 
the most efficient system we’ve ever built to allow people to seek, receive and import 
information and ideas, and therefore we need to ensure everyone has unfettered Internet 
access" (Zuckerman, 2010a). This norm was adopted by both the Clinton administration 
with its policy of the information superhighway (see chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on 
the Information Superhighway (1993)) but also by the Obama administration in 2008 (see 
chap. 4.5.2 Ideas: Cyber-Utopianism under Obama and Clinton). It is based on the 
empowerment thesis and puts its emphasis on individual humans and not the state. Internet 
access is framed as a human right (which the United Nations Human Rights Council 
adopted in 2016 (United Nations General Assembly, 2016)). 
Also mentioned is the norm that the Internet should be free, free of censorship in 
particular, which is a main concern of civil-libertarian inspired cyber-utopianism. The free 
flow of information shall not be obstructed, resembling the idea of the hacker ethic. As 
such, cyber-utopians argue for the freedom of speech norm, and define speech as basically 
everything published on the net. This explains why much of Internet advocacy focuses on 
censorship, government surveillance of the Internet and interference with technologies 
such as encryption (Deibert et al., 2008). Implied is the idea that states or large 
corporations ought not interfere with the Internet, representing a strong normative 
commitment to the "hands-off principle". This is inspired by the cyber-punk narrative of 
the evil corporation and the self-governance attitude of early cyber-utopianism. The 
Internet is perceived as space for the individual people, and not considered to be the 
domain of the state. It represents an open commons80 like the high seas, space or air. "The 
combination of the technological and normative aspects of the Internet in this period frame 
the Internet as an "open commons" in which the domain was considered a separate space 
80 According to Benkler "’Commons’ refers to a particular institutional form of structuring the rights to 
access, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of "property […] no single person has exclusive control 
over the use and disposition of any particular resource in the commons. Instead, resources governed by 
commons may be used or disposed of by anyone among some (more or less well-defined) number of persons, 
under rules that may range from "anything goes" to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively 
enforced" (Benkler, 2006, pp. 60-62).
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resistant to state regulation and control" (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 342). This 
idea inspired the decentralized, multi-stake holder governance of Internet top-level 
domains with ICANN81 but also the research and development of Internet standards with 
Internet Engineering Task Force. Both organizations feature a multi-stakeholder design 
that was chosen to prevent control of individual states over core Internet technologies and 
future standards (Hofmann, 2005).
Another political norm is net-neutrality, or the idea that every packet should be 
treated equally and that there should not be any special services from content providers 
who would be treated with higher priority (i.e. higher speed). In other words, the net 
should not discriminate. 
A key finding of this chapter is that paradigmatic elements, key ideas, identity 
descriptions and beliefs of the paradigm’s advocates that developed since the 1960s were 
systematically attached and projected to the technology in question. Technology is 
understood through the values and beliefs of the paradigm. For cyber-utopians, who share 
a strong commitment to decentralized governance structures, the decentral and distributed 
features of the Internet are seen as an essence that will produce equivalent societal effects. 
The argument goes so far that it is assumed that a technology has an inherent essence that 
reflects the particular beliefs or ideas of a group. 
Figure 20. Cyber-utopianism framing the Internet as Cyberspace in the early 1990s 
(own diagram)
The case can be made that many of these utopian ideas were dominant during the 1990s 
and influenced how the general population perceived the Internet. The appeal of 
utopianism increased with the dot-com investment frenzy, when even corporations and 
81 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
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financial actors adopted utopian frames. The dominance of euphoria and utopias lasted 
only a few years and remained largely unquestioned, although there was much to criticize.
4.2.9 Critical Analysis & Blind Spots of Cyber-Utopianism
This chapter discusses some of the cyber-utopian arguments in a critical way. Mosco 
argues that the powerful utopian narrative presented itself as hegemonic in framing the 
digital revolution as a natural fact, an irreversible transformation, thus silencing 
alternative, more skeptical voices (Mosco, 2004, p. 19). Cyber-utopianism, and especially 
the Californian Ideology had a widespread appeal, combining ideas from the New Left 
(self-empowerment, liberalism) and the New Right (market liberalism, small government), 
thus bridging different ideological camps from hackers to large IT-companies, from Al 
Gore to Newt Gingrich. This silenced critical voices.
For example, even utopians such as Howard Rheingold brought up the possibility of 
mass accumulation of citizen data by states through the Internet. He correctly predicted 
that in the future "instead of just telephone taps, the weapons will include computer 
programs that link bar codes, credit cards, social security numbers, and all the other 
electronic telltales we leave in our paths through the information society" (Rheingold, 
1993, p. chap. 10). In 1996, critics warned about the privacy implications the Internet has 
that for example "transactional information [metadata] can be very revealing of one’s 
personal habits when compiled and collected from many sources", so that for example 
sexual preferences could be deduced from surfing behavior (Wellbery, 1996). The 
individual empowerment thesis blurred the fact that the powerful (states) had the resources 
and know-how to adapt to the decentralizing tendencies of the Internet. Authoritarian states 
like China began their widespread Internet censorship effort in 1996. Russia and the USA 
began clandestine Internet surveillance activities with their quest for metadata (see chap. 
4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )) around 1998 
(Deibert et al., 2010).
The underlying meta-critique of cyber-utopianism, similar to cyber-realism, is 
technological determinism (see chap. 2.3.1 Theorizing Technology: Traditional 
Approaches), but with a positive flavor (Winner, 1997). Technology is essentially regarded 
to be autonomous. Society is the subject, technology the object of change. This 
determinism implies that technology has certain revolutionizing characteristics leading 
theologically to distinct social outcomes (like better democracy or a global community). 
Hegemonic articulations such as framing the digital revolution as irresistible and 
unstoppable argue that there is just one path to the future, which denies the possibility of 
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the social shaping of technological development (see chap. 2.3.4 The Social Construction 
of Technology and its Critique). Utopianism neglects the conditions for the possibility of 
its visions. Neither are the concept of power and power-distribution elaborated on, nor are 
the conditions of possibility for a global community analyzed.
The possibility to communicate globally does not imply its probability because 
people tend to communicate in closer circles. Language barriers are an issue that were not 
conceived in the early days, when the Internet consisted of around 99% English content. 
English is currently replaced by Mandarin as the most spoken online language. 
Sociological theories about the creation and maintenance of communities are ignored 
(Winner, 1997). The possibility of class, race or ethnic conflicts like modern networked 
antisemitism and nationalism are notably absent from cyber-utopian thought. Evgeny 
Morozov argues that the possibility of many-to-many communication alone does not 
guarantee that someones listens or that some kind of consensus or productive discourse is 
formed. The Internet can be turned into a Spinternet, a tool for spin-doctors to spread 
dissent and propaganda that drown the truth in an endless stream of noise (Morozov, 2011, 
p. 153). The current debate about echo chambers and fake news indicates this. In sum, 
Winner argues that cyber-utopianism operates with under-theorized, banal and hollow 
concepts of both community and politics (Winner, 1997). 
The explanation for this lack of social theory is that the creators of the Internet, 
hackers and early digital communities, as well as the early adopters of the Internet came 
from the same social class: white, young, well-educated, English-speaking middle-class 
males. The hacker culture, the WELL and the Internet all developed in an elitist context 
(Ivory league universities) with generous funding from the US military. Women and other 
ethnicities barely played a role during the social construction of networking technologies. 
In the mid 1990s, there were still huge entry-barriers to the Internet. The economically 
disadvantaged could neither afford a computer nor a dial-up connection. The same is true 
internationally where there is still a digital divide between the interconnected North and 
South with little Internet penetration (Hargittai & Hsieh, 2013). For these regions, the 
spread of information technologies with their supporting technical infrastructure, build by 
large Western corporations, often had the flavor of economical imperialism and 
colonialism.
In light of all these obstacles, why then is the Internet perceived to be a democratic tool for 
individual empowerment? Because the elites projected their behavior, ideas and norms 
onto these technologies and deduced from this projection that it would be true for everyone 
else. They assumed that because their particular community used the Internet for benign 
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projects with a flat hierarchy to improve individual skill, so would anybody else. The 
possibility that someone with a criminal background could use the Internet for malign 
things, did not feature prominently.82 Mosco argues that "the greatest mistake people make 
about technology is to assume that knowledge of its inner workings can be extrapolated 
over years to tell us not only where the machine is heading but also where it is taking us" 
(Mosco, 2004, p. 14). This projection fallacy works in two ways: to the anticipated social 
effects of a technology but also to its inner workings. The projection fallacy creates the 
illusion of a technical essence, the end-to-end principle in this case that is unchangeable 
and will deterministically produce certain effects. Theory teaches us that the effects of a 
technology lie less in its essence, but within the social context of usage (see chap. 2.3.6 
Combining the Frameworks). In a liberal West-coast America, the Internet certainly has 
communal and liberating effects because the underlying societal structure supports this, 
while the same technology in China and Russia is used as a tool of oppression (Morozov, 
2011). 
But not just spatial, but also temporal context matters. Utopianism with its 
deterministic notion that highlights the "newness" or the distinctness of the "information 
age" ignores that similar positive attributes have been given to almost all information 
technologies in the past: 
"Historians have documented that the telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and 
cable TV were all initially received in startlingly utopian/dystopian terms. Each 
time, it was claimed that the technology would unite people around the world, bring 
about the end of war, solute the problems of education, change human 
consciousness" (Sholle, 2002, p. 9).
 These technologies, over time, have become normalized and their meaning changed. 
Morozov maintains the same argument for the Internet. Its potential for political 
mobilization is overstated because usage statistics suggest that most people use the Internet 
for entertainment (Facebook and funny cats) instead of political dissent. Not George 
Orwell's Big Brother, but Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" is the better metaphor, 
because as long people feel entertained, they will not resist state encroachment, censorship 
and surveillance (Morozov, 2011, pp. 57-85).
82 Coleman correctly argues that the hacker ethic creates the false impression of a coherent community. Even 
among hackers there is a great variance of people believing in different norms. The open source ethos is not 
shared by all programmers. Crackers for example hack for personal or financial gain and already were a 
problem when Barlow launched the EFF in 1990s. Cypherpunks advocate radical transparency and 
publication of state secrets (Wikileaks) while information security hackers are committed to information 
security. In contrast, anti sec hackers lobby against the disclosure of software vulnerabilities because of 
anarchist notions. There are also regional differences. US hackers tend to be more libertarian while European 
hackers are more social democratic (Coleman, 2013, pp. 18-19).
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In other words, the empowerment thesis and the description of the Internet as a self-
governed open commons must be questioned. Statements like "everyone will be rich" or 
"empowered" ignore the fact that every social revolution produced winners, most notably 
large corporations like Amazon, and losers like small book stores or small business that 
cannot compete with the economy of scale. A common mistake by cyber-utopians is "to 
conflate the activities of freedom seeking individuals with the operations of enormous, 
profit seeking business firms" (Winner, 1997). Current debates about data sovereignty 
indicate a huge power imbalance between users and large corporations such as Facebook. 
The modern saying "if an online service is free, you are not the customer but the product", 
reflects this.
Cyber-utopians, with their focus on cyberspace and disregard of matter and geography, 
ignored that the physical infrastructure of the Internet is owned by large 
telecommunications corporations and other intermediates with particular interests. The 
neglect for matter also reinforced the false belief that the Internet resisted state or corporate 
control because fiber optic cables and server-farms (the Internet backbone) are 
geographically bound to the jurisdiction of states.
This leads to the final and most profound critique of cyber-utopianism: the belief that 
the Internet has an uncontrollable essence written into its protocols that cannot be altered. 
Lessig (Lessig, 2006) convincingly argued that states can control technology, for example 
by standard-setting, policies (like censorship laws or wiretapping requirements such as 
CALEA, see chap. 4.3.5 Junctures: Policy Attempts to Control the Internet (1993-1996)). 
He also argues that utopianism adheres to the fallacy of "is-ism – the mistake of confusing 
how something is with how it must be" (Lessig, 2006, p. 32). While it is true that the 
Internet originally relied on technological features that determined how the technology 
operated and how it can be controlled, this does not imply that this cannot be changed. 
Policies, ideas and norms shape the Internet and can alter these technological principles 
over time (see chap. 2.3.7 Digital Technology: Software and Code). The future Internet 
may allow greater surveillance and centralization. Cyber-realists in fact demand this, as 
another chapter will show (see chap. 4.5.4 Discourse: Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of 
Cyber-Realism).
Although it is easy to criticize cyber-utopian ideas retrospectively, the paradigm made 
an important contribution. Cyber-utopianism constructed a particular vision of the Internet 
that reduced its interpretative flexibility. It is the reason why we even nowadays associate 
the Internet not primarily with packet-switching and dynamic routing but with terms like 
cyberspace, virtual communities and the creation of a global village. All these terms 
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describe the same phenomenon but have completely different meanings. The idea of the 
positive effects of the Internet became attached to this technology by cyber-utopianism and 
shaped its initial perception and worldwide diffusion. The idea that states should not 
control, censor or monitor cyberspace was a powerful narrative that would not exist had 
the technology developed in a different place, say the Soviet Union, as for example Peters 
shows in his book on networking experiments in Russia (Peters, 2016). Although it was 
idealistic, it embedded Western liberal-democratic concepts into the technology, such as 
freedom of speech and open access as a human right. 
Without the belief in the freedom of information, there would not be a global database 
such as Wikipedia, but maybe different pay-wall encyclopedias, based on the traditional 
financial models. Without cyber-utopian thought, there might not have been one global 
network but instead many incompatible, walled-off network-islands, or what some scholars 
call a "balkanized network" or "splinter net" (see chap 4.1.4 Artifact: The World Wide 
Web (1989-present)). The Chinese and Russian Internets are showing signs of this trend. 
Alternatively, corporations are building "walled gardens" or subsections of the Internet 
where they determine social norms and types of connectivity to other networks, often for a 
price. Apple for example censors smartphone apps covering clandestine US drone 
operations and Facebook censors images depicting human nipples. Via these technologies, 
US moral standards are forced upon other countries with different moral sensibilities. 
Telecommunications providers advocate visions of a basic Internet, where you can access 
news and websites, but if you want to watch videos online, you have to pay extra, just like 
the US cable-TV model. The application, the replacement of websites with apps, is another 
trend that might fragment the Internet. In other words, "just as it was not preordained that 
the internet would become one global network where the same rules applied to everyone, 
everywhere, it is not certain that it will stay that way" (Economist, 2010).
4.2.10 Summary
This chapter showed that cyber-utopianism is not a homogenous political paradigm or 
philosophy. It is held by various actors with different interests and motivations. 
Replicating the structure of the last summary chapter, I will first describe the parts of the 
causal mechanism in a narrative fashion and provide a table with the key take-away 
messages at the end. 
First, a positive attitude towards computers developed in the highly centralized 
context of main-frame computing in the 1950s (part 1). Those who understood new 
technology were less afraid of it and saw its potential for realizing personal goals. The 
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hierarchized prestructuration of computer-use was undesirable for the impact 
constituencies, young IT-students, because it prevented effective problem-solving and 
code-writing. Hierarchized bureaucracies restricting access to information and 
technologies became the prime antagonist for cyber-utopians, an idea that resonated well 
with the counter-culture and the general 1960s zeitgeist of mistrust in authority and the 
military-industrial complex. New technologies such as time-sharing enabled collaboration 
and led to the creation of a sense of community of like-minded individuals who began to 
share a common set of ideas and norms (a paradigm), such as that technologies should be 
open and information should flow freely (resembling freedom of speech). Thus, this 
community engaged in the discursive practice of counter-signification and appropriation, 
engaging in deviant use of computers for playing games and tried to change existing 
practices and norms (part 2). Without this positive perspective of the hacker culture, it is 
very unlikely that a utopianism with a special focus on digital technologies (i.e. a cyber-
utopianism) would have formed, since the counter-culture initially was skeptical towards 
computers (see chap. 4.2.3 Artifact: Democratizing Technology (1970-1980)). 
The practice of sharing ideas and open software code was an important causal factor 
for the diffusion of early utopianism because it exposed other IT-students at other 
universities to the same ideas that were transported through the shared software. The idea 
of peer-to-peer collaboration served the same function. Later, ideas and norms got diffused 
through hacker-conferences, staff-exchange between universities and even computer 
networks such as ARPANET. Additionally, many of the early hacker generations and IT 
students became business-professionals in the early 1970 and ushered in the era of the 
personal computer. Without these operational platforms and idea-hubs, cyber-utopianism 
would have most likely been a geographically limited phenomenon.
The later Home-brew community that formed in the Silicon Valley, the epicenter of 
cyber-utopianism, adhered to the same norms and ideas and engaged in the process of 
counter-appropriating computer use, this time successfully (part 3). They developed the 
idea of the democratization of computer-usage: access to computers had to be 
democratized and decentralized away from military research applications into the home of 
the people. By creating personal computers, the Home-brew Community embedded this 
norm into these artifacts. With the successful mass diffusion and commodification of the 
PC, these ideas diffused to a wider, non-expert audience. The narrative that computers 
could empower individuals and create a better democracy became an appealing narrative 
during the 1980s and later was attached to the Internet as well.
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The second branch of the causal mechanism was the American counterculture, the 
hippies, the back-to-the-landers trying to change the political system and global 
consciousness through techniques of the mind. They too shared the antagonism of 
hierarchies, particularly the military-industrial complex that was made responsible for the 
Vietnam War. The solution to this perceived problem was creating new forms of living, 
consciousness and decentralizing power into communes. One of their key goals was self-
determined governance without state interference, resembling a strong libertarianism (a 
uniquely American tradition and thus a case-specific causal factor). They also turned to 
extravagant scientific ideas, such as cybernetics and theories of new media. This exposed 
them to new ideas, like that digital technologies, artificial intelligence and machine 
automation could be used to create a new form of global society, one of the core ideas of 
cyber-utopianism. The compatibility and consistency of cybernetic and hacker ideas with 
counter-cultural ideas, for example in terms of the hierarchies as the key antagonists, is a 
key explanation for the fusion of these. At the same time, these scientific ideas gave 
utopians some external credibility and increased the fidelity of the utopian narrative. This 
factor is highly case-specific because this libertarian-inspired idea-cluster was nonexistent 
in other countries. 
The fusion of hacker and counter-cultural ideas was facilitated by Stewart Brand, 
who gave hackers and communalists a shared forum, a platform to share ideas and 
techniques (part 4). The Catalog exposed the two communities to each other’s ideas. 
Another facilitating condition was the geographical proximity of the mostly Californian 
counter-culture and the Silicon Valley, where many hacker-ideas were conceived. Brand 
personally visited both communities, acting as a networking broker. His other important 
contribution came in the 1980s, when the diffusion of the PC reached a critical mass of 
users and networking technologies were market-ready. This enabled his first social 
network, the WELL to become successful among early Internet users. The WELL enabled 
new practices such as exchanging ideas with people from the other end of the country. The 
practice of using the WELL led to the creation of new norms such as free speech, the self-
governance of this online community, association by interest and concepts such as the 
death of distance or new forms of being (online) in virtual communities. The period 
between 1982 and 1992 thus can be seen as the period where a coherent cyber-utopianism 
formed out of the hacker and counter-culture. During this time, the Internet became the 
primary point of focus for the paradigm. It can be argued that a form of utopianism might 
have emerged absent of Stewart Brand and his influence (necessary condition), but chances 
are that this utopianism would have looked different, relying on different motives and non-
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technical themes, for example resembling more left-wing themes like its European 
counter-part with the protests of 1968. Studies comparing the European and American 
hacker culture diagnose that libertarian and counter-cultural themes are mostly absent from 
the former (Alberts, 2014). Alternatively, one could hypothesize that a non-cyber form of 
utopianism might have vanished much in the same way as the counter-culture and 
commune-living disappeared during the mid to late 1970s (Turner, 2006, p. 129).
The most important idea that emerged was that the WELL resembled a space inside a 
computer, a cyberspace, an empty signifier that was created by the Sci-Fi literature of 
cyberpunk around the same time. The WELL filled the empty notion of cyberspace with a 
concrete meaning (signification). Cyber-punk certainly had a narrative fidelity and was 
highly commensurable and compatible to cyber-utopianism and the counterculture, 
because it shared the same antagonism. Cyber-punk literature helped to transport these 
relatively marginal ideas into the public discourse, explaining the early Internet to non-
technical users and as such, engaging in a sense-making practice (part 5). Without it, we 
might not use the futuristic "cyber" term at all and might understand the Internet in 
completely different terms, for example as a network of networks. The early Internet users 
played a special role, acting as bricoleurs, sense-makers or paradigm-advocates. Because 
they were socialized with the WELL, they used this experience as a frame of reference for 
explaining the Internet when it reached mainstream diffusion in 1992.
Most notably was John Perry Barlow and the advocacy group he founded – the EFF, 
which politicized utopianism. Barlow and other utopians framed cyberspace in terms of the 
frontier. This technological frame highlighted design principles of the Internet such as its 
borderless nature and the idea that distributed routing and packet-switching would provide 
anonymity, prevent censorship and other forms of state control. Because of this projection 
they argued that the state had no role to play there, thus advocating for the norm that the 
state should not interfere with cyberspace and let the users engage in self-governance of 
this medium. This, too, represents a technical counter-signification and appropriation 
strategy, trying to establish the users as the dominant actors in cyberspace while denying 
this to the central state (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). This happened 
because of the perceived state encroachment onto cyberspace with new legislation and 
represents diagnostic and motivational frames. He tried to motivate other utopians to shape 
the initial conditions of cyberspace by explaining it to new users. It can be argued that this 
strategy worked. Cyber-utopianism established the first widely shared meaning of the 
Internet in terms of utopian frames and thus influenced future discourses by other 
paradigms about the technology. 
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This overlap of ideas and concepts shows that the early 1990s represented a juncture 
where different causal pathways converged or interacted. I showed that many utopian 
frames, ideas and norms resonated well in academic, public, economic, policy and media-
discourses of the early 1990s, which is a key explanation for the success of utopianism 
(part 6). Comparably, the technological frames of the engineering community were not as 
imaginative and commensurable as the vibrant cyber-metaphors. Some of the most 
influential utopian ideas were the concept of an irresistible information revolution that was 
going on, changing the logic of everything. Many of these ideas had the character of 
diagnostic or prognostic frames (see chap. 2.2.1 Discursive Struggles between Paradigms). 
New information technologies were said to lead to the dissolution of state power, to make 
borders irrelevant and empower the people vis-à-vis the central state. States would no 
longer be able to control media and information systems, thus making censorship and 
information controls obsolete. It becomes clear that the Internet had a high interpretative 
flexibility because digitalization affected all aspects of life, which led to a profound 
narrative fidelity.
Timing is an important contextual factor here. Cyber-utopianism could become 
dominant in public discourses because it filled an ideological and narrative void at the end 
of the Cold War by providing a positive vision of the new millennium. At the end of 
history, there was no alternative narrative so utopianism occupied that space, using this 
window of opportunity. An important necessary condition here is the invention of the 
WWW by Tim Berners-Lee, which made the Internet visual and more user-friendly, thus 
creating a large enough user base and thus momentum for mass diffusion of this 
technology (see chap. 4.1.4 Artifact: The World Wide Web (1989-present)). The 
equifinality of causal factors is particularly prominent during the early 1990s (see chap. 3. 
Methodology & Research Design). One should also keep in mind that the audience cyber-
utopian advocates were talking to was rather limited. Only 2-3% of Americans used the 
Internet between 1993 and 1994, but they were the early adopters who picked up utopian 
frames and thus further inspired and educated later adopters. Utopianism was the first 
mainstream narrative for the Internet and drew strength from this early-mover-advantage to 
shape the initial discourse.
Around 1995, new technologies such as SSL encryption enabled electronic 
commerce and the commodification of cyber-space, creating new business models and 
practices diffusing utopianism into the business world. Another necessary condition was 
that cyber-utopianism resonated well with economic ideas of privatization and 
deregulation that were en-vogue at the time, creating the so-called Californian Ideology. 
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Renowned experts, entrepreneurs and Wall Street investors picked up the utopian narrative 
and began to frame cyberspace as the realization of Adam Smith’s ideal market and in 
terms of a completely new economy that operated with a completely different logic 
(diagnostic frame). These advocates speculated about infinite growth and the distribution 
of wealth. This had a widespread appeal, as with many investment bubbles and thus 
increased the number of cyber-utopian advocates and lobbyists in Washington (part 7). 
Again, the internal logic of TCP/IP was extrapolated and assumed to produce external 
effects, a common fallacy of utopianism (see chap. 4.2.9 Critical Analysis & Blind Spots 
of Cyber-Utopianism). But stories of self-made Internet millionaires and the growing 
economy silenced critical voices. Additionally, the prospect for profit was a powerful 
incentive for industry and business to adopt cyber-utopian ideas and also the norm that the 
state should not interfere in this technology. They began promoting a more liberal version 
of this hands-off norm, focusing not on the Internet as an open commons but on private 
ownership. This liberal-utopian agenda was highly influential in policy circles, as the next 
chapter on Al Gore will show, where the cyber-liberal spin-off is analyzed more deeply. 
The argument can be made that all these parts in the causal mechanism are a minimal 
sufficient explanation for the rise of cyber-utopianism with its distinct and case-specific 
counter-cultural flavor.
Talk of the "new economy" became highly influential in public discourses because it 
operated with rosy predictions that were not necessarily grounded in empirical evidence. 
Several scholars observed a tendency for wishful thinking in these discourses (see chap. 
4.2.7 Junctures: Dot-com Bubble (2000-2001)). When the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, 
many of these predictions were proven wrong. This dramatically diminished the 
explanatory power of the cyber-utopian narrative (outcome). More people realized that not 
everyone would become rich and that digital technologies had potential downsides and 
negative implications as well. The blind belief in the positive effects of technology was 
challenged by other instances, such as Internet Sex Panic of 1996 and the Y2K panic that 
are discussed in the following chapter (see chap. 4.4.5 Discourse: Y2K and Critical 
Infrastructure Failure). 
Table 3. Causal Mechanism of Cyber-Utopianism
Context Hierarchized Mainframe 
Computing. 
Cold War.
Part 1 Hierarchized prestructuration of 
computer-use was undesirable for 
the impact constituencies. 
Hierarchized mass bureaucracies 
as antagonism. Turn to the mind 
and self-governed commune-
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Practice of hacking leads to 
creation of like-minded 
communities.
living to change the world.
Part 2 Hackers engage in counter-
signification and reconstitution of 
computing as positive, life-
enhancing technology. Ideas 
spread in computer science 
community.
Counter-culturalists turn to 
(utopian) theories of the mind, 
libertarianism and cybernetics 
and thus develop utopian core 
frames.
Part 3 Homebrew community counter-
appropriates computer & digital 
technology as personal and 
democratic, adds another core 
frame of utopianism. Cyber-
utopian ideas begin to diffuse 
with the PC.
Stewart Brand launches Whole 
Earth Catalog and initiates idea 
and norm exchange between 
hacker and counter culture. The 
Emergence of digital-utopianism.
Part 4 Stewart Brand launches the 
WELL. Practice of using the 
WELL creates new norms (free 
speech, self-governance) and new 
ideas (death of distance, being 
online) and thus stabilizes cyber-
utopianism. Cyberpunk helps to 
diffuse utopian concepts 
(cyberspace) into the mainstream.
Context Diffusion of the World Wide 
Web & end of Cold War.
Part 5 Digital avant-garde engages in 
public sense-making practices, 
framing the new Internet 
technology in terms of the 
WELL. Cyberspace becomes a 
key metaphor for the Internet 
(signification). They advocate the 
norm that the state should not 
interfere with cyberspace.
Part 6 Cyber-utopian ideas and norms 
resonate well with academic, 
public, economic, policy and 
media-discourses of the early 
1990s. Utopian ideas diffuse 
through the mainstream and 
become dominant.
Part 7 Economic actors develop a 
cyber-liberal spin-off of 
utopianism (Californian 
ideology) that influences to the 
dot-com investment boom.
Cyber-utopian ideas resonate 
with Gore administration and 
become politicized.
Outcome Dot-com crash and Y2k 
discourse discredit utopian 
narrative.
In sum, the equifinality of events presented an anomaly for cyber-utopianism that it could 
not explain. Around the same time, cyber-realism became a coherent competing paradigm 
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that was set to become influential with the Bush administration that entered office in 2000. 
Thus, as Legro argues, a competing paradigm was ready to take the place of utopianism 
(Legro, 2000, p. 266). 
Before we turn to that, I want to shed some more light on part 7 of the causal 
mechanism, i.e. the political impact of utopian ideas. To show that cyber-utopian ideas 
were influential within the political sphere is important for evidence for the hypothesis that 
utopian norms and ideas dominated the 1990s.
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4.3 Cyber-Utopian Liberalism and the Politics of Cyberspace (1990-2000)
"I took the initiative in creating the Internet." 
Vice President Albert Gore, CNN Interview 9 March 1999
Although Vice-President Albert "Al" Gore Jr. (1992-2000) clearly did not invent the 
Internet, as the above-quoted live interview mishap on CNN suggests, he and his vision of 
an Information Superhighway played a huge role in shaping early Internet policy. He 
shaped dominant norms and the overall meaning of the technology for a wider audience – 
both domestically and globally. This chapter shifts the focus from the digital natives as 
paradigm-advocates to politics and particularly to the perception of the Internet in the early 
1990s within the White House. Al Gore can be viewed as a (neo-)liberal cyber-utopian 
who, through his policies, framed the Internet in terms of a positive, liberal and economic 
vision. Together with President Bill Clinton, they adopted a market-oriented, hands-off 
norm in government behavior towards the Internet, opting for the primacy of the market 
instead of strict government regulation and control. Gore acted as a norm-entrepreneur, 
framing the meaning of the Internet in terms of global connectivity, economic growth and 
the creation of a peaceful, global community of citizens. Gore and Clinton were key 
advocates promoting positive, liberal and utopian discourse on the Internet, politicizing 
utopian ideas and creating a hybrid or a spin-off paradigm, cyber-liberal utopianism.
The analysis focuses on political documents created by the Clinton and Gore 
administration that deal with the Internet. These include election campaign materials, 
policies, interviews and secondary literature. One argument of the theory chapter is that 
norms of a paradigm not just become embedded in technological artifacts, but also in 
policies. This chapter shows the politicization of cyber-utopianism, which explains why it 
could become dominant. The early 1990s time-frame of analysis logically overlaps with 
the second half of the previous chapter but of course focuses on the political or intra-state 
level of analysis (see chap. 3. Methodology & Research Design). Here, the norm that the 
Internet should be a) democratic and b) not controlled by the state or at least only in 
minimally intrusive way, was conceived. This made the "hands-off" norm more stable. The 
norm that states should not control or censor cyberspace was advocated by Gore, not just 
on a local, but also on a global level and was dominant during the 1990s.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the regulatory background of 
telecommunications policy is introduced (see chap. 4.3.1 Background: The Governance of 
Information Technologies (1970-1990)). This is necessary to understand the policy field. 
After that I introduce the key advocates in this chapter, Al Gore and President Clinton (see 
chap. 4.3.2 Politics: Bill Clinton and Albert Gore as Internet Advocates (1992-2000)). 
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They picked up utopian ideas and fused them into politics, which will be discussed in the 
chapter on the idea of the Information Superhighway, the central policy agenda (see chap. 
4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway (1993)). This agenda 
established utopian ideas and norms as politics and at the same time defined the 
appropriate role of the state vis-à-vis the Internet at arms-length, which represents the key 
norm of cyber-utopianism (see chap. 4.3.3.1 The Hands-off Norm & the American Internet 
Governance Model). Then I will explain how Gore framed it as inappropriate for states to 
control or regulate cyberspace on a global scale (see chap. 4.3.3.2 Global Framing of the 
Internet). These ideas had a concrete material impact, namely the privatization of the 
physical Internet infrastructure in the US, giving control over switches and fiber optics to 
the market (see chap. 4.3.4 Artifacts: Privatizing Control over the Internet). This is 
necessary to understand what hands-off actually means. This was not the final outcome of 
the process. Cyber liberal-utopianism was not completely stable or even hegemonic. The 
final chapters introduce a series of junctures, understood as points of contestation where 
different visions of the Internet clashed, particularly how the cyber-realism of the 
intelligence community with the utopianism of digital natives and partly the 
administration. The encryption debate (see chap. 4.3.5.1 Policy: The Clipper Chip (1993)), 
Internet-surveillance (see chap. 4.3.5.2 Policy: Wiretapping the Internet with CALEA 
(1994)) and censorship episode (see chap. 4.3.5.3 Policy: Internet Censorship with the 
Communications Decency Act (1996)) represent different realist attempts in controlling 
parts of cyberspace. As with every paradigm before, I introduce some blind spots and 
provide a short critique of the paradigm (see chap. 4.3.6 Critical Analysis and Paradigm 
Blind Spots). This is necessary to understand why realism, presented in the next chapter 
(see chap. 4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism) could become 
dominant.
4.3.1 Background: The Governance of Information Technologies (1970-1990)
This chapter provides the background to understand early Internet politics and to 
contextualize the important policy changes that were introduced by the Clinton 
administration.
The initial Internet and telecommunications policy between the 1970s and early 
1990s can be described by a lack thereof. At this time, Internet policy was a nascent 
subsystem that emerged because of the digital revolution. Drake argues that early US 
telecommunications policy was driven by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
and the courts, not by the White House (Drake, 1995a, p. 307). Presidents Reagan and 
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Bush mostly neglected the new electronic media and the only leadership they provided was 
by endorsing deregulation, privatization and competition (Broad, 1992). Both presidencies 
were strong advocates of the laissez-faire or neo-liberal, economic paradigm gaining 
popularity in the 1970s with the Chicago school and 1980s Reagonomics (Niskanen, 
1988). The core norm of this economic paradigm is the idea that the appropriate role of the 
state in economics is a marginal one, maintaining order and security, for example in terms 
of contracts and the protection of property rights (Noam, 1995, pp. 32-33). The state ought 
not to interfere in the market competition, but let the invisible hand of the market govern 
instead. This explains why neither Reagan nor Bush attempted to alter the existing legal 
and regulatory telecommunication framework that has been in place since the 1930s 
(Drake, 1995a, p. 307) in order to make it more compatible with the growing convergence 
of computing and telecommunications industries that began in the late 1970s (Baran & 
Farber, 1977). The 1934 Communications Act, the dominant regulatory framework, only 
provided weak regulatory oversight, so that telephone provider AT&T could build and own 
80% of all telephone and access lines in the US and as such hold a monopoly over the 
Internet infrastructure. In contrast to other Western countries, the dominant 
telecommunication carrier was not state-owned, but a private business. This monopoly 
worked sufficiently in the 1950s and 1960s, so the government did not interfere. 
With the dawn of computer networks in the early 1970s, demand for long-distance 
data transmission over the telephone network and consequently corporate advocacy for the 
liberalization of telecommunications grew (Drake, 1995c, p. 15). Smaller companies 
wanted to transport computer data (value-added services) over the AT&T-owned telephone 
network without paying the costly long-distance fees (early ARPANET used leased AT&T 
copper lines). In theoretical terms this can be described as a demand-push. In 1969, the 
FCC, the independent agency regulating interstate radio, TV, wire, satellite and cable 
communications ruled that AT&T had to open their network for other carriers, which the 
company only reluctantly did. In 1974, the Department of Justice started an antitrust 
lawsuit against AT&T, because of unfair business practices directed against smaller 
telecommunications and packet-switching providers. For example, AT&T prohibited the 
attachment of "foreign devices", such as modems, to their phone network (Ryan, 2013, p. 
66). Without a modem, there could be no access to the Internet. After a lengthy trial, the 
AT&T monopoly was broken up in 1982 and two-thirds of the assets and employees were 
split into Regional Bell Holding Companies. 
According to Milton Mueller, this ruling was a necessary condition in order to enable 
the rapid spread of the Internet in the early 1990s (Mueller, 2010, p. 56). This FCC-ruling 
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is described as the "most massive reorganization in business history" (Noam, 1995, pp. 33-
36). Voice and value-added services were separated and this increased competition. 
Hundreds of new smaller data-service providers formed and began to offer cheaper rates 
for data-transmission, resulting in the "most dynamic, heterogeneous, multivendor, and 
user-driven communications and information industries in the world" (Drake, 1995b, p. 
15). Instead of one monopoly controlling the entire infrastructure and fixing prices and 
proper use, the FCC opted for a decentralized governance model very much in line with 
the Internet’s own norm of decentralization. This is sometimes called the US Internet 
Model. The AT&T episode highlights the general political hands-off and laissez-faire 
approach that guided much of early Internet policy. There was a complete lack of a 
coherent policy-vision and the Internet was understood in terms of the telephone and the 
regulatory framework of the FCC. This represents a mild form of pre-structuration in the 
policy field, but it can be argued that telecommunications and Internet politics, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, represented a nascent subsystem without much political debate and 
contestation. This made it potentially open for new actors, ideas and paradigms.
4.3.2 Politics: Bill Clinton and Albert Gore as Internet Advocates (1992-2000)
In contrast to the Reagan and Bush administration, the Clinton election campaign in 1992 
began to formulate a coherent vision, narrative and policy for a global, interconnected 
network of networks, containing video, audio and telecommunications systems. This vision 
systematically framed information technology in terms of economic growth, job creation, 
social equality and education. This has to do with two causal factors.
First, the economic focus of the Clinton ticket had to do with the small recession 
between 1990 and 1991, which led to an increase of unemployment (Gardner, 1994). The 
early Clinton presidential campaign chose to focus on economic topics, as its famous 
campaign slogan "It’s the economy, stupid!" indicated (Bennett, 2013, p. 123). With this 
slogan, Clinton was able to successfully differentiate himself from the general foreign-
policy focus of President Herbert Walker Bush, who was running for a second term. This 
economic focus in times of growing unemployment, together with the ill-conceived 
campaign of President H.W. Bush, plagued by accidents and mishaps, is a key explanation 
for him winning the presidency in 1992 (Bennett, 2013, pp. 152-159). 
The second factor was the personal advocacy by the Vice President. Albert Gore Jr., 
is described by some observers "as a bit of a nerd" leaning towards scientific and 
technological topics such as climate change or telecommunications (McCullough, 2014b). 
Internet pioneers called him "the first elected official to grasp the potential of computer 
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communications to have a broader impact than just improving the conduct of science and 
scholarship […]" (Cerf & Kahn, 2000). This technological literacy explains Gore’s early 
involvement in the history of the Internet at a time where most people did not even own a 
PC (see appendix. Quantifying the Internet and the Digital Revolution). Since the late 
1970s, Gore began to popularize the metaphors "information superhighway" or "data 
highways" which will be analyzed in the next chapter (see chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia 
on the Information Superhighway (1993)). Gore’s name is connected to several policy bills 
that played a major role in the development and diffusion of the early Internet. As 
chairman of a congressional science subcommittee, Gore was involved in legislation called 
the Supercomputer Network Study Act of 1986 that although it never became a law, 
inspired the creation of five inter-networked supercomputer centers within the context of 
the National Science Foundation (Wiggins, 2000). This super-computer network was the 
aforementioned NSFNET, which became the technological backbone of the Internet 
infrastructure in late 1988 (Kahn, 1995, pp. 17-18) (see chap. 4.1.3.3 The Internet 
Backbone). In 1988, then-senator Gore began to formulate the goal of National Research 
network, supported by ARPANET inventor Leonard Kleinrock (National Research 
Council, 1988). This eventually led to the High Performance Computing and 
Communication Act of 1991, or the "Gore Bill", spending $2.9 billion federal dollar over 
five years on super computer research (Broad, 1992). Money from this bill allowed the 
rapid expansion of NSFNET, interconnecting NASA, the Department of Energy, NSF and 
ARPANET with high-speed 1.5-Mbps lines (Ryan, 2013, p. 94). It also provided the salary 
for many early Internet developers, among them later Netscape-founder Marc Andreessen, 
who created Mosaic, the first graphical browser (see chap. 4.1.4 Artifact: The World Wide 
Web (1989-present)). Theoretically, the Gore Bill is inspired by many ideas of the 
engineering paradigm. In sum, Al Gore was an early advocate of the Internet as envisioned 
by the engineers of ARPANET, nicely described by Vint Cerf and Robert Kahn as the 
follows:
"When the Internet was still in the early stages of its deployment, Congressman 
Gore provided intellectual leadership by helping create the vision of the potential 
benefits of high speed computing and communication" (Cerf & Kahn, 2000).
As the inventors of TCP/IP highlight, Gore’s role was an intellectual one: he provided an 
optimist future vision, a narrative of what the Internet could become and therefore shaped 
the meaning of this technology and the appropriate norms for government and private 
corporations therein. It could be argued that Gore was one of the few politicians who 
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understood what the Internet, as its inventors Cerf, Kahn and Berners-Lee conceived it, 
really was about. The social norms and political goals Gore formulated were an 
aggregation of the different norms of the engineers and cyber-utopians, mixed with 
market-liberal ideas. In sum, the governmental change from Bush to Clinton was a 
necessary condition for the emergence of cyber-utopian thought in the political sphere. 
Because Gore had a personal interest and literacy in the topic, utopian ideas were able to 
spill into the political discourse. The analysis of this intellectual contribution or in 
theoretical terms, the underlying paradigm, is part of the next chapter.
4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway (1993)
This and the next sub-chapters will analyze the major policy documents and statements 
produced by the Clinton/Gore administration. It will analyze problem definitions, solution 
strategies, political goals and general reoccurring themes and frames describing the 
Internet (its design, characteristics, functions but also its envisioned positive and negative 
effects) as well as general metaphors used for understanding the technology. To do so, I 
will focus on the technological agenda called the National Information Infrastructure 
Agenda (NII) (Clinton & Gore, 1993). The Information Superhighway was officially 
defined in a document by the Information Infrastructure Task Force that was created by 
Gore only 28 days after entering office (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993). This 
task force, chaired by Gore and Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown, included a huge 
variety of private and public actors, while the military was notably absent (Cate, 1994). 
The agenda is a piece of smoking-gun evidence for the existence of both cyber-utopian but 
also neo-liberal ideas within the Clinton/Gore administration that created an interesting 
hybrid, a liberal spin-off from cyber-utopianism. To complement the analysis, I draw on 
other policy documents of the time as well (see appendix Information Superhighway 
Corpus).
First, what strikes the observer, especially compared with the cyber-realist paradigm 
is the lack of problem-definitions driving the agenda (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem 
Definitions of Cyber-Realism). The only problems that are very briefly mentioned are the 
struggling economy,83 depicted in goals such as "to revitalize our economy" (Clinton & 
Gore, 1993, p. 2), the international competition and environmental challenges: 
83 Out of all documents analyzed, only in two of them are these problems defined. They play a marginal role 
and are not even defined as problems but rather challenges. This is probably due to the fact the recession was 
a little bit exaggerated in the Clinton campaign to attack President Bush. The economic downturn was mostly 
over when Clinton entered office (Gardner, 1994).
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"We face new challenges, from our competitors around the world and from the 
people we serve here at home, that demand new solutions and creative thinking. 
Technology offers new opportunities for jobs, for a cleaner environment for better 
schools, for high-quality health care and for scores of other advances. We must 
move to seize these opportunities" (Clinton & Gore, 1993).
This quote presents both the general diagnostic frame (challenge for the economy) and 
motivational frame (seize these opportunities). These statements are accompanied by the 
need for new thinking. It is argued that defense-dominated technology policy with its 
"trickling down" of goods to the private sector worked during the Cold War, but that the 
government now should play a greater role and engage in more private-public partnerships 
to create more civilian and dual-use R&D (Clinton & Gore, 1993, pp. 7-8). The vision of 
technology included the primacy of civil-societies’ interests vis-à-vis military interests 
(Clinton-Gore Campaign Headquarters, 1992). For example, Clinton and Gore pledged to 
invest $30 billion, the same amount as Reagan’s SDI-initiative, in civil robotics, fiber-optic 
communications and national computer networks (Broad, 1992).84 Clinton developed its 
economic agenda "much in the same way we developed a national security strategy", 
ushering in a paradigm-shift in technology policy (Broad, 1992). As a result, Clinton 
created the National Economic Council as an equal to the National Security Council, 
further underscoring the primacy of the civilian sector vis-à-vis the military.85 This civilian 
primacy explains why the Internet was not predominantly understood as being a military 
technology as in cyber-realism.
What becomes clear is that solutions and goals were not formulated by deriving them 
from a problem, but they were presented on their own terms. It seems like the new 
information technology policy was adopted because the key advocate, Gore, wanted to 
adopt it on its own terms because he genuinely believed in the positive effects and because 
he wanted to seize the opportunity for third-order policy change (see chap. 2.2.3 Degrees 
of Change). The central element here is the so-called "information superhighway" 
metaphor which has been coined by Al Gore in the late 1970s. For example in 1989, Gore 
argued: 
"High-capacity fiber optic networks will be the information superhighways of 
tomorrow. A national network with associated supercomputers and data bases will 
link academic researchers and industry in a national collaboratory. This information 
84 After the Cold War, defense and intelligence budgets were "cut by $60 billion and total acquisition by 
$100 billion" (Shorrock, 2009, p. chap. 3).
85 Clinton’s relationship to the military and intelligence community can be described as ambiguous because 
he did not serve in Vietnam and was an anti-war activist. The reduced military spending made matters worse. 
The relationship with the CIA was also not optimal (Shorrock, 2009, p. chap. 3).
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infrastructure will cluster research centers and businesses around network 
interchanges […]" (Gore, 1989).
According to Hülsse, metaphors serve the function to explain something new by 
referencing something old and by projecting the "known to the unknown, metaphors create 
reality. They constitute the objects they signify" (Hülsse, 2006, p. 403). This metaphor was 
a clear reference to Gore's father, Albert Gore Senior, one of the prime congressional 
architects of the US Interstate Highway System in the 1950s, modeled after the German 
Autobahn. The information superhighway metaphor framed digital networks of networks 
in terms of the motor-highway system of the 1950s that connected large parts of the US. 
Data-packets resembled cars, different transport lines such as fiber-optic or copper cable 
resembled different types of roads connecting cities – initially super computer research 
sites but later even smaller local area networks. "Speed bumps, danger signs, traffic jams, 
road kill, and so on – to frame issues involved" (Drake, 1995b, p. 4) all have their digital 
equivalent such as network congestion or packet-loss. Take for example the Time 
Magazine cover of 12 April 1993:
Figure 21. Time Magazine Information Superhighway, Source: (TIME Magazine, 
1993)
The highway metaphor is interesting not just because of its assumed technical similarity 
between two vastly different technologies (road-networks and packet-switching networks)
86 but also because it assumes similar modes of governance and societal impacts. 
86 Indeed, academics contested the highway metaphor as misleading. For example the interstate-highway 
system was built and owned by the state, whereas the Internet was build and managed by private entities. The 
notion of overtaking is not relevant in digital networks and all packets have the same size and speed, meaning 
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The main envisioned effect was that the information highway "could do for the 
productivity of individuals at their places of work and learning what the interstate highway 
of the 1950’s did for the productivity of the nation’s travel and distribution system" 
(Broad, 1992). The highway is not an end in itself but adopted because of its assumed 
positive economic impact. As such, the highway metaphor is a powerful technological 
frame of the underlying paradigm that is driving Clinton’s and Gore technology policy. It 
provided a broader vision of the early Internet and made it tangible for a wider social 
audience besides technology experts. The media and private sector quickly jumped the 
hype-bandwagon, outlining "rosy predictions of increased access to information, 
improvement of education and health care, and a diversity in home entertainment that 
would all come from the promised "500 channels" of information" (Besser, 1995). 
The Information Superhighway quickly became a widely used the buzzword between 
1992 and roughly 2002 (see chap. 4.2.7 Junctures: Dot-com Bubble (2000-2001)). This 
technological frame became so powerful that some present-day politicians still refer to the 
Internet in terms of the "Datenautobahn" (DPA, 2013). It became a dominant meaning 
within the political discourse at a time where most people did not even know what it was. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyze the policy and discourse surrounding it in more 
detail. 
 What must be stressed though is that the Information Superhighway itself is more 
than packet-switching networks and the Internet. It has an "expansive meaning" 
predominantly understood as a National Information Infrastructure (NII) (Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 5). This information infrastructure consists of:
"A wide range and ever-expanding range of equipment including cameras, 
scanners, keyboards, telephones, fax machines, computers, switches, compact 
disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, optical fiber transmission lines, 
microwave nets, switches, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more" 
(Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 5).
Although the idea of a national information infrastructure (the sum of all information 
technologies) is largely based on the design of the Internet (at this time represented 
through the inter-connected super-computer networks such as NFSNET), but it is not 
completely equivalent to it. At the same time it is modeled very much after the 
decentralized Internet-architecture and the dominant understanding of the network of 
networks that developed in the 1970s within the context of the engineering paradigm (see 
there are no cars or trucks. Also, it is not one single, integrated system with one logic or set of rules, but 
rather a distributed network of heterogeneous networks (Drake, 1995b, p. 4).
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chap. 4.1.3 Constructing the Internet (1972-1991)).87 Gore himself often conflates the 
terms, for example when describing the NII for children in the kids-section of a popular 
newspaper: "The Information Superhighway is a web of communications networks that 
will forever change the way we live, learn, work and communicate with each other" 
(Debnam, 1994).
The "promises of the NII" clearly dominate the Taskforce document. This highlights 
the general optimist and even utopian perspective on the topic, including a series of 
prognostic frames. The most often uttered promise is economic, namely the creation of 
jobs and greater economic growth. The following quote is a good representation because it 
includes other several key codes such as the positive, life-changing affects and the 
common features ascribed to the Internet, the death-of-distance concept (see chap. 4.2.8 
Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism):
"The NII will enable U.S. firms to compete and win in the global economy, 
generating good jobs for the American people and economic growth for the nation. 
As importantly, the NII promises to transform the lives of the American people. It 
can ameliorate the constraints of geography and economic status, and give all 
Americans a fair opportunity to go as far as their talents and ambitions will take 
them." (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 12).
The belief that technology will create new and better jobs and will increase economic 
growth is central in these documents and one of the core ideas of liberalism. It highlights 
the Clintonian civil-economic frame through which digital technologies are perceived. In 
contrast, the cyber-realist advocacy coalition that forms around the same time in secrecy 
(see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)) sees 
technology mainly through a military lens. It could be argued that neoliberalism meets 
cyber-utopianism, forming a spin-off, which Manjikian calls utopian cyber-liberalism 
(McEvoy Manjikian, 2010). This positive belief is closely connected to concepts of the 
information society or the theories of the information age envisioned by futurologists like 
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, whose 1980s aforementioned concept of the third-wave (Lewis, 
1980) is quite often referred to in political discourse in the 1990s, thanks to their close 
affiliation to then-Republican leader of the House Newt Gingrich (Murphy, 2012). 
But there is more optimism, for example the assumed positive benefits on education 
and health care. This is because of the border-spanning and geography-transcending 
characteristics assigned to the new networking technology: 
87 Gore states "Currently, the information superhighway exists through programs such as the Internet, a 
massive network of computers that connects an estimated 20 million computer users worldwide" (Debnam, 
1994).
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"The best schools, teachers, and courses were available to all students, without 
regard to geography, distance, resources, or disability […] The vast resources of 
art, literature, and science were available everywhere, not just in large institutions 
or big city libraries and museums […] Services that improve America’s health care 
system and respond to other important social needs were available online, without 
waiting in line, when and where you needed them" (Information Infrastructure Task 
Force, 1993, p. 5).
What is described here is the general utopian vision of an empowering Internet technology. 
In cyberspace, physical disabilities, gender, class and physical distance are said to be 
irrelevant and all that matters is information. It is believed to magically empower the 
disadvantaged, exemplified by Gore by referring to famous physicist Stephen Hawking, 
who suffers ALS and can only participate in the scientific community with the help of 
digital technology (Gore, 1994a). This is quite similar to the utopian disembodiment thesis. 
The NII is also said to have democratizing and empowering effects, allowing all to 
participate and allowing all to access, thereby almost magically creating equality. The 
other utopian frame that is uttered here is that of the global library and the diffusion of 
knowledge and information. Al Gore, by referring to his origin from a small, remote town 
of Carthage, repeatedly stressed that every child, regardless of income and geography, 
should be able to plug digitally into the library of congress to retrieve knowledge (Gore, 
1994a). In sum, the Internet being an information exchange system is said to have positive 
effects on education in the future. Focusing on positive effects creates a powerful vision 
and narrative.
"The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that all Americans – rich and poor, urban and 
rural – have access to the benefits of the NII. That’s why President Clinton and I 
are committed to connecting every classroom, hospital, library and clinic to the NII 
by the year 2000 so that no one gets left behind on the information superhighway" 
(Debnam, 1994).
What is indicated in this often-repeated argument is the central social democratic norm of 
equal access to the NII and thus, equal chances. Universal access is quite similar to the 
idea of openness of the engineering paradigm. This norm of digital equality is uttered 
repeatedly in sentences like: "As a matter of fundamental fairness, this nation cannot 
accept a division of our people among telecommunications or information 'haves’ and 
'have-nots.’" (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 8). Again, the Internet is 
seen as a tool for social equality and justice. At the same time, Gore provides a future 
vision connected to a somewhat mystical date – the year 2000, the new millennium. 
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It was shown that the Information Superhighway agenda included generally positive 
ideas, but also some normative commitments. The next chapter introduces the central 
norms of the proposal. It presents the "hands-off" norm that regularizes the government’s 
position vis-à-vis cyberspace.
4.3.3.1 The Hands-off Norm & the American Internet Governance Model
Now that we have covered the ideas and promises of the Information Superhighway, what 
were the core objectives and goals of this NII policy agenda? These goals tell us something 
about promoted norms as well as modes of governance of this new system – the primacy of 
the private sector and the "hands-off" approach of the government. The goals are:
"Our plan is based on five principles: First, encourage private investment; Second, 
promote competition; Third, create a flexible regulatory framework that can keep 
pace with rapid technological and market changes; Fourth, provide open access to 
the network for all information providers; and Fifth, ensure universal service" 
(Gore, 1994b).
The primary goal is to foster private sector investment, together with the promotion of 
competition instead of monopolies. These are central neo-liberal concepts. The focus on 
private sector investment underscores the dominance of economic and liberal thinking. The 
idea here is that the government, through taxes and regulatory policy, can encourage long-
term development. The US government acknowledges early on that it will not and cannot 
build the NII and therefore repeatedly declares a primacy of the private sector in terms of 
construction and management of the infrastructure (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 
1993, pp. 2-3). Although the government will provide some funding, for example for 
super-computer research, most of the investment comes from private enterprises. Closely 
connected is the idea to prevent future monopolies in this young telecommunications field. 
The split-up of AT&T echoes here. 
Other central goals are the norms of universal service and open access. Both are 
quite similar and "virtually all administration speeches and testimony concerning the NII 
have repeated these goals", creating a noteworthy consistency of "diverse policymakers 
singing with one voice", as Cate argues (Cate, 1994). Universal service refers to the norm 
of equality, that as many people as possible should have access to the technology.88 This 
means that it requires affordable prices and a widespread distribution of the system, even 
88 "Although the details of universal service will vary from country to country and from service to service, 
several aspects of universal service apply everywhere. Access clearly includes making service available at 
affordable prices to persons at all income levels. It also includes making high quality service available 
regardless of geographic location or other restrictions such as disability" (Gore, 1994b).
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in remote, rural areas. Open access on the other hand refers to the norm of openness or net 
neutrality promoted by the ARPANET engineers. It states that the infrastructure is open in 
a way "that users can develop new services and applications or exchange information 
among themselves, without waiting for services to be offered by the firms that operate the 
NII" (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 9). It means that the private firms 
operating the technology should not be able to dictate the services and applications offered 
therein. As such it reaffirms the idea of distributed or decentralized control and user- or 
end-to-end driven innovation. According to Gore, "we must have an information-
superhighway network that is as accessible and as open and as democratic and as 
ubiquitous as the telephone network" (Auletta, 1994). 
Taken together, these goals and norms lead to a specific formulation of the 
appropriate role of government in this process of building and maintaining the NII. The 
question what role the government should play within this infrastructure, represents a 
sense-making and place-finding process, where different actors tried to find an appropriate 
position in a new technological environment (or policy subsystem) and a period of 
industrial reorganization (Drake, 1995c). Private firms feared government regulation and 
control of the system. For example, AT&T CEO Robert Allen accused Gore of proposing 
that the government will build this infrastructure and lobbied for minimum government 
involvement (McKnight & Neumann, 1995, p. 138). Part of the confusion seemed to stem 
from the very highway metaphor, since the original highway system was indeed build be 
the government (Sugrue, 1994). On the other hand, small firms and (utopian) Internet users 
feared a radical commercialization and state encroachment on "their" cyberspace (see chap. 
4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)), in which giant corporations 
could suppress user innovation and expression, for example by dismantling net-neutrality, 
open-access and the idea of decentralized, distributed control (Drake, 1995c, pp. 17-19). 
This debate forced Gore to repeatedly articulate the role of the state in several interviews. 
The core features of his argumentation are the following.
First, Gore repeatedly stressed the primacy of the private sector and corporations and 
companies in building and controlling the infrastructure, already spending more than $50 
billion annually with which the government cannot compete anyway (Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 6). "The private sector will build and run virtually all of 
the National Information Infrastructure, the President and the Vice President have stated 
clearly that the Federal government has a key leadership role to play in its development" 
(Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 19). This is an important deviation from 
classical utopianism, which sees the primacy for controlling the Internet with the digital 
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natives (see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)). With this 
more liberal interpretation of utopianism, economic actors are framed as the dominant 
ones. It is argued that it is appropriate for them to control the physical cyber-space 
infrastructure and the digital services therein. According to Gore, the state should only 
provide a "sense of direction" a a vision: "one role government can play is to articulate 
vision, to put certain issues and goals on the public agenda" (Sugrue, 1994). The NII 
agenda defines the government as a "catalyst to promote technological innovation and new 
applications" (Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 6). Other terms describing 
this approach are "neutral" (Sugrue, 1994), not favoring one actor over the other but 
maintaining principles of fair competition and the prevention of monopolies. In other 
words, it is not the government that decides what is built by whom, but rather it formulates 
a broader vision and gives the private sector a relatively free hand. What is quite 
interesting is that "much of the leadership on NII-related issues comes from the 
Department of Commerce" (Cate, 1994, p. 47) and the NII-Task Force and not for example 
the FCC or the military. However, this is not the radical laissez-faire approach of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush, but represents something that Gore and others call "flexible 
regulation". Journalist Ken Auletta describes it as:
"The Clinton-Gore Administration wants government to assert a role. "We want to 
serve the public interest with a minimalist approach to regulation," Gore said, but 
his definition of government’s role proved not to be minimalist. Asked to describe 
government’s mission, he answered, "Referee. Facilitator. Envisioner. Definer." 
Under Reagan and Bush, he said, government was a mere spectator" (Auletta, 
1994).
Flexible or minimal regulation is described as: "to devise investment incentives, to ensure 
affordable universal service, to keep the highway democratic, and to protect both privacy 
and intellectual-property rights" (Auletta, 1994). It is a more proactive approach. Gore and 
other democrats criticized the inability of the old Reagan laissez-faire approach to foster 
civil development and to create benefits for more actors than just large corporations.89 For 
example, in a speech Gore argues: "We need this limitation to ensure that no single giant 
entity controls access to homes and offices. We cannot permit the creation of information 
bottlenecks that adversely affect information providers who use the highways as a means 
of supplying their customers" (Gore, 1994a). Here we see the interconnection of different 
89 "All these guys who say government has no role in this–if their philosophy had prevailed when A.T. & T. 
was broken up, A.T. & T. would not have been broken up. And this competitive explosion would never have 
taken place. And we would not dominate the fastest-growing market in the world today." Government’s 
challenge, Gore said, is to "steer the enterprise away from the shoals" of both monopolistic business practices 
and bureaucratic government" (Auletta, 1994).
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norms forming a norm-network (see chap. 2.1.2 Critique of Deontological Norms). The 
government makes sure that its core norms of equal and universal access, the norm of 
openness and the benefits for education are indeed realized, that competition is maintained 
and monopolies are prevented, but does not attempt to do more. This is closely connected 
to the "no one should be left behind" norm of social justice but also to the ARPANET 
norm of decentralization of authority.
Without going into more details of telecommunications regulation, it can be said that 
Clinton and Gore promoted a "hands-off" approach in government behavior towards digital 
technologies. In theoretical terms, this policy provides an important counter-signifier, the 
information superhighway, and counter-appropriates its use and governance of the Internet 
(see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). The policy proposal includes ideas and 
norms conceived within the engineering paradigm, general cyber-utopian but also new 
neo-liberal ideas. It is not the full-scale neo-liberalism favoring the market over regulation, 
as proposed by Reagan and Bush, but adds a slightly more assertive role for the 
government. At the same time, it is not full-fledged utopianism as proposed by the early 
adopters. It should have become clear right now that during these early days, the 
government did not claim any right to interfere with the development of this infrastructure 
nor does it claim a right to tap into this infrastructure. This represents the basic model of 
early US Internet-governance which was developed between 1992 and 1995. Because the 
Democrats held both Houses in Congress, they were able to push through with this agenda. 
However, in the mid 1990s the topics shifted somewhat from building this infrastructure to 
the questions of securing this infrastructure, which will be the topic of a later chapter (see 
chap. 4.4.4 Politics: Turn to Realism - Critical Infrastructure Initiative (1996-1999)). The 
next chapter will introduce Gore’s framing of the Internet in democratic terms, arguing that 
no state alone should control this technology.
4.3.3.2 Global Framing of the Internet
Now that the central promises and goals have been covered, let’s turn to the perception and 
description of this technology. What meaning an actor has of an object can best be shown 
when he/she is describing this very object to an audience, that is unfamiliar with it. In 
Buenos Aires 1994, Gore presented the NII initiative at the World Telecommunication 
Development Conference held by the International Telecommunications Union, the 
governing international body for the harmonization and governance of telecommunication. 
This conference was the (successful) attempt to inspire the development of NII in other 
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states – in the image of the US Internet model – and interconnecting them in a Global 
Information Infrastructure (GII).
In his speech, Gore starts by referring to common utopian frame, namely that of the 
interconnected global-village or even McLuhan’s concept of a global nerve system "of 
communications around the globe, linking all human knowledge" (Gore, 1994b). These 
utopian metaphors are used to describe the early Internet and the promises of global 
interconnectivity. It is important to highlight that the concept of globalization was a central 
theme in political academic debates of the early 1990s.
"These highways or, more accurately, networks of distributed intelligence–will 
allow us to share information, to connect, and to communicate as a global 
community. From these connections we will derive robust and sustainable 
economic progress, strong democracies, better solutions to global and local 
environmental challenges, improved health care, and – ultimately – a greater sense 
of shared stewardship of our small planet. The Global Information Infrastructure 
will help educate our children and allow us to exchange ideas within a community 
and among nations. It will be a means by which families and friends will transcend 
the barriers of time and distance. It will make possible a global information 
marketplace, where consumers can buy or sell products" (Gore, 1994b).
Several of the aforementioned norms and ideas are woven together into one narrative. The 
first thing to note is the description of networks of distributed intelligence, which is a 
technological frame developed by the ARPANET engineers. That Gore uses this (accurate) 
description is noteworthy and highlights his familiarity with the original concepts of the 
Internet. One explanation is that ARPANET engineers such as Leonard Kleinrock or Vint 
Cerf served as advisors for Gore. Interconnectivity and increased connections between 
nations are described as positive. They are said to produce better economies, stronger 
democracies and solutions to global (climate) challenges. Other utopian ideas such as the 
transcendence of time and the death-of-distance, together with social, economical, 
political, ecological and educational benefits are clearly articulated and function as 
prognostic frames. The general optimist undertone is quite striking in this quote, but there 
is more:
"In a sense, the GII will be a metaphor for democracy itself. Representative 
democracy does not work with an all-powerful central government, arrogating all 
decisions to itself. That is why communism collapsed. Instead, representative 
democracy relies on the assumption that the best way for a nation to make its 
political decisions is for each citizen – the human equivalent of the self-contained 
processor – to have the power to control his or her own life. To do that, people 
must have available the information they need. And be allowed to express their 
conclusions in free speech and in votes that are combined with those of millions of 
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others. That’s what guides the system as a whole. The GII will not only be a 
metaphor for a functioning democracy, it will in fact promote the functioning of 
democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens in decision-making. 
[…] I see a new Athenian Age of democracy forged in the fora the GII will create" 
(Gore, 1994b).
Now, this lengthy quote is quite remarkable and worthwhile to be analyzed more deeply. 
First he says that the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is a metaphor for democracy 
itself. He seems to say that networks of distributed intelligence are essentially democratic 
because there is no "all-powerful central government". Power and intelligence rests with 
the end-nodes, the users or citizens of the network. This clearly refers to the norm of 
decentralization put forward by ARPANET engineers (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet 
Protocols and Norms), but goes beyond it, since the latter would not go so far as describing 
their system as inherently democratic (Crocker, 2015). Gore assumes an inherent 
connection between the Internet and democracy (diagnostic framing). The belief that the 
Internet will lead to greater democratization both within Western democracies as well as 
outside of them in autocratic regimes, is central in this speech. Domestically it is argued 
that the Internet will lead to greater government transparency and accountability. 
Government services could be offered digitally and government information could be more 
easily disseminated, resulting in a cheaper, better, more efficient and transparent 
government (Clinton & Gore, 1993, p. 20; Information Infrastructure Task Force, 1993, p. 
11).90
He then states that communism collapsed because of power-centralization and 
technology. The positive role of technology (fax machines, photocopiers) in the collapse of 
communism and the promotion of democracy is a common diagnostic frame at the time 
(Kedzie, 1997). It can be traced back to the so-called "dictator’s dilemma" that was 
formulated by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, on a trip to Moscow in 1985 
(Shultz, 1985). The assumption is that information technology allows the dispersion of 
government-critique and the organization of protest movements such as Solidarność. When 
authoritarian regimes try to control these technologies, they will hurt their economies and 
fall behind economically. If autocracies allow information technologies to maintain 
economic development, their power-structure is said to erode because they lose control 
90 To make this argument more substantial, the White House launched its official website on 21. October 
1994. Besides videos of Socks, Bill Clinton’s cat, users could tour the White House electronically as well as 
access government documents and speeches by the president (McCullough, 2014b). This website started the 
practice that citizens can access government information on their websites, which is a taken-for-granted norm 
in modern Western societies that is mostly realized by technological means. "As of February 10, 1994, the 
Administration had published electronically more than 1600 documents and had processed more than 
220,000 electronic requests for information since September 1, 1993" (Cate, 1994, p. 45). Also in 1994, Bill 
Clinton sent the first Email to Prime Minister Carl Bildt of Sweden (Clinton, 1994).
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over information circulating their territory, which then allows the formation of 
oppositional forces. 
The dictator's dilemma could be interpreted as an identity construction with the "we", 
the democratic non-internet-controlling Western governments and the "other", the 
authoritarian regimes who control the Internet and the information space. In other words, 
information technologies are framed as tools that decentralize power structures and control 
and thus are inherently destructive for authoritarian regimes. This is a further affirmation 
of the idea that democratic governments should keep their hands off these technologies. 
When screening more contemporary documents of the time, these utopian frames are quite 
prevalent.91 Gore basically argues that the GII and the Internet are positive forces for 
global development. In other words, not just some LSD-taking cyber-utopians believed in 
the democratizing effects of technology, but it was a widespread belief shared in political 
and intellectual circles.92 
Turning back to Gore, he further argues in his 1994 speech that information freely 
distributed over a communications network empowers citizens and lies at the core of 
democracy as well as the Internet. This is what he seems to say when he equates the GII 
and the Internet with "democracy itself" (Gore, 1994b). Both are similar entities that rely 
on the same norms: information should float/circulate among citizens freely and 
uncensored, freedom of expression is to be guaranteed and power should be distributed. He 
refers to the Athenian democracy, which seems to imply a highly distributed political 
power structure such as in the direct democracies in Greece in the classical antiquity. The 
belief that technology is positively tied to democracy lies at the core of both cyber-
utopianism and its liberal variant advocated by Gore and Clinton (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms 
and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism).
This perception of the Internet as democratic shapes the perceived appropriate roles 
of states. He does not just say that the Internet is based on democratic norms; he also 
argues that the Internet should be governed in the same manner. The belief in the 
democratizing effects of the Internet technology leads to the formulation of a core norm of 
cyber-liberal utopianism: The Internet should be a grassroots democracy. No single 
91 In his RAND article, Kedzie traces the evolution of the "information-technology correlates with 
democracy" thesis. He discovered that it was shared by several state leaders during the 1980s, among them 
famous figures such as Mikhael Gorbachev (Kedzie, 1997).
92 Even the highly respected and independent Office for Technology Assessment (OTA), that was dismantled 
in 1995, repeatedly affirmed many of the beliefs uttered by utopians. For example: "The prospects for 
democracy in developing countries are also greater because of technology advances. For example, improved 
networking capabilities, which make it possible to develop specialized, distributed, many-to- many 
applications such as bulletin boards and groupware, can help individuals locate information; identify like-
minded people; deliberate their ideas, organize their activities; and lobby for their points of view" (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1995). This is key evidence for the widespread appeal of utopian thought.
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authority should control it. He stresses that the development of a GII must be a cooperative 
effort and that "It cannot be dictated or built by a single country. It must be a democratic 
effort" (Gore, 1994b). Again, he repeated the idea of decentralization and the distribution 
of authority that is underlying TCP/IP. No single country should dictate (i.e. control) or 
build the system. This is a reaffirmation of the hands-off norm of the American Internet 
Governance Model that was outlined by the Clinton administration domestically with the 
NII initiative. 
Gore also reaffirms the sharing-norm of the ARPANET engineers: "As the GII 
spreads, more and more people realize that information is a treasure that must be shared to 
be valuable. When two people communicate, they each can be enriched – and unlike 
traditional resources, the more you share, the more you have" (Gore, 1994b). The norms 
promoted by Gore are an aggregate of those developed within the context of ARPANET as 
they became embedded in the TCP/IP protocol and cyber-utopian ideas. What Gore does – 
in theoretical terms – is to reaffirm this historic trajectory of the technology as envisioned 
by the engineering paradigm and, at the same time, gives it greater relevance. By lobbying 
for other states to follow the American NII model, he thereby reinforces these norms by 
managing that they diffuse globally along with fiber-optics and the Internet technology. 
Gore acts as a norm-entrepreneur, promoting the American "hands-off" governance norm 
as well as the idea of a democratic Internet in front of a wider audience. This is a global 
bottom-up process of norm-diffusion emerging from the level of the nation state.
The graphic summarizes the key elements of the paradigm and how it frames the 
Internet in utopian and liberal terms (color transition). But it was not all just words and 
rhetoric. The ideas had a real material impact in terms of technological artifacts as well as 
in terms of politics, as the next chapter shows. 
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Figure 22. Cyber-liberal Utopianism framing the Internet (own diagram)
4.3.4 Artifacts: Privatizing Control over the Internet
According to Bennett and Checkel, an analysis of ideational factors "need[s] to show that 
norms prevented actors from doing things they otherwise would have done" (Bennett & 
Checkel, 2014, p. 34). This chapter shows that the "hands-off" norm was not just rhetoric, 
but had material implications.
The material outcome of the cyber-liberal policy was the privatization of the Internet 
backbone, i.e. the technological infrastructure carrying and switching large portions of 
Internet data. As the previous chapters have shown, the Internet’s predecessor ARPANET 
was built and funded by military R&D and thus state-owned and controlled (see chap. 
4.1.2 The Social Construction of the ARPA-Network (1966-1972)). In the 1980s, most of 
the digital infrastructure was transferred to the National Science Foundation, a state-owned 
and funded entity (see chap. 4.1.3.3 The Internet Backbone). In other words, the 
government could exert a great deal of control over this technology and it did, for example 
by regulating acceptable use of ARPANET and NSFNET (National Science Foundation, 
1992). This policy strictly prohibited commercial applications on NSFNET and thus 
prevented economization or commodification of services (National Science Foundation, 
1992). 
The Gore Bill of 1991 (High Performance Computing Act) first outlined the goal to 
privatize NSFNET. Since then the plan was set in motion to replace the one and only 
Internet backbone operated by the NSF with multiple, privately-owned backbones, 
interconnected through Network Access Points (Shah & Kesan, 2007). In other words, 
central switching nodes (so-called Internet Exchange Points or IXP) carrying data were 
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gradually transferred from the state to private corporations like Sprint, MFS, or Ameritech. 
In 1995, NSFNET was decommissioned and in August 1996, NSF transferred sponsorship 
of the last public access points to the private sector (Shah & Kesan, 2007). In 1993, the 
Clinton administration moved the registration of domain names – the Internet addresses of 
websites (.com, .org etc.) – to a company called Network Solutions (Shorrock, 2009, p. 
chap. 3). 
In 1998, the Department of Commerce proposed to hand over control of the global 
Domain Name System (DNS),93 from US authorities to a new and private organization 
called ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, thereby 
transferring an important means to control global cyberspace to a private entity (Hofmann, 
2015). The rationale for this move was:
"A private coordinating process is likely to be more flexible than government and 
to move rapidly enough to meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet 
users. The private process should, as far as possible, reflect the bottom-up 
governance that has characterized development of the Internet to date" (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1998).
In other words, this decision was very much in line with the ARPANET community's 
approach to Internet governance. The very same spirit can be found in the founding 
statement of ICANN: The Internet "shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community 
as a whole" (Ryan, 2013, pp. 101-103). ICANN and similar multi-stakeholder models 
institutionalized, to some degree, the hands-off norm in a governance model and the idea 
that no single authority should control the Internet. If the US government wanted to control 
cyberspace, it would not have privatized it since prior to this, the government, through the 
NSF had formal stewardship over the technology. This shows the working of the "hands-
off" norm.
In retrospect, history proved Gore right. The ITU conference in 1994, leading to the 
Buenos Aires declaration (International Telecommunications Union, 1994), was a key 
milestone in the global diffusion of both the Internet and the central democratic norms. 
Instead of several, disconnected and incompatible local or national information 
infrastructures relying on different technologies (a balkanized Internet), one of the 
outcomes was the global and open Internet that we have today. Many states, especially 
93 Domain names are crucial for the use of the Internet, because they translate abstract numeric IP addresses 
into comprehensible names. Since there can be only one domain name called www.whitehouse.gov, it is of 
crucial importance who assigns these domains to public or private actors. According to Goldsmith and Wu, 
the DNS system is of great economic importance, since domains are valuable, but also they are a crucial 
means of political control over the Internet (Goldsmith & Wu, 2008, pp. 31-32). Those who control the root 
authority of the DNS system could for example prevent a political antagonist or another country from 
obtaining a domain name, and as such preventing a website to be found on the web.
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European states like Germany, followed the US role model of Internet governance. They, 
too, privatized former state-monopolistic telecommunications providers, created 
commercial IXP and allowed open-access for smaller service providers and user-driven 
innovation. They also adopted similar governance norms. In theoretical terms, Gore’s 
cyber-liberalism pre-structured the global development path of the early Internet and 
created a lock-in effect that institutionalized the early core norms of the Internet such as 
open-access and the idea of democratic Internet governance. 
However, this perspective became challenged by different actors who did not agree 
with the "hands-off" perspective and outsourcing of government control over the Internet. 
The next chapters will introduce some junctures where different actors, most notably law-
enforcement actors adhering to a cyber-realist paradigm, advocated for state-control over 
the Internet. These attempts ultimately were not very successful.
4.3.5 Junctures: Policy Attempts to Control the Internet (1993-1996)
This chapter introduces several key events where utopians and realists engaged in public 
discourse about the governing norms of the Internet. This implies the process of contesting 
paradigms and norms that are not yet dominant. During the early 1990s, cyber-realist 
advocates made several attempts to control various aspects of the Internet. The first 
attempt, the so-called Clipper-initiative, aimed at establishing control on the technological 
level, by interfering with the standard-setting process and by pushing for government-
controlled encryption technology. The second attempt was to regulate technology via 
policy, by demanding that private companies support FBI94 wiretapping operations of the 
Internet with the CALEA initiative. The third attempt was to control Internet content, i.e. 
the distribution of pornographic material. All these initiatives faced major public resistance 
from a wide variety of different actors: engineers, private corporations or cyber-utopian or 
liberal advocacy groups or even the political opposition and the Supreme Court. In the end, 
it can be argued that utopian ideas were dominant in the early days of the Internet. Because 
of this dominance, attempts to control the Internet by cyber-realist advocates were 
removed from plain sight and developed in secrecy, until the time was ripe for them to re-
emerge, which of course was 9/11.
4.3.5.1 Policy: The Clipper Chip (1993)
The first noteworthy juncture where different paradigms clashed with each other was the 
Clipper-debate in 1993. In analytical terms, it is a techno-political drama discourse 
94 Federal Bureau of Investigation.
4.3 Cyber-Utopian Liberalism and the Politics of Cyberspace (1990-2000)
245
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a) about the reconstitution of the technical artifact Internet. It 
happened directly at the beginning of its mainstream diffusion. The debate was about how 
the Internet and information sent over networks could be made more secure by encryption.
95 The very purpose of encryption is that only sender and receiver and no third party can 
read the content of communication. The debate addressed the fundamental issue of how 
security should be technically and politically implemented and who should be responsible: 
the state, industry, civil society or all of them. In larger terms, it was also a debate about 
the power of the state vis-à-vis the power of the Internet users. Since I have analyzed the 
Clipper discourse in higher detail elsewhere (Schulze, 2017), I will only provide a short 
overview of the main positions.
On the one hand, cyber-realists like the FBI and NSA argued for a greater role of the 
government in regulating and steering the early diffusion of digital technologies such as 
the Internet and digital telephony. They argued that the government should influence the 
code-design of encryption-technologies. FBI and NSA argued that encryption would make 
Internet surveillance harder and thus they had the goal of building a "backdoor", enabling 
government monitoring of encrypted messages (Lessig, 2006, p. 66). In theoretical terms, 
they argued for a reconstitution of Internet technologies in a way that the US government 
could control and monitor the information traveling on the Information Superhighway just 
like it could wiretap traditional telephony. It was the first major attempt of the US 
government to force a norm of control upon the spreading Internet technology. The norm 
included that the US government (and only the US government) would have a legitimate 
right to decrypt any digital communication between any two individuals carried over 
digital networks. Had it been successful, the US government would have potentially been 
able to decrypt all future Internet communication (McCullough, 2014a). 
On the other hand, there was a loose coalition of cyber-utopians (like the EFF), 
Internet-users and private companies arguing for the "hands-off" norm that the government 
should not interfere with the software design of Internet core technologies such as 
encryption. Ultimately, the latter group "won" this war on cryptography, as later NSA 
General Hayden admitted (Hayden, 2016a). What was this "crypto-war" about (Levy, 
1994)?
95 Encryption translates a plaintext (the message to be send) into a piece of gibberish or cipher-text by using a 
key that describes how letters are to be exchanged. The Romans interchanged every letter of plaintext with 
the letter that followed three steps further in the alphabet. The plaintext "VENI VIDI VICI" would be 
encrypted to "YHQL YLGL YLFL. The cipher-text can only be reversed into plaintext by knowing the key 
(replace by 3 steps down the alphabet). Stronger encryption uses longer keys that cannot be randomly 
deciphered (National Research Council, 1991, pp. 252-253).
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Historically, encryption was a top-secret, centralized technology owned and 
controlled by the military and the state. In 1976, researchers Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman published the revolutionary concept of public-key cryptography that promised 
almost unbreakable encryption (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). The top-secret British 
Intelligence Agency GCHQ96 had developed a similar system a bit earlier but kept it secret 
(Rid, 2016, pp. 303-314). With the scientific publication of public-key cryptography, the 
genie was out of the bottle and potentially everyone could use top-grade military 
technology. The knowledge of secure cryptography was decentralized from NSA and 
GCHQ and distributed among researchers worldwide. After the release of public-key 
cryptography, NSA director Bobby Inman gave a famous "the sky is falling" speech in 
1979, warning that "non-governmental cryptologic activity and publication […] poses clear 
risks to the national security" (Levy, 1993). NSA and GCHQ began to lobby their 
governments against the widespread use of public-key cryptography, arguing for outlawing 
civil use of the technology and (allegedly) threatening researchers of the National Science 
Foundation with gag-orders, trying to cut public funding of civil crypto-research (Bari 
Kolata, 1980). As a result of this successful lobbying effort, cryptography was classified as 
military, dual-use technology and thus was placed under a strict export control regime 
which prohibited widespread public adoption (Kehl, Wilson, & Bankston, 2015, p. 12).
The debate resurfaced in 1992 when AT&T announced a cryptographic phone for the 
consumer market that allowed encrypted und thus surveillance-proof phone calls. This 
market introduction threatened the core function of the National Security Agency and its 
primary mission to decipher communication (McCullough, 2014a; Levy, 1994). NSA 
feared that the new Internet could spread globally with encryption technology on the 
application layer (see chap. 4.1.2.3 Artifact: The Network Control Program). If, for 
example, AT&T developed an encryption standard that would come bundled-together with 
every AT&T Internet access contract sold, wiretapping these AT&T connections would 
become very hard. Thus, the NSA and FBI argued that "the deployment of strong 
cryptography that is widely used will diminish the capabilities of those responsible for 
SIGINT" (Dam & Lin, 1996, p. 101f.).97 NSA director and later Director of National 
Intelligence Michael McConnell warned that the agency would be "going dark" if the 
Internet would diffuse world-wide with encryption in place (Hayden, 2016a).98 For cyber-
realists, this represented the major problem that guided their agenda. 
96 Government Communications Headquarter.
97 SIGINT means Signals Intelligence, the interception of radio-waves or any other types of communications 
signals.
98 The metaphor means that one stream of interruptible communication would become unusable and thus the 
NSA would sit in the dark, not knowing what was communicated over digital channels.
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To prevent such a scenario, the NSA engaged in a standard-setting process by 
designing a software algorithm for encryption (called Skipjack) and a tamper-resistant 
computer-chip (called Clipper) that executed the algorithm and was to be attached in the 
hardware of communications devices like phones, Fax or modems (U.S. Senate, 1994). 
The Clipper chip would be built into Internet devices and then scramble all messages going 
through so that two parties (sender and receiver) could easily use encrypted messages (like 
E-mail). The caveat was that the NSA devised the algorithm to include a third key that 
could unscramble the encryption between two parties without their knowledge. This third 
key would be held in escrow by two separate government institutions and intelligence 
services could obtain the key with a court order. With this system called key-escrow, 
government law enforcement could override any encrypted communication and wire-tap 
into encrypted, digital conversations (The White House, 1994). If an NSA standard instead 
of a public standard would become mainstream, then communication-interception in the 
digital age would be guaranteed.
Originally, the NSA presented the proposal to the George H.W. Bush administration 
but it did not implement it (Levy, 1994). Instead, on February 9 1993, the NSA proposal 
was directed, via the FBI, towards the White House (Sessions, 1993). The newly elected 
Clinton-Gore Administration, which in its election campaign relied heavily on 
technological investment and utopian visions such as the advancement of the Information 
Superhighway, decided to adopt the proposal (McCullough, 2014a). An interesting 
question is why the liberal and utopian inspired Clinton/Gore administration co-sponsored 
this cyber-realist technology initiative. Dam and Lin argue that this was presidential 
pragmatism: The Clipper chip seemed to be a reasonable compromise between doing 
nothing, thus endangering surveillance capacities for law-enforcement and global signals 
intelligence, or by having no possibility for secure Internet communication at all (Dam & 
Lin, 1996, p. 170). The key-escrow scheme, with the warrant-requirement, theoretically 
prevented abuse by intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. Thus, in theory it sounded 
like a good compromise between safeguarding the privacy of individual citizens and law-
enforcement interests. However, when initiating the proposal in 1993, the government 
must have been aware of a potential backlash, indicated by its reluctant commitment to the 
initiative.
On 16 April 1993, the administration announced the Clipper initiative as "a voluntary 
program" between the government and industry (The White House, 1993b). It was not a 
policy bill (that probably would not have made it through Congress), but a technological 
initiative that basically bypassed the legislative process and thus was not mandatory. The 
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initiative was framed as a compromise or balance between increasing citizen’s privacy 
with secure communication, the interest of the private sector for secure global 
communication (to protect intellectual property or financial transactions) and the 
"legitimate needs of law enforcement" in fighting terrorism, drug-traffickers and child 
molesters (The White House, 1993a). The terrorist threat frame is a key figure in cyber-
realist discourses, even today. The "going dark" metaphor (diagnostic frame) also is highly 
prevalent in cyber-realist discourses (Comey, 2014). One other key argument put forward 
by realist advocates was that the Clipper chip was state-of-the-art and thus potentially 
better and more secure than competing cryptographic technology available on the market 
(Brickel et al., 1993). This was a major selling point.
Further anticipating a strong public reaction, the White House announced a one year 
review period for public hearings with implementation of the Clipper initiative one year 
later. During this period, a large grass-roots movement consisting of technology 
companies, computer-science, the early Internet avant-garde and advocacy groups such as 
the EFF loudly opposed this perceived government standard-setting attempt. Whitfield 
Diffie argued that Clipper created a backdoor in an otherwise secure system that would 
make the chip insecure. He criticized NSA’s role in the standard-setting process, because it 
was the mandate of the National Institute of Technology (NIST) to develop public 
standards. Furthermore, NSA held the source-code classified so it could not be vetted by 
the expert community, which is a common peer-review practice in academia (Diffie, 
1993). 
Convincing private companies to build a Clipper chip into their devices was seen as 
necessary government regulation of the market. Companies argued that this would drive up 
manufacturing costs and would make US cryptographic products uncompetitive on a 
global market, since nobody, especially not actors with malign intent, would buy 
technology of which he/she knew that the US government could listen in through a 
backdoor (U.S. Senate, 1994). Cyber-utopians warned of the privacy implications and that 
surveillance of communications is a feature of authoritarian regimes that should not be 
replicated in a democracy (Diffie, 1993), very much in line with the argument of the 
dictator’s dilemma (see chap. 4.3.3.2 Global Framing of the Internet). 
In sum, most crypto-experts, tech companies and renowned institutions such as the 
NIST urged the government to stop the initiative. 
"In 1993, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group — a coalition that 
included both privacy advocates and communications and computer companies like 
Apple, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lotus Development Corporation, Microsoft, 
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RSA Data Security, and Sun Microsystems — submitted a letter to President 
Clinton expressing concerns about the Clipper program" (Kehl et al., 2015, p. 7). 
The National Institute of Technology conducted an expert hearing on the matter: "we 
received 320 comments, only 2 of which were supportive" (Levy, 1994). Several famous 
engineers such as Internet pioneer Vint Cerf opposed the proposal (Cerf, 1993). An open 
letter by a group called Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, which included 
many of the nation’s leading cryptographers and security experts from January 27 1994, 
argued strongly against the initiative. The letter was the first electronic petition distributed 
via E-mail, which generated 45000 signatures (Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility, 1994). In a CNN poll, 80% of the public opposed the initiative (U.S. 
Senate, 1994).
The death-blow to Clipper came in late 1994, when a computer researcher found a 
fatal flaw in Clipper’s software code, thus falsifying NSA’s statement that Clipper would 
be more secure than anything else on the market (Kehl et al., 2015, p. 9). Republicans and 
Democrats also questioned the few benefits of the system compared to the relatively high 
costs (U.S. Senate, 1994). The National Research Council (NCR) argued against NSA: 
"the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages" and 
"the widespread nongovernment use of cryptography in the United States and abroad is 
inevitable in the long run" (Dam & Lin, 1996, p. 300). One of the reasons why the counter-
movement was successful was because their arguments were better, as later NSA generals 
acknowledged: "America is simply more secure with unbreakable end-to-end encryption" 
(Hayden, 2016a). Thus, the voluntary initiative was silently dropped by the Clinton 
administration and over time, the strict export controls for encryption where relaxed. 
In 1996, Al Gore acknowledged the value of encryption for e-commerce and 
launched an initiative to rethink crypto-politics. Cryptography would no longer be 
regarded as a military dual-use technology. White House Executive Order 13026 placed 
encryption technology under the export regime of the Department of Commerce, instead of 
the State Department. In 1999, the White House announced to remove all restrictions on 
the export of cryptographic technology (Kehl et al., 2015, pp. 15-17). The Internet itself 
contributed to this relaxation because open-source cryptography was available for free 
online, thus completely circumventing the US export control logic. Other countries, like 
Germany, replicated this process.
From a theory point of view, the crypto-war discourse was about norms and about 
the appropriate role of the state and its citizens with regard to technology. Cyber-realists 
wanted to maintain the historical regularization that put them in charge of cryptographic 
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matters while excluding the general public and most of the private sector. Cyber-utopians 
engaged in counter-appropriation, claiming rightful access to cryptographic technology 
and arguing for the citizen's rights to use cryptography to guarantee privacy without 
government interference. Cyber-realists in contrast argued that the government has the 
right to control and monitor encrypted communications with a warrant, if law-enforcement 
or signals intelligence demand it. By sidestepping the NIST in developing a national 
standard, the NSA actively tried to intervene in code and hardware design for Internet-
devices. As such it can be seen as an attempt to alter the core functionality of the Internet 
in order to realize cyber-realist interests. It did not aim at the Internet protocols directly, 
but was directed at the Internet devices running applications such as E-mail or web-
browsing (it was an end-to-end control attempt so to speak). This was supported by strong 
lobbying for the maintenance of export controls. Had the program been successful, it could 
be counterfactually speculated, the Internet would have spread domestically and maybe 
even globally with a US government backdoor in place. The early Internet thus would have 
represented more the Havard Model of Internet control (in Lessig’s analogy) and not the 
free Chicago model as it later turned out (Lessig, 2006, p. 34). This however, was not the 
case and the Internet spread globally without encryption built-in. 
The NSA attempt to publicly shape technology design failed and it did not try the 
same approach again. Instead, it shifted tactics and began to approach the problem of 
intercepting digital technology in secrecy, as will be shown in a later chapter (see chap. 
4.4.7 The Politicization of Cyber-Realism with the War on Terror (2000 - 2008)). The 
Clipper episode also showed the relative dominance of cyber-utopian norms. The public, 
the private sector and even Democrats and Republicans endorsed the "hands-off" norm, 
being skeptical of the fact that the US government tried to assert itself as a central 
authority being able to monitor encrypted Internet communications. Thus, this juncture 
increased the relative dominance of utopianism and liberalism vis-à-vis cyber-realism in 
the public discourse. This was also the case during the next juncture, which dealt with 
similar issues.
4.3.5.2 Policy: Wiretapping the Internet with CALEA (1994)
Another instance of an early attempt of cyber-realist advocates to dominate the digital 
revolution before it was even in full swing was the "Digital Telephony Bill", an attempt to 
mandate service providers to enable wiretapping at their digital switching-infrastructure. 
Like the Clipper proposal, the initiative came from the FBI, the predominant public cyber-
realist advocate at the time. It can be argued that after the Clipper proposal, NSA preferred 
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to stay hidden from plain sight. Because it deals with the Internet only indirectly, I will not 
conduct a full-fledged policy analysis including the surrounding discourse, but rather offer 
a quick snapshot of the debate and its outcomes.
The proposal of the FBI was initially aimed at the George H.W. Bush administration 
for implementation in 1992 (BeVier, 1999, p. 1071). However, because of the general 
skepticism towards the bill and the upcoming election, it was not implemented in time. 
After Clinton’s election, the FBI started another attempt to lobby for the bill in Congress. 
In its original form the proposal was quite broad and represented cyber-realist ideas to its 
core. The bill was designed to address the "digital telephony problem" or the difficulties of 
wiretapping digital and packet-switched telecommunications. Since the late 1980s, law-
enforcement agencies recognized that "the digital technology of computers would render 
existing phone surveillance techniques useless" (Cohen, 1994). Traditional wiretaps99 
aimed at copper-lines, which could be easily tapped with Alligator-Clips (Landau, 2010, p. 
Chap. 4). The increasing number of cellular phones, integrated voice and data or value-
added services, the rise of the PC and the increase of telecommunications providers other 
than AT&T (to around 2000) made this old technique obsolete (U.S. Congress, 1994, pp. 
23-25). FBI Director Louis Feech defined the cyber-realist problem in a congressional 
hearing:
"The United States is facing a grave and growing problem. New 
telecommunications technology is impeding or preventing law enforcement from 
conducting court-authorized electronic surveillance, or what we call wiretapping. 
The problems are just beginning, in my view. […] It will be a disaster if this and 
other emerging telecommunications technologies spread nationwide without 
needed law enforcement safeguards " (U.S. Congress, 1994, pp. 5-6).
During this congressional hearing the FBI established two major discursive frames, which 
are remarkably similar to NSA’s "going dark" metaphor (Inman, 1979) and that of FBI 
director James B. Comey in 2016 about encryption. The fear of "going dark because of the 
digital revolution" and the frame that the "FBI fell behind the curve of technical 
capabilities" is remarkably stable (Schulze, 2017). It is argued that electronic surveillance 
would virtually become impossible and that law-enforcement would lose its crime-fighting 
99 Wiretappig in the US is a controversial issue because it is the most intrusive form of surveillance. 
Therefore, it was discussed by the Supreme Court several times. Initially, intercepting communications was 
forbidden (since 1934 with the Communications Act), but over time, Supreme Court altered this norm. The 
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1969 prohibited all wiretapping except for law-
enforcement. There needs to be a court order that outlines probable cause and explains that wiretaps are the 
ultima ratio in an investigation (Cohen, 1994).
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ability (BeVier, 1999, p. 1073). The digital telephony bill was to be the solution to this 
"grave" problem because it aimed to:
"preserve the government’s ability, pursuant to court order or other lawful 
authorization, to intercept communications involving advanced technologies such 
as digital or wireless transmission modes, or features and services such as call 
forwarding, speed dialing and conference calling, while protecting the privacy of 
communications and without [either] impeding the introduction of new 
technologies, features, and services" (BeVier, 1999, p. 1051).
The solution was controlling the very design of digital technologies and their market. The 
FBI-sponsored bill mandated that the providers of electronic communications, defined 
quite broadly to include telecommunications carriers, information services and ISP, grant 
the government the capacity to intercept wire and electronic communications services. The 
FBI demanded the capability to gather meta-data such as the timing and duration of a call 
(or Internet access), or the physical location data of the phone tower or switch over which 
communication was established. In other words, the providers had to build in wiretapping 
capacities in the Internet backbone itself, for example by implementing a back door for 
electronic surveillance at key Internet Exchange Points and large packet-switching 
facilities (see chap. 4.1.3.3 The Internet Backbone). Private companies also had to bear the 
costs for this (Landau, 2010, p. chap 4.4).
This was an extension of traditional telephony wiretapping because it included not 
just telecommunications carriers (as in the past), but also Internet services and the Internet 
infrastructure itself. More so, Internet data is richer in information as traditional audio 
intercepts because it can include images, videos, voice or information on surfing behavior 
and interests, which allows to create very detailed profiles of users. Whereas the Clipper 
proposal aimed at the Internet’s application layer (see chap. 4.3.5.1 Policy: The Clipper 
Chip (1993)), this attempt targeted the underlying physical infrastructure (see chap. 4.1 
Engineering the Internet). More so, it would have given the government the authority to 
influence the development of new technology and if a company did not meet FBI’s 
wiretapping needs, it could demand changes for example in software code. Thus, early 
versions of the bill gave the government the right to interfere actively in how private 
companies write their code (see chap. 2.3.7 Digital Technology: Software and Code). It 
aimed to ban sales of nonconforming equipment and required providers of "electronic 
communications services to modify their existing equipment within 180 days or face fines 
of $10,000 per day" (BeVier, 1999, p. 1073). All of this should be done with a subpoena, 
instead a court order (Drake, 1995a, pp. 330-331). Court orders have higher legal barriers 
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which must be fulfilled in order to initiate surveillance of personal spaces, thus they protect 
legal subjects. In this form, the Digital Telephony Bill would have been a far-reaching 
attempt of interfering and regulating the nascent market for digital technology. As Lessig 
argues, it was an attempt to control the code, influencing the technical design of the 
emerging networking architecture to "adequately serve the interests of the government" 
(Lessig, 2000, p. 63). It was a policy initiative clearly driven by a cyber-realist mindset.
As such, the proposed bill faced major resistance by industry and privacy advocates 
but also from Congress itself. Several authors called the initiative a "paradigm shift" 
(BeVier, 1999, p. 1053) or a "radical transformation of U.S. Wiretap law" (Landau, 2010, 
p. chap 4.5) because in the past, telecommunications providers could individually decide 
themselves how to technically implement intercept warrants. Now the FBI itself was put in 
charge of developing switching-standards, while placing the financial burden onto private 
companies, thereby potentially harming their competitiveness (Landau, 2010, p. chap 4.5). 
More so, by defining carriers quite broadly to include Internet and telecommunications 
carriers, the old wiretapping law was significantly expanded. 
Critics questioned whether the FBI was really going dark in an era of almost limitless 
electronic data and new sources for criminal investigations. Some thought that the 
evidence the FBI published to support the seriousness of the threat was not really 
convincing. The head of the Telephone Association argued against the bill by arguing that 
that government should concerning itself with "maintaining the more appropriate arms-
length relationship between common carriers and law enforcement", thereby pledging for 
the "hands-off" norm (Cohen, 1994). Opposition not only came from cyber-utopians such 
as John Perry Barlow and civil liberty groups, but also from Democrats and Republicans.
Because of the substantial criticism from both outside Congress and within, a lengthy 
congressional process with several alterations followed until the bill was signed into law in 
October 1994 under the name of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA). The final outcome was way more restrictive and included several privacy 
protections. It limited access to telephony providers only, which had to be reimbursed. The 
providers had to assist law-enforcement, but the FBI was not allowed "to require or 
prohibit any specific design of equipment, facilities, or system configurations to be 
employed by telecommunications carriers in compliance with the statute" (Cohen, 1994). 
Additionally, the carrier was not responsible for decrypting encrypted communications or 
altering code in their systems, as the FBI initially demanded. Most importantly, Internet 
and Voice-over-IP communications were excluded from the scope of the bill. There was 
more time for implementation and reduced fines. Meta-data about the physical location of 
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a subscriber was removed from data gathering and the bill prohibited automated remote 
surveillance. Instead of a subpoena, the FBI required a court order with higher standards 
for an intercept attempt. 
Although the bill passed in the end, it was rather limited in scope and did not, as 
originally intended, affect the Internet. The EFF argued in a statement: "the bill draws a 
hard line around the Internet and other online networks. We have carved cyberspace out of 
this legislation" (Cohen, 1994). Like with the Clipper proposal, one explanation for the 
relative victory of cyber-liberalism and the "hands-off" norm was the hegemony of cyber-
utopian ideas of the time. For example, Time Magazine reported in March that "two-thirds 
of Americans said that it was more important to protect privacy of phone calls than to 
preserve the ability of the police to conduct wiretaps", reflecting a clear primacy of cyber-
utopian norms (Cohen, 1994). However, this was only a short-term victory, since CALEA 
got significantly expanded after 9/11 to include the Internet as well (Bloss, 2007, p. 219).
4.3.5.3 Policy: Internet Censorship with the Communications Decency Act (1996)
A final event in the history of the Internet of the 1990s and one final juncture, where the 
appropriate role of the state vis-à-vis the Internet was debated, happened in 1996. The 
question here was: should the state be able to control or even censor information on the 
Internet?
If one mentions the term Internet-censorship, most people think of the People’s 
Republic of China, which began the construction of its Great Firewall of China or "Project 
Golden Shield" in 1996. This censorship and surveillance infrastructure became functional 
in 2003 and filters global Internet data traffic at the large IXP points connecting the 
Chinese Intranet with the rest of the world.100 A similar initiative surfaced in the US during 
the "Internet Sex Panic" in 1996 when several newspapers and magazines launched front-
page stories about pornography on the Internet (Daniel, 1996).101 Following the outcry of 
concerned parents, a bipartisan initiative piggy-backed the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA) onto the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a major telecommunications reform bill 
100 Early Internet censorship used the simple technique of address-blocking or and DNS or URL filtering that 
has been pioneered in Western software called Firewalls (Anderson & Murdoch, 2008). What this censorship 
infrastructure does is looking for keywords within Internet data packets or preventing access to URL’s and 
Websites that are blacklisted by political authorities. These include pornography but often also regime critical 
websites (Deibert et al., 2012).
101 Because the Internet was designed to be open for all kinds of services, it should not come as a surprise 
that the Porn-Industry discovered the Internet quite early. Even during the 1980s, pornography was 
distributed through the Internet’s private predecessors such as FIDONET and USENET and the help of 
Bulletin Boards (McCullough, 2015). For example, the Website of Playboy Magazine went online in 1994.
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inspired by cyber-liberalism. While the Telecommunications Act aimed at privatizing 
Internet functions, market competition and liberalization of rules, the CDA would:
"Make it a crime, in interstate or foreign communications, by means of a 
telecommunications device, knowingly to transmit a communication that is 
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, 
or harass another person." Section 502 of the CDA also amended 47 U.S.C. § 
223(a)(l)(B) to make it a crime, in interstate or foreign communications, by means 
of a telecommunications device, knowingly to transmit a communication that is 
"obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 
years of age [...]"" (Cohen, 1997).
This bill was signed into law by the President in 1996. However, civil liberty, free speech 
and cyber-utopian advocacy groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
and the EFF filed a lawsuit (EPIC, 2002). John Perry Barlow’s declaration of 
independence of cyberspace was written as a reaction to this law (see chap. 4.2.5 Framing 
Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)) and several internet advocacy groups began 
the "Black World Wide Web protest" on February 8-9, 1996. Timed with the presidential 
signing of the bill, several major web sites changed their background to black for 48 hours 
to protest against the violation of freedom of expression. 
The bill was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1997 (ACLU 
vs. Reno). The judges ruled that portions of this act violated the First Amendment which 
says that "congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press 
(Cohen, 1997). Pornography is protected as free speech by the First Amendment.102 Such 
material is not to be banned/censored but to be made inaccessible to children (via age or 
pin-code verification for example). But the judges made a larger point, way beyond 
pornography. They made a statement about the Internet in a democracy. The three judges 
(Dolores Sloviter, Ronald Buckwalter and Stewart Dalzell) – following the ideas of cyber-
utopianism and the belief in the democratizing effects of the Internet – argued:
"[…] the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory 
marketplace of mass speech that this country – and indeed the world – has yet seen. 
The plaintiffs [ACLU] in these actions correctly describe the 'democratizing' effects 
of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a 
worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates occur in 
newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. […] In these forms of 
communication, regulations on the basis of decency simply would not survive First 
Amendment scrutiny. The Internet is a far more speech-enhancing medium than 
print, the village green, or the mails. Because it would necessarily affect the 
102 With the exception of violent material (rape videos) and child pornography.
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Internet itself, the CDA would necessarily reduce the speech available for adults on 
the medium. This is a constitutionally intolerable result" (Naughton, 1999, p. 191).
This ruling is pretty much in line with Gore’s utopian frame about the democratic nature of 
the Internet. Also, the empowering component, the "speech-enhancing" nature of the 
medium is highlighted, which is presented as far more significant as the invention of print-
media. In cyber-utopian circles, the significance of the Internet is often highlighted by 
referring to the invention of the printing-press which is seen as a key-enabler in the period 
of enlightenment. The Internet is presented as some kind of meta-infrastructure that is an 
enabler for public discourse in a democracy. Finally, Judge Dalzell affirmed the "hands-
off" norm that was guiding government behavior towards the Internet in the early 1990s:
"We should also protect the autonomy that such a medium confers to ordinary 
people as well as media magnates. Cutting through the acronyms and argot that 
littered the hearing testimony, the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending 
worldwide conversation. The Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt that 
conversation. As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the 
Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion" (Naughton, 
1999, p. 193).
That the Internet "deserves highest protection from governmental intrusion" (Naughton, 
1999, pp. 190-193) affirmed the cyber-utopian norm that the state shall not encroach onto 
cyberspace and thus stopped further attempts by the state to assert control over cyberspace. 
This first attempt to control content within the Internet failed with this landmark ruling. 
This ruling codified the "hands-off" norm into law and further constituted the idea of the 
democratizing effects of the Internet. It basically argued that freedom of speech is a greater 
good than government interests and demanded some form of democratic constraint. 
Democratic governments in particular should not intrude into the worldwide conversation, 
which can be seen as a wink to the appearing Internet censorship attempts occurring in 
other non-democratic countries but could also be seen in the context of the US information 
warfare doctrine developing around the same time (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: 
Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace).
This ruling also had an influence on the technical and economic structure of the 
Internet. Economically, the Telecommunications Act itself deregulated the market and 
allowed the creation of smaller Internet exchange carriers in competition with large 
carriers. It lowered prices and increased competition (Friedman, 2005, p. 74). Technically, 
age-verification sites became a common practice on websites, shielding minors from adult 
content (at least theoretically). It can be argued that this ruling set the general tone. 
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Proponents of state control of the Internet suffered a strong defeat. Cyber-realists, 
advocating for greater state control over cyberspace metaphorically "got their fingers 
burned" and did not attempt similar initiatives during the Clinton administration. This 
indicates a socialization or learning-effect that also set up a temporary closure or lock-in, 
which slowed or even stopped the path-trajectory of Internet control. In methodological 
terms, this episode is key evidence in showing that the "hands-off"-norm exhibited a 
normative constraint on actions, meaning that it prevented actors from doing something 
(censoring the Internet) that is not in line with the norm’s logic of oughtness (Bennett & 
Checkel, 2014, p. 34). The ruling gave the "hands-off" norm legal credibility, reified it and 
thus influenced the temporary dominance of the hands-off norm and cyber-utopianism in 
cyberspace, at least until the crash of the dot-com bubble and 9/11.
4.3.6 Critical Analysis and Paradigm Blind Spots
It should have become clear by now that "the discourse about the Information 
Superhighway" is dominated by "rosy utopian predictions of increased democratization 
and access to information and culture" (Besser, 1995). However, like every paradigm, 
early cyber-utopianism has some blind spots and issues that are not addressed. The 
following presents a series of critical arguments directed against the liberal-utopian vision 
of the Internet within the policy sphere. Since the general critique of utopian thought has 
been provided in a previous chapter (see chap. 4.2.9 Critical Analysis & Blind Spots of 
Cyber-Utopianism), I will only make a few arguments that did not appear before.
Besser reminds us that "the prediction made for cable television more than two 
decades ago sounds remarkably like the predictions being made for the Information 
Superhighway today" (Besser, 1995). Although cable-TV started with similar social norms, 
predominantly a call for openness and universal access, the media landscape looks quite 
different now, with several media conglomerates. The same can be said with the 
introduction of public telephony. In both cases, cable TV and telephony, the goal of 
universal services was not reached, for example with a telephony penetration rate of 94% 
in 1994, leaving 5.7 million homes without a phone (Cate, 1994, p. 52). If people, with 
lower incomes are excluded, it has implications for the democratic potentials of the 
technology. Democracy requires that every vote counts and that every voice is heard. 
More so, the framing of a global town square and the argument that the Internet is 
equivalent with democracy and as such a public good blurs the fact that it is not. The 
Internet is less a public sphere and more a privately-owned environment run by 
corporations who operate the physical (switches, IXP, cables) and digital-infrastructure 
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(web services, access). McChesney argued in 1996 that with the privatization of the 
Internet, "the market, and not public policy, will direct the course of both the Internet and 
the information highway." The rush to commercialize the Internet was in full swing in the 
mid 1990s and corporate media giants "are aggressively working to dominate the Internet" 
(McChesney, 1996, pp. 104-105). 
Besser warned in 1995 that digital information can be altered and manipulated quite 
easily. This invites propaganda, censorship and information warfare: "Because digital 
images can be seamlessly altered, how can the viewer be sure that the image on view has 
not been manipulated?" (Besser, 1995). In 1993, futurologist and Sci-Fi writer Howard 
Rheingold warned of a so-called Disinformocracy, a democracy where the public 
perception is shaped by a constant information war. He argued that the service and 
information providers of the Internet could use their information-dominance to manipulate 
users. "The prospect of the technical capabilities of a near-ubiquitous high-bandwidth Net 
in the hands of a small number of commercial interests has dire political implications. 
Whoever gains the political edge on this technology will be able to use the technology to 
consolidate power" (Rheingold, 1993, p. chap. 10). He also envisioned the chilling-effects 
on privacy by big corporations and Big-Data: "The most insidious attack on our rights to a 
reasonable degree of privacy might come not from a political dictatorship but from the 
marketplace" (Rheingold, 1993, p. chap. 10). Nowadays, we see this impact of corporate 
control over cyberspace with Internet giants such as Google and Facebook and their 
algorithms having a major influence on how we compute information and thus how 
deliberations over the Internet look like. Concepts like echo-chambers and filter-bubbles 
remind us of the overheard warnings of the 1990s.
Other issues that are systematically overlooked are matters of privacy, freedom of 
speech and the potential for surveillance. Cate argues that:
"None of the Administration’s NII pronouncements mention the First Amendment. 
It does not appear in the Agenda for Action or in a single speech by Vice President 
Gore, Secretary Brown, Assistant Secretary Irving, or any other senior 
Administration official. Free expression is not the subject of any NII committee or 
working group" (Cate, 1994, p. 54).
Cate argues that the principle that "Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of 
speech or of the press – erects a very high barrier to government intrusion" (Cate, 1994, p. 
54). This very principal is crucial for the function of the NII and for the public interest in 
general. Closely connected to freedom of speech is the issue of privacy, which is largely 
ignored in the Information Superhighway discourse, although it is quite relevant. Besser 
4.3 Cyber-Utopian Liberalism and the Politics of Cyberspace (1990-2000)
259
argued that the privatization and commercialization of the Internet will bring with it threats 
to privacy (Besser, 1995). In 1996, Wellbery wrote that the Internet creates new 
possibilities to compile, transmit and distribute personal information relatively easily, 
which allows the allocation of user data and the creation of user profiles, for example for 
advertisement. Because of relatively weak privacy laws, US customers would not be 
adequately protected from misuse (Wellbery, 1996). This would create a structural 
incentive for corporate surveillance and foreshadowed the business models of Google 
(1998) and Facebook (2004). However, the NII initiative did not even address this issue. 
This trend was only increased and accelerated with the realization in the late 1990s that 
data can serve as a commodity that can be sold, which ultimately led to the current Big 
Data frenzy in the Web 2.0 period.
In sum, it can be argued that cyber-utopianism dominated the early discourse on the 
Internet between 1993 and 1996, at least on the surface. This can be shown by referring to 
polls. Drake argues: "Several opinion polls conducted over the past two years indicate that 
a majority of the people who have heard of it think the new information infrastructure will 
be a "good thing" but also they do not really know what it is" (Drake, 1995c, p. 3). Below 
the surface, hidden in the shadows of the intelligence community, cyber-realist ideas and 
initiatives began to grow, as the CALEA and Clipper episodes have shown. Because of the 
dominance of cyber-utopianism these attempts to enable state control over the Internet 
failed because the advocates were not able to rally major support for their norm of Internet 
control. Instead, the "hands-off" norm, the idea that the Internet should not be controlled 
by the US Government, prevailed.
4.3.7 Summary
The causal mechanism developed in this chapter works as follows. That the Clinton-Gore 
administration won the presidency in 1992 was a key necessary condition for the 
dominance of liberal cyber-utopianism (part 1). It was also an instance of paradigm-
change via regime change, i.e. The change of dominant ideas when a new government 
from another party entered office (see chap. 2.2.1 Policy Paradigms). Former President 
H.W. Bush showed no particular interest in technology and did not engage in any political 
leadership trying to steer the telecommunications sector. 
The structure of this policy subsystem is an important conditional factor for the 
dominance of cyber-utopianism in the early 1990s. When Clinton/Gore entered office, 
Internet policy was a nascent policy subsystem without much political leadership, existing 
laws and regulations and thus little pre-structuration in terms of policy or dominant ideas 
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or paradigms. Most guiding decisions came from the FCC or the large players like AT&T 
(Mueller, 2010, p. 56). At the same time, the policy subsystem was already big enough 
(because of the digital revolution) to be relevant and in need of political leadership. Being 
a nascent subsystem means that rules of the game were not established, compared for 
example to the national security subsystem, where power positions and the appropriate 
roles of different actors are historically pre-structured. Theory assumes that it is easier in 
nascent subsystems for new actors and ideas to get their voice heard, which is a key 
explanation why cyber-utopianism, a paradigm born outside the realm of politics, could 
become influential. In this nascent Internet subsystem, there was no prior hegemonic 
paradigm and thus no staying power of the status quo. This enabled the Clinton/Gore 
administration to define the appropriate role of different actors like the private sector, the 
users or the military and intelligence community as well as the regulative goals and 
instruments with its Information Superhighway agenda, representing a third or second 
order policy change.
Besides the structure of the policy subsystem, the other important factor is that the 
central actors were receptive to cyber-utopian ideas. Technology literacy and personal 
advocacy of actors in a powerful position are key explanations for the dominance of 
utopianism within the early politics of the 1990s. Al Gore was the central figure here. 
Gore’s personal interest in the Internet and technology resonated with the ideas of cyber-
utopianism developed by the digital natives like the principled belief in the positive impact 
information technology on education, economic growth, democracy and personal 
empowerment. Closely interrelated is Gore’s personal history or background 
(socialization). In the past, he sponsored several Internet related policies such as the High 
Performance Computing initiative, which exposed him to the ideas of the ARPANET 
engineering community and gave him (enough) technological literacy about computer 
networks. He continued this path once being in high office. But there is also another path-
dependency argument: had it not been for his father, Gore probably would not have 
adopted the term Information Superhighway as a reminiscence to the interstate highway 
system (and to draw external credibility from this fact). With these factors, it is hard to 
determine which one came first, so that combined working of these factors (equifinality) is 
probably the best explanation.
The Information Superhighway initiative is a direct causal outcome of this personal 
advocacy and probably would not have been adopted (part 2) had there been another Vice 
President (necessary condition). The argument goes that cyber-utopian ideas got embedded 
into this policy. Technology was mostly understood in terms of its positive economic 
4.3 Cyber-Utopian Liberalism and the Politics of Cyberspace (1990-2000)
261
impact. This economic frame also influenced the appropriate actor positions with regard to 
the Internet: it gave primacy to the private sector building and running information 
infrastructures. It positioned the US government at arms length. Gore personally argued 
that the state should neither own, run nor control cyberspace, thus adopting the cyber-
utopian norm that the state has no (or little) role to play in cyberspace. However, since he 
was no die-hard libertarian and a political professional, he devised the appropriate role of 
government as some kind of neutral referee, preventing the creation of monopolies and 
providing only flexible regulation and hands-off leadership. A factor that should also be 
mentioned is that the telecommunications industry was afraid of too much government 
regulation and thus argued, and probably lobbied, for the hands-off norm as well. This 
coincides with the general neo-liberal zeitgeist of the 1990s. 
The technological frame of the Information Superhighway had a widespread societal 
and political appeal (part 3). It was not only highly congruent with utopianism put forward 
by the digital natives, but it also provided a positive political vision or prognostic frame for 
the future. The metaphor of the highway was highly commensurable and helped citizens to 
understand the abstract concept of the Internet. It had a high narrative fidelity, addressing a 
wide array of different issues from education to entertainment. More so, it was compatible 
with economic thought, giving it a greater credibility. The belief in the positive effects of 
the Internet became wide-spread in the early 1990s, as the dot-com frenzy showed. It was 
also a powerful frame for global norm diffusion. The Information Highway Agenda 
became a prototype of how states could govern this new medium. The privatization of the 
Internet backbone infrastructure in 1996 manifested and materialized this norm and 
established a new type of Internet governance model that many other Western countries 
adopted or emulated to some degree (part 4). 
Gore also acted as a global norm-entrepreneur, diffusing the norm that the Internet 
should be democratic on a global scale (part 5). Here, Gore picked up a common frame of 
the time that argued that states either could control information technologies and 
information, or fall behind economically (the dictator’s dilemma) and the idea of 
decentralization of authority, which was a common neo-liberal and cyber-utopian narrative 
of the time. In sum, Gore acted as a top-down norm-entrepreneur inside the US and as a 
bottom-up entrepreneur globally, trying to establish the hands-off norm.
The graphic shows the mainstream diffusion of the technical artifact on the left (with 
its material components, i.e. TCP/IP and its engineering meaning of an "internetwork"). 
The next step shows the impact constituencies and how the deviant usage of cyber-
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utopians (green paradigm) led to a counter-signification (see chap. 4.2 The Evolution of 
Cyber-Utopianism). 
Figure 23. Cyber-liberal Utopianism framing the Internet during the early 1990s 
(own diagram)
The previous chapter showed how the utopian interpretation and framing (green) of the 
Internet became dominant in the early 1990s, replacing the signifiers and concept of the 
engineering paradigm (orange). This counter-signified the Internet as cyberspace. At the 
same time, utopianism got politicized by the Gore administration creating a liberal spin-off 
(blue). These new ideas got fused into new policies such as the Information Superhighway 
agenda, which framed the Internet in economic terms, established new actor positions and 
the "hands-off" norm. But during the mid 1990s, this "hands-off" norm and cyber-liberal 
utopianism was still fragile. We saw attempts of cyber-realist policy-making (red) within 
the political spheres, trying to establish control over the Internet and contesting the "hands-
off" notion. Several government and congressional initiatives aimed at introducing some 
control, either in terms of wiretapping of digital communication (CALEA 1994) or in 
terms of setting encryption standards (Clipper 1993), or by imposing content censorship of 
indecent material (CDA 1996). These instances were paradigmatic clashes of advocates of 
cyber-realism trying to exert political influence over the Internet. I would argue that these 
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initiatives failed because of various, case specific reasons. Clipper was immature, CALEA 
too broadly conceived and the CDA unconstitutional. 
The following table summarizes the causal mechanism for this chapter.
Table 4. Causal Mechanism of Cyber-Utopianism & the Clinton/Gore 
Administration
Context Relatively unregulated policy subsystem of 
telecommunications with little pre-structuration but 
large enough to be relevant.
Part 1 Clinton election as a necessary condition for 
paradigm-change via regime change. Clinton-Gore 
administration was receptive to original cyber-
utopian ideas (resonance) and launched a political 
process of interest aggregation, creating a more 
neo-liberal version of the paradigm.
Part 2 Gore’s Information Superhighway agenda 
prioritizes the private sector in cyberspace. The 
policy assigned actors positions in the new policy 
field and defines appropriate role for the state at 
arms-length. Policy process establishes/creates 
"hands-off" norm (norm emergence).
Part 3 Hands-off norm resonates well with private sector 
and fits into the neo-liberal Zeitgeist in the 
economic sector but also fits into general cyber-
utopian ideas of digital natives in the early 1990s.
Part 4 Information Superhighway agenda initiates the 
privatization of cyber-space, enabling a path-
trajectory of decentralizing control over cyberspace 
into the hands of private corporations.
Part 5 Personal Gore advocacy frames the Internet in 
terms of democracy and defines government 
control over cyberspace as inappropriate. This 
norm & US Internet governance model begins to 
diffuse domestically and globally together with the 
Internet.
Part 6 Cyber-realist policy initiatives (Clipper, CALEA) 
and the Communications Decency Act contest the 
hands-off norm and attempt to establish partial state 
control over aspects of cyberspace but face public 
resistance.
Outcome Supreme Court creates a legal precedent by ruling 
that the state should not control cyberspace by 
censoring content. Legal precedent codifies the 
"hands-off" norm into law and makes it temporally 
hegemonic (closure).
The ruling of the Supreme Court, arguing that the government should not control 
content in cyberspace, is theoretically important because it represents an instance of 
temporal closure. The legal ruling of this magnitude had set a legal precedent that placed 
freedom of speech and information as a high priority and cemented the idea that the state 
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has no business regulating it. The utopian-liberal meaning became dominant. It was 
dominant but not necessarily hegemonic (in the sense of an unquestioned truth). This 
established a path or a future trajectory that is still valid to some degree since there was no 
other attempt of this kind. However, during the second half of the 1990s, cyber-realism 
evolved out of the military information warfare doctrine. This doctrine began to form an 
alternative paradigm, contesting the dominance of cyber-liberal utopianism. Cyber-realism 
particularly filled in the blind spots that utopianism ignored, i.e. the question of security, as 
the next chapter will show.
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4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism
"A strange game. The only winning move is not to play."
Joshua, AI in the movie War Games (1983)
Organizations concerned with national security, such as the military, intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies used to be the first adopters of expensive, new technologies. 
Especially the US military has a long tradition of using computers. One of the first large-
scale cybernetic technical artifacts was the Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) 
Radar system which incorporated the first mainframe computers (1945-1952) for 
automated radar detection and warning. Before the Internet, SAGE was the biggest data-
network (Rid, 2016, p. 109). Since then, computers have taken over many military 
command functions (called C3I, command, control, communications and intelligence) and 
have replaced human operators (Edwards, 1997). With this ever increasing automation of 
war, it does not come as a surprise that the national security community was the first to be 
concerned about security issues of inter-networked computers.
This chapter focuses on military (Air Force), intelligence (NSA, CIA) and law-
enforcement (FBI) actors and their interplay with policy-makers. These are key advocates 
of a national security or military perspective on cyberspace, which is called cyber-realism. 
I argue that the roots of the paradigm lie within the concept of information war (IW), first 
conceived in the 1970s and reformulated as a military doctrine in the mid-1990s, until it 
became an actual national security policy and coherent paradigm under the Bush 
presidency. Ultimately, information war was reframed as cyber-war, the term that we 
nowadays use. Cyber-realism assumes a national security and state-centric perspective on 
ICT and predominantly perceives the technology as having a negative impact on national 
security. Realism is carried by a coherent set of actors which produced a large corpus of 
policy documents that act as the carrier medium for analysis (see appendix Cyber-Realism 
Corpus). I will focus on military doctrines, national security directives103 and strategies to 
extract the core ideas and norms out of these documents. The central norm of cyber-
realism is that the state, through its military and intelligence apparatus, should be able to 
monitor, control and monitor global cyberspace, even beyond its national jurisdiction, in 
war and times of peace alike. The function of this chapter is to trace the origin of this norm 
and answer the question of how it could replace utopian norms. Thus, this chapter is about 
the second part of the norm-change process and the second part of the title of this 
103 In terms of academic analysis, military sources are a dual-edged sword because they only reflected the 
published military thinking. In terms of surveillance and intelligence research, much of the thinking and 
material is classified. This thesis only has the possibility to look at unclassified or leaked material that exists 
in the public domain.
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dissertation: cyber-war. It is a central chapter in this thesis, which is why it is the longest in 
the empirical part.
First, I will provide a bit of historical background regarding the question of 
computer-insecurity, a blind spot mostly ignored by the engineering paradigm (see chap. 
4.1.5 Development Blind Spots). The purpose of this chapter is to understand the actual 
problem that forms the basis of cyber-realism. After that, I turn to the central ideas of 
realism by introducing core concepts such as "information war" and its little brother, 
"cyber-war" (see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the Information War Doctrine (1976-
2000)). Since these ideas are the basis for the norm of control, I will dissect the central 
ideas in high detail according to the logic outlined in the theory chapter. This includes an 
initial euphoria about the perceived changing nature of warfare (see chap. 4.4.2.1 
Optimistic Cyber-Realism: Revolution in Military Affairs (1992-2000)), but also problems 
that derive particularly from the perceived shortcomings of the TCP/IP protocols, i.e. the 
degree of anonymity the Internet provides (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-
Realism). I argue that this central problem perception and definition of cyber-realism 
guides much of the political, technological and normative response of realists to the 
Internet. If the Internet is perceived as a battle-space and information regarded as a weapon 
and a source of power (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: Information Weapons & Digital 
Battlespace), it logically follows that the state should control these resources. In other 
words, out of these ideas evolves the norm that states should control cyberspace (see chap. 
4.4.2.4 Analyzing Emerging Norms of Cyber-Realism). After having analyzed these 
ideational and normative elements of cyber-realism, the following chapter addresses the 
question of how these ideas became institutionalized within bureaucratic structures, a key 
theoretical element for the stabilization of norms (see chap. 4.4.3 Setting the Path: The 
Institutionalization of Cyber-Realism). This and the following chapter explain the story 
line how realist ideas began to influence policy-making of the later Clinton administration, 
particularly after the terror attacks of the mid 1990s and the debate about critical 
infrastructures (see chap. 4.4.4 Politics: Turn to Realism - Critical Infrastructure Initiative 
(1996-1999)). This process culminates in a critical juncture, the Y2K panic at the end of 
the millennium, when it was feared that a computer-bug could shut down the entire world, 
which represents a key-narrative of cyber-realism that suddenly spilled over into public 
discourses (see chap. 4.4.5 Discourse: Y2K and Critical Infrastructure Failure). 
Afterwards, I will summarize the causal mechanism in the 1990s (see chap.4.4.6 
Preliminary Summary), before I turn to the politicization of cyber-realism in the war on 
terror, which represents another juncture (see chap. 4.4.7 The Politicization of Cyber-
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Realism with the War on Terror (2000 - 2008)). These chapters are absolutely crucial for 
this thesis because the ideas that formed and the political/technological decisions that were 
made in this period still have implications in terms of surveillance and cyber-war today. 
The description of the war on terror-period is structurally similar to the that of IW in 
the 1990s: I start by describing the structural composition of the Bush administration 
during the juncture that was 9/11 (see chap. 4.4.7 The Politicization of Cyber-Realism with 
the War on Terror (2000 - 2008)). I argue that cyber-realist hawks had a tremendous 
influence shaping the political response to 9/11. I show this by analyzing counter-terrorism 
strategies (see chap. 4.4.7.1 Ideas: Cyber-realism and Counter-Terrorism (2001 - 2007)) in 
order to assess correspondence with cyber-realist ideas developed in the 1990s. I argue that 
that the 9/11 policy response has two concrete outcomes: First, realist inspired policies 
such as the Patriot Act (see chap. 4.4.7.2 Policy: The Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform 
(2001 - 2004)) and second, technical artifacts developed by the NSA (see chap. 4.4.7.3 
Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). Both are political 
instruments (Hall, 1993, p. 279) that are designed to control the Internet. The chapter about 
NSA Internet surveillance is absolutely crucial and a key smoking-gun for state control of 
the Internet. It enables the offensive turn to cyber-war, as the following chapter describes 
(see chap. 4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, Surveillance and Cyber-war (2003-2008)). The core 
argument is that we should not see IW, cyber-war and surveillance as separate functions 
but as an interconnected nexus of practices, and that we should maintain a critical stand to 
the arguments put forward by supporters of mass surveillance (see chap. 4.4.8 The Norm 
of Internet Control) The summary shows how the Bush administration militarized 
cyberspace and how it normalized Internet surveillance as a norm that began to diffuse 
globally since the mid-2000s (see chap. 4.4.10 Summary).
4.4.1 Background: Growing Awareness of Computer Insecurity (1967 - 2011)
The theory assumes that the spread or mainstream diffusion of a new technology creates 
more points of contact, resulting in more people engaging with the technology over time. 
This enables deviant usage scenarios. The causal mechanism depicted in this chapter works 
like this: the mass diffusion of the Internet interconnected more civil and military 
computer systems and attracted more users. Because the Internet is open for all kinds of 
uses, more unintended activities such as malicious hacking or data extraction emerged. 
The more malicious activity on the network, the more users were potentially affected, 
which in turn led to an increase of their awareness of IT security issues such as data 
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protection. This mechanism repeated itself between the 1970s and the mid-2000s and thus 
worked in a spiral, or escalating fashion, leading to increased awareness with every turn. 
As was shown before (see chap. 4.1.5 Development Blind Spots), Paul Baran 
wrestled with the question of secure networks since 1964, and ARPA engineer Willis Ware 
pointed to intrusion-problems in computer networks in 1967 (Ware, 1967). In 1979, Jürgen 
Kraus argued that software could self-replicate and thus mimic a simple life-form: a Virus, 
which was the birth of the term (Rid, 2016, p. 189). The problem was that nobody saw this 
issue as a general problem because no-one anticipated that the experimental ARPANET 
would be used outside of academia or even on a global scale. In other words, the 
engineering-paradigm did not perceive computer security as a problem until it received 
wake-up calls during the 1980s.
During that time, pop-cultural references such as movies like Tron (1982), War 
Games (1983), or William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984) picked up the motive of 
rogue computer systems that gained an independent artificial intelligence and that 
threatened human life (see chap. 4.2.4 Artifact: The WELL and the Social Construction of 
Cyberspace (1980-1990)). War Games made the risks of computer hacking visual to the 
general public. The movie describes the digitalization and automation of the US nuclear 
arsenal, which is becoming controlled by an artificial intelligence called Joshua. A teenage 
computer hacker breaks into the command system of the US forces and tinkers around with 
simulations about nuclear first-strike scenarios. Believing it is a game, he almost 
accidentally initiates a thermonuclear war. The film ends with the conclusion that the only 
way to win would be not to play this war game. Although War Games was a science 
fiction movie, it was inspired by real hacking incidents prompted by young computer 
hackers. According to Kaplan, President Ronald Reagan was deeply impressed by the 
movie and asked his advisors "Could something like this really happen?" (Kaplan, 2016, p. 
chap. 1). A task-force concluded that there actually was a problem because nuclear 
command and control functions largely depended on computer networks that were 
potentially vulnerable. Thus, the movie was a trigger event and the first recognition of a 
security problem. Consequently for the first time it set the diagnostic and prognostic frame 
within the administration.
On September 17th 1984, President Reagan ordered the National Security Decision 
Directive Number 145: National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated 
Information Systems Security. The government realized that the "recent advances in 
microelectronics technology have stimulated an unprecedented growth in the supply of 
telecommunications and information processing services" (The White House, 1984). While 
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this trend seemed to be beneficial for the economy, it also created security challenges: 
"automated information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception, 
unauthorized electronic access, and related forms of technical exploitation, as well as other 
dimensions of the hostile intelligence threat" (The White House, 1984). Electronic systems 
of the government and of businesses are targets that can be exploited by foreign nations, 
terrorists and criminal elements. 
The directive formulated a new aim to assure the security of automated information 
systems as well as "classified national security information, and other sensitive 
government national security information" (ibid 2.) carried over networks such as 
ARPANET. Its general mission is to probe and vet the current communications 
infrastructure. For that purpose, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Systems Security Committee was founded, which included members of the intelligence 
community (FBI, NSA, CIA), the armed forces (Chiefs of army, Navy and Air Force) and 
the secretaries of commerce, transportation and energy. NSA was given the task of setting 
standards for computers because of its unique expertise, which was very controversial 
(Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 1). The result of this third order policy-change was the so-called 
"Rainbow series", a series of computer security guidelines published by the US 
Government between the 1980s and 1990s. The NSDD-145 was the first time the issue of 
computer security was brought to the political agenda and was formulated as a policy 
problem. It also alerted the US intelligence community: if someone from the outside could 
hack into US networks, the other way around was also possible. For example, when NSA 
realized the growth of computer vulnerabilities, it set up a Computer Security Center to 
combine Signals Intelligence and Information Security (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 1). Around 
the same time, the US House of Representatives started hearings on computer security that 
led to a series of laws, like the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act" (1984), "The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" (1986) and the "The Computer Security Act" (1987). 
In 1988, another shock moment happened that is described by some as the "fall of 
man" that thrust the Internet out of Eden (Landau, 2010, p. chap. 3.4). Graduate student 
Robert Morris launched one of the first computer worms that automatically spread through 
the ARPANET and disrupted about 1/10 of all devices connected, including Air Force 
computers (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 4). The Morris-worm had a self-replicating mechanism 
that allowed it to infect other machines. The computer science community at DARPA and 
the military command witnessed, for the first time, something resembling a cyber-crime. 
As a reaction to this shock, DARPA formed a Computer Emergency Response Team 
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(CERT)104 at Carnegie Mellon, thereby inventing the CERT-concept (Saalbach, 2015, p. 
58). These CERT teams were an institutionalized response to computer security breaches 
and became a common practice in the DoD and large businesses. CERT teams also began 
to measure cyber-security incidents such as viruses and network intrusions, as the 
following graph, released in 2003, shows.
Figure 24. Measured Computer Security Incidents in US Systems, Source: (The 
White House, 2003, p. 8)
While there were roughly a few hundred incidents during the 1980s that number increased 
to around 5000 in the mid 1990s and then skyrocketed in 1999 to over 10000 incidents. In 
2014, there were around 42,8 million incidents (117000 per day) globally, many of which 
represented automated network-probing and are not necessarily dangerous. Cyber-crime 
like data-theft or spam for economic gain is the motivation behind 62,3% most of the 
attacks, followed by espionage (24,9%) and hacktivism (10,2%). Only 2,5% are disruptive 
cyber-attacks, according to Data from Hackmageddon (Passeri, 2016). Just by the 
statistics, state-sponsored cyber-war is a less urgent issue compared with cyber-crime. The 
rise of network incidents correlates with the beginning mass diffusion of Internet 
connections worldwide: the more connections, the more potentially malign users and the 
more valuable targets. However, the peculiar thing is that the steadily growing number of 
incidents does not correlate with political awareness. Political awareness did not grow in a 
linear fashion, but happened in bursts that are hard to quantify. Healey argues that the 
history of cyber-security and cyber-war is a history of repeated slumber and wake-up calls, 
104 CERT Teams are a group of computer experts that handle computer security incidents, shutting down 
critical infrastructure, removing malware and enabling protection services. Nowadays, CERT team are a 
norm and regarded as essential for computer network security.
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as for example the Wargames story and the Morris-Worm showed (Healey & Grindal, 
2013). A dramatic incidence or a shock raises awareness, political action is taken and then 
the issue is forgotten again. Over time, every new headline reinforced the salience of the 
issue, representing an additive or cumulative effect. 
Another burst of awareness came in 1991 with a report from the National Research 
Council called Computers at Risk (National Research Council, 1991). In it, many of the 
nation’s top scientists (including some who worked on the ARPANET) highlighted the 
fundamental insecurity of current computer systems. The report started with a strong 
diagnostic framing: "The modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. 
Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb" 
(National Research Council, 1991, p. 7). The increasing proliferation of computer systems 
without security measures, the increasing number of software applications, the growing 
computer expertise within the general population and computer interconnection multiplied 
individual vulnerabilities (National Research Council, 1991, p. 1). The authors make it 
clear that computer security105 is not just a technical issue, but rather a social problem 
(National Research Council, 1991, p. 3). The report diagnoses a market-failure because the 
demand for trustworthy systems is concentrated in the defense community while basically 
ignoring public and business demands for computer security, such as public encryption for 
example (National Research Council, 1991, p. 146). 
The report had a substantial impact on the political establishment and also on the 
wider discourse. First, it influenced the development of the information warfare doctrine, 
which will be introduced in the next chapter. Second, it influenced the discussion about 
encryption, as the Clipper debate in the previous chapter showed (see chap. 4.3.5.1 Policy: 
The Clipper Chip (1993)). Third, it had an ideational and discursive effect, because this 
report set the tone for debate of the coming years. In a congressional hearing on that report, 
IT-security expert Winn Schwartau famously argued that government and commercial 
"computer systems are so poorly protected today that they can essentially be considered 
defenseless; essentially, an electronic Pearl Harbor waiting to occur" (U.S. Congress, 
1991). This was the first use of the electronic Pearl Harbor threat frame that was used in 
many attempts of IT-securitization from the 1990s until the present day (Hansen & 
Nissenbaum, 2009; Dunn Cavelty, 2013a). This frame became generally prevalent in 2011, 
as a later chapter will show and thus it can be argued that it represents the master frame for 
105 "Security refers to protection against unwanted disclosure, modification, or destruction of data in a system 
and also to the safeguarding of systems themselves. Security, safety, and reliability together are elements of 
system trustworthiness—which inspires the confidence that a system will do what it is expected to do" 
(National Research Council, 1991, p. 2).
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cyber-realism (see chap. 4.5.4 Discourse: Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of Cyber-
Realism). 
Another burst of awareness happened between 1997 and 1999 with the Eligible 
Receiver Simulation that uncovered network vulnerabilities and the 1998 Moonlight Maze 
incident were, military maps and troop configurations were stolen from the Pentagon. 
These events had an impact on the discourse on critical infrastructure protection that tilted 
the Clintonian cyber-utopianism more towards realism, as a following chapter will show 
(see chap. 4.4.4 Politics: Turn to Realism - Critical Infrastructure Initiative (1996-1999)). 
This is the reason why this episode of the Clinton administration is described in this 
chapter and not the previous one.
Another major burst of awareness came between 2007 and 2008 with the first large-scale 
cyber-attack on the nation of Estonia and the first use of hacking in a military scenario in 
Syria (Israeli Operation Orchard). The Pentagon, too, received a wake-up call with the 
intrusion into their classified and highly secure internal network by a malware called 
"agent.btz" in 2008. In the same year, the "Conficker Virus" affected millions of users and 
caused huge financial damage. These events led to the creation of the US Cybercommand, 
as another chapter will show (see chap. 4.5.3 Practice: Professionalization of Offensive 
Cyber-War & Surveillance). With an Internet penetration reaching roughly 80% of the US, 
and 20% of the world population in 2007, it can be argued that the political elite and the 
general public realized the significance of cyberspace and cyber-security somewhere 
between those years (see appendix Quantifying the Internet and the Digital Revolution). 
Finally, between 2010 and 2011, three hacking events made big news headlines: the 
so-called Sony hack, the actions of the hacktivists anonymous against Scientology, 
Defense Contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, VISA, Mastercard and Paypal after the 
Wikileaks affair. Finally, there was the revelation of the US-made Stuxnet virus that 
attacked Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities. These events lifted the former military 
discourse on cyber-security into the public domain. A more comprehensible table of events 
is listed in the appendix (see Table 9. List of Internet Milestones and Security Incidents). 
 Analytically, it can be argued that rather than one single shock moment, the 
continuity of cyber-security incidents had an additive, cumulative effect on the political 
awareness or problem recognition of these issues. This and the next chapters introduce 
some key events that led to the formation of the paradigm called cyber-realism, including 
the first political and technological responses to tackle the issue of computer insecurity. 
The ideational origins of this paradigm lie in the thinking about information warfare.
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4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)
The origins of what we now call cyber-war lies within the broader military concept of 
information war, which was developed shortly after the Vietnam War. The fact that the 
world’s most advanced military was not able to defeat its adversary in a jungle led to a 
general war-depression, the Vietnam syndrome. The US military began a soul-search, 
developing new strategies and ways of fighting war. Technology, automatization and 
modernization promised to reduce the duration and the human costs of war (Rid, 2016, p. 
362). Electronics already played a huge role in Vietnam. General Westmoreland coined the 
concept of electronic-warfare, a war of sensors and disruption of communications 
(Westmoreland, 1969). In 1976, shortly before DARPA tested the first TCP/IP-based inter-
network, DoD advisor Thomas P. Rona, developed the concept information war. He 
theorized a new strategy for defense based on the ongoing computerization of the military, 
driven by the Personal Computer revolution of the 1970s. 
The strategy "aims at depriving the attacker of the essential information required to 
structure an effective offense" (Rona, 1976, p. 1). Key processes in this new information 
warfare are: to disrupt (prevent the enemy from transmitting or receiving signals), to 
deceive (send erroneous signals without the enemy realizing their true nature and to 
provoke false decision-making) and to exploit ("to secure and use information extracted 
from enemy information links in order to improve our own decision process" (Rona, 1976, 
p. 32)). The idea was to target the enemy's command and control chain of command, for 
example by disrupting the communication link of intercontinental missiles, resulting in 
faulty targeting. Systems like the SAGE radar could be "hacked" by inserting false signals, 
simulating an army where there was none, which would result in false decision-making. 
Rona highlighted that there is no real conceptual difference between offensive exploitation 
of enemy information links and the defense of one’s own, because the technology used is 
essentially the same (Rona, 1976, p. 1). He also argued that cumulative mass collection of 
enemy data, driven by the aim to know as much about him as possible, while at the same 
time preventing the enemy’s data collection, is central to IW (Rona, 1976, p. 43). A similar 
idea was developed by Pentagon scientist William Perry who coined the term "counter 
command & control warfare" around the same time (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 1)
In 1983, former DARPA director Eberhart Rechtin further defined IW as the war of 
"sensors and signature control, between codes and cryptoanalysts, between military 
security and intelligence" (Rechtin, 1983, pp. 28-31). Rechtin combined the idea of a 
computer network with military organization: different parts of the armed forces would be 
integrated into one communications network so that the commander would have the 
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knowledge and the ability to talk to individual battle-groups. This network could distribute 
the communication flow from the chain of command. Later thinking would call this 
concept the "system of systems" approach (Owens, 1996) or "network centric warfare" 
(Gartska & Cebrowski, 1998) and inspire the construction of intelligence sharing networks. 
However, he also was aware of the risk of his plans. This network could be attacked and 
information from it stolen or manipulated. 
After this initial interest, the matter lay silent for a while or was probably hidden 
from the public’s eye. The Gulf-War campaign against Iraq in 1991 is regarded by some 
authors as the facilitating condition for a renewed interest in IW and its underlying 
technology (Mazarr, 1994; Morgan, 2000; Bacevich, 2013, p. 164). Between 1992 and 
1996, most documents on this issue were published. In the assessment of the war, two lines 
of thought developed. On the one hand, the Powell doctrine argued that overwhelming 
force was responsible for the success in Iraq. On the other hand, the alternative argument 
was that high-technology that facilitated the victory. The latter became a more convincing 
narrative because of the general techno-optimism of the time (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and 
Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism). For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Desert Storm "highlighted 
the increasing dependence of the US Armed Forces on information-based technologies and 
their powerful advantages" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996a, p. 2). The Gulf War put into 
practice Rona’s theoretical concept of digital counter-command and control warfare. For 
example, during Desert Storm, NSA Rear Admiral John Michael McConnell, a name that 
features prominently in the history of cyber-war,106 directed his Joint Intelligence Center to 
penetrate the Iraqi command and control network. Because American firms had built the 
Iraqi digital infrastructure, NSA knew the positions of central network switches carrying 
large portions of enemy troop communications. For the first time, NSA proposed the 
practice of hacking to be a weapon of war. The idea that were conceived during Desert 
Storm initiated a process that culminated in a new military doctrine in 1998 (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 1998).
A lot of doctrinal papers that are of significance were written during that time by the 
armed forces. They present the official, published line of reasoning and are the carriers of 
early forms of the cyber-realist paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s terms (see Cyber-Realism 
Corpus). They educate the next generation of paradigm holders (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms 
and Norm-Change). The IW initiative was mostly driven by the Department of Defense 
and the military agencies. They pushed IW on the political agenda in order to draft an 
106 Since there are many names advocating cyber-war over the course of time, a full list of key-actors from 
the US intelligence community can be found in the appendix.
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official military doctrine that matched the realities of a globalized, post Cold War security 
environment (Bacevich, 2002, pp. 131-136). The official IW doctrine documents (see 
appendix Cyber-Realism Corpus) give an overview over early cyber-realism, its ideas and 
norms. From the documents, I will extract problem definitions, core concepts, ideas and 
norms which will then be used to summarize the cyber-realist paradigm and its central 
elements. 
The official or public history of IW began in 1992, the same year Microsoft released 
Windows 3.1. Directive TS3600 Information Warfare a policy memorandum was issued by 
General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The original directive is still 
classified but a modified version was made public in 2006.107 The directive applies to most 
of the US military branches, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the defense & intelligence agencies 
and orders them to implement it throughout the 1990s. For the first time, it gives crucial 
definitions of information war and related concepts, like Information Operations (IO): 
"The integrated employment of core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), 
Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own" 
(Department of Defense, 2006, p. 1).
This definition clearly shows that IW originally was conceived as a broad meta-category of 
war-fighting that includes surveillance, espionage and intelligence operations as well as 
psychological operations, public affairs, propaganda and diplomacy from various sources. 
It included EW, such as the use of electromagnetic energy to jam enemy radar systems as 
well as the broad category of Computer Network Operations or what later is called cyber-
war. CNO are different operations like Computer Network Attacks (CNA),108 or what we 
nowadays call cyber-attacks, Computer Network Defense (CND)109 and Exploitation 
(CNE).110 This indicates that cyber-war should not be understood in isolation of those 
other concepts. CNA aims at the intrusion into enemy computers and computer networks 
107 Unfortunately, the difference between the first and later versions cannot be determined due to 
classification. However, it can be assumed that some core definitions and competencies are to be similar or 
even the same since they include concepts that can be traced back to Rechtin and Rona and other documents 
of that time-period. All further elaborations are based on the 2006 version (Number O-3600.01).
108 "Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves" (Department of Defense, 2006).
109 "Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD 
information systems and computer networks. […] CND also employs intelligence, counterintelligence, law 
enforcement, and other military capabilities to defend DoD information and computer networks" 
(Department of Defense, 2006).
110 "Enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated 
information systems or networks" (Department of Defense, 2006).
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in order to disrupt or destroy them, but also targets information stored in these systems. 
The directive is quite clear about the range and scope of those applications. The key goal 
of the DoD policy is:
"[…] Full spectrum dominance by taking advantage of information technology, 
maintaining U.S. strategic dominance in network technologies, and capitalizing 
upon near real-time global dissemination of information, to affect adversary 
decision cycles with the goal of achieving information superiority for the United 
States" (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 2).
The central cyber-realist goal of full spectrum dominance is refined further in other 
military doctrines throughout the 1990s. It is defined as an operational advantage based on 
the ability to collect and process large amounts of information while denying adversaries 
the same, for example by obstructing the decision-making process. The doctrine aims to 
integrate various military services as well as intelligence agencies into one coherent 
military cooperative (called joint operations) and outlines responsibilities for 
implementation. 
In sum, the Directive TS3600 Information Warfare is a rather legalistic and technical 
document that provides no contextual information, explanations or reasons why definitions 
are given or what necessities are driving the doctrine. It has a declaratory, commanding 
character. Because it is a rather complex doctrine, I subdivided the analysis into different 
chapters that follow the logic of paradigms. I start with a quick description of the initial 
euphoria in the face of of new digital weaponry that quickly turns into pessimism when the 
problems with interconnectivity are discovered. The problem definitions are central for 
cyber-realism since they influence and shape the goal formulation. After the problems I 
will discuss further concepts of the IW doctrine and then turn to its normative implications.
4.4.2.1 Optimistic Cyber-Realism: Revolution in Military Affairs (1992-2000)
When reading the early 1992 US doctrine on information warfare, one gets the impression 
of a great euphoria because new digital technologies promised to win wars easily by 
remotely manipulating the enemy's chain of command. This enabled the US to overcome 
the Vietnam syndrome. The euphoria was called a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 
the competing line of thought to the Powell-doctrine of overwhelming force. This optimist 
military theory was formulated in 1992 with the Office of Net Assessment Report 
(Krepinevich, 1992). The report was a reaction to the Russian military thinking of the mid-
1980s. Around the same time when Rona and Rechtin began to think about information 
war, Soviet military strategists theorized about a revolution in military affairs driven by 
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information technologies and precision-guided weaponry. Russians called the integration 
of the two "reconnaissance strike complex". They also predicted the possibility of 
"electronic fire operations" on enemy communication lines, which could be interpreted as 
cyber-attacks. The Office of Net Assessment Report tried to test the assumption whether 
such a revolution was indeed happening and thus it provides the larger, intellectual context 
and explanations of strategies and guidelines in the 1992 DoD Directive on information 
war. 
The RMA-theory assumes that new technological advances, together with new 
military operational concepts and strategies that exploit these technologies,111 can alter the 
conduct or nature of war itself (Krepinevich, 1992, p. 3). It is an argument based on 
technological determinism that positions technology as the driver for social change. RMA 
argues that two key technologies change the nature of war: information communication 
technology (ICT) and precision-guided weaponry like cruise-missiles (with satellite 
targeting). These played a crucial role in the First Gulf War of 1991. 
Computer communications networks such as the early ARPANET and the Internet 
played a key role in this concept because they ought to be combined with military 
weaponry and their supporting infrastructure. In theoretical terms, this represents a new 
form of social embeddedness of computer networks (see chap. 2.3.5 Phase Model of 
Technological Diffusion) All military systems would be integrated into one "network of 
systems" (or systems architecture). These inter-networked forces would be able to 
exchange real-time battlefield information and thus would gain superior knowledge, 
overcoming the "fog and friction of war". In later military thinking, these ideas would 
result in military-built technical artifacts called "the Global Command and Control 
System" (Edmonds, 1996), "WARNET" (McCarthy, 1997) or the Global Information 
GRID (Department of Defense, 2007). The data stored in these networks would be 
accessible by all weapons platforms. Cruise missiles could acquire targeting information 
and the "soldier of the future" (Edmonds, 1996) on the field, equipped with electronic 
devices, could access real-time data from the battlefield from orbiting spy satellites or 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).112 
The result would be a better organized and more efficient force projection, "to pierce 
the opponent’s jugular vein on the first throw" (Owens, 1996, p. 4). The goal is to gain "a 
comprehensive understanding of a state as a political, social, economic and military 
111 A common example is the use of new tank technology within the operational concept of Blitzkrieg (rapid 
advances of armored forces) in WW2, which proved to be superior than the competing French military 
paradigm of defensive war based on the Maginot line.
112 RMA concepts gave the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles a boost that led to combat drones 
such as the Predator (Blom, 2010).
4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism
278
organism" (Krepinevich, 1992, p. 12). This is not just about militarily relevant information 
such as troop size or status and position of enemy tanks, but goes much deeper:
"Information dominance, as used here, is defined as a superior understanding of a 
(potential) adversary’s military, political, social, and economic structures, to 
include their strengths, weaknesses, locations, and degrees of interdependence, 
while denying an adversary similar information on friendly assets" (Krepinevich, 
1992, p. 22).
Information about all vital functions of an adversary state are to be collected, processed 
and analyzed in order to get inside the enemy's head (Harris, 2014, p. Prologue). This 
includes comprehensive knowledge of heads of states, close advisory circles and all 
information-links at the enemy’s command and control decision-making infrastructure. 
The social and economic functions of a state are to be understood in order to determine 
exploitable weaknesses. A comprehensive knowledge of all other states is the core aim. 
The optimistic belief is that gathering as much information as possible will result in 
superior knowledge. If sufficient information is gathered, then the second component 
becomes active. In case of war, the center of gravity would then be hit by GPS-guided 
cruise missiles or drone-strikes on targets. That is one reason why information dominance 
includes knowledge about the physical whereabouts of state leaders (geo-location). The 
concept of "leadership decapitation" follows logically from RMA-thinking. In fact, the 
drone war is just a logical outcome of these developments that were started in the early 
1990s and clearly exemplifies the political influence of RMA-thought.
Building upon this RMA narrative, Jon Arquilla and David Ronfeldt published a 
widely regarded RAND article called "Cyberwar is coming!" (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993), 
a warning that has been uttered repeatedly until the present day. They too, argued that 
overwhelming force and military budget are irrelevant if the enemy's strikes against ones 
digital chain of command. With the ongoing information revolution, information would 
become a strategic resource. Those who control and posses as much information as 
possible, while denying the adversary the same, would be dominant in this age. Hierarchies 
would be inefficient compared to new network-centric forms of organization, which follow 
naturally from the information revolution. In their view, there would be two kinds of war: 
"’netwar’—societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through internetted modes of 
communication—and 'cyberwar’ at the military level" (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993, p. 27). 
Netwar refers to psychological operations and propaganda by smaller, asymmetric enemies 
like terrorists. Cyber-war revolves around the destruction and disruption of the enemy’s 
information systems, crippling the enemy's command and control. They argue that 
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"cyberwar may be to the 21st century what blitzkrieg was to the 20th century" (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 1993, p. 31).
The appeal of this new mode of warfare was obvious, especially with the Vietnam 
syndrome in mind. The US was the technologically most advanced country in the world, so 
it seemed obvious, at least for a while that it would benefit from this revolution. It had 
advanced sensors and superior precision-strike capability. It also had information 
dominance with its vast array of satellites and its global spy network Echelon. In 1995, 
General Jay Garner brought the optimist RMA narrative into the public by giving an 
interview with Time magazine. He argued that because of new information technologies, 
war would be revolutionized. A war, theoretically, could be ended before it began, without 
the loss of human life, which was a major concern after Vietnam (Thompson & Waller, 
1995). The prospect of winning a war by digital means by disrupting the enemy's 
command and control before an attack seemed promising (Rid, 2016, p. 371).
However, this optimism was only one side of the story that quickly vanished when 
NSA and others realized in secrecy, that the very same principles of information war could 
be turned against the United States. Over the course of the 1990s, optimism about the 
digital revolution turned into pessimism. The Internet quickly became a problem, 
especially for Signals Intelligence agencies like NSA. The next chapter will introduce the 
problem definitions that lie at the core of cyber-realism.
4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism
This chapter analyzes the central ideas of cyber-realism and their evolution. Thomas Kuhn 
argues that one characteristic of a paradigm is that it defines what counts as a problem. 
What constitutes a problem for a paradigm is based on the perception of the world. The 
characteristics of the problem define appropriate solution strategies (see chap. 2.2 
Paradigms and Norm-Change). This chapter identifies the core problems that the cyber-
realism identifies with the unfolding Internet during the 1990s. These problems are the 
foundation for a cyber-realist technological frame that defines norms and policies in order 
to deal with the unfolding digital revolution.
Most of the analyzed doctrinal papers start with a diagnosis of the impact of new ICT 
on traditional military and state conduct (see appendix Cyber-Realism Corpus). Like their 
utopian counterparts, they diagnose a transformative power of the Internet that is indicated 
with terms like the "explosive proliferation of ICT" or "technological/information 
revolution" ushering in the "Information Age" or a "new frontier", which are widely used 
metaphors in these documents. For example:
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"The information age is here. Rapidly advancing information-based technologies 
and an increasingly competitive global environment have thrust information into 
center stage in society, government, and warfare in the 21st Century" (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 1996a).
This tech-deterministic argument serves as a diagnostic frame and is line with Kuhn’s 
assumptions that new paradigms often turn to epistemology and ontology, defining what 
the nature of things are (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 73-88). A revolutionary character or a 
transformative power is attributed to the Internet and ICT in general (Feaver, 1998, p. 98). 
It is believed that the Internet will change everything, social order and the conduct of war 
and there is no escape from it. Technological progress is the driving force to which social 
reality has to adapt. In that regard it is similar to cyber-utopian thinking. That cyber-
realists pick up utopian frames shows the discursive dominance of these. While this change 
is positive for utopians, it produces a set of problems for military impact constituencies 
(see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). The problems are directly related to the 
technical design of the Internet:
"Within the last decade, personal computers, workstations, data bases, and 
mainframes have been interconnected into distributed information networks. This 
interconnection is continuing at an ever-increasing rate. Through the Internet and 
other data networks, government networks are interconnected with commercial 
networks, which are interconnected with military networks, which are 
interconnected with financial networks, which are interconnected with the networks 
that control the distribution of electrical power, and so on. It is now almost 
impossible to distinguish where one network ends and another begins in this 
extensive and complex information Infrastructure" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, 
pp. 1-4).
The core logic of TCP/IP, linking networks together into a large inter-network, is 
perceived as problematic because all different kinds of networks (military, government, 
banking) are interconnected in one large, increasingly globe-spanning communication 
structure. Interconnectivity, one of the goals and norms of the engineering-paradigm, is 
seen as a problem. As I have shown in the chapter on technical affordances of TCP/IP, 
networks within the Internet are not aware of the overall structure and it is difficult to 
shield sub-networks like military nets from intrusion (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet 
Protocols and Norms). Theoretically, it is possible to enter every network in the Internet, 
given that access controls and security measures (Firewalls etc.) can be circumvented. 
Computer researchers quickly reached the conclusion that the only way around this 
problem is "air gapping", to physically disconnected sensitive networks from the internet 
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infrastructure (Aitel, 2013). The problem definition has two major dimensions, dependency 
and vulnerability, which each produce a subset of minor problem definitions.
First, it is argued that the US Government, the economy and the military are 
dependent on this infrastructure. 
"The national security posture of the United States is becoming increasingly 
dependent on U.S. infrastructures. These infrastructures are highly interdependent, 
particularly because of the internetted nature of the information components and 
because of their reliance on the national information infrastructure" (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1996b, p. 1).
Indeed, some observers estimated that even in 1996, 95% of military command and 
control communication was transmitted through public-switched networks, i.e. the Internet. 
(O’Neill, 1997). The "internetted nature" is perceived as a problem. This dependency 
spans across all societal sectors: military, economy, politics and society in general. 
Financial transactions are done electronically as well as maintenance and control of the 
electric energy network. The general gist of the argument is that an information- or 
network-economy such as the US requires the Internet to function. 
The second problem dimension is that this new ICT infrastructure, and everything 
connected to it, is vulnerable to information war and CNO, as developed by the US. In 
other words, the US could become the target of the same techniques it wants to apply to 
others:
"Today’s concept of national security extends beyond military protection of of 
borders, and is based on connectedness. Disruption, denial, or destruction of 
government, commercial, utility, or social-service infrastructures is unthinkable; 
even the temporary loss of service due to a natural disaster can have effects that 
ripple throughout society. The use of information technologies to simplify, 
enhance, or speed operations has led to massive dependence and, consequently, 
critical vulnerability" (O’Neill, 1997, p. 189).
The structure of this argument stays the same during the whole cyber-war discourse, 
even until the present day (see chap. 4.5.4 Discourse: Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of 
Cyber-Realism). This RMA-inspired idea of strategic cyberwar assumes that a strike on 
this internetworked infrastructure could cascade through the network and therefore could 
disrupt or destroy everything else connected to it. This is the worst-case scenario and at the 
same time the master frame for legitimizing the cyber-war doctrine. It is argued that a 
cyber-attack against a internetworked system X (where X could be replaced by any 
electronic system such as online-banking, air-traffic & transportation, communications 
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networks etc.) could (in theory) bring the entire operation of connected systems to a halt 
and therefore cripple a society depending on these infrastructures, causing death and 
physical harm.113 In short, it is assumed that cyber-attacks can shut down an entire nation. 
In discourses, the clearest expression of this master-frame is the "digital Pearl Harbor" 
metaphor that was coined in 1992 and constantly reiterated by cyber-realist advocates such 
as Bill Clinton’s national security advisor, and George W. Bush’s "cyber-czar" Richard W. 
Clarke in 2002:
"A coordinated cyber attack on the nation’s critical computer networks. Such an 
attack could well succeed in shutting down 911 systems, shutting down telephone 
networks, and transportation systems. You black out a city, people die. Black out 
lots of cities, lots of people die. It’s as bad as being attacked by bombs" (Bacevich, 
2002, p. 120).
Besides the "crippling blow thesis", IW theorists deduce a whole range of other 
threats and dangers from the dependency and vulnerability argument. For example:
"The lack of geographical, spatial, and political boundaries offers further 
anonymity and legal and regulatory arbitrage; this lack also invalidates previously 
established "nation-state" sanctuaries. Information warfare is also relatively cheap 
to wage, offering a high return on investment for resource-poor adversaries" (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, pp. 1-5).
One part of that vulnerability argument is for example "the availability and relatively low 
cost of these technologies in global markets that "increase the likelihood of an adversary 
buying and using IW technology (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996a). Since the 1991 Computers 
at Risk Study from the National Research Council (National Research Council, 1991), the 
argument is brought forward that a skilled individual can do more with a cheap computer 
than a terrorist with a bomb. Indeed, the history of hacking incidents (see Table 9. List of 
Internet Milestones and Security Incidents) indicates that skilled, young computer geeks 
indeed were able to infiltrate insecure communications systems. Individual and collective 
hackers became a threat figure during the 1990s, just as cyber-utopians predicted (see 
chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)). Computers were 
becoming cheaper during the 1990s, which facilitated their massive diffusion. This 
availability of knowledge produced "rapid growth of a computer-literate population" 
113 A common feature of IW and cyber-war literature is the similar narrative structure. Articles first diagnose 
a revolutionary change, point to dependency and vulnerability and then typically provide a list of critical 
infrastructures that are interconnected and then include a threat argument that hypothesis a terror-attack or a 
critical failure. This discursive mechanism has been extensively researched (Deibert, 2003; Dunn Cavelty, 
2007; Dunn Cavelty, 2013a; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009).
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whose members "possess the skills necessary to conduct such an attack" (President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). This might be an implicit 
recognition of the "empowerment thesis" that is mostly brought forward by cyber-utopians 
(see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism). In general, "threats include, 
but are not limited to, computer hackers, criminals, vandals, terrorists, and nation states" 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, pp. I-15).
"Easy access", "cheap hardware" and "knowledge diffusion" to launch cyber attacks 
are seen as a key problem for the state. The argument here is that cyber-war favors or 
empowers the weak while making high-tech information economies more vulnerable 
(Lindsay, 2013, p. 375). It is argued that everyone could be an information-warrior because 
"much of the technology needed to attack information systems is low-cost (a computer, a 
modem), widely available (a willing hacker) and just as efficient (one phone call)" 
(Thompson & Waller, 1995). Why is this problematic? Because the cyber-realist paradigm 
sees ICT and information as a weapon, which will be elaborated on a little later. For now, 
the list of problem definitions needs to be completed.
Another perceived problem is the global nature of the Internet technology because, at 
the time, it became truly world-wide. Three problems are central: "the lack of state 
borders", the "death of distance problem" and "the problem of international jurisdiction". 
These problems were recognized in official government documents for the first time in 
1996. It makes sense to discuss them together because they all have to do with the way 
TCP/IP was designed. The Inter-network has no intelligence of physical space and 
therefore it does not know what borders are. Packets randomly choose the most efficient 
route through a network and do not even notice that they travel through different networks 
or national jurisdictions. Therefore, packets do not recognize government borders. 
Dynamic routing is so fast that distance is ultimately reduced: packets or a message can 
reach the other end of the world in less than 3 milliseconds. Because of the norm of 
openness, there is no content or usage restriction. This means that all kinds of digital 
information (including malware, propaganda, pornography and cyber-attacks) can stream 
into a network in the form of packets. The openness norm is perceived as a dual-edged 
sword by cyber-realists:
"The speed of information warfare attacks, coupled with near-anonymous offensive 
capabilities, makes it difficult to differentiate the nature and source of possible 
attacks. While information systems and network management tools (e.g., access 
logs, intrusion detection systems) offer possible sources for I&W, the government 
does not own or have complete access to these sources and does not have the 
authority to monitor them" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, p. 106).
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The result is that network operators (and governments) can no longer control what 
digital information enters the US Internet from the global outside. The IW doctrine clearly 
states that the government does not (yet) have the authority to monitor a nation’s Internet. 
Both the speed of information and the sweeping nature of data transmission produce 
two implications for actors concerned with national security, intelligence and law 
enforcement: first, an information war-attack can be launched from another jurisdiction 
and arrives at the target instantaneously. In other words, there is no pre-warning 
mechanism like with conventional attacks (Molander et al., 1996, p. xiv). Second, a target 
could strike from everywhere on the globe, as long it is connected to the Internet. Geo-
strategic features such as oceans or mountains are non-existent in cyberspace. Distance 
does not protect anymore because in cyberspace, adversaries are virtually in close 
proximity to each other. This is what is meant by the death of distance metaphor. 
The third problem is that of jurisdiction. The Internet is described as an infrastructure 
"over which the government has little control" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, p. 1). Because 
of the decentrality of network design, large portions of the Internet operate outside the 
control of governments. 95% of the physical and digital Internet infrastructure is run by 
private entities over which the government has only indirect influence. The 1990s were 
dominated by economic deregulation, which gave government regulation, for example of 
Internet content, a bad reputation (see chap. 4.3.4 Artifacts: Privatizing Control over the 
Internet). Internationally the physical infrastructure is decentralized as well: it is located 
within different countries and jurisdictions. No government can simply super-impose 
control and regulation over the entire infrastructure, at least not as easily as in other areas 
of government regulation.
A closely related issue that was discovered during the mid 1990s is that TCP/IP 
provides a basic level of anonymity. The idea that "on the Internet, nobody knows you are 
a dog" was a common perspective in thinking about the Internet during the 1990s and was 
also adopted by cyber-utopians (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-
Utopianism). This also has implications for IW because it "offers a veil of anonymity to 
potential attackers" because they "can hide in the mesh of internetworked systems and 
often use previously conquered systems to launch their attacks" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1996b, p. 5). This problem would later be called the attribution problem. It is defined as 
"assigning a cause to an action […] identifying the agent responsible for the action 
(specifically, "determining the identity or location of an attacker or an attacker’s 
intermediary") (Clark & Landau, 2011, p. 25). It describes difficulties of monitoring and 
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tracing what an actor (represented by an IP-address) is doing online. The IT-community 
was aware of this problem since the Morris worm of 1985 and intelligence actors began 
pondering the issue since the mid-1990s. Not knowing who is responsible for an action in 
cyberspace (like an CNA) has severe ramifications for the use of the Internet for war and 
surveillance, deterrence, coercion and retaliation, as scholars like Libicki (Libicki, 2009) 
and Rid (Rid, 2012) argue. The attribution problem is both a technical and a social or 
political problem (Landau, 2010, p. chap 3.7).
On the technical side, the problem has to do with how TCP/IP was designed because 
"typical computer network environments are not designed to support attribution of 
attackers" (Wheeler & Larsen, 2003, p. 4). TCP/IP was not designed to monitor what an 
actor does on the Internet (internal intelligence) and this is a logical obstacle for any actor 
who wants to determine this fact (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet Protocols and Norms). 
For example, to trace a CNA or CNE to its original IP-address would require the log-
protocols114 of every intermediary node (router) through which packets of the attack were 
routed. As has been shown, one packet easily crosses several jurisdictions and most 
messages (depending on size) consist of hundreds, if not thousands of packets that are all 
routed randomly through different subnetworks and countries. Obtaining log files that 
(might) indicate which IP-address launched a cyberattack is difficult. Obtaining this 
logging information from foreign governments can be a huge legal and diplomatic 
obstacle. It gets particularly complicated if the packets are routed through failed states with 
weak law enforcement or a botnet of remote-controlled computers. This is what the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff paper means when it says that "the government does not own or have 
complete access to these sources and does not have the authority to monitor them" (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, p. 106). 
Additionally, TCP/IP has no authentication mechanism built in that guarantees that a 
packet indeed originated from a source.115 This weakness allows for a practice called 
"spoofing", the faking of an IP-address (Clark & Landau, 2011, p. 27). As a result, even if 
one could retrieve the source IP address for a cyberattack there is no guarantee that the 
attack really originated from this location. Another problem is interference with routing. 
114 Most computers and routers in a network produce log files that document every activity of that server. 
These files for example document incoming and outgoing packets, data flow in the network and general 
system activity. These logs are essential for system maintenance and security because they document time, 
date, and location of possible intrusion and sometimes even file access, or bandwidth use. They are therefore 
substantially important pieces of digital evidence to investigate cyber attacks (Chaikin, 2007).
115 "The weakness in IP is that a source host itself fills the source address field in the header of an outbound 
IP datagram. In theory, any host can transmit an IP datagram with any source address. […] There is no 
guarantee that a datagram was actually sent from a given source" (Mutaf, 1999, pp. 18-19). In contrast, 
intelligent-network designs such as X.25 would allow easer network surveillance and therefore identification 
of packet-origins.
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There are easy-to-use technologies available (such as Virtual Private Networks or Onion 
Routing) that allow artificial re-routing. An attacker can direct his attack through another 
country to give the impression that it originated there, increasing the possibility of false-
flag attribution (Lindsay, 2013, p. 377). Finally, most cyber-attacks are multi-staged, as the 
Joint Staffs recognized. "Computer A penetrates computer B, which is used as a platform 
for penetrating computer C, which in turn is attacks computer D" (Clark & Landau, 2011, 
p. 1). Even if it were possible to trace the IP-address of the attacking computer D, this does 
not necessary mean that the attack really originated there. 
Besides the problem of technical attribution, there is the problem of social 
attribution. An IP-address identifies a machine or in many cases just a local-area network, 
but not the human operator. How do we know who did it, if the origin-IP address is an 
Internet cafe with an open WIFI network, where every passing computer or mobile phone 
could get access to? To assess the identity of the originator, further sources of data are 
needed. In most cases, trace evidence from the application layer (for example login 
information of webservices or billing addresses) is used for that. To attribute Internet 
activity to an actor requires multiple kinds of data, or in other words – better more than 
less. This is a strong impetus for the idea of mass data collection. The attribution problem 
explains why most cyber-attacks can just be vaguely attributed and why political 
statements regarding state-sponsorship of CNA must always be critically evaluated. The 
possibility for false attribution and political instrumentalization is tremendously high. 
It should have become clear by now that besides opportunities for interconnected 
systems of systems and the exploitation of the information space for military and 
intelligence actors, the Internet technology creates a set of core problems (dependency, 
vulnerability, geographic problems and the problem of attribution) for their own military 
operations, law enforcement and intelligence gathering. Thus, the Internet is predominantly 
seen in negative terms by impact constituencies tasked with national security. These 
problems can be, in most cases, traced back directly to how the Internet works and how 
TCP/IP was designed. This diagnosis is central because it provides the fundament for 
solution strategies which basically aim at solving issues such as traceability of cyber-
attacks by exercising total control over the Internet. Before we turn to that, it is important 
to look at other ideas and norms that develop in the early information warfare doctrine. 
These other ideas further contextualize the perceived problems and create a coherent 
meaning network that frames the issue of computer security from a concrete, military 
security perspective.
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4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace
Before we turn to solutions to the aforementioned problems, it is necessary to analyze 
some of the key ideas of cyber-realism. The aim here is to show how ideas from the IW 
concept lay the foundation for the norm that the state, represented through its military, 
should exert control over information systems like the Internet. In this early stage, the 
norm is not clearly pronounced but it is implied in the logic of IW. These documents 
understand control as the ability to monitor information traversing the global information 
infrastructure. Control includes the ability to disrupt and alter information traversing the 
Internet on the content layer. This later gets expanded to include the workings and 
functionality of this very infrastructure at the physical layer.
As indicated before, information is the central concept in IW. Information is defined 
as "perceived phenomena (data) and the instructions required to interpret that data and give 
it meaning" (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1995, p. 2). For the military, precise and 
timely information, for example knowledge of enemy positions, is crucial for war fighting. 
It is believed to mitigate the effects of the so-called "fog of war", a metaphor invented by 
Carl von Clausewitz describing uncertainty on the battlefield resulting from unclear 
information (Bacevich, 2002, p. 133). The Air Force (1996) and the Joint Chiefs argue that 
war is about the competition of information, which might be "as old as human conflict […] 
a defining characteristic of humanity" (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1995, p. 1). This 
implies an instrumental character for gaining an advantage in a battle situation. A central 
element of the paradigm is a new relevance that is attributed to information: "Information 
itself is becoming a strategic resource vital to national security" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1996a, p. 19), a "strategic asset" (Schwartau, 1997, p. 49), or ultimately a weapon 
(Rechtin, 1983). This is a key element of cyber-realism:
"Knowledge as a resource is not included in the current resource paradigm of 
manpower, materiel, money, forces, and logistics. Knowledge, the "ammunition" of 
information war, is inexhaustible. Once produced (at a cost), knowledge can be 
used repeatedly – it will not disappear. In fact, it only increases! Digital knowledge 
can be copied and never missed. It can be given away but still kept. Digital 
knowledge can be distributed instantly" (Fast, 1997, p. 12). 
The idea of information as a weapon that can be exploited against adversaries whose 
societal functions depend on the distribution and processing of information (i.e. 
information economies) is one of the central ideas in the cyber-realist paradigm. This 
frame legitimizes and normalizes the mass acquisition of information by military actors. 
Weapons and the use of force seem to fall naturally into the domain of the military. In 
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other words, military actors position themselves as the appropriate actor for the job. The 
newly discovered relevance of information is presented as an utterly new element in 
military thinking. This idea is the fundament for understanding many related cyber-realist 
concepts like espionage, exploitation of information and disruption of communication 
flows. If information is valuable, then exploitation and espionage is a kind of theft. It is 
driven by the fear that someone uses this weapon against ones own infrastructure. It also 
legitimizes the military asserting a role as defender against these issues, which is its 
primary function in a state. It also explains the ultimate goal of IW: "We must have 
information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted 
flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same" 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996c, p. 16).116 
 The goals are to be reached with the instrument of Information Operations. IO, the 
use of computer hacking and exploitation are described as appropriate tools for the end of 
information superiority. IO directly target information (the content) as well as information 
systems (i.e. the delivery structure such as computers & networks) in order to affect an 
adversary's decision-making process. Again, if information is a weapon, then the 
destruction or disruption of that weapon or its supporting infrastructure, becomes an 
appropriate military goal. Computer networks that are used in command and control are of 
special importance here. Offensive IO, such as computer network attacks play a special 
role. The idea of intrusion into the digital infrastructure of an enemy in order to either 
passively monitor or actively alter information in data-bases resembles Rona’s idea of 
digital deception. Therefore, CNA and CNE are twin-concepts or two sides of the same 
medal. Both attack and exploitation require first and foremost an infiltration of enemy 
systems via security weaknesses, backdoors or social engineering (Wilson, 2006, p. 5). 
Once inside a computer system/network, analysis is required to identify ways to shut down 
or disrupt a system which at the same time is exploitation and intelligence gathering. Only 
the end-product (the payload) of the operation differs – exploitation aims at data 
exfiltration or manipulation and tries to mask its presence, whereas disruption (CNA) 
produces visible effects. CNE is a logical precondition for CNA and CNE is the more 
valuable operation, because it extracts valuable information that is required for CNA 
(Lewis, 2002, pp. 7-9). For the key goal of information superiority, computer network 
exploitation is the far more important (policy) instrument (see chap. 2.2.3 Degrees of 
116 Bacevich argues that the aim is "to achieve something approaching omnipotence" (Bacevich, 2013, p. 
133).
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Change). In sum, although spectacular cyber-attacks dominate the news, it is very likely 
that the number of undetected CNE is way higher.
The official US doctrine is quite transparent about the designated targets of computer 
espionage (U.S. Air Force, 1998). The doctrine adopts the holistic or organic perspective 
that was outlined by the RMA theory (see chap. 4.4.2.1 Optimistic Cyber-Realism: 
Revolution in Military Affairs (1992-2000)). Targets include enemy heads of states as well 
as leading economic and social figures. It is a state-centric approach, another similarity to 
realism as an IR theory. All vital functions of a state are targets of IO – energy and 
financial infrastructure, manufacturing, telecommunications. It basically targets everything 
within a society and particularly critical infrastructures that guarantee the basic operation 
of a state. 
It is furthermore argued that IO have the "greatest impact in peace and the initial 
stages of a crisis" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, p. viii). Intelligence gathering, CNA and 
CNE are to be conducted in peace and war and this somewhat makes sense from a military 
perspective. It is logical to be prepared, to have targeting lists and contingency plans in 
case of war. However, the idea basically transcends the notion of war having a clear-cut 
beginning and end. IW is permanent, in peace and in war. It need not be declared, which 
has severe legal implications, which are not discussed in the major doctrines (Bitton, 
2014). 
It is total in the sense that the distinction between offense and defense is blurred 
because "offensive IO also can support defensive IO […] because they are so interrelated 
[…]" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, pp. 3-13-14). Other military thinkers would go as far and 
argue:
"Traditional distinctions—public versus private interests, warlike versus criminal 
behavior—and geographic boundaries, such as those between nations as 
historically defined, are complicated by the growing interaction within the 
information infrastructure" (Molander et al., 1996, p. xiii).
The blurring of traditional dichotomies like war–peace, front–homeland, public–private, 
war–crime is a reoccurring theme in scholarly articles about the Internet of that time and is 
also articulated by cyber-utopians. This has to do with the way the Internet is perceived. 
Since the Internet transcends traditional geography and connects all mankind through one 
network, the distinction between homeland and front-line does not make sense anymore. It 
is quite interesting how the military actually perceives this infrastructure.
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The military aligns itself partly with the idea of the Information Superhighway (see 
chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway (1993)). It talks about 
the so-called Global Communication Infrastructure (GII)117 which includes the US 
National Infrastructure (NII) and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). This 
includes all communication channels that can store or transmit any kind of information 
(News, Media, Internet). The definition includes both the software (databases) and 
hardware of this information structure (like fiber-optic cables) and is therefore more 
precise than cyber-utopian ideas of a predominantly digital and virtual cyberspace. 
Cyberspace indeed has a hardware base that operates under different conditions than 
software protocols. With hardware, geopolitics and military force matters, because it can 
be physically destroyed. Most of the physical infrastructure of the Internet is located at 
dense metropolitan areas and diffused along areas with substantial economic relevance, 
whereas in remote areas no broad-band Internet can be found (Botnet, 2012). The physical 
infrastructure of cyberspace is not as space-less and immaterial as utopians assume. 
However, cyber-realism still has a somewhat metaphysical understanding of this global 
information structure. The Internet is understood as a realm:
"In many respects, one can consider information as a realm, just as land, sea, air, 
and space are realms, information has its own characteristics of motion, mass, and 
topography, just as air, space, sea, and land have their own distinct characteristics. 
There are strong conceptual parallels between conceiving of air and information as 
realms. […] But the Information Age changed the information realm’s 
characteristics so that widespread military operations within it became practical" 
(U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1995, p. 6).
Defining the Internet as an operational domain or realm is noteworthy because it 
implies that the military plays an appropriate role therein. The military asserts a role, it 
claims a stake or it begins to "colonize" cyberspace to use utopian frames (see chap. 4.2.5 
Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic Frontier (1990s)). More so, based on the realist 
belief in the centrality of the state, it claims to be the dominant actor therein. Interestingly, 
the notion of the realm or domain implicitly builds upon the cyber-utopian metaphor of 
cyberspace as a distinct digital space that has certain properties. Cyber-realists and 
utopians frame the same thing, the Internet, in similar ways but reach different 
interpretations and conclusions. Cyberspace is said to have the aforementioned distinctive 
117 "The GII is the worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, data bases, and 
consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users. It encompasses a wide range 
of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact 
disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites and satellite ground stations, fiber-optic transmission lines, 
networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, pp. I-13f.).
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characteristics (like the lack of borders, death of distance etc.). Cyber-realists assume that 
it functions similar to material realms, but is yet different because it is a man-made, digital 
construct. In sum it can be argued that cyber-utopian and realist ideas are two sides of the 
same coin. They operate with similar assumptions about the nature of this new technology 
and assign similar technological frames (such as the death of geography or the ideas of a 
distinct cyberspace). However, they perceive the same thing differently. Military actors 
focus, as it seems to be in their operational DNA, on the negative aspects and the potential 
threats to national security while utopians focus on the positive side of things.
Implicit in these ideas are certain norms, which will be distilled in the next chapter.
4.4.2.4 Analyzing Emerging Norms of Cyber-Realism
This chapter analyzes the normative implications of the IW doctrine. It shows how certain 
ideas and problem definitions construct certain imperatives for action that over time 
become normalized until they are seen as standards of appropriate behavior. In line with 
Kuhn, norms emerged out of the problem-solving practices of cyber-realists (see chap. 2.2 
Paradigms and Norm-Change). Initially, these norms were not completely articulated, 
mature or even dominant outside the context of military and IC. 
The first point is the perceived chaos and lack of control of the Internet that is seen 
as potentially dangerous for national security of the US. The Internet is said to enable 
small actors engaging in offensive attacks and no one knows what is going on because 
technical features of TCP/IP prevent visibility. The protocols create an artificial "fog of 
war" because no central watchtower is able to see what actors are doing on the Internet. 
Anonymity and the attribution problem prevent control. Exerting authority by states is 
complicated by TCP/IP because there is no central activity logging. From this perceived 
core problem follows a powerful imperative: the US should be able to know what is going 
on.
Second, IW claims that the military should have information dominance, i.e. 
awareness of information traversing the global information infrastructure. Because this is 
not easily possible, this dominance should be achieved through information operations, 
defined as computer network attacks, espionage and defense. Inspired by techno-optimism 
and the RMA tradition, new technological capabilities and strategies are seen as the 
solution to this problem.
Third, from this follows a kind of strategic imperative for the mass accumulation of 
data. Information is treated as a resource that should be collected and massively 
accumulated to gain information superiority over the enemy. Following from the 
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Clausewitzean notion of war, more information about the battlefield is always better. This 
includes a holistic approach and social, economic and political information.
Fourth, treating information as a weapon serves to legitimize the military's role in 
cyberspace, because the use of force and violence falls into the natural turf of the military. 
This is further extended by the rhetoric framing of hacking, i.e. the intrusion into foreign 
networks as an computer network attack. This militarized language legitimizes the role of 
the military, as Dunn Cavelty argues (Dunn Cavelty, 2013a). In theoretical terms, this 
framing represents an attempt to counter-signify the Internet, giving the technology a new 
meaning (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the Frameworks). Framing the Internet as dangerous 
creates the need to defend the US from adversaries that develop computer network 
capabilities. During the mid-1990s, however, this language is contained within military 
discourses and not very public, thus it serves more the function of internal sense-making.
Fifth, defining cyberspace as a distinct military realm or domain serves to assert this 
role. It is an attempt to claim the stake that the military has a role to play in cyberspace. 
This is noteworthy because this infrastructure was created by academics (with military 
sponsoring) but is run by private enterprises. The Clinton/Gore administration specifically 
gave primacy to the private sector and now the military is claiming to be relevant as well 
(see chap. 4.3.3.1 The Hands-off Norm & the American Internet Governance Model). In 
theoretical terms, the military is structurally excluded from cyberspace and thus not in a 
natural position to make that kind of claim. Arguing that it is appropriate for the military to 
assert a role in cyberspace, guaranteeing its protection, resembles a counter-appropriation 
strategy to compensate for the perceived exclusion (see chap. 2.3.6 Combining the 
Frameworks). The IW doctrine itself elaborates on this issue that the military is in no 
natural position to control the Internet because it neither has the competencies nor the 
capabilities. "Legal arbitrage" as they call it, prevents this (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, pp. 
1-5). In cyber-utopian terms, this is a kind of colonialization of cyberspace by force. 
Sixth, the concept of IW blurs the traditional dichotomy of war and peace. The goal 
to achieve information dominance through computer network attacks is said to be most 
efficient in peace. Thus, the extraordinary practice of intruding into someone else’s 
network via CNE is normalized. It is presented as an appropriate state practice, regardless 
of legal obstacles in form of the humanitarian law that sees peacetime espionage as highly 
ambivalent (Bitton, 2014, p. 1018).
Seventh, the death of distance and the argument of a borderless cyberspace 
normalize the practices of exercising authority over someone else's territory. Intruding into 
another nation's network to exploit information stored on a server located in another 
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nation's territory could be regarded as a hostile act, as is stealing information from the 
White House.
In sum, the IW doctrine lays ou the foundation of the norm of control, i.e. that the 
state, through its military and intelligence agencies, has the natural right to monitor the 
global Internet infrastructure. Control works on two levels. First, by being aware of the 
content or information that is exchanged over this medium (the content layer) and by being 
able to manipulate or alter this information. Second, by being able to control the very 
workings or functions of this infrastructure on the physical layer. We should not forget that 
the early IW doctrine explicitly mentions the concept of electronic warfare and the idea to 
disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum or the physical transmission of electrons. The IW 
doctrine claims that it is appropriate for states to disrupt the workings of the 
communications infrastructure of another country, i.e. shutting down the phone network or 
Internet, by utilizing CNA. What might be appropriate in times of war, is not necessarily 
so in peacetime. But IW intentionally blurs this dichotomy. The following graphic 
summaries the key ideas, norms and frames of early cyber-realism during the 1990s.
Figure 25. Cyber-Realism during the 1990s (own diagram)
It is important to state that the norm of control, at this stage, is only implicit in the doctrine. 
This represents the emergence of a norm within closed military circles (see chap. 2.1 
Norms and Theories of Normative Change). The meaning of the Internet during that time 
is still dominated by cyber-utopian and liberal ideas. The chapter showed nicely how 
standards of appropriate behavior depend on problem perceptions and definitions and thus 
the standpoint of observation, i.e. the paradigm. The next chapter will explain how this 
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norm got expanded and diffused outside of military circles and inside into the political 
administration, which is an important condition for cyber-realist norms becoming 
dominant during the mid-2000s.
4.4.3 Setting the Path: The Institutionalization of Cyber-Realism
Whereas the last chapter introduced the ideational and normative content of the early 
cyber-realist paradigm, represented through the IW doctrine, this chapter discusses the 
process of institutionalization. As the result of the intellectual formative period since 1992, 
advocates and holders of the cyber-realism paradigm have been creating organizational 
structures. The institutionalization of the paradigm in military bureaucracies made the 
paradigm more permanent than its utopian counterpart, which was predominantly held by a 
loose actor coalitions without fixed structures or platforms. Institutions, such as military 
branches, also allowed the recruiting and socialization of new actors or paradigm 
advocates into cyber-realist thinking that would later serve within the administration and 
thus act as norm-entrepreneurs from within the government (see chap. 2.2 Paradigms and 
Norm-Change). This is a key explanation why cyber-realism could permanently influence 
US decision making and that it could become the dominant paradigm in the mid-2000s.
NSA established its Information Warfare Center in 1992. In secrecy, NSA began 
developing techniques for launching "information warfare attacks", breaking into computer 
networks and destroying them from the inside (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 3). NSA began 
collecting known and unknown security vulnerabilities (zero day vulnerabilities)118 in 
Internet hard and software that could be exploited for infiltrating computers and networks 
(Harris, 2014, p. chap. 6). The US armed forces established several IW centers like the 
Defensive Information Warfare Program (1992) (Saalbach, 2015, p. 58) or the School for 
Information Warfare and Strategy at National Defense University in Washington D.C, and 
NIWA, Navy Information Warfare Activity (both 1994). In 1995, the Air Force established 
its first Information Warfare Squadron in South Carolina (Department of the Air Force, 
2006) and the army established its Land Information Warfare Center in 1995. Before 
becoming director of NSA in 1996, Kenneth Minihan led the Air Force Information 
Warfare Squadron. Its official mission was to defend Navy networks from intrusion, but its 
secret other mission was to "threaten information systems of America’s adversaries" 
118 "A zero day vulnerability refers to a hole in software that is unknown to the vendor. This security hole is 
then exploited by hackers before the vendor becomes aware and hurries to fix it—this exploit is called a zero 
day attack [or exploit]" (Symantec, 2016). In theoretical terms, it is information about an entry-vector in a 
target system that can be utilized by an offensive malware. As such, zero days are the "most effective cyber 
weapon" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 6) because there is no defense against it until the vendor fixes the 
vulnerability.
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(Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 7). Later, as head of NSA, Minihan set up the Information 
Operations Technology Center which gave NSA a more offensive posture. In 1996, the 
FBI formed the Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center to investigate cyber-crimes and 
the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU), a domestic signals intelligence operation, in 
1997. The CIA created a top secret unit called Information Operations Center, designed for 
the more physical side of network attacks like planting agents inside an enemy's 
infrastructure to distribute malware in air-gapped systems (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 7).
The purpose of this short chapter was to show how cyber-realist ideas became 
institutionalized. These institutions play a major role during the politicization and spill-
over of realist ideas into the political discourse of critical infrastructure protection and the 
Kosovo war. Institutions outlined in this chapter sponsored key personnel for presidential 
commissions and advisory panels, which allowed classified cyber-realist concepts such as 
IW to spill into the discourse of political elites and decision-makers. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
4.4.4 Politics: Turn to Realism - Critical Infrastructure Initiative (1996-1999)
This chapter explains the politicization of cyber-realist core ideas into a wider political 
discourse in the second half of the 1990s. This indicates a shift from early Information 
Superhighway cyber-utopia to critical infrastructure protection and technological 
pessimism. It also marks the shift from concepts developed in secrecy and inside the 
military sphere into policy discourse. I argue that although the Clinton administration 
initially adhered to a utopian, optimistic perception of the Internet (see chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: 
Cyber-Utopia on the Information Superhighway (1993)), its perception began to change 
due to a series of events in the mid-1990s. The causal mechanism explaining this subtle 
turn to realism is a rapid succession of critical events that were used by cyber-realist 
advocates to push their agenda. Cyber-realist problem definitions, particularly the problem 
of network-interconnectivity and ICT-dependency and vulnerability became embedded in 
the discourse on critical infrastructures. This is due to persistence and continuity of 
personnel: realist advocates held key positions in relevant commissions to diffuse their 
agenda. This led to a cumulative learning effect: the more incidents happened, the more 
public leaders were convinced of cyber-realist ideas (see chap. 4.4.1 Background: Growing 
Awareness of Computer Insecurity (1967 - 2011)). At the end of the millennium, euphoria 
had gotten replaced by a general anxiety and sense of vulnerability.
Since the 1991, Computers at Risk Study from the National Research Council 
(National Research Council, 1991) and various others (Office of Technology Assessment, 
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1990; General Accounting Office, 1996) have warned that computers are insecure (see 
chap. 4.4.1 Background: Growing Awareness of Computer Insecurity (1967 - 2011)). 
These expert opinions have been widely neglected during the Information Superhighway 
euphoria but became visible after the Oklahoma bombing on 19 April 1995. As a reaction 
to Oklahoma, President Clinton issued PDD-39 called "Policy on Counterterrorism" on 21 
June 1995. President Clinton set up the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
protection to identify and review the vulnerability of all critical infrastructure systems, 
including information and telecommunications networks. This commission uncovered a 
series of critical vulnerabilities and rang the alarm, which led to a growing awareness of 
computer security. The commission identified eight sectors of critical infrastructure: 
telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, 
water supply, emergency and continuity of government (President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). 
Key members of this working group were outspoken cyber-realist advocates such as 
former Air Force expert on electronic warfare Tom Marsh, or NSA Director for 
information warfare Rich Wilhelm, who was the NSA White House liaison for the Clipper 
proposal in 1993 (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 3). He also became a national security advisor for 
Al Gore, probably because of his expertise and knowledge of NSA’s digital capabilities. 
Previous governments dealt with critical infrastructure as well but they defined the threat-
spectrum more in terms of civil accidents, natural disasters and thus physical disruption 
and destruction (Ackerman, Bale, & Moran, 2006, p. 35). Wilhelm argued that this 
understanding must be expanded to include digitals systems, i.e. computers and networks, 
upon which these sectors rely. Being a former information-warrior, he knew that computer 
networks could be penetrated by an outside force because the US was essentially doing the 
same (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 3). Wilhelm also made the case to keep the US cyber-attack 
capabilities top-secret, because complaining about other nation’s and hacker’s attempts to 
penetrate US networks while one does the same, certainly looks awkward. In other words, 
America was building in secrecy what it denounced publicly. 
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection released its report 
in February 1997 (President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). 
The commission identified the problem that in case of an emergency, no agency was 
formally in charge. Kaplan describes how several White House officials "were startled 
when more than half of its report and recommendations dealt with the vulnerability of 
computer networks and the urgent need for what it called 'cyber security'" (Kaplan, 2016, 
p. chap. 3). Although coming from the civil side of government, the report features a 
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rhetoric very similar to cyber-realist doctrines (see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of the 
Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)). It also includes a chapter on information warfare. 
Take for example statements like "we must learn to negotiate a new geography, where 
borders are irrelevant and distances meaningless," and "cyber attacks could be combined 
with physical attacks, against facilities or against human targets, in an effort to paralyze or 
panic large segments of society, damage our capability to respond to incidents" 
(President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, pp. 1-18). This cyber-
realist inspired military language is no coincidence because central realist advocates 
introduced it to the civil actors of the Commission, who of course had no idea about the 
state of military doctrine and technical capabilities. This shift marks the beginning 
politicization of cyber-realism.
On July 15, 1996, President Clinton signed the executive order 13010 – Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, to develop a national strategy for infrastructure protection 
(Ackerman et al., 2006, p. 35). It argues that:
"Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United 
States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power 
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, 
water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and 
rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall 
into two categories: physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), and 
threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information 
or communications components that control critical infrastructures ("cyber 
threats")" (The White House, 1996).
The narrative of the order is pretty much in line with cyber-realist thinking: dependencies 
on new technologies create new vulnerabilities, including to cyber-attacks. Note that the 
report does use military language like computer network attack or defense and introduces 
the word "cyber-attack". The inclusion of terrorism and cyber-threats in a presidential 
directive is a novelty. It is important to stress the temporal and cultural context of this 
order. It stands in the context of a growing awareness of computer-security issues and thus 
a growing perception of insecure computer systems. Pessimism began to replace optimism, 
a trend that accelerated with every network intrusion that was discovered by the US 
government. Nothing makes this clearer than what came to be known as Eligible Receiver. 
On June 9th 1997, the NSA ran a military simulation called Operation Eligible 
Receiver in order to test the vulnerability of US networks in case of a foreign CNA. It 
simulated a cyber-attack against the emergency communications systems and military 
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communications networks in order to disrupt US command and control – a test of 
information warfare so to speak. In this simulation, an NSA red-team successfully 
penetrated DoD computer networks with CNA and extracted and altered data. The team 
only used commercially available, off-the-shelf technology for this intrusion, which is seen 
as key evidence for the vulnerability of governmental computer networks and the thesis 
that potentially everyone could launch such an attack (Bendrath, 2001). Eligible Receiver 
was initiated by the new director of NSA Kenneth A. Minihan. He drew this idea from a 
war-plan that had been created at the NSA Information Warfare Center (see chap. 4.4.3 
Setting the Path: The Institutionalization of Cyber-Realism). The simulation was a success 
in the sense that it revealed shocking deficits in US network security. Kaplan describes the 
reaction by some military officials when they learned about the network intrusion:
""I don’t trust my command-control." This was the ultimate goal of information 
warfare, and Eligible Receiver revealed that it was more feasible than anyone in the 
world of conventional warfare had imagined. […] Eligible Receiver revealed that 
the Defense Department was completely unprepared and defenseless for a cyber 
attack. The NSA Red Team had penetrated its entire network […] Everyone in the 
room was stunned, not least John Hamre, who had been sworn in as deputy 
secretary of defense at the end of July" (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 4).
Eligible receiver showed why cyber-attacks, information war and psychological warfare 
should not be seen in isolation. It showed that information dominance was fragile and 
could quickly turn into its opposite (Rid, 2016, p. 380). The psychological effect, the 
distrust in one’s own computer system definitely increased the seriousness of the issue. For 
the Pentagon, the simulation resembled a shock, or a "wake-up call", as Healey argues 
(Healey & Grindal, 2013).
What made matters worse was the fact that in its direct aftermath, only four months 
later, a similar intrusion into DoD networks happened, but this time, it was not a 
simulation. The attack utilized a security vulnerability in Sun’s Solaris operating system 
which is why the incident was called Solar Sunrise. Deputy Secretary of Defense John 
Hamre called this "opening shots of an authentic cyber-war, perhaps launched by Iraq–
exactly the kind of 'electronic Pearl Harbor' that Pentagon analysis had been warning of for 
years" or as the fulfillment of Eligible Receiver's hypothetical threat, as he briefed 
President Clinton (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 5). Because of general geopolitical tensions, it 
was speculated that the culprit was either Iraq, China or Russia, which had begun their 
information warfare programs around the same time. In the end it turned out to be a 16 
year old boy from San Francisco. However, Russia is believed to be responsible for 
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another hacking campaign called "Moonlight Maze". Over the course of the year 1998, 
huge quantities of sensitive military information were stolen from US military networks. 
At the time, it was the biggest CNE operation ever recorded, which showed for the first 
time what the attribution problem actually meant. FBI forensic experts investigated over a 
year, including diplomatic procedures, to find the source of the attack, which probably was 
a Russian intelligence agency (Rid, 2016, pp. 391-404). Due to diplomatic difficulties the 
issue was never really resolved. As a reaction, a Joint Task Force for Computer Network 
Defense (JTF-CND) was founded at the DoD. In April 2000, the Joint Task Force was 
given a broader mandate to include CNO, operations and hence was renamed JTF-CNO.
All of this indicates a spill-over of cyber-realist ideas from the military into the 
political sector. This trend continues with the 1998 the Presidential Decision Directive 63, 
which called for "a National Plan to protect America’s critical infrastructures, especially 
cyber systems, from deliberate attack and disruption" (The White House, 1998a). It 
assigned roles and lead agencies, as well as private sector liaisons for the management of 
infrastructures (Ackerman et al., 2006, p. 35). In May 1998, Clinton created a National 
Coordinator for Critical Infrastructures and began lobbying for an increased year 2000 
investment in cyber-security programs with the "protecting cyber-security" initiative. 
There, the White House:
"Proposed a Fiscal Year 2001 budget which allocates $2.01 billion to defend 
against this emerging threat, up by over $250 million from the actual FY 2000 
budget, and double the FY 1998 budget" (The White House, 1998b).
Another instance of idea spill-over was the 1998 Kosovo conflict. US secretary of defense 
John Hamre called this conflict the first "cyber-war" (Bendrath, 1999). According to 
Kaplan, a joint group consisting of NSA and the Navy’s Information Warfare Squadron 
fed false information to Serbian Air-defense systems, using a demon dialer technique that 
had been devised, but never been executed, for an operation in Haiti in 1994 (Kaplan, 
2016, p. chap. 7).119 American hackers also sent messages to enemy leaders and even made 
Milosevic’s phone ringing (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 7). 
Kosovo was the first instance of politicization of hacking because different 
international hacking groups engaged in low-impact CNA against Serbian and NATO-
websites. Most of the attacks were "distributed denial of service" (DDoS) attacks that 
119 The aim was to disrupt Haitian Air-defense, which was connected to the telephone system. By utilizing a 
well-known known technique called Demon Dialing, made famous by the hacker Captain Zap in the early 
1980s, communications of the radar could be disrupted by flooding the phone network with fake calls – a 
crude version of a distributed denial of service attack (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 4). The mission was called off 
but the attack-plan was kept.
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simply disrupted websites. There were also several incidents of web-site defacement – 
taking control of a website to smear it by posting propaganda. These so-called cyber-
attacks had more the character of digital sit-ins and did not alter the course of war, they 
just changed its medial representation (Bendrath, 1999). Stil, Kosovo set the path for 
conflicts to come. Russia and China were certainly watching and taking notes on how to 
utilize IW and cyber-attacks as new means of warfare that ultimately led to the concept of 
hybrid warfare (Wirtz, 2015). 
In October 1999, the USSPACECOM was designated as the lead agency for CND 
for the DoD and, via another executive order, a National Infrastructure Assurance Council 
was created. In 2000, this capacity was expanded to include CNA as well. In January 2000, 
the first ever "National-Plan for Information Systems Protection" was published. The FY 
2001 budget included an $8 million program to create the Federal Intrusion Detection 
System (FIDNET) to protect non-DoD federal agencies (The White House, 1998b).
After the Kosovo war, the Clinton Administration included cyber-threats into its 
official "National Security Strategy for a New Century". It argued that America faces 
threats to its critical infrastructure, for example in form of cyber-attacks, sabotage by 
terrorists or hostile states (The White House, 1999, p. 2). Cyber-threats rank second place 
following regional or state-centered threats. The wording resembled the standard narrative 
of the cyber-realist paradigm or the cyber-revolution thesis (Lindsay, 2013, p. 370). 
Proposals included closer collaboration between law enforcement and the creation of an 
intrusion detection system. This official strategy is key evidence for the argument that 
cyber-realism spilled over from a military doctrine into the overall national security 
strategy of the US. 
Let’s sum up. The turn to critical infrastructure protection was a turn to cyber-
realism that increasingly replaced the utopian perception of the Internet during the late 
Clinton administration. This represents an instance of political learning. This process 
initiated a path-trajectory that led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
under the Bush administration, which subsumes cyber-security and the protection of 
governmental networks under one authority. At the same time, it must be stated that these 
operations that have been called the "first cyber-war" – Eligible Receiver, Solar Sunrise, 
Moonlight Maze, the NATO operation in Kosovo – were classified for a long time. Only 
political elites such as the Secretary of Defense and military circles knew about these. But 
one particular incident introduced cyber-realist arguments and frames to a wider general 
public: the Y2K or "millennium bug" discourse, which is the topic of the next chapter.
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4.4.5 Discourse: Y2K and Critical Infrastructure Failure
The Y2K-panic of the late 1990s is an interesting juncture in the history of cyber-security 
because it introduced key realist arguments into the public discourse and led to growing 
pessimism about the digital revolution.
For reasons of cost-effectiveness, early computer programmers used a shortcut for 
the date in their computer applications: 1964 became 64. In the past, computer storage was 
expensive so this shortcut actually saved storage capacity and thus money (The United 
States Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, 1999, p. 7). Since 
around 1984, computer experts speculated that this might create issues once the year turns 
to 2000, which the computer would interpret as 00. It was not regarded as a problem 
because no-one expected that in this fast moving software business, code would be used 
for longer than a few years (Computerworld, 2000). This "millennium bug" turned into a 
potential problem at the moment when large systems became internetworked and mutually 
dependent. It was a problem of path-dependency, an uncorrected mistake made in the past 
and causing future troubles. Around 1996, some firms began to report anomalies in their 
applications when the date turned to 00, which some applications misinterpreted as being 
1900. This was particularly an issue for corporations with long-term processes, such banks 
calculating interest rates. 
The President’s commission on critical infrastructure recognized the problem when 
doing a thorough analysis of US IT-systems (The United States Senate Special Committee 
on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, 1999, p. 12). This institutional embeddedness set 
the frame for the discourse: Y2K was framed as a matter of critical infrastructure 
vulnerability and thus fell in the domain of cyber-realist advocates. 
It is nearly impossible to collect all the predictions of what consequences the 
millennium-bug would have before 2000, so I focus my short analysis on an interesting 
Retro Report by the New York Times in 2013 called "Y2K Bug: Much ado about 
nothing?". This report gives a short overview over different predictions made by IT-experts 
and cyber-realists. Voices range from "nothing or little will happen", to "the Y2K bug will 
be an international disaster", "threaten nearly every aspect of modern life", "could cripple 
the nation" because a potential "failure of Uncle Sam’s computers would be chaos". Planes 
were said to be falling from the sky, nuclear power plants could meltdown or the nuclear 
stockpile could be launched by accident. A Senate estimate circulated through the media 
where it was claimed that "40% of the country could be hit by power failures on New 
Year’s 2000" (The New York Times, 2013). A cover of Time Magazine in January 1999 
was titled "The End of the World!?! Y2K insanity! Apocalypse Now! Will computers melt 
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down? Will society? A guide to MILLENNIUM MADNESS" (TIME Magazine, 1999). 
Even policy-makers chimed into the crippling-blow narrative that is pretty similar to the 
cyber-war narrative. United States Deputy Secretary John Hamre, who in the past 
repeatedly warned about the immediate crippling blow to American infrastructure by 
cyber-attacks, dubbed the Y2K problem as "the electronic equivalent of the El Niño and 
there will be nasty surprises around the globe" (CNN, 2006). Senator Dodd is quoted in the 
official report with a statement pretty much in line with the cyber-war narrative: "the 
question is not will there be disruptions, but how severe the disruptions will be" (The 
United States Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, 1999, p. 
12).
The general narrative should have become clear. It is striking that the Y2K bug is 
deeply inspired by the discourse on critical infrastructure protection and features narratives 
developed within the context of the IW doctrine. Especially, the core problem-definition of 
interconnectedness stands out. Because everything is interconnected by the Internet, 
potentially everything could come to an end. To assess the impact of Y2K, the Senate set 
up a special committee "Investigating the Impact of the Year 2000 Problem". The official 
report released in March 1999 describes the problem as follows: 
"Y2K is about more than the failure of an individual’s personal computer or an 
incorrect date in a spreadsheet. As one examines the multiple layers of systems and 
technologies that support our everyday lives, the potential Y2K problems increase 
exponentially. The interdependent nature of technology systems makes the severity 
of possible disruptions difficult to predict" (The United States Senate Special 
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, 1999, p. 1).
The problem described here is remarkably similar to the crippling-blow and cascading-
effect thesis of the cyber-war narrative developed within the IW-doctrine (see chap. 4.4.2.2 
Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism), the interconnectedness of computer-systems in 
networks and the potential of a cascading effect. Because these systems are mutually 
interdependent, no one knows what happens if a few of them produce an error. Even the 
threat representations are similar: shutdown of the power grid, nuclear meltdown, loss of 
life and potential failure due to computer blackouts. 
But there is more spill-over from the cyber-war narrative. The report states: "hackers 
and other criminals might see Y2K as a prime opportunity to attack pieces of our 
infrastructure. Or they might use Y2K-induced infrastructure failures as cover for theft, 
arson, bombings" (The United States Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 
Technology Problem, 1999, p. 12). The difference between Y2K and the cyber-war 
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discourse is the global reach of the issue. Best argues that Y2K shows the potential 
weakness of a globalized, interconnected world order and is thus seen as the first crisis of 
globalization: "We have never gone through a global event like this in which all the world 
is affected by one thing at the same time, something that has the potential to disrupt 
commerce" (Best, 2003). In other words, the crippling-blow and cascading effect thesis is 
not just limited to US territory, as in the cyber-war narrative, but is predicted to be global. 
At the same time, Y2k presented an anomaly for utopianism since the potential for 
catastrophic failure due to the connectedness of systems was not expected by this 
paradigm. Cyber-realism predicted a possible Y2k outcome while utopianism was blind to 
that.
To provide leadership and to counter the media-frenzy, President Clinton appointed 
the Deputy Budget Director John Koskinen to be to chair the "Year 2000 Conversion 
Council" guiding the governmental efforts to make a secure transition to the year 2000. 
According to Koskinen, his job description given by the President was "do not let the 
world end" (The New York Times, 2013). A $50 million Y2K coordination center was 
created, involving government and private industry like Microsoft (The Washington Post, 
2003). Microsoft released Windows 98 Special Edition, including a fix for the Y2K bug 
and computer manufactures sold Y2K-proof certified systems. In sum, the entire US spent 
an enormous amount of money, roughly $100 billion, on Y2K fixes in software and 
hardware (Reuters, 2000). Roughly $9 billion came from the Federal Government. Global 
spending is estimated between $300 and $500 billion (Manjoo, 2009). While some argue 
that this was government overspending, the general consensus seems to be that it was 
money well spent and that this effort prevented a major incident. It also helped to reduce 
public anxieties over the severeness of the Y2K issue, as a Gallup Poll from 1999 showed: 
"the number of Americans who think Y2K-related computer mistakes around the world 
will cause "major problems" dropped to 21%, down from 34% in December [1998]" (Saad, 
1999).
The Y2K scare is interesting because it received so much public and media attention, 
although little actually happened. No planes crashed and the world did not end. There were 
only minor disruptions and probably more people died of firework injuries on New Years 
Eve 2000. The Y2K scare coincided with a general "end of the world fear" around the new 
millennium and therefore made the issue of cyber-security more tangible for a large 
audience. It revealed 
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"a sense of urgency and a fear of loss of control over the state of affairs in the 
world. Y2K was a revelatory eye-opener about the fragility of the digital economy 
and the world in general. It was the definite negation of the promises of ICT and 
cyber-utopianism and a reminder that technology could break loose and turn on its 
creators, and thus possibly have unforeseen negative consequences for society" 
(Pärna, 2010, p. 152).
The problem of network-interconnectivity and dependence on these systems that military 
and intelligence experts had warned about in secrecy of the National Security Council, 
suddenly became common knowledge.
4.4.6 Preliminary Summary
Since this is the longest chapter in this thesis, I decided to split the description of the causal 
mechanism into two-parts. The second part is presented in the final summary (see chap. 
4.4.10 Summary).
First, the technological mass diffusion of both the personal computer in the 1980s 
and the Internet in the 1990s led to a greater interconnectivity of military and civil 
computer systems (part 1). With this technical diffusion, the number of actors 
experimenting with hacking and computer network intrusions (deviant use of technology) 
increased. The result of this was an increase of computer security incidents, both in 
quantity and quality. The more computers spread, the more incidents happened which 
ultimately raised awareness of the issue of computer insecurity (necessary condition). The 
bigger the perceived incident, the stronger the political response was. 
The most prominent trigger in the early days were the 1983 War Games revelation 
and the Morris Worm of 1989 that shut down large portions of ARPANET and thus 
affected military command and control. This led to the slow growing political perception 
and problem recognition (part 2). Actors with the greatest know-how of computer and 
technical matters, i.e. the intelligence and engineering community, realized the problem 
first. Technological literacy is a key explanation in the entire history of cyber-security. 
Network intrusions presented themselves as a problem that no-one had thought about 
before, which means that no existing standard operating procedures within the bureaucracy 
existed. However, the problem was not necessarily perceived to be urgent in the mid 1980s 
because there was no other country technologically as advanced as the US. The issue was 
dealt with in secrecy. Only a hand full of actors knew about this issue in political circles at 
the time. 
The salience of the topic inside military circles increased with the Gulf War that 
showed military planners the importance of computers and superior information about the 
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battlefield (part 3). This trigger led to an initial euphoria about the possibilities of new 
information technologies and the expected revolution in military affairs it could bring. This 
process can be described as sense-making or soul-searching process, which marks the 
beginning of the construction of a coherent paradigm as a general roadmap to make sense 
of the emerging Internet. National security actors began to research the issue and turned to 
the existing literature on the matter, for example the work of Rona (Rona, 1976) or Rechtin 
(Rechtin, 1983). What followed was the development of the military doctrine of 
information war. To make sense of the Internet and computer security, advocates 
established a set of technological frames or sense-making devices that helped them to 
understand the issue from a national security perspective. New ideas regarding the nature 
of these new information technologies were developed (for example the concept of 
information weapons) or partly picked up from cyber-utopian media discourses (the 
concept of cyberspace as a distinct space). Military actors began to understand cyberspace 
as a chaotic, borderless, anonymous and potentially anarchic medium that was lacking 
state control and order. The Internet began to be seen as a challenge to national security 
with predominantly negative attributes. The decentralized logic of TCP/IP, as well as the 
security and control issues it introduced became the core problem definition of cyber-
realism. These stayed the same the entire time, even until today. What we see here is a 
coherent problem definition within this process of paradigm or doctrine-building. In 
contrast to the other paradigms, realism is the most problem-driven. 
The answer to these perceived problems was the state-centric norm that the military 
and intelligence community should exert control over this new medium cyberspace, 
particularly in terms of information dominance and being able to disrupt and exploit 
information flows of other countries, even in times of peace (part 4). Institutions were set 
up to fulfill this function. This lead to the realization of a classical security-dilemma: while 
the IC developed computer network attack capabilities, it realized that others could 
potentially do the same to the US. Other countries in turn began to mimic US practices. 
The institutionalization of information warfare in military organizations was a 
crucial causal factor for the success of the paradigm (part 5). According to Kuhn, 
paradigms have to be carried by actors that are socialized into this belief system. Military 
training and Information Warfare centers served the function to educate the next generation 
of paradigm holders which entered political offices during the Bush and Obama 
administration. The continuity of personnel, for example in the case of former NSA 
director Mike McConnell (1992-1996), who later served as Director of National 
Intelligence, pushing pretty much for a similar agenda, is a key explanation for the 
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persistence of cyber-realist ideas. This created a relatively steady and stable path trajectory 
and permanence that cyber-utopianism was lacking. This is particularly the case during the 
turn to critical infrastructures in the second Clinton administration, when many trained 
information warriors were placed into the presidential commission on critical 
infrastructures. In these positions, cyber-realist advocates acted as norm-entrepreneurs, 
diffusing their ideas to a non-military political audience.
 In terms of the advocacy coalition framework, cyber-realists got access to political 
power to spread their message to political elites. The salience of their ideas increased with 
the terrorist attacks of the mid 1990s while the Eligible Receiver Simulation uncovered the 
vulnerability of large portions of US command and control systems, followed directly by 
the Moonlight Maze intrusion. The rapid succession and perceived severeness of these 
issues further increased the salience of cyber-realist ideas. These events led to the spillover 
of the military concept of information war into the political sphere (part 6). Ideas, 
discursive frames and norms developed, in secrecy, within the military concept of IW 
appeared in the political discourse on critical infrastructure. Particularly the cyber-realist 
narrative of a crippling blow that could cascade through the network and shut down the 
entire US economy (or the power grid) had a certain narrative fidelity that became obvious 
during the Y2K Panic at the end of the 1990s. In other words, ideas, norms and frames that 
were first developed within the military doctrine of information war now suddenly featured 
prominently in non-military policy documents. 
The Y2K panic (a shock in theoretical terms) elevated cyber-realist lines of thought 
and frames into the public discourse and decreased the salience of cyber-utopianism 
(while not dismantling it completely). This is in line with the theory (see chap. 2.2.4 
Explaining Change). Compared to the utopian paradigm, the explanatory power of cyber-
realism was greater. For utopianism, Y2K presented an anomaly (or a blind spot) that was 
not conceived within the optimist narrative of a better technological future. Cyber-realism 
simply had the better explanation for what was going on because the Y2K bug had fit 
perfectly into its narrative of critical vulnerability and dependency of digital 
infrastructures. In other words, Y2K was a commensurable manifestation of the problem 
that cyber-realist had been warning about all along. This crippling-blow narrative had a 
high degree of fidelity, was shared by many civilian and military experts and was even 
actively promoted by President Clinton. This increased the external credibility of cyber-
realism in front of the general public. For first time, it presented itself as a viable 
alternative to utopianism that was still dominant during the mid of the 1990s. This also has 
to do with the fact the that military doctrine of IW was in the public domain. Y2K was the 
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first instance where the utopian narrative got contested and lost some of its salience. The 
second major disruption was the burst of the dot-com bubble that again presented itself as a 
phenomenon that was not perceived by utopians. 
Table 5. Causal Mechanism of early Information War
Context Growing computer security instances during the 
1980s.
Part 1 Technological mass diffusion of both the personal 
computer in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s 
lead to a greater interconnectivity of military and 
civil computer systems. Deviant use by hackers 
creates security problems.
Part 2 War Games as trigger. Intelligence Community 
begins to recognize the problem of vulnerable 
computer systems during the 1980s, but attributes 
no urgency.
Part 3 Increased salience of technology, information and 
computer insecurity for conduct of war in the 
context of Gulf War. Military begins sense-making 
and drafting a new doctrine utilizing information 
technology.
Part 4 Cyber-realists develop a negative perception of 
cyberspace that is driven by problems that derive 
from shortcomings in TCP/IP and their concern for 
national security. They develop the norm that it is 
their appropriate role to exercise control in 
cyberspace (norm emergence) in order to wage 
information war.
Part 5 Institutionalization of cyber-realist lines of thought 
in new information warfare institutions leads to a 
socialization of a new generation of paradigm 
holders and a persistence of ideas.
Part 6 Cyber-realist advocates diffuse their ideas regarding 
critical infrastructure protection and the Kosovo 
War among political elites.
Outcome Y2k Panic leads to a spillover of cyber-realist ideas 
and norms into the public discourse and helps to 
disenchant the cyber-utopian narrative.
The table summarizes the findings of the causal process that unfolded during the late 1980s 
and 1990s. However, this marked only the beginning of the growing dominance of cyber-
realism. The paradigm was by no means dominant yet. The Bush administration picked up 
the path that had been laid out before and systematically began to fuse cyber-realism with 
counter-terrorism, giving it a new direction and accelerating its development. This will be 
the topic of the next chapter.
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4.4.7 The Politicization of Cyber-Realism with the War on Terror (2000 - 2008)
This chapter analyzes how the military cyber-realist paradigms got further transferred into 
the political domain (politicized) and how it could become dominant within the Bush 
administration. The weeks after the tragic terrorist attacks of 9/11 present a critical 
juncture where multiple causal pathways come together (equifinality) and form a coherent 
trajectory. This and the following chapters describe the broad changes in terms of ideas, 
norms, strategies, policies and technology that were set in motion only within a few weeks 
after the attacks. Since this is a complex matter, I subdivided the chapters thematically to 
deal with conceptually different topics like policies or technologies. The reader has to keep 
in mind that these different chapters cover more or less the same time period.
In January 2001, the newly elected republican administration of George Walker Bush 
entered the oval office and with it a whole bunch of strong advocates of RMA and 
information warfare. Bush himself affirmed the RMA concept in his first speech on foreign 
policy (Kellner, 2002, p. 1). Other advocates were Secretary of Defense Donald Henry 
Rumsfeld, his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, as well as Vice President Richard "Dick" Cheney. 
The idea of RMA, information warfare and particularly cyberspace control is one of the 
key concepts within the neoconservative (neocon) agenda. In 1997, Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think-tank, which advocated RMA-thinking 
was formed. Many PNAC members later occupied positions in the Bush administration 
(especially in the field of national security).120 Three months before Bush took office, the 
think tank released an influential paper, outlining neoconservative military reform (Kagan 
et al., 2000). The goals were to achieve a "pax Americana", a peace based on global US 
dominance and supremacy. Three technological instruments are key for this: global missile 
defense, the control of cyberspace and the exploitation of the RMA (ICT & precision strike 
technology such as drones). Neoconservatives argued that control of cyberspace, "the new 
international commons", is "a key to world power in the future" (Kagan et al., 2000, p. 51). 
Offensive capabilities (to disrupt or paralyze the military or the commercial sector’s 
computer networks), would be an invaluable source for power to maintain US supremacy 
(ibid). In general, neoconservative thinking outlined in this paper is basically identical with 
the cyber-realist paradigm outlined in military documents that were analyzed in previous 
chapters. 
Other core ideas and principled beliefs were first, the norm of military omnipotence 
and power (Griffin, 2007) and the perceived appropriateness to use it as a main instrument 
120 Among them Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, Eliot Cohen, Paula Dobriansky, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard 
Perle, Peter W. Rodman, James Woolsey, and—most significantly—Cheney, Libby, Rumsfeld, and 
Wolfowitz, became central members of the new Bush administration (Kagan, Schmitt, & Donnelly, 2000).
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of international affairs (including new forms of IW). Second, the perceived appropriateness 
of unilateral action and a distrust in international organizations such as the UN (Ikenberry, 
2007) based on the idea of American exceptionalism and concepts of benign hegemony 
(Monten, 2005). Third, the idea of pre-emptive war, "to confront the worst threats before 
they emerge" (Bush, 2002) that became, for the first time ever, part of the official National 
Security Strategy (2002). The belief that it is possible to deterministically predict how a 
chain of events will play out and be able to intervene with correct measures before it 
manifests itself, is one of the key driving forces of Internet control and mass surveillance 
or what neoconservative agenda calls "21st century surveillance" (Halper & Clarke, 2004, 
p. 273). Neoconservatism can be seen as the conduit that brought military concepts into the 
political domain.
The early Bush security policy, outlined in his election campaign, was relatively 
moderate, arguing for a "humble foreign policy" (Onea, 2013, p. 121) and was not 
particularly predisposed towards neoconservatism and cyber-realism. Bush was not that 
much interested in the Internet either. He is described by observers as technologically 
ignorant. Bush himself said that he used "the Google" only occasionally (CNBC, 2006). It 
was Dick Cheney, David Addington and CIA Director George Tenet who turned Bush 
towards Internet surveillance. They used the window of opportunity to present the 
neoconservative ideas as the appropriate response to the terror attacks. They framed 
neocon ideas and policies as solution strategy to the 9/11 shock, which is in line with 
theory (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). Internet control, espionage and surveillance 
programs had been in development before 9/11 and were taken out of the drawer and 
reformulated as an appropriate 9/11 response strategy (Buckley & Singh, 2006). Observers 
close to the President (Clarke, 2004, p. 243) confirm that both Cheney and Rumsfeld 
exerted a great deal of influence on the (inexperienced) President. This changed with 
Bush’s second term, but during the crisis days after 9/11 the national security decision-
making process was dominated by neoconservative voices (Renshon, 2009, p. 63). Bush 
gave broad orders what had to be done, but had no interest in the details (Starr-Deelen, 
2014, p. 110). This gave his close advisory circle more influence to shape policy. The 
hawks repeatedly sidestepped the moderate forces, namely National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Risen, 2006, p. chap. 3).
 Richard Cheney transformed the representative function of the Vice President into an 
effective Co-President. No other Vice President in history had as much influence (Onea, 
2013, p. 106) and indeed, many of the controversial post 9/11 responses, like the NSA 
mass surveillance program, can be traced back to him. Cheney is described by colleagues 
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as "the most radical conservative" (Clarke, 2004, p. 19). He served in the government 
during the Watergate scandal (where illegal domestic surveillance played a role). Since 
then, he was an advocate for a strong executive, working in secrecy, unchecked by other 
branches of government. He was also a proponent of mass surveillance. He repeatedly 
stressed that the limits that were put onto US domestic intelligence gathering with the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 led to an "erosion of Presidential 
power and authority" (Cheney inMiller, 2008, p. xvi). Since 1978, FISA had to authorize 
domestic surveillance. Before 9/11, FISA rejected more domestic surveillance requests of 
the Bush administration than it had during the four administrations before. This just 
increased Cheney’s negative attitude towards legal checks & balances (Bamford, 2009, p. 
113). To cut back FISA was one of his and David Addingtons personal goals. Addington 
said before 9/11: "We’re one bomb away from getting rid of that obnoxious [FISA] court" 
(Addington inBamford, 2009, p. 112). The two are said to be the chief designers of the 
idea "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to disregard virtually all 
previously known legal boundaries, if national security demands it" (Mayer, 2006). This 
controversial legal paradigm, called unitary executive theory, served as the legal 
framework for many controversial programs that were often legitimized by secret 
Presidential directives.
Among these are the CIA extraordinary rendition program "Greystone" (Risen, 2006, 
p. Chap. 1), the reclassification of terrorists as "illegal enemy combatants" (Ralph, 2013, 
pp. 2-3) and the CIA "enhanced interrogation" practices like water boarding in secret 
prisons all around the world (Sanders, 2012). The NSA’s domestic surveillance program 
was also legitimized with this interpretation of the law, but more about that later (see chap. 
4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). The 
noteworthy point here is that all these programs were established within a few weeks after 
9/11, without any public discourse or opposition from Congress. The composition of the 
close circle of decision-makers in the White House (sometimes called the War Council) 
and group-think phenomena are a key explanatory factor for the post 9/11 dominance of 
cyber-realism (Badie, 2010). Besides Addington and US White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales (also a strong advocate of the Bush policy), no-one had a legal or even law 
enforcement background, which is rather unusual in the US political system (Mayer, 
2006).
 This explains the declaration of a global war on terrorism (GWOT) only a few days 
after the attacks (Starr-Deelen, 2014, p. 125). This is a result of the neoconservative norm 
that war is a legitimate/appropriate instrument of statecraft (Halper & Clarke, 2004, p. 
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281). Whereas the Bush Senior and Clinton administration responded to the terror attacks 
of the 1990s with a "law-enforcement paradigm" (Starr-Deelen, 2014, p. 88), members of 
the Bush administration favored a war-paradigm. Why? Because war could be used to 
legitimize the use of all available means and granted the President executive powers as 
commander-in-chief (called Article II powers), thereby enabling the key neoconservative 
ideas such as the idea of a unitary executive. A state of emergency (Ralph, 2013) could 
serve to "justify classifying everything associated with fighting it" (Priest & Arkin, 2012, 
p. chap. 1), like targeted killing of terrorist suspects and domestic mass surveillance. Key 
evidence for this is a memorandum written by John Yoo, one of the Department of Justice 
(DoJ) top lawyers that legalized the NSA warrantless Internet surveillance, arguing that 
such intrusive measures are now justified because of the attacks and that the Fourth 
Amendment had no application for military operations, even in the homeland (Bamford, 
2009, p. 116). A leaked letter from Yoo to judge Kollar-Kotelly indicates that Yoo was 
aware that domestic Internet surveillance was illegal, but tried to convince the judge 
anyway, arguing that national security is the higher good compared to the constitution 
(Humpenöder, 2016).
In sum, the shock that was 9/11 and neoconservative norm-entrepreneurs within the 
administration lifted the former military cyber-realist paradigm and the norm of control 
into the executive. Controlling the Internet was presented as a solution to the terror attacks. 
The following chapters will analyze the socio-technological system that was put into place 
to enable control over vast portions of the Internet traffic. This system has three 
dimensions: First, the strategic side, explaining how to fight terrorism, second the legal 
side that enabled extraordinary measures and third, the technological response in forms of 
actual technical systems (NSA surveillance program and the DARPA’s Total Information 
Awareness program) which perfectly illustrates the workings of cyber-realism. The next 
chapter introduces new ideas and the evolution of cyber-realist thought within the context 
of the war on terror that ultimately led to the fusion of information war and surveillance.
4.4.7.1 Ideas: Cyber-Realism and Counter-Terrorism (2001 - 2007)
This chapter analyzes the impact of 9/11 and counter-terrorism policy on cyber-realism. It 
argues that elements of the new counter-terrorist policy (Starr-Deelen, 2014, p. 103) got 
fused together with the cyber-realism. "Laws and policies in the area of cybersecurity are 
combining and interacting with those in the antiterror realm" (Deibert, 2015, p. 77). This 
gave cyber-realism a new direction. For this analysis, major US strategic documents, 
counter-terrorist policy, are analyzed for content relating to the Internet (see appendix 
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Cyber-Realism Corpus). It will summarize the main ideas and shifts that came after 9/11. 
This chapter will focus on problem definitions that are developed within these strategy 
papers, whereas the following chapters will look at legal, technical and institutional 
solutions to these problems.
 The core problem that was diagnosed quickly after the attacks and that shaped most 
of the US response, even to the present day, is the simple realization that terrorists were 
able to live in America, hidden within the general population (The White House, 2001a). 
The enemy "lurks in the shadows" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. vii) and is 
"invisible against the backdrop" of an open society (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 
15). The problem is that an open society "presents an almost infinite array of potential 
targets" that can be attacked with various methods. The identity, intention and location of 
the enemy are unknown, in contrast to nation-state threats.121 Additionally, the attackers 
are framed as a new kind of enemy, "a challenge as formidable as any ever faced by our 
nation" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. vii).
From the beginning, the connection between terrorism and technology is drawn. 
According to Bendrath, this started before 9/11 (Bendrath, 2003) and has to do with the 
network-character of terrorism (The White House, 2002, p. 1). Like computer networks, 
Al-Qaeda is said to resemble "loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no 
single commanding hierarchy" forming a "network of networks" (Jackson, 2005, p. 410). 
Signifiers from the engineering and utopian paradigm are used to describe the enemy 
which connects computer-science terms with terrorism, thereby changing meaning 
(Nissenbaum, 2005). There is an interesting oxymoron here. Although Islamic terrorists 
are generally framed as barbaric, inhuman and uncivilized (Tsoukala, 2008), they are 
described as technologically potent, using satellite communication and the World Wide 
Web for recruiting and information war (spread of propaganda). Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
some of the initial proponents of the term cyber-war, argue that terrorists could use the 
Internet to launch a net-war (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). The cyber- and information war 
threats become systematically connected to the counter-terrorism discourse.
On the 9th October 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is created 
and new "Counterterrorism and Cyberspace security positions" are announced. Richard 
Clarke becomes the President’s Special Advisor for Cyber-security ("cyber-czar"). He 
highlighted that the future security of the US depends on cyberspace: "America has built 
121 This changed the intelligence requirements, as one analyst explains: "If you’re talking Russia, Humint is 
really important. If you’re talking about al-Qaeda, Humint ought to be important, but Sigint turns out to be 
more important" (Haseltine inBamford, 2009, p. 143). Humint refers to human intelligence, contacts and 
spies.
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cyberspace and America must now defend its cyberspace" (The White House, 2001b). In 
his first speech, he presents most of the elements of the cyber-war narrative that have been 
shown before. These positions then become gradually implemented into national security 
policy (The White House, 2003). For example, "the gravest danger our nation faces lies at 
the crossroads of radicalism and technology" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2). 
Initially, the focus was on nuclear proliferation, but over time it shifts to cyberspace issues: 
terrorists "exploit information technology and the Internet to plan attacks, raise funds, 
spread propaganda, collect information and communicate securely" (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002, p. 7). Sooner or later they might start cyber-terrorism to "cause widespread 
disruption and damage, including casualties" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 7). In 
2006, a new National Strategy for Combating Terrorism introduces the term cyber safe 
havens, which frames the Internet as an:
"Anonymous, geographically unbounded and largely unregulated virtual haven for 
terrorists. Our enemies use the Internet to develop and disseminate propaganda, 
recruit new members, raise and transfer funds, train members on weapons use and 
tactics to plan operations" (The White House, 2006, p. 17).
The similarity to the description of the Internet in the information warfare doctrine is 
striking (see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism). Because of the Internet 
core norms such as openness, decentrality and anonymity, it can be used by all kinds of 
actors for a variety of purposes, even terrorism and propaganda. From a counter-terrorist 
perspective, the Internet becomes a problem and a target in the war on terrorism. At the 
same time, it is seen as an opportunity for exploitation for example by providing counter-
messages to terrorist propaganda. The official goal becomes to "deny the Internet to the 
terrorists" (The White House, 2006, p. 17).
These broad problem definitions set out the general strategic goals that are similar in 
most of the documents and resemble many elements introduced in the IW-doctrine. The 
first priority is prevention.
"The United States must take every appropriate action to avoid being surprised by 
another terrorist attack. To secure the homeland, we must have an intelligence and 
warning system that is capable of detecting terrorist activity before it manifests 
itself in an attack so that proper preemptive, preventive, and protective action can 
be taken" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. viii).
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The national security122 strategies show that the major themes of the counter-terrorist 
policy are highly compatible with and even reinforce cyber-realist ideas: First, the belief 
that more information could lift the fog of war and theoretically uncover or prevent hidden 
terrorist plots ("the more we know about our enemy, the better we are able to defeat that 
enemy" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 7)). The assumption is that the goal of 
prevention can be achieved with the instrument of better intelligence. The belief goes so 
far that even terrorist intentions should be detected, if one has enough information. 
Therefore, "intelligence and information has become a priority of the highest measure" 
(Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 15).
The second major theme is the need to share, or the fusion of various sources of 
information (all-source intelligence) together in databases. The database becomes the core 
technology of the 21st century:
"Databases used for federal law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, public 
health surveillance, and emergency management have not been connected in ways 
that allow us to comprehend where information gaps or redundancies exist. […] To 
secure the homeland better, we must link the vast amounts of knowledge residing 
within each government agency while ensuring adequate privacy" (Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002, p. xi).
The idea here is to fuse intelligence databases together into one an accessible network. The 
issue is described by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 as the problem to "connect the dots" 
(9/11 Commission, 2004). The Homeland Security strategy outlines the general mission to 
integrate information sharing across the federal government, across the state and local 
governments as well as private industry and citizens, to develop a common meta-data 
standard for electronic information to homeland security (Office of Homeland Security, 
2002, pp. x-xi). 
These themes become more refined in the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy that 
argues that the Intelligence Community (IC) must be able to "penetrate the thinking" of 
leaders and therefore must make "the best use of all-source intelligence, including from 
open sources [such as the Internet]" (Director of National Intelligence, 2005, p. 9). Since 
information is a resource, it follows that it must be "mined" from all sources, even the 
Internet. This is the origin of the term data-mining. In sum, the intelligence strategy 
describes a paradigm change from need-to-know to need-to-share, removing the ownership 
of data by agency (Director of National Intelligence, 2005, p. 14). In a nutshell, every 
122 Starr-Deelen argues that the National Security Strategy of 2002 resembles a neoconservative key 
document called Defense Planning Guidance, written in 1992 by Cheney and Wolfowitz (Starr-Deelen, 2014, 
p. 141).
4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism
315
piece of collected data must be accessible by agencies with sufficient authorities. At the 
same time, the number of agencies with data access is dramatically expanded. The 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007) outlines the norm that information 
sharing should be the rule, not the exception. All these documents indicate the increased 
relevance of intelligence gathering in the war on terror, being perceived as the first line of 
defense (Director of National Intelligence, 2005). This of course implies the upgrading of 
all intelligence functions and agencies, giving them more resources and reducing legal 
hurdles for surveillance and espionage.
The third major theme is the expansion of the battle space in several dimensions: 
physically, spatially, digitally and temporally. The national security policy states that "the 
war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration" (The 
White House, 2002, p. 1) and therefore it argues that the distinction between domestic and 
foreign affairs is diminishing. The 2007 renewed National Strategy for Homeland Security 
summarizes:
"In order to uncover terrorists and terrorist activity against the backdrop of our 
highly mobile, dynamic, and diverse society, we must attain domain awareness of 
the actions, events, and trends that occur throughout our land, maritime, air, space, 
and cyber domains" (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 5).
The language is very much in line with IW documents of the mid 1990s and frames 
cyberspace as a military domain with the goal of total battle-space awareness (see chap. 
4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace). The Internet becomes a 
central battle space in the war on terrorism. The strategy papers repeatedly stress "the War 
on Terror is a different kind of war, which requires a paradigm shift and the application of 
all elements of our national power and influence" (The White House, 2007, p. 1). 
Especially the homeland security strategy systematically connects the cyber-war narrative 
(US dependency on vulnerable critical infrastructure) with the threats of terrorists and 
hackers. Terrorism in fact becomes the more dominant threat to cyber-security within these 
documents (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 28). But not just IW and counter-terror 
problem definitions become integrated, but also the solution strategies. Many of these 
strategy papers are inspired by cyber-realism: they are full of RMA assumptions and IW 
goals, for example the demands for the development of remote sensing and precision strike 
capabilities together with the need to conduct information operations (The White House, 
2002, p. 30). 
These three themes, all-source information gathering to prevent terrorism, the fusion 
of this intelligence in accessible databases for law-enforcement, military, intelligence and 
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the private sector and the expansion of the battle space in the global war on terror are 
repeated and refined in various documents throughout the Bush administration. These 
general ideational components extend the cyber-realist paradigm: they introduce new 
enemies (hidden terror cells), a new battle space (the domestic homeland and global 
cyberspace), and legitimize the use of all sources of national power, like surveillance or 
other military-grade technologies domestically, digitally and preemptively. Counter-
terrorism becomes the dominant frame for understanding the Internet, thus shaping the 
meaning of the technology itself. This is a fundamental shift: whereas the older IW 
doctrine was clearly outward-facing, to target enemy states, the new strategy is also 
inwards-facing, looking for individual enemies within the homeland. In sum, these 
documents reinforce the norm of Internet control: it is appropriate for states to use all 
available means to fight terrorism. This norm inspires many policies, such as the Patriot 
Act and the NSA warrantless Internet surveillance program. The following chapters will 
analyze the effects produced by this new cyber-realist paradigm in terms of technological 
artifacts and policies.
4.4.7.2 Policy: The Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform (2001 - 2004)
The theory assumes that paradigms influence policy and technological design. In other 
words, they can change socio-technical systems. One part of this change is legal, the other 
technological. This chapter focuses on the legal paradigm-change that happened with 9/11 
and that lay the legal groundwork for expanded Internet control. Cyber-realist ideas of 
Internet control became embedded in policy.
To understand the scale and size of the paradigm change that took place after 9/11, it 
is necessary to provide a bit of background. In the 1970s it was revealed with the Pike and 
Church Committees that NSA, FBI and CIA, ordered by Presidents, repeatedly engaged in 
warrantless domestic surveillance of American citizens. Thousands of Americans, who are 
protected by the constitution from such practices, were monitored and profiled.123 The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 was a bipartisan reaction to prevent 
that Presidents could order the secret surveillance of citizens without court or 
congressional approval (Lerner, 2003, p. 496). FISA was intentionally designed to deter a 
rogue executive from bypassing legal checks and balances. The aim was to prevent the 
123 For example under Operation SHAMROCK, the executive forced telecommunications carriers to 
cooperate with NSA to allow access to continental telegraph and telephone cables. The NSA was potentially 
wiretapping most incoming and outgoing traffic to Europe and the Pacific region. FBI’s COINTELPRO 
program was designed to infiltrate civil rights and anti-war movement groups and to discredit their leaders 
(Martin Luther King) and to spread dissent (Schwarz, 2008).
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fusion of intelligence and law enforcement in an almighty secret police like the "Gestapo" 
or "KGB" (Turner, 2004, p. 52).
Therefore, it created a logical separation between foreign intelligence collection done 
by CIA and NSA and domestic law enforcement (FBI). Because law-enforcement 
intelligence should be usable in the court of law, a domestic surveillance warrant required 
higher legal standards. For example, an FBI warrant application had to include probable 
cause,124 the nature of information sought had to be described and it had to be certified that 
the information could not be obtained by other means. FISA, de jure, did not prohibit 
domestic surveillance by outward-facing intelligence agencies, but established a regime of 
court oversight to prohibit abuse of powers. If NSA wanted to monitor a foreign suspect 
inside America, it needed a warrant from the FISA court (FISC). Warrantless domestic 
surveillance of US citizens protected by the 4th amendment was illegal under this regime 
(Seamon, 2008, pp. 130-132). FISC warrant applications just needed to show that the 
target is somehow connected to criminal activity and that useful intelligence will be the 
result of surveillance. Compared to crime investigations, FISC warrants have a much lower 
standard which is the prime reason why evidence obtained under a FISC warrant should 
not be used in the court of law. Also, FISC warrants and procedures are normally classified 
(Landau, 2013, p. 55). FISA also granted an attorney the authority to authorize pen 
registers, trap and trace devices that collect caller-IDs of phone calls (Donohue, 2008, pp. 
229-233). However, FISA initially did not grant the executive the right to obtain business 
records (such as customer records or data stored on company servers), which was changed 
after the Oklahoma bombing. 
FISA, de facto, ended NSA’s domestic surveillance and since then the FBI became 
the primary agency under this legal regime (Risen, 2006, p. chap. 2). Between 1978 and 
1995, FISC granted around 500 warrant applications per year, with the number growing 
slowly until 9/11, when it doubled. Out of 16,450 applications between 1978 and 2003, 
FISC denied only 3 (Donohue, 2008, p. 232). FISC supporters see this as evidence for the 
high legal standards of the FISA warrant-applications, whereas critics argue that FISC is 
not independent and just a "rubber-stamp" (Lerner, 2003, p. 498). For some 
neoconservatives and the intelligence community, FISA was "an impediment for 
intelligence gathering and presidential authority" (Cheney inMiller, 2008, p. xvi). After 
9/11, the neocon reading became dominant and increased pressure for reform. 
124 Probable cause "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of 
reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" (Congressional 
Digest, 2016).
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The most significant changes to the legal regime came with the PATRIOT Act that 
passed Congress on 25 October 2001 (with 98 to 1 votes). Even the Democrats jumped the 
9/11 bandwagon without many questions. Observers describe the bill as a paradigm 
change, it abandoned the law enforcement paradigm to terrorism (of the Clinton and Bush 
Senior administration) and substituted it with "an intelligence [or military/war] paradigm 
that seeks to secretly gather all information that might turn out to be useful" (Podesta, 
2002). With it came a norm change – the norm of the separation of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies was discarded (Turner, 2004, p. 53). This agenda was driven by the 
principled beliefs outlined in the previous chapters: first, the idea "to prevent another 9/11" 
and second, to do so without restrictions to the unitary executive, which should use all 
available means, unbound by legal or congressional restraints. The Patriot Act included 
many high-detail items that had been on the neoconservative and intelligence community 
wish-list before 9/11, for example lower FISA standards and more executive powers 
(Rovner & Long, 2005, p. 617). The following sections are of particular relevance for 
Internet control.
 Section 218125 and 203126 effectively dismantled the wall between foreign 
intelligence agencies such as the CIA or NSA and domestic law enforcement such as the 
FBI, thereby sweeping away 30 years of fundamental FISA norms (Donohue, 2008, p. 
234). The FISA process (with its lower standards) could now be used for domestic 
intelligence more easily. These lower standards of FISA warrants are part of the reason 
why since 2002, "the Department of Justice requested more wiretaps under FISA than 
under ordinary wiretap statutes – a circumstance suggesting a significant shift in the 
government’s strategy for gathering information" (Donohue, 2008, p. 232).
Section 206 expanded the concept of a "roaming wiretap". Not a device, but a person 
itself is wiretapped, meaning that the warrant roams between different devices (phones, 
computers, Fax). The act removed the legal requirement that the target had to actually use 
the device. This means that all public phones or routers in a neighborhood could 
theoretically be tapped into just based on a suspicion (Podesta, 2002). It also authorizes the 
"the installation of devices to record all computer routing, addressing, and signaling 
information" (Podesta, 2002). This theoretically legalizes wiretapping into the routing 
infrastructure of the Internet. This is noteworthy because it seems to be designed to 
counter-appropriate the effects produced by dynamic routing within the TCP/IP protocol 
125 Section 218 reduced requirements for a warrant from previously demanding that the (primary) purpose of 
the investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence, whereas in the new version it was reduced to "a 
significant purpose", but there could be others (Lerner, 2003, p. 505).
126 The key idea in Section 203 is that foreign intelligence (which is defined quite broadly) gathered during 
criminal investigations (court evidence) can be shared with the intelligence community.
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(see chap. 4.1.2.1 Ideas). Section 216 mandates Internet service providers to maintain logs 
of a target’s Internet-surfing and E-mailing behavior like the IP addresses of external hosts 
a computer connects to (so-called Internet metadata) and this data must be shared with law 
enforcement and the IC. Metadata plays a huge role in the NSA programs that will be 
discussed afterwards.
Section 215 allows the collection of business records that could be relevant for any 
investigation. It significantly expanded the type of intelligence that can be gathered, 
defined broadly as "tangible things". This basically means everything: books rented, billing 
records, documents, data and other items. With this paragraph the government can force 
private companies to hand over all kinds of customer data, like IP-address tables. It also 
includes so-called gag-orders, which means that the company is not allowed to disclose 
this seizure publicly and cannot initiate a judicial appeal. This paragraph was used to 
legalize the NSA PRISM program (see next chapter). 
Accompanying the practice of the gag orders are the National Security Letters 
(NSL). Those letters are a kind of subpoena, initially designed to collect customer 
transactional records, and were expanded for other types of (meta) data: "historical 
information on telephone calls made and received from a specified number; billing 
records; subscriber information including name, address, and length of service; and e-mail 
addresses associated with an account" (Greenlee, 2008, p. 188). Critiques argue that these 
letters are a method to bypass warrant requirements for law enforcement. In 2004, the FBI 
issued 56000 of these letters, compared to 8500 in the year 2001, before 9/11 (Donohue, 
2008, p. 238). In 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a guideline that data from these 
letters can be stored indefinitely and should be shared with any other federal agency. In 
2004, the Bush administration expanded executive powers quietly with the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. This order enabled that more agencies could issue 
NSL on a broader range of targets127 (Donohue, 2008, p. 241).
In sum, legal provisions within the Patriot Act fit nicely to the idea to gather as much 
data as possible from different sources and to make this data available to different 
agencies. It is very much in line with the idea of information dominance. The Patriot Act 
thus is a clear expression of cyber-realism and an often-citied instance of the securitization 
of the Internet, expanding national security politics beyond the established rules of the 
game within a liberal democracy (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 70). The act blurs the boundaries 
127 Like "banks, credit unions, thrift stores, brokers in securities or commodities, currency exchanges, 
insurance companies, credit card companies, dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels, pawnbrokers, loan 
or finance companies, travel agencies, any business that transfers funds, telegraph companies, car, airplane, 
and boat sellers, real estate agents, the US Postal Service, state and local government entities involved in the 
preceding, and casinos" (Donohue, 2008, p. 241).
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between domestic and international. It turns the outside in: instruments of international 
relations (intelligence gathering) were used domestically. In a nutshell, the act lowered the 
standards for intelligence gathering and reduced judicial oversight while expanding 
surveillance functions to more parties and maintaining a broader definition of what 
information could be gathered and must be shared with other agencies. At the same time, 
4th amendment rights were restricted – "information about individuals not subjected to a 
criminal investigation" (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 7) could be collected without their 
knowledge and the need to inform suspects after an operation, to allow an appeal in court. 
Lawmakers realized the controversial nature of the act and introduced so-called sunset 
provisions – clauses that had to be reauthorized by Congress in 2005. However, 
controversial elements such as the NSL would not be designated to sunset. 
What other changes were there? One was the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 and the idea of local intelligence fusion centers.128 The 
DHS was meant to address the problem of terrorists inside the US. As mentioned before, 
the need-to-share norm requires the creation of databases that store intelligence. To this 
day it is hard to grasp a complete picture of how many counter-terror and crime databases 
exist, what kind of information is stored therein, who has access129 to what kind of data 
and what kind of privacy safeguards exist. Only a snapshot can be provided. In 2007, the 
DHS reported that its Homeland Security Information Network (an integrated network of 
several classified databases) had expanded to all 50 states. This network allowed multi-
directional sharing of counter-terror information between government and industry.
Another change was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 
in 2004, which implements the reshuffling of the intelligence agencies. It was a response to 
the 9/11 commission report and represents the "most sweeping changes in the intelligence 
world since the National Security Act of 1947" (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 5). It 
created the position of the DNI, Director of National Intelligence (John Negroponte) whose 
job it is to coordinate all 17 intelligence agencies (as of 2015). IRPTA added the so-called 
"lone-wolf clause", which authorizes FISA warrants "for individuals involved in 
international terrorism, but not affiliated with a known terrorist group" (Collins, 2004, p. 
14), thus broadening the scope for potential surveillance targets. In 2004, the FBI asked the 
FCC to expand the scope of the 1994 CALEA to include Internet and VoIP 
128 Fusion centers combine intelligence from various agencies (intelligence community, military) with 
information from the local level (police reports, crime & other incidents). It is unclear how many of these 
centers exist. Even the DHS has no numbers how much it spends annually on these centers and what the 
money is used for. The initial budget in 2003 was $31 billion (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap 7).
129 According to Arkin, there are around 4000 federal, state and local organizations with counterterrorism 
responsibilities and jurisdictions (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 7).
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communications (see chap. 4.3.5.2 Policy: Wiretapping the Internet with CALEA (1994)), 
which was denied because of privacy concerns when the bill was signed (Landau, 2010, p. 
chap 4.4). Between 2004 and 2007, the phone wiretap volume grew 62% and that of digital 
communication like email 3000% (Singel, 2007).
Additionally, there was a dramatically increased intelligence budget. Directly in the 
aftermath of 9/11, Congress granted a blank-cheque of $40 billion to counter the attack and 
another $40 billion were approved a few weeks later (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 1). 
Both intelligence and defense spending doubled since 9/11, a dramatical increase 
compared to the the Clinton administration. It is possible to reconstruct this, because the 
intelligence budget was declassified in 2007, following a recommendation from the 9/11 
commission. In this year, the National Intelligence Program (NIP) was worth $49.25 
Billion, and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Budget was $22.64 Billion, totaling 
an intelligence spending of $71.9 billion. The budget increased during the Obama 
administration in 2011 to a total $83.26 billion and then began decreasing to $73.16 billion 
in 2013 (Erwin & Belasco, 2013).
Summing up the legal and structural changes that were adopted after 9/11, there is 
one theme: bigger/more is better. Everything grew in scale: money (intelligence budget), 
personnel, competencies, data gathering skills and intelligence private-public partnerships. 
New agencies were formed,130 the outsourcing of surveillance functions to private 
companies and overall secrecy131 increased. The only thing that did not grew was legal 
oversight and staffers.132 The post 9/11 security apparatus grew so substantially that even 
those tasked to coordinate it had no complete picture. When Robert Gates replaced 
Rumsfeld as Defense Minister in 2006, he wanted to track all the DoD secret programs. 
The conclusion was: "the complexity and lack of accountability made it impossible to tell 
whether the country was safer because of all this spending […]" (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. 
chap. 1).
These cyber-realist policies were the necessary condition for the creation of technical 
artifacts that aimed to control cyberspace. The next chapter analyzes how the NSA and 
other agencies constructed technical artifacts to realize the goals of total information 
dominance or awareness that would potentially enable the tracking of terrorists in 
cyberspace.
130 Journalist William Arkin counted 1074 new federal government organizations concerned with 
counterterrorism in the year 2009 (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap 4.)
131 The number of classified documents tripled to over 23 million, bringing the classification system to its 
limits (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 1).
132 The amount of congressional staffers with intimate knowledge of the intelligence community, controlling 
their programs actually declined (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. chap. 1).
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4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )
This essential chapter introduces the counter-artifacts developed by NSA that aim to 
realize the goal of total information awareness and to collect as much intelligence as 
possible. These programs are intentionally designed by cyber-realists to counter the effects 
of the original Internet – namely anonymity and privacy and other obstacles introduced by 
TCP/IP. They are the technical side of the large socio-technical change that was introduced 
after 9/11 (but began before), the other being the legal and structural reforms of 
intelligence gathering described in the previous chapter. Before we turn to the changes, a 
bit of background is needed.
The NSA was established in 1952 and since then had an outward-looking mandate, 
to monitor Soviet targets (Bamford, 2009, p. 13). Domestic surveillance was not its 
original mission description, but the Watergate scandal showed that NSA, in secrecy had 
expanded its mission to monitor actors inside the US as well.133 Initially, NSA was 
intended to be a small agency with a supporting role. It was tasked by lead agencies such 
as CIA to collect certain types of SIGINT for them (Rovner & Long, 2005, p. 619). With 
the primary eavesdropping target (Soviet Union) gone, the importance of NSA gradually 
declined during the 1990s. General Michael Hayden, Director of NSA between 1998-2005 
(see appendix Table 14. Intelligence Community Directors) comments:
"NSA downsized about one-third of its manpower and about the same proportion of 
its budget in the decade of the 1990s. That is the same decade when packetized 
communications – the e-communications we have all become familiar with – 
surpassed traditional communications" (Hayden inBamford, 2009, p. 47). 
This indicates the problems the Internet produced for intelligence agencies, because 
dynamically routed communication was harder to intercept (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 8). 
Other problems for a SIGINT included that "communications were being encoded with 
powerful new commercial encryption that was proving virtually impossible to break" and 
"the exploding volume of global communications as more and more messages were 
moving through hard-to-tap fiber-optic cables" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 1.). In other 
words, the digital revolution was perceived as a problem for a downsized and marginalized 
agency whose job description is intercepting and interpreting information. Packet-
133 "Between 1967 and 1973, the NSA intercepted communications of Americans thought to be associated 
with drug trafficking, terrorism, threats to the President, and civil disturbances such as the anti-war 
movement" (Sanders, 2012, p. 273).
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switching made NSA's job more difficult. "Technology has moved from being the friend to 
being the enemy" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 2.).
For Hayden, 9/11 was a window of opportunity to address this problem and to 
increase NSA’s standing vis-à-vis the IC in general. In fact, 9/11 would transform NSA 
into the biggest and technically most sophisticated intelligence agency on earth.134 The 
change began directly a few days after the 9/11 attacks. In early October 2001, Hayden (for 
the first time ever) met with President Bush and Cheney. In an interview, Hayden recalled 
that Cheney said: "What would you like to do that you cannot already do that would help 
prevent another 9/11?" (Kirk, 2014). At least since 1999, Hayden had several experimental 
R&D programs in place that aimed at domestic telecommunications surveillance (Harris, 
2014, p. chap 2.). Hayden argued that he cannot legally use them under the FISA regime 
and thus uttered concerns over the lawfulness of these programs. According to Hayden, 
Bush said: "[…] there are some things we are going to have to do, and I think I have the 
authority to authorize you to do the things" (Kirk, 2014). The underlying rationale behind 
this blank cheque was that in times of emergency the "gloves come off" (Risen, 2006, p. 
chap.1). In the following days, Hayden, together with CIA director George Tenet, basically 
drafted a surveillance wish list. 
On October 4th, Cheney issued a secret signing order, under which the President 
authorized "the program". The order was written not by the President’s legal aid (who 
would be legally in charge), but by Cheney’s, David Addington, which is unique in US 
intelligence history (Kirk, 2014). This underscores the role of the Vice President in 
enabling the largest spying operation known to date. The program would operate outside 
the FISA regime for domestic surveillance. It would only be legitimized by the President’s 
article 2 powers, based on the unitary executive theory. The combination of these 
necessary conditions, the blank cheque and the shared interests of Cheney and Hayden in 
terms of surveillance, immediately after the 9/11 shock, explain the form and severity of 
surveillance measures taken. A non-influential Vice President with no grudge with the 
FISA court and less radical neoconservative views probably would have adopted less 
severe measures.
What did "the program" do? Because of secrecy there is an ambiguity whether it was 
indeed one program or several smaller ones that later were combined and renamed. Its 
origin was a 1999 program called Trailblazer, which Hayden described as the agency's 
134 With failure to connect the dots at 9/11 and the Iraq WMD intelligence blunder of 2003, the CIA’s role 
was downgraded with the Intelligence reform of 2004 (Russell, 2007). At the same time, NSA became 
upgraded dramatically. In 2008, NSA had 40% more workforce compared to pre 9/11. Whereas in 2001, 
NSA had around 55 contracts with external companies, that number grew to 7197 in 2005 (Bamford, 2009, p. 
199).
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future (Gorman, 2006). Trailblazer was designed to fuse all kinds of information that NSA 
gathered with different techniques (SIGNT, HUMINT, Reconnaissance Intelligence) from 
various listening-posts (like the Echelon satellite surveillance system) all around the world 
into one, centralized and searchable database. The problem that this technical artifact was 
going to address was that even before the intelligence expansion of 9/11, NSA collected 
more data than it could analyze, thereby suffering information overload. In his memoirs, 
NSA director Hayden describes a blackout of NSA systems in early 2000 where "the sheer 
volume of collection had overwhelmed the capacity of our networks as they had been 
configured" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 1). In 2002, NSA collected 200 million pieces of 
intelligence per day but could only analyze 1 percent of it (Lee, 2015, p. 28). Additionally, 
with the digital revolution, the digital haystack was potentially doubling in size each year.
135 Trailblazer was designed to be the solution to all of NSA’s "information management 
problems" (Gorman, 2006), to store and analyze intelligence in "the largest database of 
every call ever made" (Cauley, 2006). 
Data like audio (intercepted messages in a plethora of different languages), video and 
images and all different kinds of records like financial and Internet traffic, had to be 
transcribed (to be computer-readable) and stored. To get this data, in early 2001, before 
9/11, NSA allegedly began approaching US Internet- and telecommunications carriers, in 
secrecy, to obtain two kinds of data: First, customer records such as caller-ID and Internet 
meta-data.136 Second, NSA began to collect Internet content data (in some instances) by 
physically tapping into communication networks that handled the majority of the nation’s 
phone-calls, text- and E-mail messages as well as Internet traffic.137 Later, the Snowden 
leaks would call this full-take of Internet data the UPSTREAM program (see chap. 4.5.5 
Artifacts: The Snowden Leaks). Initially, some of the ISP denied, but the later Patriot Act 
required them by law to hand over this kind of information (Harris, 2007). 
135 Hayden: "mobile cell phones increased from 16 million to 741 million, an increase of nearly fifty 
times. […] Internet users went from about 4 million to 361 million, an increase of over ninety times. Half as 
many landlines were laid in the last six years of the 1990s as in the whole previous history of the world. In 
that same decade […] international telephone traffic went from 38 billion minutes to over 100 billion. This 
year [2002], the world’s population will spend over 180 billion minutes on the phone in international calls 
alone" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 4).
136 Metadata like: who calls whom, when, how long, with which phone number from which geolocation. The 
Snowden leaks (2013) repeatedly stressed the important role of metadata that is used as a first instance of 
intelligence. Metadata is used as a filter-device in order to manage the vast amounts of stored content data. 
To analyze metadata, NSA set up a special Metadata Analysis Center (Harris, 2014, p. chap 2.). According to 
Snowden leaks, 250 people work there (Ewen MacAskill et al., 2013).
137 Estimates by Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies suggest that during 2000, the amount of data that the 
internal US internet-network handled was between 20000 and 35000 Terrabytes/Month. In the year 2011, 
this grew to around 3 million TB/month (Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies, 2017). According to Forbes, 12 
billion E-mails were sent in 2000. (Chiang, 2009).
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To gather data, NSA would install "what’s normally foreign intelligence, outward-
facing equipment" (Drake inKirk, 2014) on domestic networks. Splitters would be installed 
at fiber-optic cables at the central US Internet Exchange points (IXP), for example those 
which physically connect the North American continent with Europe or East-Asia (see 
following figure). 
Figure 26. Map of Internet Data flows, Source: (Landau, 2010, p. chap. 4.6)
Since the privatization of the Internet backbone (see chap. 4.3.4 Artifacts: Privatizing 
Control over the Internet), these are operated by private service providers and handle large 
amounts of both domestic and global Internet traffic.138 Splitters use a prism to copy 
everything that is transmitted through that fiber optic cable (The Washington Post, 2013a). 
They basically copy the Internet. We know all this because in 2003, AT&T technician 
Mark Klein became aware of secret NSA rooms (room 641A) at large AT&T Internet-
switches. Through these rooms, international and domestic Internet data-streams were 
routed, copied and then fed into NSA’s data analysis programs. Former NSA analyst and 
Trailblazer developer William Binney declared (under oath) in 2012 that the agency had 
between 10 and 20 intercept centers all over the US (Lee, 2015, p. 153). Hayden once 
called this the "gold of the program" – the agency could "spy on the world without leaving 
home" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 2).139 Klein filed a law-suit, together with civil liberty 
groups, and lost in 2006. However, this process revealed the existence of the NSA 
138 Large portions of the physical Internet infrastructure are located in the US, which means that a large 
amount of global traffic is routed via the US. Additionally, many services like Google or Facebook are 
American, which means that the 90% of people around the globe who use "Google search", contact servers 
within the USA, which means that their traffic potentially gets collected (Risen, 2006). Insiders testified that 
NSA even encouraged the telecommunications industry to increase the capacity so that even more global data 
is handled by US switches (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 2).
139 This creates a legal ambiguity. Because of dynamic routing, an E-mail between two 4th amendment 
protected American citizens, from Washington to Austin may be routed via Pakistan, and therefore become 
international communication. Since these switches carry both international and domestic communication, it 
becomes harder (if not impossible) to distinguish between foreign and domestic communication, as the FISA 
law requires (Risen, 2006, p. chap. 2).
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warrantless surveillance program in late 2005 (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005) and President 
Bush was forced to acknowledge its existence on December 17, 2005.
From a technical perspective, this is a remarkable program because it is a logical way 
to circumvent many of the wire-tapping issues introduced with the TCP/IP protocol and 
fiber optic cables – namely dynamic routing, packet-switching, the end-to-end principle 
that created limited degrees of anonymity (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: Internet Protocols 
and Norms). Several intelligence officials repeatedly stressed the challenge of TCP/IP for 
eavesdropping:
"Today you have no idea where that information is being routed […] You don’t 
know how it’s being routed, it’s going through all kinds of switches, the 
information is not where you think it is, and that’s what created the complexity and 
that’s what we have to figure out how to deal with" (Bamford, 2009, p. 162).
This statement is key evidence (see chap. 3. Methodology & Research Design) that the 
Internet’s core technologies like fiber optic cables and dynamic routing represented a core 
nuisance for actors engaged in SIGINT, because it made wiretapping harder. In theoretical 
terms, it is an anomaly or puzzle that the paradigm of cyber-realism tried to solve with all 
available means, which explains why NSA, the impact constituency, spent a lot of 
resources circumventing it (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 1). The goal of these artifacts was to 
reinstate intelligence in a network that was designed to have none.
This becomes evidently clear with one of Trailblazer's companion programs called 
Thinthread. It sorted and analyzed metadata and then correlated it to content data and 
thereby basically acted as a filter. It could "detect meaningful traffic via the metadata of a 
massive communication stream (e-mail or voice)" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 2). The 
metadata was analyzed for patterns, frequency and length of calls and thereby pointing the 
analysts to communications whose content should be explored (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 
2). It included E-mail analysis and was directly designed to address one of the core 
problems of NSA: packet-switching. According to Hayden, Thinthread "could assemble 
the individual packets that comprise e-mail messaging" which "enabled it to put 
communications back together from the individual packets" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 2). 
The problem of Thinthread was that it could only handle small portions of data. It could 
not be scaled up to support bulk-data collection. The problem of Trailblazer was that it was 
bulky and slow and was highly cost-intensive – over $1 billion in a decade (Kaplan, 2016, 
p. chap. 8). Eventually, Trailblazer and Thinthread were merged to address the problem of 
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scalability and to create one of the first big-data systems within an intelligence agency.140 
It was renamed Stellarwind, which since 2005 is known to the public as the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (Bush, 2005). 
The "Upstream" data collection at large intermediary nodes of the physical Internet 
infrastructure that handle the majority of packets allows to intercept many of these. Packets 
would be reassembled with the help of supercomputers and special Deep-Packet-
Inspection Software.141 In theory, if one would have all the packets sent over the Internet, 
one would be able to sort them out and combine them, just like in a large jigsaw puzzle 
(given enough computing power and as long as they are not encrypted). In the post card 
metaphor used to describe packet switching before, the equivalent would be collecting and 
photocopying all post cards passing through a postal office (see chap. 4.1.3.1 Artifact: 
Internet Protocols and Norms). However, this data alone is too complex. To make sense of 
it, meta-data (data about this data) and customer records are needed. Customer records 
allow to correlate an IP-address with a human operator, which eliminates all anonymity 
and so it becomes transparent what each Internet connection does on the web. In other 
words, meta-data collection on a massive scale is one way to solve the attribution problem 
(see chap. 4.4.2.2 Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism).
If this practice was repeated internationally at other large IXP,142 this would 
statistically allow to analyze large portions of global, unencrypted Internet 
communications. With the Snowden leaks of 2013, we became aware of similar programs 
conducted by the Five-Eyes intelligence partnership (including US, UK, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand). Under the Tempora program, the British GCHQ applied the splitter and 
DPI technique to European fiber-optic cables, intercepting "more than 40 billion pieces of 
content a day", or 25% of the Internet traffic (Gallagher, 2015b). Because of the 
geographic structure of the large transcontinental Internet-cables, most of the European 
traffic to the US physically crosses British territory, which allows for interception of 
140 According to Hayden: "we had the theoretical ability to access a significant percentage of the calls 
entering or leaving the United States" and "We also gathered large volumes of metadata. In the first six 
months of the program we built up a bank of billions of domestic call events in addition to an even larger 
number of foreign ones. We used contact chaining from known or suspect "dirty numbers" to see if there 
were connections that suggested terrorist ties to the United States" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 5).
141 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), was initially designed by ISP for billing purposes and can read a packet’s 
content data while it passes an Internet router (Parsons, 2013). According to Bamford, NSA used a 
technology from an Isreali Company called NARUS to analyze the copied data-streams. After 9/11 NARUS 
began to sell its NARUS STA 6400 Semantic Traffic Analyzer and its Intercept Suite to intelligence agencies 
around the world. The suite can reassemble packets, based on their identifier number, flowing through a 
network from a remote location (Bamford, 2009, p. 192).
142 Another method would be installing splitter under the ocean, directly at the cables. In the month before 
9/11, reports surfaced that NSA was repurposing submarines for this end (Jr, 2001). Other nations most likely 
do the same (Huddleston, 2015). Physical control of fiber-optic cables would be one way to disrupt global 
communication in case of war.
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continental communication directly at the British shorelines. The Tempora program, with 
its aim of "Mastering the Internet" became operational in 2011 (Shubber, 2013). Operation 
Eikonal by German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) seemed to serve a similar purpose at 
the largest central European IXP, DE-CIX (although BND denies this). Most likely, other 
partners conduct similar operations (there are reports from Mexico, India, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand), thereby creating a global wire-tapping 
network (Bamford, 2009, p. 221). Mastering or "owning" the Internet, which means 
awareness and total control of all information transmitted therein stands in stark opposition 
of the initial norms that were embedded in the system, namely a certain degree of privacy 
and anonymity and the idea that only the end-points of the network have intelligence. In 
total, the whole NSA-program can be characterized as a global dragnet data collection that 
tries to collect every piece of information that traverses the global ICT infrastructure and to 
circumvent the Internet’s initial anonymity features. 
The intentional design of the program is to gain as much data as possible and 
potentially, in the long run, collecting and storing the entire Internet and communication 
traffic, both content and meta-data for weeks or even months. In 2014, a large $1.5 billion 
NSA data-center was completed. It is said to have a storage capacity for several zetta or 
even yottabytes of data143 and is equipped with Cray supercomputers to sift through the 
data (Bamford, 2012). In other words, the ultimate aim is to store and analyze all 
information transmitted over the global Internet infrastructure, hence the name "full take 
approach". To this present day we cannot be sure how much of this data is actually stored 
and analyzed. Nevertheless, it is the most expansive data collection in the history of 
mankind, although only a quick snapshot could be provided.
Although we are aware of intelligence collection, we have limited insight on analysis 
or what is done with the data. To shed light on this, we can analyze another, non-classified 
program called Total Information Awareness Program (TIA) that was launched in August 
2002 at DARPA under the lead of Navy Rear Admiral John Poindexter. When Congress 
cancelled TIA in 2003, many of its components went to the NSA. This is the reason why I 
elaborate on this. The following is based on a report to Congress in 2003 (Stevens, 2003) 
and other secondary sources. The aim of TIA was quite similar to NSA’s program – to 
prevent another 9/11 and therefore to find "terrorists in the world of noise" (Poindexter, 
2002). The problem is not just connecting the dots, but "to know which dots to connect" 
(ibid.). The ultimate aim is, as the name suggests, total information awareness or to create 
143 Cisco estimates that the global Internet traffic has a size 1.1 ZB per year (Cisco Systems, 2016). This 
includes video content. Excluding the video, a data-center of 1 ZB storage capacity could store several years 
of Internet traffic.
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an "information weapon", as Harris called it (Harris, 2006). The seal of the TIA program 
was therefore the freemason pyramid with the all-seeing eye and the slogan "scientia est 
potentia", knowledge is power. For that purpose, TIA aimed at building an integrated, 
unified software platform that could "data mine an indefinitely expandable universe of 
databases" (Stevens, 2003). Because of the sharing norm, external databases would be 
provided by other law enforcement and intelligence agencies (for example the plethora of 
new counter-terror databases after 9/11, such as the DHS database), but could also come 
from the private sector.144 In turn, they would get access to the system.145 The major 
functions of TIA were machine-translation of languages, data mining and patterns of life 
analysis. Let’s take a look at some subcomponents:
 The $44.6 million Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery program was intended to 
analyze social relationships of people, organizations and places. It analyzed who would go 
where, when and how long and search for patterns. Similarly, the Scalable Social Network 
Analysis module ($7.4 million) analyzed patterns in communications metadata to draft 
social networks of people (who speaks with whom, who is the central broker in a network). 
Social network analysis is particularly powerful and based on the idea of affiliation. If you 
affiliate with a terrorist (even without knowing), you belong to that network and thus 
potentially to a terrorist cell. The NSA allegedly stores social network information of 
targets up to three hops (or degrees of segregation), which mathematically increases the 
number to millions of people. If anyone in these is a terrorist, and you have a random link 
to him/her, you therefore are suspicious (Gallagher, 2013). The HumanID module ($32.2 
million) aimed to identify humans at a distance based on their body features. The Next-
Generation Face Recognition program ($17.1 million) would implement automatic face- 
and biometric recognition of stored images and videos (Stevens, 2003). In sum, TIA 
brought together many state-of-the-art Big Data analysis algorithms that were designed to 
find patterns in large quantities of data. These quantities came from the NSA wiretapping 
activity described before.
When Congress discovered the plans and ambitions behind TIA in late 2003, a public 
outcry followed. The executive initially simply renamed the program Terrorist Information 
144 "Transactional data for the TIA database could include financial (e.g., banks, credit cards, and money 
transmitters, casinos and brokerage firms), educational, travel (e.g., airlines, rail, rental car), medical, 
veterinary, country entry, place/event entry, transportation, housing, critical resources, government, and 
communications (e.g., cell, landline, Internet) data. Biometric data for the database could include face, finger 
prints, gait, and iris data. The TIA system could seek access to databases to discover connections between 
"passports; visas; work permits; driver’s license; credit card; airline tickets; rental cars; gun purchases; 
chemical purchases – and events – such as arrest or suspicious activities and so forth" (Stevens, 2003, p. CRS 
2).
145 Harris argues that in its first year of testing in 2003, more than 250 agencies and entities had access and 
used the TIA prototype. In August 2003, there were 320 agencies connected to it (Harris, 2006).
4.4 Information Warfare and the Origin of Cyber-Realism
330
Awareness to eliminate concerns, but in the end, Congress decided to stop funding. John 
Poindexter, partly because of his controversial role in the Iran-Contra affair, had to resign 
(Harris, 2006). Theoretically, that was the end of TIA, but there is evidence that some of 
the subcomponents I just described were renamed Research Development and 
Experimental Collaboration, "to erase any connection to its past" (Harris, 2006) and were 
moved to different contractors and to NSA’s own research program (Shorrock, 2009, p. 
chap. 6). When Congress asked Hayden whether TIA really closed in 2003, he responded 
"I’d like to answer in closed session" (Harris, 2006). Indeed, many of the NSA programs 
leaked by Snowden clearly resemble TIA components (see chap. 4.5.5 Artifacts: The 
Snowden Leaks).
On a theoretical level, what the NSA and TIA did with the programs was to 
reestablish intelligence in the Internet, by building, within a legal grey-zone, on top of the 
existing physical infrastructure. As such, it represents a form of reconstitution 
(Pfaffenberger, 1992a) of the Internet infrastructure without altering its protocols (see 
following figure). The surveillance infrastructure that was put in place is a counter-artifact, 
aiming to compensate deficiencies perceived by cyber-realist advocates, namely norms of 
privacy and anonymity. Anonymity, and tools that provide it (like encryption or the Tor 
Network), are "the bane" of every intelligence agency (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 5). The idea 
of end-to-end was that the network is dumb – no central authority is aware of the Internet’s 
content. By tapping into the physical Internet infrastructure and analyzing data streams 
with software, NSA reintroduced intelligence into the network, becoming aware of every 
packet and its content. The different legal and technical parts of the program made it 
possible to circumvent anonymity and to see which IP-address communicates with whom, 
where and what they talk about. Thus, NSA reversed the logic that on the Internet nobody 
knows that you are a dog (see chap. 4.2 The Evolution of Cyber-Utopianism). The 
following graphic depicts the interplay of cyber-realism and the technical artifacts it 
constructed.
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Figure 27. Cyber-realist paradigm reconstituting the Internet via NSA programs 
(own diagram) 
In retrospect, even national security officials acknowledge that the NSA warrantless 
surveillance program was a "sea-change" or "a major shift in American intelligence 
gathering practices" (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005) that altered 30 years of intelligence 
regulations, established with FISA. "Stellarwind was a departure from normal" (Hayden, 
2016b, p. chap. 5). Legitimized during the shock situation of 9/11, without any public 
discourse, the Bush administration turned the NSA inwards while sidestepping 
fundamental checks and balances. At the same time, the scale and magnitude of 
intelligence gathering was expanded. "Everybody’s a target, everybody with 
communication is a target", as one senior intelligence officer told author James Bamford 
(Bamford, 2012). Over time, this extraordinary practice, contesting many liberal norms, 
became the new normal. Tech-enabled mass surveillance initiated a path-trajectory. 
The reader might ask, what does this have to do with cyber-war? The answer is: the 
very same infrastructure used for intelligence collection also is a valuable platform to 
launch offensive cyber-attacks. In the digital age, wiretapping is no longer a passive 
activity, sitting at the wires and listening in. It is an active procedure that requires breaking 
into computer-systems and networks with the help of special malware. Hacking into the 
global Internet infrastructure and sifting through global data-streams technically is a form 
of computer network exploitation. The network "exploited" is the global Inter-network. 
Thus, Internet surveillance with the aim of information awareness and/or dominance in 
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cyberspace is logically connected to computer network attacks or cyber-war. In other 
words, surveillance involves a great deal of hacking, as will be shown in the next chapter.
4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, Surveillance and Cyber-war (2003-2008)
Whereas the previous chapter highlighted additions to cyber-realism that came with the 
anti-terror policy immediately after 9/11, this chapter analyzes the continuity and 
institutionalization of information operations within the US Military and IC. Thus, it 
adopts a longer timeframe describing the general storyline (see chap. 3. Methodology & 
Research Design) and focuses predominantly on the evolved literature on Information 
operations. The central argument is that IW and Internet surveillance became fused 
together to create a nexus.
As indicated before, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was one key advocate of 
IW and CNO, even before 9/11. Beginning with his swearing-in ceremony, he placed the 
issue of IW on the agenda as the second most urgent threat after weapons of mass 
destruction (Rumsfeld, 2001). In June 2001, at a NATO council meeting, he warned allies 
of "attacks from cyberspace", thereby diffusing the threat perception of the Internet as a 
dangerous place globally (Bendrath, 2003, p. 57). During his tenure, Rumsfeld began to 
implement RMA and IW concepts within the organizational structure of the US military 
and IC in order to reform the US defense policy and strategy. In 2002, he wrote an op’ed in 
Foreign Policy, arguing that the revolution in military affairs must be used to fight against 
new enemies such as terrorists and to defend US information networks from cyber-attacks 
(Rumsfeld, 2002). The roadmap for this transformation argued that information 
operations146 should become a core capability of the US military: "the Department must be 
prepared to fight the net" (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 6). The norm of control is 
clearly outlined in plans for "seizing control of adversary communications and networks", 
even in peace-time. When implemented, this roadmap will transform the military into an 
"information-centric force" and would "jumpstart a rapid improvement of CNA capability" 
(Department of Defense, 2003, pp. 6-7). The fusion of the intelligence reform and military 
strategy becomes obvious in statements such as that "the IO battlespace should be prepared 
through intelligence" because "intelligence is a fundamental prerequisite for full spectrum 
IO." Computer network operations should "capitalize on newly acquired authorities 
provided by the Patriot and Homeland Security acts" (Department of Defense, 2003, pp. 
146 "Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), 
computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and 
operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own" (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006, p. ix).
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18-22). In other words, the bulk-data collection should be used to prepare the battlefield 
for cyber-attacks.
In February 2003, President Bush issued the classified presidential directive 16, 
which intended to clarify under which circumstances the US would engage in offensive 
cyber-attacks and who would have the authority to conduct those. It also included the 
notion of a pre-emptive cyber-attack, for example against China and Russia. The directive 
was also the result of a larger "national strategy to secure cyberspace" (The White House, 
2003) that had been in development since the Clinton administration. It adopts a lot of the 
critical infrastructure rhetoric of the Clinton administration and surprisingly includes 
liberal norms that acknowledge that the government alone cannot and should not secure 
cyberspace. However, this strategy seemed to be relatively marginalized in the general IO 
context.
Counter-terrorist terminology and ideas also became embedded within the reformed 
Doctrine for Information Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).147 There is a heavy focus 
on the notion of intelligence support for IO. IO "requires intelligence on relevant portions 
of the physical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment" 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, pp. III-1). Informational properties are "specification, 
capacity, configuration, and usage" as well as "technical design of information 
infrastructure", in other words the structural composition of Internet nodes and networks in 
other countries, as well as content and context of communication networks. It should 
become clear that these intelligence demands fit nicely with the NSA mass surveillance 
programs that targeted international IXP for bulk data collection.
In January 2005, IO including offensive network warfare authorities were given to 
US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and one of its functional components called Joint 
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW). The new director of 
NSA, General Keith Alexander (2005-2014), became director of JFCC-NW and was 
"responsible for deliberate planning of network warfare" (Wilson, 2006, p. 8). NSA 
became responsible for CNE and CNA. General Alexander, in contrast to his predecessor 
Michael Hayden, is described as a "technical wizard" or engineer, one who actually 
understands the technical backgrounds of cyber-war (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 9). Alexander 
worked at Army Intelligence and Security Command after 9/11 where he developed 
147 Whereas the 1998 doctrine explained the concepts of information war, the 2007 doctrine replaces the term 
with Information Operations and aims to "provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to 
help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO in support of joint operations." (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, p. ix). 
The general problem definitions and narrative and goals stay the same. The 2013 updated Information 
Operations doctrines continues the trend to assign authorities and responsibilities and also focuses on 
multinational IO.
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similar ideas to NSA, like to conduct traffic and pattern analysis in large volumes of 
Internet data. Whereas NSA built Trailblazer, a one-size-fits-all system that was costly 
($1.2 billion) and bulky, Alexander favored a distributed, decentralized approach of 
multiple smaller programs and databases talking to each other. Smaller systems interacted 
and backed each other up while specializing in certain aspects (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 9). 
One component was called Turbulence and began in 2005 (see chap. 4.5.5 Artifacts: The 
Snowden Leaks). Although Turbulence is similar to Trailblazer in the sense that it, too, 
analyzes Internet data on the packet-level by sifting through the data looking for suspicious 
patterns, it also included several offensive cyber-war components. Whereas Trailblazer 
was more of a passive eavesdropping system (CNE), Turbulence was designed to be active 
or even offensive (CNA). Turbulence included a series of interconnected hacking 
techniques for CNA, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, DNS-injection, packet-spoofing 
and more.148 These will be analyzed in more detail in a later chapter (see chap. 4.5.5 
Artifacts: The Snowden Leaks). 
In general, these technical artifacts manifested the fusion of surveillance and cyber-
war. JFCC-NW was tasked with both disruptive and destructive CNA, espionage or CNE 
and, since 2008, computer network defense of military networks (whereas the DHS is 
responsible for the CND of civilian critical infrastructure). Its operations are classified and 
the US never admitted to be responsible for any known cyber-operation. Because of this 
dual-hat structure, the director of NSA can utilize intelligence support (from the overall 
IC) for computer network operations (Lin, Dam, & Owens, 2009, p. 166). This functional 
overlap is effective because complex cyber-attacks require actionable intelligence of 
adversaries’ computer systems and are functionally similar to CNE. Nothing showed this 
more than the war in Iraq.
During the year 2007, several noteworthy cyber-incidents happened (DDoS Attack 
on Estonia and Israeli hacking of Syrian air-defense called Operation Orchard). The 
military operation in Iraq is often forgotten in books on the history of cyber-war (Healey & 
Grindal, 2013). During the "surge" of 2007, JFCC-NW’s new toys and skills were put to 
the test. It was former NSA director (1992-1996) and now DNI (2007-2009) Mike 
McConnell who convinced G.W. Bush to authorize operational cyber-war with CNE 
elements in Iraq in April 2007 (see appendix Intelligence Community Directors). As 
148 All these are hacking techniques are often used by criminals in order to insert malware into a system. 
According to Kaspersky, a man-in-the-middle attack "requires only that the attacker place himself between 
two parties that are trying to communicate and that he be able to intercept the messages being sent and 
further have the ability to impersonate at least one of the parties. For example, in the offline world this could 
involve someone creating fake bills or invoices, placing them in a victim’s mailbox and then intercepting the 
checks that the victim attempts to mail back as payment." (Fisher, 2013). By faking to be a trusted party, 
hackers can insert malware into the senders system without him/her knowing.
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former NSA director and a fierce advocate of cyber-war (see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation 
of the Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)), McConnell’s goal as DNI was to put 
cyber-security on the President’s agenda (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). In order to do that, 
McConnell framed offensive CNA in terms of a digital 9/11: "if the capability to exploit a 
communication device exists, we have to assume that our enemies either have it or are 
trying to develop it" and if successful, such an attack could have the physical effects of 
9/11 (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). He had a powerful argument. In March 2007, DHS tried 
to answer the question of whether a cyber-attack could cause physical destruction. During 
the so-called Aurora Generator Test at Idaho National Laboratory, the emergency circuit-
breakers, designed for preventing a power-surge, were digitally manipulated. The 2.25 
megawatt generator exploded (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). McConnell briefed Bush on the 
experiment. According to insiders, Bush got furious and said "We’ll do another Manhattan 
Project if we have to" and gave McConnell "thirty days to fix it" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 8). 
Of course, a highly complex issue such as cyber-security has no easy fix to it. Meanwhile, 
General Alexander and General Stanley McChrystal, head of Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC), the American Special Forces, already had their own plan. 
They fused Special Forces and NSA hackers together to hunt down Iraqi insurgents. 
The problem at the time were roadside bombs, often detonated via cellphone calls (Kaplan, 
2016, p. chap. 9). NSA got access to the large Iraqi telecommunication switches that 
handled Internet and cellphone data and was able to copy meta- and content data of all 
Iraqi communication (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013).149 Correlating phone-call meta-data 
with maps allowed to detect self-made explosive devices. In other words, the US exported 
the technical artifact of UPSTREAM data collection and used it in another context (see 
chap. 4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). 
American hackers from NSA’s Tailored Access Operations150 and CIA’s Technology 
Management Office developed cyber-attacks to infiltrate computer networks, websites, 
servers and E-mail accounts of Al-Qaeda (its internal network was called Obelisk) and 
149 NSA struck a deal with Iraqi telecommunication carriers which gave it access to the fiber optic cables. 
"[…] by the time the 2007 surge began, NSA had put in place the spying infrastructure to collect every piece 
of electronic data going in and out of the country—every phone call, every text message, every e-mail and 
social media post" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 1). According to one agreement, the carriers also had to implement 
an Internet kill switch: a technology to shut down all communications travelling through the countries. This 
kill switch technology is based on tampering with the Border-Gateway-Protocol that manages data 
transmission between two large IXP. According to insider reports, in 2010 DHS tested such an internet kill-
switch in California but it remains unclear, whether the US has working Internet kill switches in place 
(Saalbach, 2015, p. 59). Shutting down a nation’s internet would be one of the most intrusive cyber-attacks.
150 TAO is said to be NSA’s hacker elite, tasked with getting inside adversary networks, steal or crack 
passwords, implant spyware and backdoors. According to the Snowden files, TOA has implemented spyware 
in at least 85000 computers in 89 countries during 279 operations, as of 2010. (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 4). This 
organization is the physical manifestation of the fusion of cyber-war and surveillance.
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other insurgents, tracking Internet activity of terrorists. With the help of metadata, analysts 
drafted social networks of insurgents that were communicating frequently with each other, 
just as envisioned with TIA. NSA hackers sent fake messages to known suspect phone 
numbers, arranging meetings just to arrest (or kill) the people who would show up. JSOC 
Special Forces planted electronic surveillance equipment such as key-loggers and other 
malware at suspects computers for further surveillance (Priest & Arkin, 2012, pp. 236-
245). Offensive cyber-war tools also played a role in the assassination of targets with drone 
strikes, as Hayden (2014) once admitted by accident: "We kill people based on metadata" 
(Ferran, 2014). In other words, JFCC-NW, TAO, JSOC and other organizations were 
physical manifestations of the fusion of cyber-war, surveillance and kinetic wars.
But DNI McConnell successfully advocated for three other famous initiatives that 
marked the start of operational cyber-war, its fusion with surveillance and the rise of the 
cyber-realist paradigm (representing another instance of equifinality). The first is called 
Olympic Games (or Stuxnet), the second the FISA-Amendment Act of 2008 and the third 
the creation of US Cybercommand, which was completed under Obama. Stuxnet und US 
CYBERCOM will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters (see chap. 4.5.3 
Practice: Professionalization of Offensive Cyber-War & Surveillance). 
A key trigger or catalyst for these initiatives was an intrusion into classified, air-
gapped DoD networks by an allegedly foreign malware, a self-replicating worm dubbed 
"agent.btz" in June 2008 (Brown & Poellet, 2012, p. 131). The fact that for the first time a 
classified and highly secure DoD network got hacked represented a shock that rang the 
alarm bells. Like with Solar Sunrise in 1998, the question was "who is in charge?" 
(Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). NSA General Alexander saw an opportunity to "make NSA 
the military’s new leader in cyberspace" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 9). General Alexander 
lobbied that NSA was put in charge. He told a congressional committee that incident 
showed that offensive and defense capabilities should be brought together and that NSA 
would be best positioned to do the job, if he got more personnel and budget. 
NSA’s TAO was tasked with the defense operation called "Buckshot Yankee" to 
remove the malware and trace its origin. That NSA, and not DHS or any other organization 
was put in charge is described by insiders as an NSA "power grab" (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 
9). In fact, the malware was well-known among private cyber-security companies and 
relatively benign. Malware analysts pointed to the fact that agent.btz also infected systems 
of the greatest adversaries (Russia and China) and was probably not a targeted attack at the 
Pentagon (G Data, 2015). This episode shows the imbalance of knowledge that is visible in 
the entire cyber-war discourse – because of classification and secrecy, many attacks and 
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practices cannot be analyzed independently and critically, which gives those agencies who 
maintain those secrets an advantage in proposing their message. The IC in that sense acts 
as "an institutionally distorting prism" (Herman, 2004, p. 345). In theoretical terms, the 
technical side of national security policy is a highly closed policy subsystem where only a 
few actors have access and insight. These actors sit in a special position of power and work 
as norm-entrepreneurs from within the executive. NSA Generals Hayden and Alexander 
and other cyber-advocates like DNI McConnell systematically framed this incident as an 
existential threat to the US (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 9). But this could not be critically 
evaluated by non-tech savvy decision-makers. 
What followed was comprehensive a national plan by President Bush to increase 
cyber-security, announced in January 2008. Bush signed NSPD-54, which includes a 
language highly inspired by IW and cyber-war doctrine documents: 
"The electronic information infrastructure of the United States is subject to constant 
intrusion by adversaries that may include foreign intelligence and military services, 
organized primal groups, and terrorists trying to steal sensitive information or 
damage, degrade, or destroy data, information systems, or the critical 
infrastructures that depend upon them" (The White House, 2008).
To address this problem, all governmental agencies (and not just military ones) should 
focus on increased computer network defense. It defines CNA, CNE, cyber-security, 
cyberspace and much more. Formally, it designates the DHS as the lead agency which 
shall set-up a cyber-security center coordinating the various US CERT teams. Congress 
approved a budget of $17,3 billion, but most of this budget went directly to NSA because 
DHS neither had the resources nor the know-how. There were only a handful of network-
security experts at DHS compared to NSA, which at the time, already had hundreds if not 
thousands of analysts charged with CND, CNE and CNA (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). This 
is more evidence for the power-grab thesis and shows how national security actors 
positioned themselves as dominant in cyberspace, thereby excluding civil or non-military 
responses to cyber-security issues.
Although the directive focused on CND, General Alexander began advocating for a 
broad interpretation of "defense". Narrowly defined, defense could mean Firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems, such as the DHS Einstein-2 program, a network-defense 
system designed to detect malicious code entering government networks. Alexander 
instead advocated for "active defense: penetrating an adversary's network to see what kinds 
of attacks he was planning, so that NSA could devise a way to disrupt, degrade, or defeat 
them preemptively" (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). The idea of active defense is a clear 
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fusion of the preemptive war doctrine, developed during the GWOT and the idea of 
information dominance, developed in the 1990s in the IW doctrine.
The last outcome was the reform of the FISA-system with the FISA-Amendment Act 
(FISAAA), adopted in July 2008. Again, it was DNI McConnell who took the initiative. 
The leak of Stellarwind in 2005 had sparked controversy over the legality of the NSA 
programs, collecting large portions of world Internet-traffic as it was passing through 
networks-switches inside the US (Lichtblau & Risen, 2005). Differentiating between 
foreign and domestic communications in the vast amounts of Internet packets – as FISA 
required – was technically and legally challenging, if not impossible. There was no sound 
way of guaranteeing that there were no domestic data-packets in this vast data-collection 
and thus 4th amendment rights of US citizens were not violated. With TCP/IP, it is 
virtually impossible to differentiate whether a packet is foreign or not (see chap. 4.1.3.1 
Artifact: Internet Protocols and Norms). DNI McConnell convinced Bush of the necessity 
of the "full-take" data-collection of global Internet-data streams at domestic switches and 
urged him to "fix" legislation (Kaplan, 2016, p. Chap. 11). 
As a result, Republican leaders in the Senate brought forward a bill that adjusted the 
FISA system with the new full-take surveillance practice in the digital age. McConnell 
adopted the "death of geography in cyberspace" frame to argue that the distinction between 
foreign and domestic could not be made anyway and therefore was too restrictive (Kaplan, 
2016, p. chap. 11). FISAAA specified that electronic surveillance of American citizens 
would not be illegal (and not be called surveillance anymore) if it was aimed at a person 
"reasonably believed to be located outside the US." The clause "reasonably" is 
intentionally kept broad. A warrant request from now on would not need to specify the 
"specific facilities, places, premises or property" where intelligence collection would take 
place (U.S. Congress, 2008, p. section 701). This, again, widened the set of surveillance 
targets.
The bill also prohibited law suits against telecommunications providers and other 
companies (such as AT&T) facilitating the data-collection on behalf of NSA, giving them 
post-hoc legal "immunity from civil and criminal liability for any persons and companies" 
(Shorrock, 2009, p. chap. 9). The only legal protection of US citizens was the requirement 
to "minimize" data of US citizens discovered within the bulk-data collection, meaning the 
data had to exclude names of targets and the content of communications. Whereas under 
the old FISA law, data could be obtained and stored only if it was relevant for an 
investigation and if it could be shown that the target is a foreign power, the new law 
lowered standards again. Now, under section 702, it must only be shown that the target is a 
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"NON-USPER [non US person] located outside the United States" (Landau, 2013, p. 58).
151 It inverted the logic and the burden of proof: the bill defined everything as potentially 
relevant but in order to assess that, the data had to be collected first. Before, it was the 
other way around: relevancy had to be shown first before data collection could be initiated. 
It enabled NSA to collect the whole haystack of data; it legitimized the full-take principle 
and the norm of cyberspace control. It also inverted another legal principle in democracies: 
government practices have to be compatible with the law. In this case, the law was made 
compatible with NSA practices. Besides the usual civil liberty groups, few recognized this 
subtle, but massive change to the FISA system. There was not much of a public discourse. 
The Senate debated this bill only for two days until was adopted as law with a 60-28 vote 
(Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 11). 
In sum, during the second Bush presidency, domestic surveillance, foreign SIGINT 
and cyber-war capabilities became fused together, forming a coherent assemblage or a 
nexus that is hard to disentangle (mostly because of secrecy). Not only were the ideas of 
counter-terrorism with its focus on prevention and electronic surveillance (CNE) 
compatible with concepts of IW, especially CNA, but also were the policies and 
organizational structures similar and thus allowed convergence. The new intelligence 
gathering capabilities created with the PATRIOT Act were potentially useful for offensive 
CNA. The organizations doing counter-terrorism and CNA, like NSA, overlapped. Since 
electronic surveillance and offensive cyber-war are two coins of the same medal, it is no 
surprise that the creation of a powerful surveillance apparatus lead to the creation of a 
powerful cyber-war machinery, too. This enabled the fusion of the IW doctrine and 
counter-terrorism to form a coherent cyber-realist paradigm of the Internet. This also 
happened in the economi sphere, which can only be mentioned here briefly. Private 
intelligence contractors and cyber-security firms such as Northrop Grumman, SAIC, 
General Dynamics and Booz Hamilton saw a dramatic rise in revenue since 2001 
(Shorrock, 2009, p. chap. 1). To further indicate this fusion, between 2005 and 2007 the 
term "information war" was replaced by the term "cyber-war" in military doctrine and 
other policy documents (Wilson, 2006). When Obama entered office in 2009, DNI 
McConnell instantly met with the President to lobby for the continuation of his plans, to 
which Obama agreed (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 3). Before we turn to that, we need to analyze 
the underlying norms and summarize the findings of this lengthy chapter.
151 In contrast to European Charter on Human rights which grants privacy for every individual regardless of 
citizenship.
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4.4.8 The Norm of Internet Control
Taken together, the epistemological and ontological ideas and problem definitions of 
cyber-realism led to a definition of standards of appropriate behavior for state-actors with 
a national-security identity to engage with the Internet primarily through a militarized 
security logic. This cyber-realist norm states that this new, uncontrollable medium must be 
controlled. This follows directly from the logic how IW was perceived in the 1990s and 
extended in the early 2000s: "Whereas the world wars used attrition (WW I) and maneuver 
(WW II), information age war emphasizes control" (Fast, 1997, p. 12). The Air Force 
argued in 1995 that: "Information is the next realm we must control to operate effectively 
and with the greatest economy of force" (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1995). The 
technical and political measures put in place after 9/11 materialize this norm and thus are 
an instance of path-dependency.
Who should control cyberspace? In contrast to cyber-utopianism, cyber-realism is a 
state-centric paradigm: the state ought to be a dominant actor in cyberspace, controlling 
and monitoring it. This contests norms of the original Internet, which was designed to keep 
the state out. It was designed to be a decentralized, global infrastructure representing open 
commons that essentially belong to no single entity and to which no single actor has 
exclusive access or privileges, at least for now. Now, state actors claim special privileges 
such as the intrusion into another nation’s information infrastructure and to exploit 
someone else’s information.
Additionally, with cyber-realism the Internet is predominantly understood as a 
national security problem and less as an opportunity for democratic or economic 
development. The exhaustive problem definitions have shown this (see chap. 4.4.2.2 
Problem Definitions of Cyber-Realism). More so, if information is perceived as a weapon, 
therefore it becomes a means of power: "power in the information age depends more on the 
ability to influence access and interconnection than on the capacity to enforce borders" 
(Fast, 1997, p. 10). The argument assumes that the more information one possesses, the 
more power can be accumulated. It is no accident that the seal of the Total Information 
Awareness Office had the slogan "knowledge is power". Here it becomes clear why the 
paradigm is called cyber-realism. Realism as an IR theory predominantly operates with an 
understanding of power as a resource – the more resources (i.e. tanks, military personnel, 
GDP or even CNA-capabilities) a nation has, the more powerful it is compared to those 
who have less (Baldwin, 2012). Cyber-realism assumes a direct correlation between 
information and power. If information is perceived as just another resource or weapon 
category, the ultimate aim becomes to gather more information. The general logic of this 
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paradigm is – the more information,152 the better the command and control, the more 
powerful one gets, the higher the chances of winning a war. ICT and computers play a 
crucial role in this logic because they elevate the aforementioned functions to a new level.
 The norm of Internet control defines the appropriate action as the preemptive, "full-
take" data collection. Mass acquisition of information is a means to the end of information 
superiority. The key idea of "bulk data collection" or in other words, the "full take 
principle" or "big data"153 is conceived as early as the mid 1990s but becomes dominant in 
the GWOT. The GWOT added the notion that mass data collection should happen 
preemptively, to prevent a potential terrorist attack. The full-take principle can be 
conceptualized as an emerging norm within Internet governance that is highly taken for 
granted and many countries are trying to replicate it.154 It presumes that, because of 
national security concerns, it is appropriate for states to gather all kinds of data (that 
might belong to other states or private actors such as intellectual property, patents or 
private communication) of the global Internet traversing its physical territory and beyond, 
regardless of whether this data is of domestic origin or not. A consequence of that is that 
data accumulation will have no logical end. Cyber-realism strives for total information 
awareness and as such includes totalitarian aspects. 
But there is another aspect of the norm of control. The fusion of intelligence and 
cyber-war leads to another definition of appropriate action: states claim the appropriate 
right to not just monitor, but alter, manipulate or destroy data and information stored in 
another country's networks. Cyber-realist advocates argue that this is appropriate behavior. 
It is also a taken-for-granted, unquestioned belief.
At the same time, the norm of Internet control is a dark norm because it contests 
several other norms in liberal democracies that were established to prevent abuses. First, it 
contests the norm that a severe measure such as surveillance requires a probable cause or a 
concrete suspicion before it is initiated. It turned the traditional legal principle mens rea 
upside down. This is the legal principle that "criminalization must be based on a specified 
criminal act" (Amoore & de Goede, 2008, p. 67). Instead, counter-laws are "’laws against 
law’ or 'zero-law’, by which legislation pursues harms that are finus reus: they act against a 
mere possibility of harm and explicitly undermine conventional legal principles" (de Lint 
& Kassa, 2015, p. 361). With the norm of control, suspicion is generated after intelligence 
is gathered and analyzed for terrorist affiliation patterns for example. Second, mass 
152 Rona mentioned in 1976: "The value of the exploitation is therefore cumulative; once we have extracted 
data to the opponent’s information channel, further exploitation is facilitated" (Rona, 1976, p. 35).
153 Colonel Fast speaks about "the value of "big information" as the source of power" (Fast, 1997, p. 18).
154 In the years since Snowden, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and Germany have adopted laws that 
allow full-take collection of fiber optic cable content and metadata.
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surveillance without suspicion contests the norm that severe surveillance measures should 
be targeted and that data of innocent individuals should be protected. The "full-take" 
surveillance approach necessarily catches data of innocents. Third, the "full-take" principle 
harms the distinction between foreign and domestic surveillance targets (which are 
protected by civil-liberties). Fourth, the unitary executive theory and the FISAAA reversed 
the idea that intelligence agencies had to follow the law. Instead, it established the 
precedent that the law was altered to legalize controversial practices post-hoc. Fifth, 
Internet control of both domestic and international data blurred the separation of powers 
and checks and balances that were put in place to prevent the formation of an almighty 
secret police. With the post 9/11 legal changes, NSA became judge, jury and eavesdropper 
at the same time (Bamford, 2009, p. 119) and with cyber-war, even a combatant in war. 
Additionally, no probable cause can be given when monitoring the entire Internet – 
potentially everyone becomes a target without any prior suspicion. NSA once was a 
marginal intelligence agency and now it is the most powerful agency in the world.
It is important to state that the norm of control developed out of a particular idea of 
cyber-realists, namely "that more information characterizes better judgment, and that 
therefore more raw information to fill their gaps is their greatest need" (Honig, 2010, p. 
54). This particular interest of intelligence agencies became reformulated and framed as a 
general strategy in the war on terror that encompasses all sectors of society, which 
represents a hegemonic practice in terms of discourse theory. The intelligence reform of 
2004 reshuffled the entire security apparatus and the 2008 FISA Amendment Act fulfilled 
the goal of making make data from the lowest to highest levels of society accessible. This 
also indicates a shift in actors: whereas IW was coined by the military, now the IC became 
positioned as the dominant cyber-realist actor. 
It is important to note that cyber-realism could become dominant only because of the 
state of emergency directly after 9/11, pretty much in line with the predictions of the 
securitization framework. Total control of Internet data streams originally was an 
extraordinary measure adopted in an emergency situation after 9/11. However, over time 
this extraordinary measure became reified and normalized within the practices of the 
intelligence community. To monitor global data streams is now deeply taken for granted. 
This might be problematic, as the next chapter will show.
4.4.9 Critical Analysis of Cyber-Realism
Like with the other paradigms before, a critical discussion of the ideas is in order. The 
developments described in the previous chapter introduced several legal and political 
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dilemmas. For example, the goal to prevent human suffering in form of terrorist attacks is 
clearly understandable. It is also quite logical that more and better intelligence is needed to 
prevent attacks. The question is where legitimate needs cross a line and become too 
radical. That cannot be easily rectified. Therefore, this chapter introduces a critical 
discussion of some of the developments outlined in the previous chapters.
Cyber-realism is based on a simplistic understanding of knowledge generation, 
namely that having all the facts matters and that the facts speak for themselves. However, 
scientists know that "facts never speak for themselves" because data must be interpreted, 
analyzed and enriched with theory. The central problem here is bias. There is strong 
empirical evidence that intelligence failures often happen not because of lacking data, but 
faulty, biased analysis, like for example the political instrumentalization of intelligence 
estimates like with the WMD in Iraq 2003 (Rovner & Long, 2005). Bar-Joseph shows that 
in numerous cases, from Operation Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, the Korean War to the 
Iranian revolution, "the source of the problem is not insufficient information about the 
looming threat, but rather the misinterpretation of the meaning of the available 
information" (Bar-Joseph, 2010, p. 24). Reporters counted that in many major terror 
attacks within Western countries in the last 10 years (from Paris to Boston), the suspects 
were already known to intelligence and law-enforcement agencies (Gallagher, 2015a). 
Even without new data-collection powers to sift through the entire Internet, intelligence 
already was available. Intelligence experts convincingly argue that too much information 
can lead to overload and perception biases, which result in faulty interpretation (Jervis, 
2011). As it was shown, the dilemma of information overload was NSA’s problem number 
one that led to the inception of Trailblazer in the first place, even at a time where it could 
not wiretap the Internet (see chap. 4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of 
Internet Control (2001 - )).155 NSA collected 200 million pieces of intelligence per day in 
2002 and could only analyze 1 percent of it (Lee, 2015, p. 28). According to the Snowden 
files, NSA now collects 97 billion pieces of intelligence in a 30 day period both 
domestically and globally (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). It is unclear how much of it 
NSA can analyze. Even with more data, the problem of biased interpretation, however, is 
not going away. The higher the complexity and quantity of data, the higher the chances for 
intelligence failures (Rovner & Long, 2005). 
This problem increases with automated information processing techniques. 
Mathematician Kurt Gödel argued that any mathematical model representing reality (and 
155 Knightley shows that information overload is in fact the reoccurring theme with most intelligence 
agencies (Knightley, 2003, p. chap. 16).
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trying to predict the future) would be either incomplete (perfect information is an illusion) 
or have paradoxes, or both. Every model is a reduction of reality and therefore incomplete 
by design, which is the reason why information systems cannot be perfect (Hables Gray, 
2003, p. 206). Total information awareness is probably not possible. The "father" of the 
modern general computer, Alan Turing, showed that Gödel’s law applied to computing 
machines in general. The perfect computer and the perfect algorithm predicting future 
behavior is also impossible, but cyber-realists believe in this very idea. There is another 
factor that makes prediction impossible and which is an explanation for the fact that even 
with the large intelligence apparatus, US agencies are rarely able to prevent attacks like the 
Boston marathon bombing or other amok incidents. The so-called fog of war, that total 
information awareness wants to eliminate, cannot be lifted because it is not a physical 
problem, but a logical one. Uncertainty, or to know the enemy's intention or where an 
attack might happen is generated by three complex components that are always present: the 
antagonists’ behavior, one’s own behavior and random chance (or nature). These problems 
are unpredictable and not controllable by current mathematics (Hables Gray, 2003, p. 205)
More so, automatic systems of information processing can be intentionally 
overloaded with false information by enemies, generating many false positives, a problem 
that indeed did plague Thinthread: "there were too many false positives, indications of 
something of intelligence value when that wasn’t really true" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 5). 
Besides internal errors, "a potential attacker could deliberately spew out large amounts of 
information to overload the opposing system and thus create confusion and delay in 
decision-making" (Knightley, 2003, p. chap. 15). This possibility lies at the very core of 
the information warfare doctrine and is practiced with great success by current day Russia 
with its hybrid warfare (Geers, 2015).
A question that is always hard to answer is how effective this bulk data collection is. 
It is in an important question considering that the costs of the entire US terrorist prevention 
operation are estimated at annually $80 billion, or $1 trillion between 2001-2015 (de Lint 
& Kassa, 2015). De Lint and Kassa argue that in terms of a cost-benefit analysis that was 
demanded by the 9/11 commission report, the GWOT and the counter-terrorism policy in 
general is a failure and the question arises whether the little gains in security are worth the 
enormous spending (de Lint & Kassa, 2015, p. 358). In contrast to law-enforcement, in the 
intelligence world there are no single smoking-gun indicators linking a piece of data to a 
crime, but more often intelligence is "like a tapestry with multiple threads woven into a 
beautiful whole" (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 5). This makes it hard to pinpoint the 
effectiveness of one single tool. However, IC officials regularly argue that these programs 
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are effective, necessary and legal. For example, when Stellarwind was on the brink of 
being canceled in 2004 after the DoJ discovered it, Hayden repeatedly called it an 
indispensable and "most effective tool in our arsenal" while unofficially acknowledging 
that without it, NSA would only loose 20% of its overall effectiveness (Hayden, 2016b, p. 
chap. 5). 
Another component of this norm is naive technological determinism, i.e the "view by 
some that more technology will always make 'better intelligence collection’" because it is 
believed that data mining and Big Data algorithms can be used to identify "footprints of a 
terrorist in the data ahead of an attack" (Walsh & Miller, 2015, p. 9). While Big-Data 
algorithms indeed hold some promise, it can result in the blind belief in data. However, 
Big Data also has its limits because human behavior always has a random component that 
cannot be programmed in advance. More so, the over-reliance on electronic forms of 
surveillance often leads to a downscaling of human intelligence – the use of agents and 
informants in different regions (Russell, 2007, p. 75). Human intelligence is necessary to 
make sense of signals intelligence (Rid 2013, chap. 6). It is also necessary to capture hard 
to reach targets. One of the reasons why it was so hard to find Osama bin Laden in his 
hideout in Pakistan was that he did not use any form of electronic communication at all but 
relied on human carriers. History is full of examples where SIGINT was blind because 
human carriers were used.156
While terrorist prevention might be a legitimate goal, the practice that was 
introduced by the Bush administration after 9/11 is somewhat radical and potentially 
totalitarian in its approach.157 The goal of total information awareness cannot logically be 
reached. However, "full-take" surveillance practices nevertheless try to reach this goal. The 
quest for more information has no logical end. It also implies that intelligence agencies 
will always lobby for more and more capabilities. But these capabilities clash with legal 
principles. 
The general disregard of the unitary executive against legal checks and balances 
(such as the FISC in the early days of the NSA program) and the weakening privacy and 
civil-liberty safeguards is a problematic trend have become normalized since 9/11. Cyber-
realism has the tendency to contest central norms that were taken-for-granted within 
democratic systems, such as the distinction between law-enforcement and foreign 
156 Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former British intelligence officer argues "If the Soviets ever decided to go for 
broke, they wouldn’t put anything on electronic communications or do anything visible by satellites. All the 
orders would go by officer couriers, which was what Hitler did at the Battle of the Bulge and caught us 
totally unprepared. We were relying too heavily on communications intelligence" (Knightley, 2003, p. chap. 
15).
157 If we define totalitarian ideas consisting of seeking control over all aspects of public and private life of a 
society by a state.
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intelligence gathering and the implementation of congressional and/or court oversight. It is 
important to remember that these legal checks and balances that are contested by cyber-
realism were put in place to prevent the abuse of power, to prevent an all-powerful secret 
police like the Gestapo or Russian KGB that could be exploited by an authoritarian 
president (Heller et al., 2012). These checks and balances also are what differentiates 
intelligence agencies in Western democracies from those in authoritarian regimes. With the 
dismantling of many of these safeguards, authoritarian and democratic intelligence 
agencies became a bit more similar to each other.
This is particularly problematic when these intelligence agencies become judge, wire 
tapper and combatant at the same time within the field of cyber-war. As was shown, the 
official US Doctrine is actually surprisingly transparent about the designated target of 
information and cyber-war (U.S. Air Force, 1998). Targets include enemy heads of states 
as well as leading economic and social figures, but in principle, all vital functions of a state 
are targets of IO – energy and financial infrastructure, manufacturing, telecommunications. 
This is another totalitarian idea because it basically targets everything within a society and 
particularly critical infrastructures that guarantee the basic operation of a state. It is 
noteworthy that both original thinkers of IW, Rona and Rechtin, warned of the 
implications of the IW concept for democratic states (see chap. 4.4.2 Ideas: Formation of 
the Information War Doctrine (1976-2000)). Rona asked, "how does an "open" society, 
with its emphasis on freedom of information and public scrutiny, protect its interests in a 
hostile world suffused with long-term moves and countermoves of the information war?" 
(Rona, 1976, p. 4). For Rechtin, it was not a surprise that a totalitarian country such as 
Soviet Russia would firstly discover IW because of their "pervasive use of information 
control" (Rechtin, 1983, p. 31). A report to Congress highlights the ambiguity of this trend 
and asks for the development of a legal framework for information war (particularly 
psychological operations) against the own population (Wilson, 2006).
In sum, cyber-realism includes some controversial ideas that actively contest 
standards within liberal democracies but also in terms of international law and best 
practices.
4.4.10 Summary
The Bush administration, upon entering office, initiated another instance of paradigm-
change via regime change. Had Gore won the presidency, we most likely would have seen 
a continuation of the Information Superhighway agenda. The structural composition of the 
Bush administration is a necessary condition for the dominance of cyber-realism (part 1). 
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Several proponents of information war and mass surveillance occupied key positions 
within the administration, thus shaping the post 9/11 political agenda with cyber-realist 
ideas. The role of Vice President Cheney and path dependency is important here, because 
Cheney had a personal policy agenda regarding the FISA court. 9/11 presented a shock that 
was framed as an extraordinary circumstance that allowed the expansion of presidential 
power as commander-in-chief and potentially the contestation of liberal norms (Heller et 
al., 2012). Controversial ideas and policies that existed before 9/11 were reformulated as 
solution strategies to the problem, including expansion of the executive authority, 
restricting oversight over surveillance activities, more secrecy and generally the use of 
extraordinary measures such as suspicion-less mass surveillance. Reframing 9/11 as a war-
situation could legitimize that "the gloves come off". This is a classical example of 
securitization. This was possible because the crisis situation represented a window of 
opportunity producing a rally-around-the-flag effect that limited political resistance to 
legal measures such as the Patriot Act. The 9/11 attacks represented the central shock 
moment and trigger that initiated a completely new path trajectory for cyber-realism. This 
has two interlinked components.
First, it allowed the expansion of cyber-realist ideas. Besides this regime change, 
there also came a gestalt switch, a replacement of dominant paradigms with the war on 
terror. The GWOT and national security became the dominant narrative and 
(technological) frame of reference for understanding the Internet (part 2). Over time, it 
replaced the utopian or economic perspective of the previous administration. The diagnosis 
and the sense-making of the terrorist attacks uncovered a central problem definition: 
finding an enemy hidden against the backdrop of civil society that also used the Internet to 
coordinate the attack. The problem of domestic sleeper-cells legitimized the idea that the 
foreign intelligence and information-gathering apparatus had to be turned inwards. This 
resonated with the IW belief that more information could be used to lift the fog of war.
These ideas got amplified by the increased focus on preemptive action and terrorism-
prevention, a new key goal derived from the aforementioned problem definition. The 
desire to predict actions of individuals, to penetrate their thinking, as it was called, also 
resonated well with the idea of information superiority. A key means to realize this goal 
was the need-to-share norm that intelligence agencies should make their databases 
available to each other, sharing information per default, instead of a need-to-know basis. 
The definition of the "war" on terrorism expanded the battlefield. The Internet itself 
became defined as a problem, because it was perceived as a safe-haven for terrorists and an 
amplifier for radical propaganda and recruitment. It became a target and battle-space, the 
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fifth domain in the war on terrorism. In sum, the new counter-terrorist doctrine and the IW 
doctrine were highly compatible in their goals and means to achieve these. 
Cyber-realist ideas became central to the counter-terrorism strategy of the US and 
became embedded into politics and technology (part 3). The Patriot-Act, the Intelligence 
Reform of 2004 and the FISA-Amendment Act of 2008 are instances of cyber-realist 
inspired policies that defined new instruments and settings to realize the aforementioned 
goals and thus represent a third order policy change. These laws also include (legal) norm 
change, dismantling the separation of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, 
expanding their surveillance or information gathering powers by giving them broad access 
to new data-sources such as telephone and Internet communication streams. These laws 
were designed to gather as much domestic and international information as possible and to 
allow the sharing of this information between agencies.
Cyber-realist ideas led to the creation of new technical artifacts. NSA, one of the 
main impact constituents of the Internet, used the window of opportunity to lobby for new 
powers and to present itself as the first line of defense in the war on terror. For NSA, 
packet-switched Internet communication over fiber optic cables presented a major problem 
for its global SIGINT capacities. This diagnostic frame drove the problem solution in 
terms of Internet and communications data collection on a large scale, a plausible way to 
overcome surveillance issues introduced by TCP/IP. NSA accelerated the development of 
new surveillance technologies that it deemed to be illegal under normal circumstances, but 
appropriate within the extraordinary context of the war on terror. The goal of these 
programs resonated well with the goal of information superiority and the concept of Total 
Information Awareness program. The aim became to "master" or "own" the web, piercing 
through the veil of anonymity or the fog of war created by packet-switching and thus 
becoming aware of information transmitted over, or stored in these networks, just as the 
IW doctrine envisioned it in the 1990s. In theoretical terms, NSA engaged in the technical 
reconstitution of the Internet, building new technical counter-artifacts to address the 
problem of packet-switching. These artifacts tried to establish control and centralized 
intelligence in a network that was designed to have none. With this practice, NSA 
materialized the norm of Internet control with technological artifacts, i.e. the multiple 
surveillance programs. The norm states that it is appropriate for states to monitor and 
control potentially all information (full-take principle) traversing the global Internet 
infrastructure, regardless of foreign or domestic territory, origin, time (peace and war) and 
without the need for probable cause or prior suspicion. This represented a major norm 
change in American intelligence practices since the creation of FISA, which had actively 
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prohibited broad, suspicion-less full-take surveillance in the past. The executive framed 
this as appropriate because the war on terror legitimized such extraordinary measures, but 
chose to keep it secret nevertheless. The creation of these artifacts increased their staying 
power and initiated a path-trajectory towards offensive cyber-war.
While this originally was a passive SIGINT collection, the offensive value of this 
information became relevant in the context of the war in Iraq 2007 (part 4). Particularly 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld systematically began to fuse the new counter-terrorist and 
intelligence-strategy with the older concept of IW, arguing that information operations and 
computer network attacks should utilize the vast SIGINT collection. The fusion of SIGINT 
or surveillance and cyber-attacks can be explained with the technical similarities of these 
functions. In other words, once capacity A exists, B follows logically. Personal continuity 
of cyber-realist advocates that had been socialized either within the Intelligence 
Community or in one of the IW centers in the 1990s (like General Alexander or DNI 
Michael McConnell) also played a role in this fusion. They developed IW ideas further. 
This included the notion of pre-emptive attacks, the idea to destroy physical objects with 
cyber-attacks (Aurora Generator) and the fusion of SIGINT with kinetic or signature-
strikes from UAV. The war in Iraq showed the utility of these concepts, which increased 
their staying power.
In 2008, a shock situation happened inside the national security apparatus that 
accelerated the already established trajectory. The agent.bz malware penetrated secure 
DoD networks and caused a certain anxiety within military circles. NSA lobbied heavily to 
be put in charge by framing this cyber-attack as an existential threat to the US that 
potentially could worsen in the future (security master frame). Because national security is 
a relatively pre-structured and closed-off policy subsystem with little transparency, NSA 
could plausibly argue that no other agency had the same skills and computer-literacy. This 
points to an under-theorized factor: turf-battles between political bureaucracies are a key 
explanation here. NSA had several advantages compared to other agencies like DHS. NSA 
already had institutionalized cyber-security procedures and thus skilled personnel since the 
mid-1990s. Cyber-security and cyber-war developed as a military or intelligence practice, 
which means great secrecy and classification. This excluded non-military actors (like the 
later DHS) from the turf and increased the standing of NSA within the intelligence 
community. NSA used this upgraded standing to lobby the White House for a more 
aggressive posture in cyber-space, arguing for active defense and thus an expansion of the 
global surveillance and hacking of foreign IT-systems to preempt cyber-attacks (part 5). 
G.W. Bush lacked computer literacy and was uncritical towards these suggestions. Policy 
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reforms were by advocated former information warrior DNI McConnell, including the 
suggestion to retrospectively legalize the full-take surveillance effort, which led to a minor 
policy scandal in 2004/2005 with the FISA Amendment Act of 2008. McConnell also 
argued for an increased cyber-security spending and the creation of a unified command 
structure, the US CYBERCOM, which Bush acknowledged. This part of the mechanism 
shows how path-trajectories initiated during the IW era of the 1990s (institutionalization, 
continuity of personal, ideas, procedures), became relevant at a later point in time.
Timing, again, is an important conditional factor. In the last years of the Bush 
presidency, and particularly with major computer network incidents like Estonia 2007, 
Operation Orchard 2007 and Georgia 2008, the whole issue of cyber-attacks and the 
general notion of cyber-security and hacking got a greater salience among policy-makers 
and the general public. This has to do with increased Internet penetration and the beginning 
smartphone revolution, giving even more people access to the Internet and enough literacy 
to comprehend the issue, at least to some degree. 
It can be argued that the legitimization of offensive hacking and surveillance with 
GWOT became a meta-narrative that quickly became dominant in the years after 9/11. 
Extraordinary measures such as intruding into another country's networks or copying data-
streams and potentially the entire Internet were legitimized with the 9/11 shock and then 
got normalized over time. But these practices are extraordinary since they contest central 
liberal democratic principles such as the separation of powers and civil-liberties (4th 
amendment). Terrorism has been used as the key legitimization figure for enhanced 
securitization in many countries, representing a global normative impact or the partly 
diffusion of some of these norms, including the norm of Internet control. In other words, 
the outcome of this mid-2000 process is the stabilization of the norm that the state, through 
its intelligence apparatus, has the legitimate right to sift through Internet data streams, even 
in other countries beyond their jurisdiction. While President Nixon got impeached during 
the Watergate scandal for using intelligence agencies for domestic surveillance, we 
nowadays take it for granted that intelligence agencies from around the world might 
monitor Internet surfing. The norm of Internet control is closely tied to the war on terror 
narrative, which is one of the most influential policy narratives of our time. It has a great 
interpretative flexibility (there are numerous ways how to fight terrorism), 
commensurability (there is an enemy to pin-point), and narrative fidelity (the civilized 
West vs. "barbaric" radical Islam) and this is likely to stay this way.
But there might be another argument for the stabilization of the norm. Once 
technology and supporting laws are put in place and bureaucracies are built, they have an 
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enormous staying power. This creates strong structural incentives to maintain the 
technology, policy and the narrative. To abandon the GWOT and dominance of the IC with 
its technical artifacts to fight terrorism would mean to waste a lot of money (Trailblazer 
and similar programs had cost billions) and to lose available tools of state power that might 
be useful in scenarios other than terrorism (inter-state espionage for example). In other 
words, the constructed technological artifacts to fight terrorism create a structural 
mechanism that increases the likelihood of their continuation (path-dependency). This is 
also facilitated by a whole industry of private intelligence contractors, security providers 
(like Blackwater) or arms-manufacturers that earn well with fighting terrorism. Cyber-
realism in a sense, created its own economical side arm much like cyber-utopianism spread 
into economics and business in the 1990s.
Table 6. Causal Mechanism of Cyber-Realism during the 2000s
Context 9/11 shock and the failure of cyber-utopianism with 
Y2k and dot-com crash.
Part 1 Election of Bush administration with its structural 
composition of cyber-realist hawks plus 9/11 
emergency situation enable controversial cyber-
realist ideas to be put on the post 9/11 agenda.
Part 2 Cyber-realists frame the Internet predominantly in 
national security terms and lobby for policy and 
technical changes to counter perceived problems. 
Advocacy for the norm of Internet-control which 
strongly resonates with the old IW doctrine.
Part 3 PATRIOT Act and other policies materialize 
cyber-realist ideas and enable the goal-oriented 
construction of controversial Internet surveillance 
programs designed to counter problems created by 
TCP/IP. This enables a path-trajectory.
Part 4 Fusion of new post-9/11 mass-surveillance (CNE) 
capacities, technologies, policies and ideas with 
offensive computer network capabilities and IW, 
particularly in Iraq 2007.
Part 5 Rapid succession of cyber-security events (Estonia 
2007, Buckshot Yankee) accelerate the cyber-
realist path-trajectory and increase salience. 
Constant advocacy of socialized cyber-realists for 
new competencies and institutionalization.
Outcome Further legal (FISAA) and organizational 
(USCYBERCOM) changes establish the NSA as 
the dominant state-bureaucracy in cyberspace. Idea 
that states ought to control/monitor global Internet 
data streams becomes normalized and unquestioned 
over time (norm stabilization among elites).
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The next chapter will introduce changes during the Obama administration. This 
episode is interesting because Obama was initially skeptical about these new surveillance 
powers and during the election it looked like he might alter the over-extensive practices of 
the Bush administration. Once in office however, he kept most of the new surveillance and 
cyber-war technologies created by his predecessor.
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4.5 From Cyber-Utopia to Cyber-War: The Obama Presidency (2008-2013)
"I could have added that the cyber domain has never been a digital Eden. It was always 
Mogadishu." 
General Michael Hayden
This chapter exemplifies the normative change this thesis is about: From digital Eden to 
digital Mogadishu, as NSA General Hayden frames it. It is the culmination of the paradigm 
competition and the finalization of norm change from cyber-utopia to cyber-war or 
realism. The Barack Obama administration can be seen as a critical juncture where the 
future path of the norm of control was decided. The options were continuity of cyber-
realism developed under Bush (which probably would have happened if Republican 
candidate John McCain had won the 2008 election), or an abandonment or correction of 
this path, which Obama indicated in his utopian election campaign. Thus, the Obama 
victory opened up the possibility of changing the established path-trajectory, reducing the 
impact of cyber-realism. 
The analysis again focuses on the political level, analyzing political documents such 
as national strategies, election campaign material, official communications and speeches 
done by different parts of the administration. However, it also includes the military side of 
things in order to assess which paradigm is dominant within this administration. 
Methodologically, I screened key Internet-related documents of this administration, 
checking for congruence with cyber-realist or utopian ideas. This was not an easy task, 
since the Obama administration shows a duality between utopianism and realism. 
The general temporal succession of the chapter is congruent with the rest of the 
thesis. The Obama administration is a hybrid-presidency, where both realist and utopian 
ideas overlap. I explain this in the next chapter (see chap. 4.5.1 Background: The Hybrid 
Presidency). This demands a slightly different chapter structure that emerged inductively 
out of the empirical analysis. Because of this hybrid-nature, I first focus on utopian ideas 
that Obama developed during the election campaign and that became partly realized in the 
Internet freedom agenda (see chap. 4.5.2 Ideas: Cyber-Utopianism under Obama and 
Clinton). Then I argue that the cyber-realist practice of this administration does not fit 
100% with this cyber-utopian campaign. To keep the chapter structure simple and to 
highlight the duality between utopian rhetoric and realist practice, I talk about cyber-realist 
inspired policies, strategies, artifacts and institutions in one single chapter (see chap. 4.5.3 
Practice: Professionalization of Offensive Cyber-War & Surveillance). This is justified 
because all of these form a tightly knit nexus. This is a crucial chapter because it shows the 
professionalization and normalization of cyber-war. 
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There is another novelty. For the first time, this section will introduce a distinct 
chapter on discourses to highlight the dominance of cyber-realist thought in the public 
domain (see chap. 4.5.4 Discourse: Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of Cyber-Realism). 
This further indicates the normative change that is taking place under Obama. Observe that 
I do not conduct an individual discourse analysis, but mostly rely on summaries of 
discourse analyses done by other scholars. The function of this chapter is simply to show 
the overall societal impact of cyber-realist frames in public discourses. 
Then I turn to another juncture, the leaks of Edward Snowden, which actually spans 
two chapters. First, I focus on the technical artifacts that NSA and others constructed in the 
war on terror to reach the aim of information dominance, developed within the context of 
IW (see chap. 4.5.5 Artifacts: The Snowden Leaks). The structure of this chapter follows 
the analysis of other technical artifacts, looking at goal-oriented construction, embedded 
norms and technical affordances at a handful of leaked programs. This is a technical but 
important chapter because it shows what the norm of control technically entails and means. 
The other chapter focuses on the outcome of the Snowden leaks in terms of political 
reform (see chap. 4.5.6 Juncture: The President's Panel on NSA Practices). This chapter 
addresses the President’s panel that was tasked to evaluate the Internet mass surveillance 
practices and to formulate reform ideas. I will analyze this report in high detail, focusing 
on critical arguments and suggested reforms. My argument is that Obama did only follow a 
few minor recommendations of the report, which is smoking-gun evidence for the 
dominance of the cyber-realist norm of Internet control that now has become fully 
established. Like before, the chapter concludes with a critical discussion (see chap. 4.5.8 
Critical Analysis) and a summary of the causal mechanism (see chap. 4.4.9 Summary).
4.5.1 Background: The Hybrid Presidency
The purpose of this chapter is to characterize the Obama administration and to understand 
the structural constraints and background that facilitated its policy decisions. This is 
important because the Obama administration cannot be as easily described as the 
Clinton/Gore administration (which clearly was cyber-utopian) and the cyber-realist Bush 
administration. The Obama administration is a hybrid between the two along two 
dichotomies: first, continuity vs. change in the general strategic framework of the GWOT 
and second, an election campaign and a foreign policy driven by cyber-utopian ideas 
facing the realities of institutionalized cyber-realism when entering office.
The first dichotomy describes the general continuity and path-dependency of the 
Obama national security policy in the war on terror, but refined in nuances (Renshon, 
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2009, p. 4). For example, Obama limited the scope the GWOT as a foreign policy matter 
of reduced importance (compared to Bush). It was reframed as an issue that did not require 
a mobilization of all instruments of national power, but only a selected few. Obama 
avoided the terms global and long war on terrorism (of uncertain duration) and spoke of a 
more limited "war against Al-Qaeda" (Starr-Deelen, 2014, p. 174). However, the focus on 
terrorist prevention and the overall idea of the global battle space (homeland and 
cyberspace) was maintained. A heavier emphasis was given to counter-insurgency in 
Afghanistan as the main battle space in the GWOT, and troops were withdrawn from Iraq 
(Onea, 2013, pp. 150-151). Only special- and training forces stayed behind, marking the 
shift from quantity to quality. The reason for the overall continuity is that big ships such as 
the US national security policy are slowly to maneuver. Many policies and reforms 
adopted by the Bush administration exhibited inertia and their effects became visible only 
during the first Obama term (like the establishment of US Cybercommand and offensive 
cyber-war programs that became ready under Obama). Path-dependency is a key 
explanatory factor for the continuity under Obama. Kaufman argues: "Obama inherited a 
United States that was economically troubled, militarily overstretched, politically 
polarized, and diplomatically estranged from world public opinion" (Kaufman, 2012, p. 
12). Especially the economic crash of 2008 forced Obama to prioritize domestic policy 
(Obamacare) and to stabilize the US economy, which reduced his flexibility in national 
security politics and created a demand to effectively use the resources that were already in 
place: quality had to replace quantity. This explains the heavier use of special forces under 
JSOC like Navy Seals, UAV signature drone strikes and offensive cyber-attacks such as 
Stuxnet, which are all more punctuated tools compared to large armies.
The second dichotomy, cyber-utopianism as a candidate versus cyber-realism as 
President is more interesting. First, compared to Bush, Obama is described as 
technologically savvy or even a tech-enthusiast. Obama embraced the Internet and 
particularly the social media revolution of Facebook (est. 2004) and Twitter (est. 2006) 
quite early during his election campaign. The campaign heavily used new social media 
such as Twitter as well as big-data mining techniques. He was the first presidential 
candidate to tweet (Lee, 2015, p. 184). Interestingly, the campaign was also targeted by a 
cyber-attack through which perpetrators stole campaign files (Glendinning, 2008). More 
so, the election campaign on "change" embraced many cyber-utopian concepts, such as 
support for net-neutrality, digital privacy, transparency and more. These utopian ideas 
influenced early policy and stood in opposition to cyber-realist concepts. The personal 
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background of the President is one explanatory factor for the high priority given to cyber-
security and cyber-war during his administration. 
Another factor is the general timing of the campaign that coincides with major 
technological milestones in the history of the Internet (see Table 9. List of Internet 
Milestones and Security Incidents). Examples are the smartphone & social network (Web 
2.0) revolution since 2007, which expanded the prevalence of the Internet into everyday 
life and the launch of the first Big Data, cloud-computing and Artificial Intelligence 
platforms that accelerated digitalization. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman 
calls the year 2007 the "single greatest technological inflection point since Gutenberg 
invented the printing-press" (Takahashi, 2016). There is an equifinality of factors at work 
here. Mobile technologies expanded the use of the Internet globally. When Obama entered 
office in 2008, Internet penetration in the US has reached about 70% and 23% worldwide. 
When Obama left office in 2016, 40% of the world was online (see appendix Quantifying 
the Internet and the Digital Revolution). Particularly smartphones opened up the Internet 
for new user groups from the Middle East and developing countries, which was a 
facilitating condition of the 2011 Arab spring. The number of Internet devices skyrocketed 
and thus the potential vulnerability in these systems grew. During that time, a series of 
cyber-incidents happened that are often described as wake-up calls in the IC (see chap. 
4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, Surveillance and Cyber-War (2003-2008)). These events raised 
awareness inside the cyber-security community. All that explains why the Obama 
administration jumped the cyber-hype bandwagon quite quickly.
Third, the Obama administration's perspective on the Internet is not as unitary and 
simple as the Bush administration’s, which was structurally dominated by cyber-realist 
thinking and framed cyberspace-issues in terms of the GWOT. Obama's Internet policy is 
more complex, nuanced, even contradictory because of different actor preferences. When 
entering office, the Obama administration revoked some of the controversial emergency 
measures such as the CIA Greystone torture and rendition program. President Obama also 
restored some of the IC oversight functions in the White House that were eliminated under 
Bush (Lepri, 2012, p. 77). However, the increased surveillance apparatus and its legal 
framework was left mostly intact controversial Patriot Act sunset provisions were extended 
in 2010 and even expanded by Congress in 2011, with strong presidential support. Obama 
affirmed the idea that connecting the dots could prevent terrorist attacks after the 
Christmas Day bombing attempt in 2009 (Lepri, 2012, pp. 70-73). Obama also extended 
the US cyber-war efforts, increasing its capabilities, budget, personnel and skills, and 
(allegedly) ordered the first large-scale cyber-attack against Iran. Additionally, the Obama 
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administration expanded the scope conditions of cyber-war, enabling retaliatory action and 
physical counterstrikes to CNA, which is seen as highly controversial. The Snowden 
disclosures in 2013 shed light on the state of the art of US Internet control practices. 
Obama’s handling of the Snowden revelations revealed the gap between his rhetoric of 
cyber-utopianism and his practices of expanded, professionalized cyber-realism (with the 
creation of a unified military command, new cyber-weapons such as Stuxnet and the 
clandestine drone wars). Although he created a commission to evaluate NSA practices in 
2013, he did not follow its recommendations and just made minor adjustments. This can be 
seen as proof that cyber-realism became indeed hegemony under Obama.
4.5.2 Ideas: Cyber-Utopianism under Obama and Clinton
The Internet-driven election campaign of Barack Obama embraced many cyber-utopian 
ideas such as the free flow of information, the democratizing and economic potential of the 
Internet and the demand for net neutrality. This chapter will analyze some noteworthy key 
election speeches and campaign documents that showed a heavy focus on Internet-related 
issues. I will proceed much in the same manner as the other chapters that focused on ideas, 
analyzing paradigmatic problem definitions and technological frames describing the 
Internet.
During the campaign in November 2007, Barack Obama and Joseph Biden launched 
their vision of technology called "Connecting and empowering all Americans through 
technology and innovation" (Obama, 2007). They want to "harness the power of the 
Internet to transform government and politics", making the government more transparent, 
accountable and allowing citizens to participate more in the democratic process. The core 
aims are: to "ensure the Full and Free Exchange of Information through an Open Internet 
and Diverse Media Outlets", including aims such as "Protect the Openness of the Internet", 
"Encourage Diversity in Media Ownership", "Protect Our Children While Preserving the 
First Amendment" and "Safeguard our Right to Privacy". Other goals are to "create a 
Transparent and Connected Democracy", to "Deploy a Modern Communications 
Infrastructure" and to "Employ Technology and Innovation to Solve Our Nation’s Most 
Pressing Problems" (Obama, 2007).
The first goal argues that the free flow of information is crucial in a democracy and 
that the Internet is a critical facilitator for the democratic process. This touches upon the 
early Jeffersonian ideas of cyber-utopians such as Barlow and shows that this framing still 
exercises a degree of influence (see chap. 4.2.5 Framing Cyberspace as the Electronic 
Frontier (1990s)). The key argument is that the Internet must remain accessible: 
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"A key reason the Internet has been such a success is because it is the most open 
network in history. It needs to stay that way. Barack Obama strongly supports the 
principle of network neutrality to preserve the benefits of open competition on the 
Internet. Users must be free to access content, to use applications, and to attach 
personal devices" (Obama, 2007).
This support for net-neutrality reflects the original visions of the Internet’s designers, 
which is why Vint Cerf welcomed this proposal (Arthur, 2008). An Internet of two speeds, 
one slow lane for normal traffic and a faster, more pricier line for special services would 
"threaten innovation, the open tradition and architecture of the Internet, and competition 
among content and backbone providers. It would also threaten the equality of speech" 
(Obama, 2008). In another speech, Obama argues that "We can’t have a situation in which 
the corporate duopoly dictates the future of the Internet" (Obama, 2008). This affirms 
central utopian ideas such as the hands-off norm, freedom of speech and the cyber-punk 
narrative of defending the open Internet from corporate or government encroachment. 
During his presidency, Obama kept word and maintained net-neutrality.
But in the campaign, the growing influence of cyber-realism becomes visible, 
especially within the goal to protect children from online crime. The openness of the 
Internet is generally seen as benign and it is argued that the information age empowered 
individuals by giving them new tools. At the same time "Barack Obama also recognizes 
that lurking out there are the darker corners of the media world: "from Internet predators to 
hateful messages to graphic violence and sex". Like in the 9/11 discourse, the frame of 
dark figures lurking in the shadow is used (see chap. 4.4.7 The Politicization of Cyber-
Realism with the War on Terror (2000 - 2008)). But overall, Obama does not want to 
regulate technology, for example by censoring content. Instead he demands that the parents 
need to have the tools to shield their children from online threats. In line with the spirit of 
the end-to-end principle, he delegates the problem to the end-points of the network: the 
user. Interestingly, Obama does not just recognize the threats from child molesters or 
terrorists, but also: "The open information platforms of the 21st century can also tempt 
institutions to violate the privacy of citizens" (Obama, 2008). The availability of data 
creates a risk of (government) abuse. Therefore, the privacy-enhancing power of new 
technologies must be used in order to protect privacy. 
Obama supports updating surveillance law to ensure that intelligence gathering 
adheres to legal principles and that data of American citizens is only used for the fight 
against terrorism and not "misused for other purposes" (Obama, 2007). This is in line with 
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the general rhetoric of his speeches, distancing himself from the Bush administration. In a 
famous 2007 campaign speech he made a powerful argument:
"This administration [Bush/Cheney] also puts forward a false choice between the 
liberties we cherish and the security we provide. I will provide our intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to track and take out the 
terrorists without undermining our Constitution and our freedom. That means no 
more illegal wiretapping of American citizens. No more national security letters to 
spy on citizens who are not suspected of a crime. No more tracking citizens who do 
nothing more than protest a misguided war. That is not who we are. And it is not 
what is necessary to defeat the terrorists. The FISA court works. The separation of 
powers works. Our Constitution works. We will again set an example for the world 
that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers, and that justice is not 
arbitrary" (Houck, 2013).
Barack Obama, with his constitutional law background built up some credibility in fighting 
against US mass surveillance in the past. He protested against Bush’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, legitimized with the controversial unitary executive theory and 
against the expanding practice of national security letters including gag-orders that 
prevented a court of law. He also voted against the promotion of former NSA director 
Michael Hayden to become CIA director in 2006. However, in February 2008, when the 
Bush administration presented the FISA Amendment Act, a bill that post-hoc legalized and 
expanded the NSA mass surveillance program, Senator Obama voted in favor, although he 
threatened to filibuster the bill before (see chap. 4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, Surveillance 
and Cyber-War (2003-2008)). Observers argue that he needed to appear strong on matters 
of national security to bind a wider electoral base from the conservative spectrum 
(Bamford, 2009, p. 307).
The second major theme of the Obama campaign that reflects cyber-utopianism and 
even cypherpunk ideals is the focus on transparency: "The Bush Administration has been 
one of the most secretive, closed administrations in American history" therefore Obama 
wants to create "a new level of transparency, accountability and participation for 
America’s citizens" (Obama, 2007). This includes the idea that the government should 
publish more data online, hold digital town-hall-meetings and holding ompanies and 
government agencies, who misuse private data, accountable. The Internet plays a special 
role in creating transparency because: "Full broadband penetration can enrich democratic 
discourse, enhance competition, provide economic growth, and bring significant consumer 
benefits" (Obama, 2007). The open access norm becomes apparent in the goal to provide 
full-broad band access for all Americans, thus bridging the digital gap.
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It should have become clear by now that the Obama campaign relied heavily on 
cyber-utopian rhetoric, picking up key-frames from the 1990s such as the empowerment, 
the democratization and economic growth thesis, advocating for core cyber-utopian norms 
such as open access, net-neutrality,158 freedom of the Internet. This rhetoric has been 
absent from governmental discourse during the Bush administration. 
In 2009, after the election, President Obama made a visit to China and there he 
engaged in a Q&A with Chinese students. A student brought up the question of Internet 
control in terms of regulation. Obama’s response to that question is enlightening. He says 
that:
"But I am a big believer in technology and I’m a big believer in openness when it 
comes to the flow of information. I think that the more freely information flows, 
the stronger the society becomes, because then citizens of countries around the 
world can hold their own governments accountable. They can begin to think for 
themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages creativity. And so I’ve always 
been a strong supporter of open Internet use. I’m a big supporter of non-
censorship" (Obama, 2009a).
Assuming this is not a scripted response, the answer includes many cyber-utopian beliefs 
and generally adopts a positive undertone. He argues that the free flow of information 
strengthens societies and encourages creativity. This is similar to Marshal McLuhan in the 
60s and cyber-utopians in the early 90s. He continues and argues the "Internet has become 
an even more powerful tool for that kind of citizen participation […] and it also helps to 
draw the world together" (Obama, 2009a). By reflecting on the Internet-usage practices of 
his daughters, he is fascinated by how they can speak to people at the other end of the 
world and the "enormous power that they have" because of the Internet, basically 
reaffirming the empowerment thesis. However, at the same time he is aware of negative 
Internet usage: "terrorists are able to organize on the Internet in ways that they might not 
have been able to do before. Extremists can mobilize. And so there’s some price that you 
pay for openness, there’s no denying that. But I think that the good outweighs the bad so 
much that it’s better to maintain that openness" (Obama, 2009a). This is a remarkable 
statement against those who constantly demand more state control over cyberspace 
because of whatever threat they fear. Although there are certainly bad elements, like hate-
speech against the President himself, he maintains that an open society must live with that 
and that the value of an open, uncontrolled Internet is the greater good.
158 At the same time, the McCain campaign argued strongly against net neutrality, calling it unnecessary 
regulation (Holen, 2008). In fact, net neutrality is the default configuration of the Internet while prioritizing 
services like video would require regulation.
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This remarkable attitude towards the Internet partly influences policy as well, 
particularly in the practices of the State Department. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
referring to the policies of the Obama administration, adopts a similar tone in her 2010 
"Remarks on Internet Freedom" speech. This speech stands in the context of the so-called 
"Green revolution" in Iran 2009 and the emerging Arab spring, where social media drove 
uprising against authoritarian rule in the Middle East (Penke, 2012). Clinton argued in her 
speech that the Western democracies must defend the openness and the freedom of the 
Internet from a grave threat: 
"Some countries have erected electronic barriers that prevent their people from 
accessing portions of the world’s networks. They’ve expunged words, names, and 
phrases from search engine results. They have violated the privacy of citizens who 
engage in non-violent political speech. These actions contravene the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, which tells us that all people have the right "to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers." With the spread of these restrictive practices, a new information curtain 
is descending across much of the world" (Clinton, 2010).
This strong statement against Internet control practices shows that the 1997 Supreme Court 
ruling, prohibiting Internet censorship in the US still has normative power (see chap. 
4.3.5.3 Policy: Internet Censorship with the Communications Decency Act (1996)). Well-
known utopian frames such as the empowerment, power-distribution, free-information-
flow, democratizing, digital-revolution, the dictator's dilemma, the global commons all 
appear in her speech. Clinton also adopts the notion of the electronic frontier and digital 
borders: "Today, we find an urgent need to protect these freedoms on the digital frontiers 
of the 21st century." Electronic barriers or digital borders such as censorship systems 
prevent access to the free flow of information, thus creating insulated information spaces. 
These practices could result in a "fragmented planet in which access to information and 
opportunity is dependent on where you live and the whims of censors" (Clinton, 2010). 
This statement is interesting because one year later, President Mubarak shut down the 
Egyptian Internet on 25 January 2011 to block rebelling citizens from accessing Twitter 
and Facebook (Penke, 2012). Since then, the physical Internet shut-down of Internet 
backbones or services like Twitter, for example during elections or times of unrest, has 
become a common feature of Internet control in authoritarian societies (Deibert et al., 
2010). Other examples are the Russian election of 2012 (Tselikov, 2014) or the protests 
against Turkish President Erdogan. Clinton warns in her speech that challenges for national 
security, such as the anonymity on the Internet, "must not become an excuse for 
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governments to systematically violate the rights and privacy of those who use the internet 
for peaceful political purposes" (Clinton, 2010). 
Clinton also develops two relatively new utopian frames that do not seem to derive 
from counter-cultural and hacker discourses of the past. First, she argues: "the Internet can 
help bridge divides between people of different faiths" (Clinton, 2010). It can create a 
dialogue between different religious communities. This of course requires open access. The 
second novel idea is that freedom of assembly directly relates to the Internet as well: "the 
freedom to connect – the idea that governments should not prevent people from connecting 
to the Internet, to websites, or to each other. The freedom to connect is like the freedom of 
assembly, only in cyberspace" (Clinton, 2010). Clinton traces this argument back to her 
idol Eleanor Roosevelt. 
But of course, Clinton is a pragmatist and well aware of threats of terrorism, hacking 
and criminal activity online. As such the speech tries to create a balance between realist 
and utopian frames. In the end, she states the position of the US:
"States, terrorists, and those who would act as their proxies must know that the 
United States will protect our networks. Those who disrupt the free flow of 
information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our 
government, and our civil society. Countries or individuals that engage in cyber 
attacks should face consequences and international condemnation. In an internet-
connected world, an attack on one nation’s networks can be an attack on all. And 
by reinforcing that message, we can create norms of behavior among states and 
encourage respect for the global networked commons" (Clinton, 2010).
The last sentence is remarkable, not just because it adopts the utopian frame of the open 
commons, but because it indicates a new security paradigm. It recognizes the 
interconnectedness and combines it with the idea of NATO’s collective defense: an attack 
on a member equals an attack against all.159 IT-experts such as Susan Landau argue that in 
the age of digital interconnectedness we must overcome our narrow, terrorist-focused 
understanding of national security and instead focus on global or common security of our 
networks (Landau, 2016). A vulnerability in one system affects everyone who uses it and 
thus potentially billions of people (for example everyone using Windows would be 
affected by a security vulnerability). In contrast, the practice of US Cybercommand during 
the Obama presidency represents the total opposite of this globalized understanding of 
cyber-security (see chap. 4.5.3 Practice: Professionalization of Offensive Cyber-War & 
Surveillance). 
159 Since around 2015 NATO argues, that a cyber-attack could trigger article 5 (McLeary, 2015). For more 
detail on NATO’s offensive capabilities see (Lewis, 2015).
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However, one practice of the US State Department to promote Internet freedom 
deserves some mentioning: the support of the "development of new tools that enable 
citizens to exercise their rights of free expression by circumventing politically motivated 
censorship" (Clinton, 2010). In 2013, the State Department supported anti-censorship and 
secure communication technologies with $25 million (U.S. Department of State, 2013). 
Technology such as TOR,160 the secure, encrypted and anonymity-providing browser 
received an $1,8 million Dollar funding from the US government. TOR is used by 
journalists and activists worldwide to shield their anonymity from surveillance of 
authoritarian regimes (Hern, 2014). It is also used by criminals and terrorists. That is the 
reason why the IC lobbied heavily for the dismantling of anonymity on the Internet 
provided by the activist TOR network. The Snowden leaks that are introduced a bit later 
show how NSA wrestled with getting its head around TOR, breaking encryption and 
anonymity it provides (see chap. 4.5.5 Artifacts: The Snowden Leaks). Former NSA 
director Hayden described the paradox in 2013: "So on the one hand we’re fighting 
anonymity, on the other hand we’re chucking products out there to protect anonymity on 
the net" (Tucker, 2015). This highlights the utopianism-realism clash of the Obama 
administration and its hybrid nature. 
Now that we have established utopian features in the rhetoric of the Obama 
administration, lets shed some light on the opposite: the realist practices.
4.5.3 Practice: Professionalization of Offensive Cyber-War & Surveillance
The Obama administration has four distinct cyber-themes I want to focus on: first, an 
increased focus on cyber-security. Second, the increased institutionalization of cyber-war. 
Third, the professionalization and the offensive-turn of cyber-war and fourth, the 
expansion of cyber-realist ideas. These are four distinct streams that all facilitate the 
normalization of cyber-realist thinking.
The first general gist of Obama's Internet policy is the expansion and 
professionalization of cyber-security. As one of the first issues after entering office, 
Obama ordered a Comprehensive Cyberspace Policy Review (Lee, 2015, p. 251), and 
confirmed Bush's Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). This is a 
computer network defense effort to protect government/executive networks from foreign 
160 The Onion Routing (TOR) is a technology initially conceived by DARPA and the intelligence community 
to protect classified information. Since 2006, the TOR project is driven by researchers and internet activists 
to provide anonymity on the Web that even NSA cannot break (to the present date). Onion routing artificially 
reroutes data-packets through different servers, adding a layer of encryption at each hop. In the end, the 
origin of an internet activity cannot be traced and monitored. There is an overall consensus within the cyber-
security community that TOR is the only affective guarantee for anonymity online to the present date.
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intrusion. With this initiative, "President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the 
most serious economic and national security challenges" (Executive Office of the President 
of the United States, 2009, p. 1). The CNCI launches initiatives for better federal network 
management, intrusion prevention across governmental networks, a coordinated R&D 
effort, better security of classified networks and an education program. The initiative 
pursued the deployment of deep-packet-inspection equipment (called EINSTEIN) on 
internal governmental networks that monitors incoming traffic for malicious packets. 
Formally, DHS was the designated lead agency for protecting government networks but 
NSA also began to play a role.161 Landau argues "giving the NSA a major role in securing 
unclassified networks represented a significant change" (Landau, 2010, p. chap 5.6). It can 
be argued that with the affirmation of this directive under Obama, cyber-security became 
its own policy field with increasing priority. The high priority given to the topic can be 
shown with the following graph, which summarizes the Federal Cybersecurity spending. 
Figure 28. Federal Cyber-Security Spending and Incidents, Source: (Dourado & 
Castillo, 2015)162
161 General Alexander lobbied for the expansion of NSA’s role in protecting private networks: "I do not have 
the authority to stop an attack against Wall Street or industry, and that’s a gap I need to fix." The financial 
executives resisted the plans to install surveillance equipment on their networks. "He wanted to create a wall 
around other sensitive institutions in America […] and to install equipment to monitor their networks," says a 
former administration official. (quoted inHarris, 2014, p. chap. 10).
162 The graph combines data from the congressional research service, the GOA and the Federal Information 
Security Management Act of 2002. FISMA records the number of cyber-security incidents (thousands of 
incidents).
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The increased spending is noteworthy, because other branches of government, including 
the overall military spending were downgraded due to the economic recession of 2008. 
Additionally, the graphic includes the cumulated rise of cyber-security incidents which 
increased with an ever-growing diffusion of Internet services and devices. This is a key 
explanation for the increased focus on cyber-security issues and Obama's cyber-policy and 
an equifinality of converging causal factors.
The second element of Obama’s policy is the institutionalization of cyber-war, not 
just in the USA, but globally. The Bush administration, influenced by DNI Mike 
McConnell had set in motion the cyber-war machinery with plans for a cyber-command, 
the development of new CNA capabilities like Stuxnet and new surveillance-enabling 
legislation like FISAAA (see chap. 4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, Surveillance and Cyber-War 
(2003-2008)). However, it left a "cyber-security patchwork" (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 
200).163 The Obama administration tried to streamline the different capabilities that had 
been sprawled within the IC and the different military branches by creating a unified US 
Cybercommand (US CYBERCOM) in May 2010. The main purpose of US CYBERCOM 
was to answer the "who is in charge" question that resurfaced after the Buckshot Yankee 
incident in 2008 (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 10). CYBERCOM created a clear chain of 
command, overseeing and coordinating different cyber-warfare centers within the armed 
forces that had been established in the past (Lynn, 2010). CYBERCOM is coordinated by 
the director of NSA, and located in close proximity to Fort Meade, highlighting the nexus 
between cyber-war and surveillance. In total, it has around 60000 employees (Singer & 
Friedman, 2014, p. 134) and is coordinated by US STRATCOM, which plans and 
coordinates CNO and IO. Its mission statement is:
"USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts 
activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense 
information networks; and prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum 
military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure 
US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries" 
(STRATCOM, 2010).
The new relevancy of CYBERCOM can be shown by looking at its budget (see following 
figure). In 2014, while the most of the military forces received less budget, that of 
CYBERCOM doubled (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 135) and "cyberspace operations" 
(CNA and CNE) received roughly $2 billion. CYBERCOM itself received around $509 
163 A 2013 Congressional Research Service report counted more than 50 statutes that form the legislative 
framework for cybersecurity (Fischer et al., 2013, p. 1).
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million in FY 2015. Observe that it is estimated that in the future more money (around $2 
billion) will be spent on Cyberspace Operations, i.e. offensive CNA compared to 
information assurance, a terminus-technicus for CND. The enormous budget can be 
explained because CYBERCOM operates "a 600,000-square-foot, $896.5 million 
supercomputer facility called the High Performance Computing Center-2" (Bamford, 
2015).
Figure 29. DoD Spending on Cyber-Security, Source: (Sternstein, 2015)
In sum, CYBERCOM implements and institutionalizes many elements of the IW doctrine 
and cyber-realist paradigm in a joint military structure.
CYBERCOM also initiated the professionalization of a cyber-war workforce within 
the armed forces and IC (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 17). Since 2010 there are 
officer-career tracks, for example the US Air Force 17 deltas officer. US Navy is training 
24000 recruits per year in its Information Dominance Center in Nevada (Saalbach, 2015, p. 
31). Other agencies, like DHS, NSA or CIA also invested heavily in recruitment for digital 
war. Since 2012, CYBERCOM created its Cyber Mission Force, consisting of roughly 
6200 civilian and military employees. These are subdivided for different tasks: Cyber 
Protection Forces for cyber-security (computer network defense),164 National Mission 
Forces for offensive cyber-war like Stuxnet, which is coordinated by NSA’s TAO and the 
164 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review explains: "DoD currently operates more than 15,000 different 
computer networks across 4,000 military installations around the world. On any given day, there are as many 
as seven million DoD computers and telecommunications tools in use in 88 countries using thousands of 
warfighting and support applications." (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 37). As a consequence, DoD 
reduced the number of access points to its internal network and implanted sophisticated network monitoring 
tools (DPI) at these gateways, analyzing incoming packets for malicious code. (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 3). 
NSA was tasked to compile lists and dossiers of known hackers, particularly in China but potentially on the 
entire globe.
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even more elitist Remote Operations Center. Those groups are tasked with scouting out 
and breaking into networks to provide targeting information for CYBERCOM. Finally, 
there are Combat Mission Forces, with tactical CNA capabilities during combat operations 
(Saalbach, 2015, p. 60). An example are the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
that has its own cyber-warriors that can "conduct operations like embedding sensors in 
computer keyboards to follow what suspected terrorists type, or creating fake online 
identities in order to trap suspects and elicit information" (Priest & Arkin, 2012, p. 225). 
The use of cyber-war within limited combat theaters also marks a subtle shift in strategy. 
Publicly, advocates frame offensive CNA and cyber-war as a strategic element that shifts 
the nature of war by disrupting entire nations from the distance (see chap. 4.5.4 Discourse: 
Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of Cyber-Realism). Internally, the military moved from 
the concept of strategic cyber-warfare to the concept of "operational cyber-war": CNA 
used by special forces in limited combat scenarios, resembling the concept of hybrid 
warfare (Geers, 2015). 
The third theme of the Obama administration is the offensive-turn. From the job 
listings it becomes clear that US CYBERCOM prioritizes CNA and not CND, as its 
mission statement might suggest. "It’s an attack agency...." according to Edward Snowden 
(Bamford, 2015). With a suitable cyber-war workforce comes the increased sophistication 
and a general offensive turn in CNA capabilities. Nothing represents this more than the 
technical artifact called Stuxnet. In June 2010, cyber-security experts discovered the so-
called Stuxnet worm that specifically targeted Siemens SCADA systems165 in the air-
gapped Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz. The CNA utilized four previously 
unknown security vulnerabilities (zero day exploits) and was distributed via USB drives, 
indicating the involvement of secret agents. This weaponized software was one of the most 
sophisticated cyber-attacks known to date. It had around 650,000 lines of code, or 4000 
times as much as typical malware (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 12). The enrichment centrifuges 
in Natanz were sabotaged remotely over a period of months (not in a single knockout 
blow). The goal of this artifact was to disrupt or delay the Iranian nuclear enrichment 
program. Stuxnet made great efforts to remain hidden during that time. "Only" 2000 of 
around 8700 centrifuges were damaged (Barzashka, 2013). While the tactical effect was 
limited, the strategic impact was profound. Michael Hayden and several other officials 
described this as a watershed moment: "This is the first attack of a major nature in which a 
cyber attack was used to effect physical destruction. Somebody crossed the Rubicon" (Lee, 
165 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition are used for remote monitoring of industrial machinery over 
networks. They play a huge role in so-called "Industry 4.0", connecting industrial assets to the Internet.
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2015, p. 60). The Rubicon is the so-called kinetic-threshold. Indeed, media reporting on 
Stuxnet was manifold and the case is often highlighted in cyber-security publications, 
indicating its high impact among security professionals. As a result of Stuxnet, many 
countries started to recognize cyber-security issues and began to develop national cyber-
warfare programs and doctrines (Shafqat & Masood, 2016). In 2012, Iran allegedly 
retaliated with a counter-attack called Operation Shamoon, which erased data from 30000 
computers, replacing it with an image of a burning American flag (Healey & Grindal, 
2013).
The Washington Post reported in June 2012 that President Obama allegedly ordered 
the CNA, which was an outcome of operation Olympic Games (Lindsay, 2013), a program 
that began under the Bush administration around 2005 and became operational in 2008 
(Nakashima, Miller, & Tate, 2012). According to malware analyst Ralph Langer, the 
development had cost several million dollars (Langner, 2013). The attribution problem of 
CNA/CNE makes the question of who was responsible hard to answer. Although the 
Obama administration never confirmed to be responsible for any type of CNA or CNE, 
indicators point to US and Israeli intelligence agencies. The high complexity of the 
malware and the detailed knowledge of the target systems indicate the involvement of 
intelligence agencies and years of preparation and simulation (Lindsay, 2013, p. 386). 
Operation Olympic Games also produced two of Stuxnet’s technological siblings, Flame 
and Duqu. The Flame virus was revealed by Kaspersky in May 2012 and was a more 
refined version of Stuxnet’s code. In contrast to Stuxnet, which was a CNA (with a big 
portion of information warfare in terms of deception), Flame was designed for CNE: it 
targeted high-ranking Iranian officials, stealing information (screenshots, audio, video, 
network traffic, key-logging) and sent it to remote servers in different parts of the world 
while masking its traces. In other words, it was a sophisticated targeted surveillance 
software directed at key leaders, just as the 1990s IW doctrine envisioned. According to 
US officials, Flame "prepared the battlefield for another type of covert action" 
(Nakashima, Miller, & Tate, 2012), which again highlights the logical connection between 
surveillance, intelligence-gathering and cyber-warfare. Stuxnet and Flame indicate the 
logical overlap between CNE, Internet surveillance and offensive CNA, which was also 
addressed in new military doctrines.
The fourth theme of Obama’s cyber-policy was the formulation of a new 
Cyberstrategy in 2011 (updated in 2015). It serves as the ideational background for the 
practice of cyber-war in the US and includes many of the ideas and concepts developed in 
the 1990s under the IW doctrine. This is no accident because some of the drafters of the 
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doctrine held IW positions in the intelligence community back in the day. In other words, it 
represents a continuity of ideas. For example, the cyber-strategy declares cyberspace 
officially as an operational domain, an idea that was invoked in the mid 1990s, finally cast 
into policy (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 4). Besides replicating well established 
cyber-realist ideas, it introduced a new approach to cyber-attacks: the concept of 
equivalence (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 136). The US "will respond to a cyberattack on 
US interests through its defense capabilities" and "conduct cyber operations to counter an 
imminent or on-going attack against the US homeland or US interests in cyberspace" 
(Department of Defense, 2015, p. 5). In other words, the US would respond to cyber-
attacks either in kind ("to hack back") or with conventional weapons, and even 
preemptively (a legacy from the Bush administration). For the first time, digital attacks 
were equated with conventional attacks. This is a highly controversial position because of 
the attribution problem. The DoD strategy recognizes the problem of attribution which 
makes retaliation difficult. It argues that anonymity [of the Internet] "enables malicious 
cyber activity by state and non-state groups". However, it highlights that the IC "invested 
significantly in all source collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, all of which 
reduce the anonymity of state and non-state actor activity in cyberspace" (Department of 
Defense, 2015, p. 15). In other words it is, at least implicitly, confirmed that intelligence 
programs are designed and able to remove anonymity from the original TCP/IP 
infrastructure. Therefore, the cyber-strategy maintains the old IW doctrine’s strategic goal 
to gather "actionable intelligence about global networks and systems, adversary 
capabilities, and malware brokers and markets" (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 16). This 
position yet again highlights the entanglement of the IC (and CNE) with cyber-war (and 
CNA) (Lewis, 2015). 
A second noteworthy new concept adopted in the US cyber-strategy is General 
Alexander’s idea of "active defense" that he developed after taking over the helm at NSA. 
This is a euphemism for preemptively hacking enemy command and control structures in 
order to anticipate cyber-attacks. This is a controversial notion because it intentionally 
blurs the line between offense, defense and peace and war. This is controversial because 
the difference between CNE, which needs no authorization from the President, and CNA, 
which does, is often only the flick of a switch. A CNE operation can be easily turned into a 
CNA by enabling the destructive payload of a malware. More so, if CNA can trigger a 
kinetic response, the risk of escalation is not trivial. What further complicates matters is 
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that all of this is done in great secrecy.166 Thus, in the worst-case scenario, "active defense" 
could trigger a military escalation and no-one would know about it.
Generally, the cyber-strategy indicates the normalization of cyber-war. Cyber-realist 
ideas that emerged in the 1990s now are perceived as normal tools of statecraft (Valeriano 
& Maness, 2014, p. 347). Considering that many other states started their own cyber-war 
programs as a reaction to Stuxnet, the idea to exercise control over another nations' IT 
infrastructure with the instrument of state-hacking can be seen as a consolidated norm that 
started to diffuse around 2010 with the technical artifact called Stuxnet. Although not 
analyzed as deeply as the other technical artifacts, the case can be made that Stuxnet is 
another instance of norm-diffusion via technology-diffusion. General Michael Hayden 
acknowledges this norm-diffusion: "The rest of the world is looking at this and saying, 
"Clearly someone has legitimated this kind of activity as acceptable international conduct. 
The whole world is watching" (Kroft, 2012). This could be called norm-diffusion by 
emulation (Florini, 1996). The norm diffusion got accelerated by technical diffusion. For 
example, soon after Duqu’s code was discovered and publicly dissected, derivative 
malware popped up on the Internet. In other words, unknown hackers were mimicking 
their US counterparts by replicating and repurposing their technology.
Accompanying this normalization is the classified, TOPSECRET/NOFORN 
Presidential Policy Directive PPD 20 of October 2012, issued only a few months after the 
press discoveries of Stuxnet. It defined under what circumstances the US President would 
authorize CNA. In general, this doctrine materializes cyber-realist ideas: the primacy of 
US military and IC in defending US networks and controlling international cyberspace and 
the elevation of CNA to the status of traditional combat (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 3). It 
ordered relevant agencies and departments to identify adversarial critical infrastructures 
against which US cyber-attacks "can offer a favorable balance of effectiveness and risk, as 
compared to other instruments of national power" (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 12). To scope 
out enemy command and control structures (targeting) during peace time was first 
conceived with the IW doctrine in the early 1990s and then, 20 years later put into 
operational policy. According to Kaplan, the PPD-20 closely resembled an article from 
NSA’s in-house journal called Cryptolog in 1997, which clearly shows the continuity of 
cyber-realist thought over time (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 12).
166 Former NSA director Hayden argues: "Beyond complexity, developing policy for cyber ops is hampered 
by excessive secrecy (so says this intelligence veteran!). Look at the bloodline. I can think of no other family 
of weapons so anchored in the espionage services for their development (except perhaps armed drones). And 
the habitual secrecy of the intelligence services has bled over into cyber ops in a way that has retarded the 
development—or at least the policy integration—of digital combat power. It is difficult to develop consensus 
views on things that are largely unknown or compartmented or only rarely discussed by a select few" 
(Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 8).
4.5 From Cyber-Utopia to Cyber-War: The Obama Presidency (2008-2013)
371
In sum, these factors indicate the transition from defensive cyber-security, concerned 
with hardening networks and critical infrastructure protection (that goes back to the 
Clinton administration) to offensive and even preemptive cyber-war. This represents the 
creation of new policy goals and as such incremental paradigm-change within cyber-
realism, according to the theory (see chap. 2.2.3 Degrees of Change). The creation of a 
cyber-workforce, the institutionalization of defensive and offensive competencies under 
USCYBERCOM and the doctrinal guidance that allows in-kind or even physical responses 
establish offensive cyber-war as a new norm within US policy. "The core infrastructure for 
fighting a cyber war has been created. Now the United States is raising an army" (Harris, 
2014, p. chap. 3). More so, because of its role-model character, many other states and 
organizations (particularly NATO) followed this US position and started to develop 
offensive cyber-war capabilities as well. As a result, offensive cyber-war and the norm of 
control become established globally, creating an arms race in cyberspace. This can be 
shown by pointing to the 2011 cyberspace strategy that argues for the right to self-defense 
in case of CNA: "We reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable 
international law" (The White House, 2011, p. 14), as a response to cyber-attacks. It is seen 
as appropriate that states strike back digitally and physically.
That cyber-realist norms became dominant under Obama can be shown by referring 
to their discursive trail. Although we saw cyber-realist topics spilling over from 
governmental circles to the public discourse before, since 2011 this happened at an 
unprecedented scale. The next chapter will introduce the discourse around cyber-warfare in 
the US.
4.5.4 Discourse: Cyber-Doom and the Hegemony of Cyber-Realism
Whereas the cyber-realist paradigm was predominantly held by military and intelligence 
officials during the Clinton administration and brought into the political sphere by neo-
conservative hawks in secrecy by Bush, under Obama, it became normalized and in fact 
hegemonic. Cyber-realist concepts, originally invented within the military discourse on 
information war, became standard or unquestioned terms in political discourse during the 
Obama presidency. Since then, even democratic policy-makers adopted the cyber-war 
narrative in public speeches or op’ed newspaper articles. Cyber-doomsday scenarios 
(Lawson, 2011), became standard headlines in media coverage. Between 2007 and 2011, 
cyber-realists openly securitized the Internet. They used incidents like Estonia 2007 as a 
legitimization for new security measures and offensive cyber-war capabilities in front of a 
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wider media audience. The discourse peaked in late 2010 or early 2011 with the revelation 
of Stuxnet. Whereas the debate about cyber-war had been limited to military papers and 
academic literature before, suddenly TV documentaries (Stuxnet: Cyberwar 2011) and 
movies (Cybergeddon) illustrated the threat of cyber-attacks for a wider audience. This 
securitization of cyber-security through discourse is well studied by academia (Lawson, 
2011; Lawson, 2012; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Dunn Cavelty, 
2013b; Dunn Cavelty, 2013a; Eriksson, 2001; Gartzke, 2013). Because these threat frames 
and security mechanisms are well studied, there is no need for replication and I only 
present a short overview over the discourse that unfolded after Stuxnet. The purpose of this 
chapter is to gauge its general societal impact. This chapter does not conduct a full-fledged 
discourse analysis but describes the overall story-line of the discourse in a narrative 
fashion, much like the previous chapter on cyber-utopian ideas appearing in public 
discourses (see chap. 4.2.8 Norms and Key Ideas of Cyber-Utopianism).
There are generally two discursive positions: cyber-realist hawks and more skeptical, 
often academic or professional voices. Cyber-realist advocates include military and 
intelligence actors including DNI Mike McConnell (McConnell, 2009; McConnell, 2010), 
CIA-director Leon Panetta (Mulrine, 2011), (Panetta, 2012), NSA General Keith 
Alexander (Gertz, 2011) or politicians like Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn 
III (Lynn, 2010). Even President Barack Obama (Obama, 2012) adopts cyber-realist 
positions. There are also cyber-security firms (like McAfee) and arms & surveillance 
technology manufacturers that frame cyber-war and hacking in terms of doomsday 
scenarios. Cyber-realist advocates act as bricoleurs, sense-makers, in this particular 
context. Doomsday scenarios are narratives that focus on strategic cyber-war and operate 
with the crippling-blow thesis (Lawson, 2011). They assume that a single sophisticated 
CNA (like Stuxnet) could bring down a modern, information-based society (the referent 
object). CNA like Stuxnet or Shamoon are framed as an extraordinary threat to which must 
be responded by adopting new policies and a military strategy. For example, Barack 
Obama argued in 2009: "the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic 
and national security challenges we face" (Obama, 2009b) and "the number one strategic 
threat to the United States, placing it ahead of terrorism for the first time since the attacks 
of September 11, 2001" (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 8). A CBS article quotes the 
script of a documentary called Stuxnet that aired in March 2012, summarizing some of the 
famous quotes by the central cyber-realist advocates from within the IC:
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"FBI Director Robert Mueller: I do believe that the cyberthreat will equal or 
surpass the threat from terrorism in the foreseeable future. Defense Secretary Leon 
Panetta: There’s a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront 
could very well be a cyberattack. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike 
Rogers: We will suffer a catastrophic cyberattack. The clock is ticking" (Kroft, 
2012).
Terrorists could use cyber-attacks to poison the water supply, derail trains or damage air 
control traffic systems. Since Stuxnet passed the physical threshold (Hayden), the 
metaphoric genie is out the bottle and it is only a matter of time until a "digital 9/11" or 
"digital Pearl Harbor" takes place.167 The overall similarity to the Y2K discourse is striking 
(see chap. 4.4.5 Discourse: Y2K and Critical Infrastructure Failure) with the difference that 
now there are clear adversaries. Adversaries are generally China, Russia, terrorists or other 
sophisticated states. This line of thought is basically the continuation of early IW and 
RMA thinking that includes many of the same metaphors ("digital Pearl Harbor" from 
1991). An example is the "cyber-revolution thesis" (Lindsay, 2013). The argument here is 
that new technologies are a game-changer that alter the fundamental nature of war 
(technical determinism). The technological structure of TCP/IP produces asymmetric 
effects: modern, information societies depend on the Internet to operate (finance, 
electricity, transportation, military command & control) and are therefore more vulnerable 
than non-state actors or industrial societies (say North Korea). The weaker get empowered 
while the stronger become more vulnerable. Additionally, the offense is said to be easier 
(only one security vulnerability must be found), while the defense gets harder (CND must 
protect the entire network of interconnected devices) and because the Internet grants 
attackers anonymity, which creates the problem of attribution. This, in a nutshell, are the 
predictions made by the IW doctrine in the 1990s (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: 
Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace). In theoretical terms, the cyber-doom 
discourse represents a counter-signification that frames the Internet and related phenomena 
in predominantly national security terms and threats. The Internet is presented 
predominantly as an existential threat to the US and not as a harbinger for democracy that 
it used to be in the 1990s (see chap. 4.3.3 Ideas: Cyber-Utopia on the Information 
Superhighway (1993)). An outcome of this process is that instead of a prefix, the former 
greek adjective "cyber" is now often signified and treated as a standalone noun. When 
policy-makers speak of "the cyber", they generally mean something negative, something 
167 The "not if but when" frame is particularly interesting because it operates like a prophecy. In this frame 
there is no alternative future and as such it represents a hegemonic articulation. Interestingly, the "not-if-but-
when" frame was seldom uttered during the Cold War, where the possibility of a nuclear first strike was 
always taken for granted.
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that is a problem for national security. "Cyber" as a noun signifies the cyber-security 
domain and thus, the meaning is no longer equivalent with the adjective "digital".
The general function of this cyber-securitization is to legitimize extraordinary 
measures that would not be legitimate without an existential threat. Extraordinary 
measures that are demanded include a heavier focus on offensive and preemptive cyber-
attacks (reframed as "active defense") and cyber-deterrence by retaliation (a legalization of 
digital and physical retaliation), new funding for offensive programs (like Olympic 
Games) and more network surveillance infrastructure (like deep-packet inspection 
software) to monitor the Internet. Former head of NSA and DNI Mike McConnell even 
demands to "reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis 
and impact assessment – who did it, from where, why and what was the result – more 
manageable" (McConnell, 2010). Nothing makes the norm of Internet control, once 
derived from the core problem of attribution, more visible in public discourse than this 
quote. McConnell actively argues to change the code, the underlying architecture of the 
Internet to enable better surveillance. As we have seen, CND, CNE and CNA are 
structurally similar which brings it down to this formula: more offensive capabilities 
(CNA) equals an empowerment of surveillance (CNE). Many of these measures feature 
elements of Internet control and therefore are a manifestation of the norm of control. The 
goal becomes to control the Internet, not just within the homeland but also beyond one's 
own border. 
The second line of argument is critical of these often unproven assumptions and fear-
mongering strategies in the cyber-war narrative. Because cyber-security is a highly 
technical and specialized discourse, it is mostly academics (Deibert, 2003; Deibert, 2015; 
Rid, 2012; Lindsay, 2013; Gartzke, 2013; Dunn Cavelty, 2013b; Libicki, 2014; Valeriano 
& Maness, 2015; Lawson, 2012; Healey & Grindal, 2013) who criticize these threat 
figures by relying on classical theories of peace and conflict research and empirical data 
(Valeriano & Maness, 2015). For example, to the present day, not a single person has died 
because of a strategic cyber-attack. Comparing CNA with the destructive capabilities of 
physical weapons is way out of scale. Additionally, every year storms, falling trees or 
squirrels produce more power-outages and black-outs than cyber-attacks in the US alone 
(Peterson, 2016). The general line of argument is that strategic cyber-war and crippling 
blows will very likely not take place (Rid, 2012), because only a few actors have strategic 
incentives and relevant capabilities. Even if a digital Pearl-Harbor took place, its effects 
will be limited and most likely not produce chaos, due to the temporary nature of digital 
disruptions (Lawson, 2011). 
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Additionally, some argue that the threat of cyber-terrorism is overblown because 
destructive cyber-attacks like Stuxnet are too sophisticated and cost intensive that they do 
not favor well in the cost/benefit calculation of extremists. Terrorists can produce greater 
effects with cheaper means like AK rifles and pipe-bombs, as for example the Paris attacks 
have shown (Sin et al., 2016). They argue that much of the cyber-war discourse is 
overblown, which blurs the real issue: cyber-crime and economic espionage (as well as 
foreign intelligence), which produces factual economical damage. Scholars like Thomas 
Rid argue that most instances (like Estonia or Stuxnet) resemble acts of military deception 
or sabotage, but do not qualify as acts of war (Rid, 2012). Indeed, statistically, most cyber-
incidents are either cyber-crime (data & intellectual property theft) for monetary gain 
(82,7% of cases), hacktivism for political reasons (9,3%) and cyber-espionage (4,0%), 
done by intelligence agencies. Inter-state cyber-attacks account only for 2,7% of the cases, 
according to analysts (Passeri, 2016).168 In terms of actual damage, cyber-crime is the 
more pressing issue. 
Especially computer scientists that analyze the technicalities of CNA argue that the 
cyber-attacks that already did happen are not as severe as cyber-realist advocates frame 
them (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011; Barzashka, 2013; O’Connell, 2012). 
However, because of the high technical sophistication of the cyber-security discourse 
(Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009), the playing field is not equal. Because most cyber-attacks 
remain either hidden or are dealt with in secrecy, there is no transparency and room for 
critical and independent evaluation. Data used for attribution of intruders is seldom 
published. The actors who are tasked with CND are also those who are tasked with CNA 
and CNE, which often results in the classification of events that happen. These actors have 
a strategic interest in boosting the cyber-threat because it results in more competencies 
(like digital-retaliation or more CNE/CNA capabilities) and funding. In contrast to other 
policy areas, a civil-society discourse not taking place. It is mostly academics (social & 
computer sciences), a few critical NGOs (ACLU, EFF) and cyber-security experts who 
warn of a militarization of cyberspace and provide critical arguments. They do so mostly 
within inner-academic circles (scientific journals) and with a temporal delay. Observe that 
critical evaluation of Stuxnet happened roughly three years after the fact, when more data 
became public. At this point, the institutionalization of new CNA capabilities was already 
at full steam. Critics argue that war-games in cyberspace make the Internet more 
vulnerable and are contradictory to efforts to increase cyber-security. As a result, there is a 
168 Additionally, there is a wide range of "cyber-attacks" from simple, but often occurring automated network 
probing to sophisticated malware ala Stuxnet, that rarely is discovered. When statistics speak of millions of 
cyber-attacks a year, most of them are actually harmless.
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huge imbalance within the media discourse: the cyber-realists from the IC have an 
information advantage which they use to dominate the news, which allows them to 
establish their cyber-revolution narrative as dominant. In terms of discourse theory, the 
cyber-war discourse resembles what philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls a "dominated 
discourse" that structurally favors one discursive position over another (Habermas, 1970). 
Thus, the institutionalization of cyber-realism and its upgraded standing in a post 9/11 
world, allow it to dominate the discourse. 
The issue became even more apparent when former NSA-contractor Edward 
Snowden leaked roughly 3 million internal documents describing NSA’s mass surveillance 
and cyber-war machinery to the public. This further increased public salience of the issue 
and led to much controversy regarding these practices.
4.5.5 Artifacts: The Snowden Leaks
This chapter introduces some of the Snowden leaks that are of relevance for this thesis. 
There are reasons for this.
First, as indicated before, the Snowden leaks can be theorized as a potential shock for 
the cyber-realist paradigm which led to a potential juncture in the causal process. The 
controversial nature of these leaks increased the chances for policy change. Snowden 
himself argued that he hoped his actions would lead to a rethinking of the US global mass 
surveillance and hacking practice (Gellman & Markon, 2013). The leaks tested the 
durability of the cyber-realist paradigm much like the dot-com burst tested the explanatory 
power of cyber-utopianism (see chap. 4.2.7 Junctures: Dot-com Bubble (2000-2001)).
The second reason why these leaks are important is because they showed the public 
what "full-take" and the norm of Internet control actually meant. They are smoking-gun 
evidence for the existence of cyber-realist inspired technical artifacts and norms (see chap. 
3. Methodology & Research Design). In the press, intelligence officials described this 
norm guiding NSA mass data-collection established by NSA director Keith Alexander:
"Rather than look for a single needle in the haystack, his approach was, 'Let’s 
collect the whole haystack,’ " said one former senior U.S. intelligence official who 
tracked the plan’s implementation. "Collect it all, tag it, store it. . . . And whatever 
it is you want, you go searching for it" (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013).
Furthermore, the leaks show how information- and cyber-war together with surveillance 
form a tightly-knit assemblage of interrelated practices (Haggerty, Kevin, 2000). Before 
the leaks, these practices were shrouded in secrecy, only known to highest-ranking 
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intelligence officials. The leaks also show the globalization of cyber-realism in terms of 
the IW-goals and how the norm of Internet control became adopted by international 
partners (like the Five Eyes) and corporations that manage information. 
Third, these documents describe the goal-oriented construction and use of artifacts 
inspired by a cyber-realist mindset. Thus, these documents are prime source material to 
trace the diffusion of both technology and the norms it carries. Although repeatedly 
justified with the GWOT, the leaks included programs that had little to do with terrorism, 
like the surveillance of the EU and UN embassies (DROPMIRE), the spying on the UN 
security council members and allies during UN or G20 meetings, the surveillance of video 
games (Angry Birds, World of Warcraft), the surf-behavior of love-interests (Gorman, 
2013) or spying on allied heads of states (Angela Merkel’s phone). These programs make 
more sense if one understands them in the context of the goal of total information 
awareness (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace). I 
argued earlier that cyber-war and surveillance should be understood within the framework 
of information-warfare. 
Because of the massive scope of leaks and programs, I will concentrate only on a few 
programs that focus on the circumvention of norms of the original Internet and the fusion 
of IW, cyber-war and surveillance. A disclaimer is in order upfront. Due to the contested 
and classified nature of the Snowden documents, the author cannot (and will not) assure 
the accuracy of the claims depicted in the documents. However, NSA did not deny the 
authenticity of many of these documents.
What is noteworthy with these programs is that most of them operate within the 
expanded legal framework that was introduced under Bush (see chap. 4.4.7.2 Policy: The 
Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform (2001 - 2004)). They often rely on special 
interpretations of law to circumvent the warrant process, heavily use gag orders and secret 
contracts that prohibit commercial partners from disclosure (for example to affected 
customers, as the rule of law normally dictates). In contrast, NSA officials argue that these 
programs are subject to strict oversight from Congress and the FISA court, but to assess 
the legality of the programs is not the task of this thesis (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013). 
What is more important for this work is the fact that they aim to realize the goal of total 
information awareness – by collecting every piece of data transmitted, stored and 
generated and make data accessible to partners and other agencies (sharing norm). 
Additionally, data obtained by programs is used an analyzed by multiple other programs 
(and probably third parties), creating an assemblage of interconnected systems. 
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The PRISM program, leaked on 7 June 2013, documented the extraction of user data 
(E-mail conversations and data stored in online services) from servers of private 
companies (and the largest providers of Internet services and devices) such as Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Microsoft. PRISM collects mails, browsing histories, social media 
activity, voice chats and multimedia from servers, is legalized under controversial section 
215 of the Patriot Act and protected by gag-orders (see chap. 4.4.7.2 Policy: The Patriot 
Act and Intelligence Reform (2001 - 2004)). The data seemed to be obtained by NSA 
either directly by request without the need for wiretapping, or by intelligence sharing, 
obtained by the FBI in the first place (The Washington Post, 2013a). According to Hayden, 
it was only data about foreign targets that was stored domestically on US servers, like 
terrorists using a Gmail account (Hayden, 2016b, p. chap. 20). The participating companies 
denied the cooperation – which could be the result of the gag orders – and are legally 
protected from law-suits with the FISA Amendment Act of 2008. However, leaked 
documents describe another NSA program called MUSCULAR that aims at "copying 
entire data flows across fiber-optic cables that carry information among the data centers of 
the Silicon Valley giants" probably using the aforementioned splitter technique (see chap. 
4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). MUSCULAR 
is said not to require a FISA warrant but collects "twice as many data points ("selectors" in 
NSA jargon) compared to the better known PRISM" (Gellman & Soltani, 2013). 
According to NSA power-points, the PRISM program is closely tied to the aforementioned 
UPSTREAM data collection at IXP that was already established under Bush.
Another noteworthy program called MAINWAY seems to resemble the legacy of 
TIA (see chap. 4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - 
)). It does social network analysis of the various SIGINT data collected with other 
programs to create networks of associations. "N.S.A. correlates 164 "relationship types" to 
build social networks and what the agency calls "community of interest" profiles, using 
queries like "travelsWith, hasFather, sentForumMessage, employs." It is "large-scale graph 
analysis on very large sets of communications metadata without having to check 
foreignness" (Risen & Poitras, 2013).169 This program possibly can reveal the innermost 
secrets of a person because pattern of life analysis can determine sexual preferences or 
169 Fred Kaplan did the math: "Imagine someone who had dialed the number of a known al Qaeda member, 
and assume that this person had phoned 100 other people over the previous five years. That would mean the 
NSA could start tracking not only the suspect’s calls but also the calls of those 100 other people. If each of 
those people also called 100 people, the NSA—in the second hop—could track their calls, too, and that 
would put (100 times 100) 10,000 people on the agency’s screen. In the third hop, the analysts could trace the 
calls of those 10,000 people and the calls that they had made—or (10,000 times 100) 1 million people. In 
other words, the active surveillance of a single terrorist suspect could put a million people, possibly a million 
Americans, under the agency’s watch" (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap 13).
4.5 From Cyber-Utopia to Cyber-War: The Obama Presidency (2008-2013)
379
political orientation based on association data (Jernigan & Mistree, 2009). Closely 
connected to MAINWAY is MARINA, a metadata program that "tracks a user’s browser 
experience, gathers contact information/content and develops summaries of target" 
conducting pattern of life analysis. MARINA can look back on 365 day's "worth of DNI 
metadata", regardless of "whether a person is a NSA target". James Ball argues that there 
are millions of users in this database (Ball, 2013). Another TIA legacy can be found in an 
unnamed program that is "harvesting huge numbers of images of people from 
communications that it intercepts through its global surveillance operations for use in 
sophisticated facial recognition programs" (Ball, 2013). This program seems to be in 
operation since 2011 and aims to create a database of biometric information that can be 
used for precision targeting and can track people when they cross borders. This system is 
connected to other databases such as PINWALE, TIDE (Terrorist Database) and PISCES, 
a system that is collecting "biometric data on border crossings from a wide range of 
countries" (Risen & Poitras, 2014).
The need-to-share norm found its manifestation in a program called XKEYSCORE, 
a mass storage and information management system or database that combines many NSA 
programs into one searchable database. To make sense of the vast amounts of data NSA 
and its partners obtain via tapping into fiber optic cables with programs such as 
TEMPORA, FASCIA, MUSCULAR, Squeaky Dolphin, SOMALGET and PRISM, an 
interface is needed that can organize these data points, to make them usable and 
searchable. Edward Snowden described the functions as following:
"You could read anyone’s email in the world, anybody you’ve got an email address 
for. Any website: You can watch traffic to and from it. Any computer that an 
individual sits at: You can watch it. Any laptop that you’re tracking: you can follow 
it as it moves from place to place throughout the world. It’s a one-stop-shop for 
access to the NSA’s information. […] You can tag individuals […] Let’s say you 
work at a major German corporation and I want access to that network, I can track 
your username on a website on a form somewhere, I can track your real name, I can 
track associations with your friends and I can build what’s called a fingerprint, 
which is network activity unique to you, which means anywhere you go in the 
world, anywhere you try to sort of hide your online presence, your identity" (NDR, 
2014).
XKEYSCORE also marks the global diffusion of this surveillance system and its 
underlying logic and norms since it is used by various Western intelligence agencies 
around the globe. The German investigation into BND-NSA cooperation revealed this 
(Biselli, 2016). It is an actant in that regard (Latour, 2005b), a non-human norm-
entrepreneur that transports the goals and functions embedded in the system and makes 
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them available for a wider audience, thereby establishing a norm of practice. There are 
reports that third-party intelligence agencies and law-enforcement agencies have access to 
parts of XKEYSCORE.170 
To indicate the fusion of information-war, cyber-war and mass surveillance, let me 
introduce another of programs. The first is a CNE program called TURBINE that was 
allegedly conceived by General Alexander in 2004 (see chap. 4.4.7.4 The Fusion of IW, 
Surveillance and Cyber-War (2003-2008)) and materializes the idea of active defense. It is 
said to be a semi-automatic hacking system that uses security vulnerabilities in networks 
and a whole set of hacking-techniques like Trojans, packet-spoofing, DNS-injections to 
break into networks. Theoretically it would allow "industrial scale" infection of "millions 
of computers". It is said to have the "capability to deploy and manage hundreds of 
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA) implants to 
potentially millions of implants" (Gallagher & Greenwald, 2014). Implant is an euphemism 
for malware, which can be used for data-exfiltration but also computer network attacks on 
a very large scale. The aim of this $67 million program is nothing less than "owning the 
net", according to its Powerpoint slide. This is a prime indicator for the norm of Internet 
control. "Owning" the net is a hacker term to describe skill and domination – utilizing 
NSA’s access to worldwide Internet switches. There, a Turbine Module called 
SECONDDATE can become active, which enables "mass exploitation potential for clients 
passing through network choke points" (Gallagher & Greenwald, 2014). The 
communication of an entire network flowing through a hacked switch could be potentially 
altered and exploited. On NSA’s Powerpoint slides it is called "a more aggressive 
approach to SIGINT", yet again manifesting General Alexander’s idea of "active defense". 
It is said to be in use in the US, UK and Japan (Gallagher & Greenwald, 2014). 
Closely connected to TURBINE is QUANTUM, a set of different CNE, CNA and 
CND capabilities. This system could be used for surveillance, CNA and economic 
espionage, for example against European partners like Belgium. According to der Spiegel, 
"Belgacom’s network engineers were targeted by GCHQ in a QUANTUM mission named 
"Operation Socialist" – with the British agency hacking into the company’s systems in an 
effort to monitor smartphones" (Gallagher & Maass, 2014). This operation is said to be 
part of a wider initiative to target administrators of computer networks with spear-fishing 
attacks in order to gain access to the networks they administer. Similar techniques are said 
170 Among them the German BND and Verfassungschutz, Swedish FRA, Australia’s Signals Directorate, 
New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau, British GCHQ and allegedly third party 
intelligence agencies in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway (Rensfeldt, 
2013).
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to have been used to target German companies Stellar, Cetel and IABG (Poitras, 
Rosenbach, & Stark, 2014). These companies provide satellite Internet communications to 
remote places like Oil-drilling platforms or armed forces in the field and are connected to 
major EU Internet backbones. They also offer service to German companies as well as 
government communications (defense ministry and Bundeswehr), which makes them a 
lucrative target for economic espionage as well as for the aforementioned preparation of 
information war in peace time (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: Information Weapons & 
Digital Battlespace). According to the leaks, British GCHQ got access to the networks they 
administer, "spying on the Internet traffic passing through these nodes". This and other 
data have been used to create profiles of the leadership of 122 states and filing them in a 
"Target Knowledge Database". This database is said to allow the creation of profiles of 
state leaders, among them Angela Merkel, Bashar Al Assad and Yulia Tymoshenko. For 
Merkel, the database included 300 citations, "derived from intelligence agencies, 
transcripts of intercepted fax, voice and computer-to-computer communication", in other 
words a multitude of different surveillance programs. Similar authorization is said to exist 
for "China, Mexico, Japan, Venezuela, Yemen, Brazil, Sudan, Guatemala, Bosnia and 
Russia" (Poitras, Rosenbach, & Stark, 2014). This is very much in line with what has been 
envisioned with the information warfare doctrine of the 1990s: using CNE to create 
leadership profiles of the enemy and allied heads of states, to "penetrate their thinking" and 
to gain advantages, for example in state negotiations (see chap. 4.4.2.3 Core Ideas: 
Information Weapons & Digital Battlespace).
In a similar vein, 2010 "Operation Shotgiant" allegedly targeted the network 
infrastructure of Chinese IT-giant Huawei. During this CNE, NSA obtained information 
about the workings of Huawei routers and switches, which connect a third of the world's 
population with the Internet, in China but also in Western countries. "The N.S.A. could 
roam through their computer and telephone networks to conduct surveillance and, if 
ordered by the president, offensive cyber-operations" (Sanger & Perlroth, 2014). Unknown 
security vulnerabilities in Huawei switching hardware would be highly valuable for 
launching offensive cyber-attacks, underscoring once more the close connection between 
CNE and CNA. 
Closely connected is another program called BULLRUN, which is described by 
journalist Greenwald as, the "biggest threat" to "the use of ubiquitous encryption across the 
Internet" (Ball, Borger, & Greenwald, 2013). Good encryption is a cornerstone of effective 
cyber-security and is used in services such as online-banking and shopping (HTTPS and 
SSL protocols), in Virtual Private Networks (VPN) that companies and universities use to 
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connect to their networks from afar, or even by government and military organizations to 
maintain sensitive information. NSA spends $250 million annually to influence the design 
of encryption products to implement so-called Backdoors (secret access) and calls this the 
"price of admission for the US to maintain unrestricted access to and use of cyberspace" 
(Ball, Borger, & Greenwald, 2013). The list of private collaborators is protected by the 
highest classification possible. By introducing artificial vulnerabilities into software that 
promises uses secure communication, NSA undermines the "fabric of the Internet" such as 
"security and privacy", according to IT specialist Schreier, quoted in the article (Ball, 
Borger, & Greenwald, 2013). Bullrun also shows that the NSA did not stop its war on 
cryptography after its Clipper failure (see chap. 4.3.5.1 Policy: The Clipper Chip (1993)).
A final example underscoring the synergy between surveillance, information and 
cyber-war is "Operation Rolling Thunder" of GCHQ, a little known information- and 
cyber-war campaign against Anonymous in 2011. The aim of GHCQ hackers was very 
much in line with the US information war doctrine: to "destroy, deny, degrade [and] 
disrupt enemies by discrediting" them and "planting misinformation and shutting down 
their communications" (Cole et al., 2014). This was done by using Anonymous very own 
CNA of choice, DDoS attacks, but also included information-war and "propaganda 
campaigns use deception, mass messaging and pushing stories via Twitter, Flickr, 
Facebook and YouTube" and "false flag operations, in which British agents carry out 
online actions that are designed to look like they were performed by one of Britain’s 
adversaries" (Cole et al., 2014). In sum, Snowden claims that NSA conducted over 61000 
cyber-attacks until 2013 (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 13) 
All of these leaks produced a crisis questioning the legitimacy of surveillance in 
general (Schulze, 2015). Although there have been intelligence scandals before (2005 with 
the warrantless wiretapping program, and 2000 with the leak of the Echelon spying 
network), this was undoubtedly the one with the most international resonance, resembling 
a shock for cyber-realism. The public’s acceptance of mass surveillance began to shift 
from majority support to opposition (Rainie & Maniam, 2016). This trend was facilitated 
because IC officials denied the existence of the mass surveillance programs back in March 
2013 during a congress-hearing. There, Senator Ron Ryden asked DNI Clapper whether 
NSA does "collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of 
Americans?" Clapper replied, "No, sir . . . not wittingly" (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 13). After 
the Snowden leaks, Republican Senator Rand Paul complained that DNI "Clapper lied in 
Congress, in defiance of the law, in the name of security. Mr. Snowden told the truth in the 
name of privacy" (Landau, 2013, p. 55). Former Vice President Al Gore attacked the 
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government practice as unconstitutional because it clearly violates the Fourth Amendment 
(Landau, 2013, p. 54). 
Initially, the White House defended the bulk-telephony metadata-retention program 
based on a controversial interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act (The White House, 
2013). Because of the public and international diplomatic outcry from allies, President 
Obama was driven to set up a review board, evaluating two of the most controversial 
programs (but not all of them, which is an important caveat). Thus, the juncture continued 
over the course of 2013. For better readability, the report of the evaluation panel and the 
ideas and critique it includes, is presented in the next chapter.
4.5.6 Juncture: The President's Panel on NSA Practices
On 9th August 2013, Obama gave a press-conference on the Snowden leaks. Highlighting 
his "healthy skepticism" (The Washington Post, 2013b), he announced a balanced review 
of these programs. A committee would make suggestions for intelligence reforms on 
August 27th 2013, with a final report due to the end of the year 2013. This panel included 
several high-ranking US intelligence officials such as former Bush cyber-czar Richard 
Clarke, former CIA director J. Morell, but also two constitutional lawyers and one first 
amendment scholar. It can be said that the panel was rather balanced since it included 
insights from both the IC and from a more privacy-focused legal perspective. 
The general gist of the report is a critique of radical cyber-realist provisions that were 
legalized within the framework of the unitary executive theory. Cyber-realism is seen as an 
unbalanced approach to national security, realizing primarily the particular interests of 
state actors (military and IC) but not the universal interest of the general public (both 
within the US but also internationally). In the very beginning the report states that there are 
two sides to security: national security but also "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" (Clarke et 
al., 2014, p. 15), as reflected in the 4th amendment. Privacy is another variant of security 
and particularly relevant on the Internet. While on the one hand acknowledging the new 
threat of terrorism, the report argues that the government overreacted after 9/11 (Clarke et 
al., 2014, p. 53), focusing exclusively on risks to national security while ignoring the risks 
that come with an expanded national security apparatus: risks to privacy, to freedom and 
liberties, to commerce but also the risks to the relationship to other nations (a clear 
reference to the spying on Angela Merkel’s phone). Because the "natural tendency of 
government is toward abuse of power" and the "tendency of intelligence activities to 
expand beyond their initial scope", to "generate ever-increasing demands for new data", 
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which all thrives in secrecy (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 58), the FISA system was put in place. 
However, this system was severely changed with post-9/11 legislation. The report 
criticizes many of the legal provisions of the Patriot Act that changed or circumvented the 
FISA system (see chap. 4.4.7.2 Policy: The Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform (2001 - 
2004)), for example the general suspicion (vs. prior individualized suspicion), the issuance 
of National Security Letters with gag orders,171 the increased classification to prevent 
public disclosure, the repeated bypassing of legal checks and balances and the bulk-
collection of telephony metadata under section 215. Although new digital technologies 
allow for more information to be gathered, it does not logically follow that the government 
should collect everything. The government should resist the temptation of the full-take 
approach – collecting everything just because it might be useful in the future (Clarke et al., 
2014, p. 48). The report argues for a norm of democratic restraint that should make 
democratic surveillance and intelligence regimes structurally different from their 
counterparts in authoritarian regimes.
They criticize that in many instances empirical evidence is lacking whether more 
intelligence is helpful and that "the abstract possibility does not, by itself, provide a 
sufficient justification for acquiring more information" (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 51). This 
argument seems to stem from interviews that the panel held with NSA and FBI members 
where they learned that not a single terrorist had been caught with the help of the meta-
data surveillance system.172 According to Clarke, who was very skeptical, this begged the 
question why this controversial system was kept in place if it had not produced any results 
(Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 14). 
Besides questions of efficiency, there are also fundamental legal issues. The panel 
also learned that domestic communication indeed inevitably was caught with this dragnet 
technique because of packet-switching, which made it impossible to distinguish between 
foreign and domestic data-packets (see chap. 4.4.8 The Norm of Internet Control). This 
was no accident but intentional design. To find the needle in the haystack, the whole 
haystack had to be scanned. NSA operated according to the logic collect first and check for 
relevancy later (inductively so to speak) whereas since the 1970s, the rule of law was 
based on a deductive approach: have a suspicion first, get a warrant and then conduct 
surveillance. An important question the reviewers asked is, what happened with the 
171 According to the report, in 2012 FBI issued 21000 NSL and 97% included a gag-order, highlighting how 
normalized this practice has become (Clarke et al., 2014, pp. 90-92). Gag orders effectively prevent third 
parties to take legal measures against the disclosure demand.
172 "Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 
telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely 
manner using conventional section 215 orders" (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 104).
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haystack after the search. According to the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, the data had to 
be deleted but the panel quickly realized that there is an enormous potential for abuse and a 
potential threat for democracy. The same was true for the questionable practice of National 
Security Letters with gag-orders issued by the FBI. Neither had there been any evaluation 
regarding the effectiveness, nor was there anyone monitoring that practice. The FBI had a 
relatively free-hand and there was no chance for judicial control because gag-orders 
prevented the court of law (Kaplan, 2016, p. chap. 14).
In sum, the panel indicated that the IC overstepped by putting in place a mechanism 
resembling a totalitarian logic. In contrast to totalitarian states, the democratic rule of law 
sets limits to intelligence gathering, for example that surveillance should not be collected 
to punish political enemies or suppress dissent (as happened in the 1970s). Some of the 
new surveillance provisions violated this democratic core principle. The panel argued that 
when people realize they are being monitored, associational and expressive are freedoms 
hindered. This might create chilling effects for the democratic process and increase public 
mistrust in government conduct (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 117). 
To remedy these problems, the 300-pages report makes 46 recommendations 
(henceforth called "Rec") which are full of normative statements, of which I only can 
discuss a few. One general theme is better legal, congressional oversight and 
transparency, reinstating lost checks and balances. Section 215 should be altered to 
reinstate the principle that third parties have to inform their customers of government 
searches (Rec 1). National Security Letters should follow normal warrant standards (Rec 
2). As a general rule: "without senior policy review, the government should not be 
permitted to collect and store all mass, undigested, non-public personal information about 
individuals to enable future queries and data-mining for foreign intelligence purpose" (Rec. 
4). Data collection for terror-prevention is seen as necessary, but should be permitted only 
upon senior executive and legal review (creating accountability). Rec. 7 demands that 
Congress should be informed annually about the issuance of NSL and the number of 
warrants obtaining of business records (under section 215) and the installation of pen 
registers and trap-and-trace devices (under section 702 FISA Amendment Act of 2008). 
Disclosure of such information to Congress and citizens should be the norm in a 
democratic society and not covered in classification. Big, far-reaching programs such as 
NSA metadata retention should not be kept secret from the public, and can only remain 
classified by providing strict legal justification (Rec 11). For such programs, the President 
should create a high-level approval process, creating better official accountability (Rec 16). 
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Another theme is the limitation of the increased quantity and quality of post 9/11 
surveillance technology. Bulk meta-data collection by NSA should be prohibited. Instead, 
a third party should maintain the data and NSA still should be able to access it with a FISA 
warrant (similar to EU data retention policies). Rec. 6 asks for a rethinking of the 1970s 
idea that meta-data does not contain private information (which with digital 
communication, it increasingly does). The surveillance of foreign leaders and allies as well 
as economic espionage should be stopped (Rec. 31), unless there is substantial reason not 
to (Rec 19). NSA surveillance should return to the pre-9/11 targeted approach, instead of 
following the full-take principle (Rec 20). The NSA should return to its original mandate 
being a foreign-oriented agency, effectively scaling back the expansion and power-grab of 
NSA (Rec 23). As was shown before, after 9/11 NSA’s ears were turned to domestic soil, 
which was originally the domain of the FBI (see chap. 4.4.7.3 Artifacts: NSA and the Full-
take Norm of Internet Control (2001 - )). In a similar vein, the government should conduct 
a technological assessment of Big Data and data-mining programs, determining the effects 
on civil liberties and evaluating cost-effectiveness (Rec 35). The impact of future 
surveillance programs should also be assessed by an independent expert group (Rec 36). 
The general theme of this is a critique of the haystack approach or full-take principle to 
sweep up and analyze as much data as possible. The data-sharing practice (need-to-share) 
created security vulnerabilities and privacy issues, because more agencies (and third 
parties) than necessary can access critical data and there is no accountability who has 
access. The need-to-know principle should be reinstated and updated with a work-related 
access model which ensures that only analysts that really need the data can obtain it (Rec 
41). The loose sharing-culture, which also includes private corporations should be reduced. 
The report maintains that the need-to-share norm also creates security problems: much of 
the gathered data is unencrypted and theoretically can be accessed by third parties.
A third theme is reestablishing the balance between military and IC interest vis-à-vis 
the public interest, in other words, reducing cyber-realist hegemony by questioning the 
supremacy of the military and IC in cyberspace issues. The DNI should be a senate-
confirmed position (Rec 22). In general, the blurring of domestic law-enforcement and 
foreign intelligence is criticized. Another theme is reducing structural dominance of the 
military and IC within the intelligence process by creating a counterweight in form of civil 
actors which represent the general public’s interest (the other side of security so to speak). 
Rec 27 proposes the creation of a Civil Liberties and Protection Board that oversees IC 
activities and should be open to whistle-blower complaints. Within the FISC, there should 
be a Public Interest Advocate, so that the judges would hear both sides of a story, and not 
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just the IC perspective before issuing a warrant. Rec 28 also argues that the transparency of 
FISC decisions should be increased by declassifying them, increasing public 
accountability. Congress should also reconsider the appointment of judges and the review-
procedures for warrants. Also, FISC should build better technical expertise (because the 
old judges often cannot comprehend the scope and technicalities of surveillance programs 
they approve).
Finally, the report also addresses cyber-war and argues for a demilitarized 
perspective on cyberspace: "even where a military rationale exists for information 
collection and use, there increasingly will be countervailing reasons not to see the issue in 
purely military terms" (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 187). It argues for a clear separation of the 
functions, cyber-security/network defense (information assurance), surveillance (SIGINT) 
and cyber-offense (CNA). These functions should not be fused together under one agency 
(NSA). The report confirms positions put forward repeatedly by the computer science 
community that argue that computer network defense (information assurance) and offense 
have conflicting interests, which weakens global cyber-security. Offense benefits from 
insecure systems, while defense aims to make them more secure: "when the offensive 
personnel find some way into a communications device, software system, or network, they 
may be reluctant to have a patch that blocks their own access" (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 192). 
This addresses NSA’s practice to hoard zero day vulnerabilities instead of patching them, 
which is in contrast to industry security best-practices. NSA does this because these 
weaknesses are necessary for offensive cyber-attacks, which is the reason why these 
functions should be separated. The director of Cybercommand and NSA should not be a 
single (NSA-) official (Rec 24). Protection of domestic networks should be the 
responsibility of DHS (which operates under a different legal regime compared to NSA) 
and not that of NSA. While it legally is, DHS lacks NSA’s resources and technical 
sophistication. For that reason, NSA’s Information Assurance Directorate, responsible for 
network protection should be a separate agency, reporting to the DoD (Rec 25). This could 
ensure that DHS gets state of the art network-defense technology and tools to execute its 
legal mandate.
In theoretical terms, the report criticizes the hegemony of cyber-realist principles and 
norms that guide US cyberspace policy. The Internet should not be seen primarily as a 
military or intelligence issue, subsuming everything under this guiding frame, thus 
increasing the further militarization of cyberspace. It questions the legitimacy of the norm 
of Internet control driven by the idea of total information awareness.
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The interesting question now is whether this report was effective and how many of 
these measures were implemented. In January 2014, President Obama announced the 
changes (McCarthy, 2014). In his speech, the hybrid presidency became visible again. On 
the one hand Obama argued: "As the nation that developed the Internet, the world expects 
us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual empowerment, not 
government control" (Obama, 2014). However, on the other hand he did not end any of the 
leaked surveillance programs. Critics argue the changes were rather cosmetic. Obama 
made clear that although there is enormous potential for abuse, and that the IC has the 
inherent bias "to collect more information about the world, not less" he will not end the 
programs because they make America and its allies more secure. They secure not just 
against terrorism but against foreign intelligence agencies and cyber-threats, highlighting 
yet again the fusion of surveillance and cyberwar. However, he acknowledges that trust has 
been lost and that the American citizens should not blindly trust the good intentions of the 
Government, so as a results he put forward several initiatives that aim at greater 
transparency and trust-building (Obama, 2014).
As a reaction, the government declassified a lot of material describing the legal 
rationale behind some, but not all, of their surveillance programs based on Section 215 of 
the Patriot Act and Section 702 of FISAAA. The storage of US citizen's phone records 
would be moved away from NSA, because of potential abuses. However, it still has access 
to it via FISA or inter-agency intelligence sharing (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 14). Contact-
chaining and social-network analysis of meta-data is now limited to two hops. According 
to Michael Hayden, President Obama cancelled the spying on international organizations 
such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and some state leaders like Angela Merkel 
(Hayden, 2016b, p. chap.20), but a future President could reinstate this. The IC must apply 
to the FISA court, which was the law anyway. The FISA court will now include a public 
interest advocate to balance the dominance of the IC in the hearings and will be equipped 
with better technical expertise because the review panel found out that the old FISA judges 
often lacked the technical know-how for understanding what they were legitimizing. 
However, large portions of the programs remained untouched. It must be kept in mind that 
the Obama initiative and the review panel only focused on a fraction of the surveillance 
practices, i.e. domestic telephony meta-data retention under section 215 of the Patriot Act 
and section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act. The other leaked programs or even the 
question of the legality of the NSL-system were never part of the evaluation and remained 
largely unchanged. The government still scoops up large portions of Internet traffic and 
analysts can search their databases without the need for warrants, as the President’s panel 
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suggested. Most changes affected NSA, but the FBI, which does a substantial part of 
domestic surveillance, remained untouched. It still can issue NSL and secret gag orders, 
against which the President’s panel argued, although the NSL now can expire, unless the 
FBI writes a letter that it should not. According to the EFF, the move "doesn’t fix the 
constitutional problem," […] "that there’s a gag order when [a letter] is issued, without any 
judicial involvement or showing that there needs to be a gag" (Childress, 2015). The bulk-
collection of telephony metadata is still in place as well. NSA contractor Snowden was 
charged with espionage, based on a broad interpretation of the Espionage Act of 1917, 
although "leaks of classified information to the press have relatively infrequently been 
punished as crimes," according to a Report from Congressional Research Service (Landau, 
2013, p. 54). This, again is evidence for the war-paradigm that drives cyber-realism and 
replaced the law-paradigm of the 1990s. Before leaving office in 2016, Obama announced 
that the head of US CYBERCOM would be separated from the NSA (Nakashima, 2016).
In sum, cyber-realism survived this shock situation with a mix of pragmatism, 
endurance and power-politics, prioritizing national security interests over norms and values 
such as the protection of privacy, which represents a classical realist line of thought. 
Cyber-realism ultimately reached hegemony and it would require a strong political will to 
break with these established norms of total control or even implement a few of these 
proposed changes (Diersch, 2014). In the wake of more terrorist attacks, the public’s 
support for these surveillance measures increased again (Rainie & Maniam, 2016). During 
the presidential election of 2016, both candidates supported more surveillance powers with 
only a minority of politicians opposing the expansion of the surveillance apparatus. The 
dominance of cyber-realism will be quantified in the next chapter.
4.5.7 Outcome: The Dominance of Cyber-Realism
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the dominance of cyber-realism and its ideas within 
the United States. If cyber-realism is indeed the dominant paradigm, we should see some 
spill-over into public and elite opinion. To check for that, I will use several opinion polls to 
assess whether the cyber-doom discourses and the elite's attitudes toward the topic had a 
wider societal impact. Due to time and financial constraints I could not conduct my own 
survey of US public opinion in order to test whether cyber-realist or utopian frames are 
dominant within the general public. To make such a judgement, one would require a 
longitudinal survey of the publics’ attitude towards the Internet, starting in the mid 1990s, 
which then should be repeated during certain intervals. Ideally, it would include items or 
frames distilled from each paradigm (like "How much do you agree with the statement 
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"information should be free"?), which would allow us to compare the attitudes before and 
after say, 2010, when the cyber-doom discourse was highly relevant or before and after 
Snowden. Such a study does not exist. Therefore, I rely on my own findings and that of 
other studies, which of course use different questions and items and thus are not always 
comparable. These polls provide some very limited evidence on the dominance of cyber-
realism. 
In previous chapters I have shown that during the early 1990s, the general public was 
skeptical towards government attempts towards Internet control. A majority of citizens 
opposed the Clipper initiative (see chap. 4.3.5.1 Policy: The Clipper Chip (1993)) and 
argued that privacy on the Internet is more important than national security (see chap. 
4.3.5.2 Policy: Wiretapping the Internet with CALEA (1994)). Both Democrats and 
Republicans were skeptical of government control of information technologies, indicated 
by the dictator's dilemma that was widely acknowledged by policy-makers and 
independent institutions like the Supreme Court. This changed with the dominance of 
cyber-realism. 
In 2011, the Internet Society conducted its first global Internet survey (Internet 
Society, 2011) asking over 6000 Internet users (from different countries) about their 
opinion on different topics (see appendix Polls on the Dominance of Cyber-Realism). The 
survey is interesting because it includes some utopian items such as privacy, net-neutrality, 
censorship and open access, as well as cyber-realist topics such as the question of Internet 
control and surveillance. Unfortunately, this provides only a snapshot view and allows no 
before/after comparison. The following table summarizes the findings for the US 
Population (N=1001).
Table 7. Internet Society Survey 2011, Source: (Internet Society, 2011)
Agree (including agree 
somewhat) in %
Disagree (including disagree 
somewhat) in %
20. There should be no 
restrictions on accessing lawful 
content via the Internet. 
73 27
21. There should be no 
restrictions on lawful software 
or services on the Internet. 
66 34
23. The ability to share and 
access information privately 
using the Internet is important 
to me. 
94 6
24. The Internet needs to be 
controlled to protect end-users. 64 36
25. The Internet needs to 58 42
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remain as uncontrolled as 
possible to promote innovation. 
Source: 
http://www.internetsociety.org/sur
vey (2011)
The first two items that ask about restricting content on the Internet show the tendency that 
the majority of Internet users in the US still adheres to the "hands-off" norm, specifically 
that there should not be any type of censorship on the net. For them, the Internet is, as the 
original designers intended, about sharing and the free flow of information. The picture is 
not as clear when it comes to the items of whether the Internet should be controlled, which 
leaves open the question: by whom? Users generally favor control of the Internet when it is 
about security and protection. However, the question is quite open (Protection from what? 
Who should protect etc.?). Other items (see appendix Polls on the Dominance of Cyber-
Realism) ask about what the greatest concern facing the Internet is. 30% of users say 
privacy, followed by the security of the infrastructure (26%), spam (21%), government 
control (12%), net-neutrality (5%) and a few minor items. This is not a clear tendency. 
Interestingly, 12% strictly still oppose government control of the Internet, the core cyber-
utopian norm of the early 1990s. This indicates the relative decline of cyber-utopianism. 
On the other hand, privacy is a major concern. Interestingly, a final item asks about "How 
concerned are you that the Government is monitoring your use of the Internet?" and 46% 
are very, 32% somewhat, 17% not very and 5% not concerned. Interestingly, the US 
numbers are higher than the global average (Internet Society, 2011). Unfortunately, this is 
only a snapshot and allows no comparison with the post-Snowden timeframe. 
The dominance of these cyber-realist threat narratives or ideas have been measured 
by other researchers (see appendix Polls on the Dominance of Cyber-Realism). For 
example, Pew research conducts an annual telephone survey, giving Americans a list of 
national security threats, asking them to rate them according to the most severe ones. In the 
2013 poll, fear of cyber-attacks from other countries, for the first time, entered the list of 
major threats. 70% of the survey participants see cyber-attacks as a major concern, second 
place only to international terrorism (75%). Unfortunately, the cyber-attack item does not 
appear before 2013 but it nevertheless shows the increased significance since otherwise the 
item would not be included after all. 
A Gallup poll with a similar methodology asks about critical threats for the US and 
replicates this finding. Cyber-terrorism, i.e. the use of computers to induce fear (73%) 
appears on the top-list of critical threats for the first time in 2016, third after nuclear 
weapons in Iran (75%), and international terrorism (79%). This is noteworthy because in 
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the history of cyber-security, there has not been a single successful act of cyber-terrorism 
causing physical harm. Nevertheless, the threat-frame of cyber-terrorism and digital 9/11 
make this issue to appear more real and more dangerous than it is. This could be a 
consequence of the cyber-doom discourse. Of course, the question of causation cannot be 
answered because there exists no data before 2013. The case can be made that the elite talk 
about the issue and spectacular media coverage increased salience of these issues within 
the general public, which in return facilitates more elite discourse. 
 That the Snowden shock did only temporarily contest cyber-realism can be shown 
with the following Pew Study that found out that directly after the Snowden leaks, a 
majority was indeed critical of Internet surveillance practices, but the pendulum swung 
back after successive terrorist attacks, for example the San Bernardino shooting or because 
of the visible threat of the so-called "Islamic state" in the Middle East (Rainie & Maniam, 
2016). 
The dominance of cyber-realism can also be shown by elite support for its ideas, 
norms and policies. The continuity of programs under Obama and Bush also has shown 
that there is a bipartisan consensus on these issues: cyber-war and surveillance are here to 
stay. Within the US political system, there are only a few, often strongly democratic (Sen. 
Ron Wyden) or strongly libertarian (Sen. Rand Paul) politicians who oppose more 
surveillance capacities. In the 2016 presidential campaign, both Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump supported the extension of the intelligence apparatus in the war against 
terror, including controversial policies such as demanding government-enabled backdoors 
into otherwise secure cryptography (Elmer-Dewitt, 2016). The website ISideWith.com 
condensed the most important positions of the candidates with regard to the Internet and 
compared it to public opinion (ISideWith.com, 2016).173 Regarding surveillance, Donald 
Trump argued that basic data-collection of US citizens is necessary to track terrorists and 
even supported a database for Muslims within the US (racial profiling based on 
surveillance data). Hillary Clinton opposed, and so did the general public (only 31% agree, 
69% opposed). When asked whether the US should monitor allied heads of states via NSA 
surveillance (that was stopped by President Obama after the monitoring of Angela 
Merkel’s cellphone was discovered), Donald Trump argued in favor, while Clinton 
opposed. Regarding this item, the general public was also in favor (52% yes, 48% no). 
Both candidates supported the Patriot Act and both argued that Edward Snowden should 
173 ISideWith.com is a useful resource to track the original statements of the candidates regarding the 
question items. However, the public opinion is measured via an online poll with approx. 3-4 million votes per 
item. However, since users have to participate voluntarily, it might not be the most representative survey 
(ISideWith.com, 2016).
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not be granted immunity from prosecution under the Espionage Act. The underdog 
candidates Jill Stein (Green) and Gary Johnson mostly argued against these practices but 
only received a small fraction of the votes in the 2016 election (ISideWith.com, 2016). 
President Trump’s picks for key positions such as FBI- or CIA-director or Attorney 
General included only strong cyber-realists who in the past opposed restraints put on NSA. 
General attorney Jeff Sessions for example is a strong advocate of Internet surveillance 
without the need for warrants (Strohm, 2016). Thus, it is very likely that both Internet 
surveillance and offensive computer network attacks will likely grow under a President 
Trump and a Republican controlled Congress. 
One effect of the Snowden leaks was an increase in encrypted Internet traffic that 
could not be read by the NSA spying infrastructure and thus NSA and the FBI began 
lobbying efforts to gain "exceptional access" to wiretap secure, encrypted communication. 
When asked about this, Donald Trump supported this. Thus, a new war on cryptography, 
like Clipper in 1993 is likely going to happen within the next few years. In Europe, a 
similar initiative is pushed by France and Germany and most states have started to build 
technical capacities for CNO, breaking into encrypted messenger systems such as 
WhatsApp or Telegram (Schulze, 2016b).
The irony of the Snowden leaks is that they made the world aware of these practices. 
The leaked tools created a demand-pull where intelligence agencies worldwide began to 
lobby their governments for similar capacities. Especially foreign intelligence agencies like 
Russian and Chinese agencies closely monitored the leaks and soon began to draft wish-
lists. Since Snowden, most Western democratic and authoritarian regimes adopted very 
similar legislation and gave their intelligence agencies similar surveillance and cyber-war 
capacities. In the wake of the Paris attacks, France gave its services broad Internet 
surveillance powers (Pick, 2015). The United Kingdom initiated its "Investigatory Powers 
Bill", characterized by critics as the most extreme surveillance law in any democratic state 
(MacAskill, 2016). The German government initiated the process of legalizing many 
Internet control practices of its BND (Mützel, 2016). Since early 2017, the German 
domestic intelligence agencies demand similar competencies as their NSA counterparts, 
for example the capacity for "active defense" or hacking back (DPA, 2017). A recent, quite 
alarmist report from Amnesty International found similar initiatives in Austria, Belgium, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland, (Amnesty International, 2016). Thus, the case can 
be made that the example of NSA’s internet surveillance and cyber-war artifacts, leaked by 
Edward Snowden, accelerated the diffusion of Internet control as a global norm, even 
among democracies.
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4.5.8 Critical Analysis
Cyber-realism itself has some blind spots that deserve a critical discussion. Within the 
cyber-realist paradigm, espionage is presented to be normal or appropriate behavior: 
"competitive espionage are [is] the expected manner of conducting business" (Schwartau, 
1997, p. 50). Controlling cyberspace and information therein is framed as a necessary 
practice, although modifying information stored on another nation's servers breaches the 
Westphalian sovereignty rights of other nations (the principle of non-intervention). CNA 
and CNE violate this principle, if their targets are located in another state (Betz & Stevens, 
2012, p. 61). If CNO are indeed to be classified as weapons, then the attack on another 
country's digital infrastructure might be equitable with an act of war. Cyber-realists seldom 
explain why exploiting other nation’s information networks is a legitimate or rightful 
thing, it is just demanded that this must be a capability. Another issue is the constant nature 
of the doctrine that does not differentiate clearly between war and peace. During an armed 
conflict, a CNA against military or civilian networks might be lawful according to the laws 
of armed conflict, but in peace time it is not.174 This is particularly important because the 
primary target of IO are critical infrastructures which are mostly civilian in nature (like 
banking, electricity, transport). This might violate the principle of necessity in armed 
conflict.
Second, the cyber-war crippling strike narrative is probably overblown. There are 
lots of hypotheticals, which remain untested. The worst-case scenario of shutting down an 
entire nation by a cyber-attack simply did not happen (yet). Until today, no-one has died 
because of a cyber-attack. Even in spectacular cases like Stuxnet, the effect was rather 
limited. Advocates argue: "but it could happen!". Indeed, but even if adversaries have the 
possibility, it does not follow that an attack is probable. There needs to be further incentive 
and most likely physical force to maintain the often short term effects of cyber-attacks. 
More so, even if something happens, catastrophe does not logically follow. There is no 
determination between successful CNA, a societal blackout and mass casualties, as Lewis 
(Lewis, 2002) and Lawson (Lawson, 2011) show in their studies. A Hurricane or Tornado 
can be more devastating than a cyber-attack, but panic rarely occurs. Rid (Rid, 2012) 
argues that because of tech-determinism, cyber-war advocates overestimate the 
174 An Assessment of the legal status of information operations by the DoD reaches the same conclusion 
(Department of Defense, 1999, p. 8).
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decisiveness of strategic cyber-war175 against critical infrastructure much in the same way 
as theorists of air power overestimated the decisiveness of air power.176 RMA is driven by 
the idea to end wars quickly, from far away, if possible without own casualties. The belief 
is that a critical precisions strike on the enemy leadership could end war is theoretically 
true, but practically problematic. Even if attacks shut down critical infrastructure of an 
information economy, the decisiveness of this attack might be limited.177
Third, these fallacies might have security implications that are overlooked by cyber-
realism. Cyber-realism is based on a technological bias: the idea that technology can 
mediate human imperfection in data-processing. But computers are human-made machines 
that do not have full artificial intelligence and are not perfect. They, too, make errors and 
crash. Additionally, one of the reasons why it took so long to kill Bin Laden was that he 
avoided using digital technologies. His communications system relied on carriers of trust 
that could not be intercepted. Terrorists of the future most likely will write physical letters 
or use oral telegrams, because digital surveillance does not work here. We already see the 
increased use of steganography, hiding messages in images and paintings. The 
technological response to terrorism prevents effective social mechanisms like community 
policing, deradicalization programs, integration and education policies that aim to tackle 
the root causes of terrorism: personal grievances, hopelessness, personal isolation, 
ideology and arms training, often perfectly combined in civil wars in failed states.
Another problem that is ignored by cyber-realism is data storage and data security. 
Recent history is full of data-breaches where criminals stole private and public data. The 
data breach of the US Office of Personnel Management in 2014, where security clearances 
and private information of government employees were stolen by a foreign power serve as 
a warning example (Office of Personnel Management, 2015). The more intelligence data is 
stored and shared between multiple parties, the more susceptible it becomes for 
exploitation and manipulation (i.e. cyber-war) by external third parties. The trend to 
privatization of surveillance and outsourcing of intelligence to private companies produces 
a whole set of difficult issues that cannot be addressed here. It is important to remember 
that the IW doctrine assumed that intelligence data stored in databases can be used to 
175 Observe that this is not an argument against the overall utility of cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks might be 
used effectively in war, but in concert with other weapons ("joint operations"). The argument is against the 
assumed "independent war-winning effects" attributed to strategic cyberwar.
176 Lindsay compared the discourses on "air power of the 1930s" with the cyber-war discourse and finds that 
these operate with very similar frames and assumptions (death of distance because of speedy airplanes, no 
pre-warning mechanism, advantage of the offense, crippling blow thesis). He also presents evidence that the 
crippling blow thesis might be overstate because even during the heavy-allied bombardment during 1943, 
Germany was able to increase economic output by placing factories under-ground (Lindsay, 2013).
177 This can be proven by looking at events where infrastructures fail, for example during hurricane Katrina, 
or in almost every American Winter when the power-outages cut off cities, sometimes for days (Rid, 2012).
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influence decision-making and can be altered without the owner knowing. The 
manipulation of the ever-increasing list of data-bases by foreign hackers can produce a 
whole new dimension of intelligence failures, for example when innocent dissidents are 
placed on kill-lists or terrorist suspects are removed from no-fly lists by third party 
hackers. 
The more general problem is that the international advancement of cyber-war and the 
development of CNE/CNA skills (a cyber-arms race so to speak) increases the risk of 
intrusion and escalation and reduces the overall security of the internetworked 
infrastructure. With more states hoarding zero-day exploits and writing malware to 
penetrate target systems, the overall global cyber-security is reduced because most states 
rely on similar technologies (i.e. Windows computers). This classical security-dilemma or 
rather prisoner’s dilemma, conceived by realist scholars, is actually produced by cyber-
realists, resembling a self-fulfilling prophecy.
4.4.9 Summary
With the Obama administration, cyber-realism became the dominant paradigm, after some 
initial hegemonic struggle between the utopian ideas, particularly put forward during the 
election campaign and more realist ideas becoming more salient during the actual 
presidency. This chapter outlines the causal mechanism for this process.
It can be argued that Obama started as a cyber-utopian. His election campaign 
framed the Internet and Obama’s policy in terms of utopian ideas and norms, such as the 
freedom of information, net-neutrality, an anti-censorship attitude and a general positive 
perception of the Internet for the democratic process and the economy (part 1). He was 
also very critical of the extensive cyber-realist agenda of the Bush administration. 
However, Obama was not a wholehearted libertarian and blind follower of utopianism, so 
that his campaign incorporated more critical undertones as well. This has to do with 
timing. Obama witnessed the disenchantment of utopianism and thus represented a more 
educated or rational version of it, not blindly believing in all the rosy predictions. This can 
be seen as a learning effect of cyber-utopianism adjusting to new realities, of which the 
war on terror is one. Obama was aware of potential malign uses of the Internet for cyber-
crime, hacking and terrorist activity. However, the positive undertones still dominated the 
campaign and thus a reintroduction of cyber-utopian ideas into politics was a possibility. 
This changed when he entered office. Here, Obama mostly followed the path 
developed by the Bush administration, making some minor adjustments in terms of 
transparency. In theoretical terms, this represents incremental paradigm change in terms of 
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instrument settings and the formulation of some new cyber-realist goals, such as "active 
defense" and the "concept of equivalence" (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). How can 
we explain this? One argument is the staying power of the status quo and already 
institutionalized operating procedures in terms of IW. As was shown before, over the 
course of time, the cyber-realist paradigm had become institutionalized in terms of national 
strategy and military institutions, which recruited and educated new generations of realists, 
positioning those throughout leadership positions. This pre-structured the relatively new 
policy field of (governmental) cyber-security with cyber-realism being the dominant voice 
and realist institutions as the perceived appropriate actors.
Another explanation is the structural constraint Obama witnessed after the financial 
crisis as well as the gridlock in Congress. Additionally, the GWOT was still the dominant 
narrative of the time so that many of the ideas, norms and policies that were adopted as a 
response to this problem remained still valid or useful. There was not much room for 
completely new accents in policy compared to, for example, the Clinton/Gore 
administration. To utilize already available tools such as the global NSA SIGINT 
collection may also have been pragmatism that is required of the presidency. The 
perceived utility of these technical artifacts seemed greater than constitutional or ethical 
concerns. Thus, the general explanation for Obama’s cyber-security policy is path-
dependency and the staying power of the status quo (part 2). This can for example be 
shown with path-trajectories that were initiated under Bush, such as the creation of US 
CYBERCOM or Operation Olympic Games that were completed when Obama entered 
office. It was simply unfeasible to ignore these developments or alter them. 
Although Obama was technologically literate, the IT-agenda was not his most 
pressing concern (in contrast to Gore). He rather chose to focus on domestic issues such as 
health care. Within the cyber-security policy field, he chose to focus on quality instead of 
quantity, which led to a further professionalization and specialization of the cyber-security 
policy field. Cyber-security and Internet politics became a more pressing issue around the 
year 2010/11 with notable events such as the Stuxnet revelation, the Wikileaks affair, the 
Arab Spring and the Sony Hack, all cases in which the Internet played a huge role 
(context). The number and quality of cyber-security incidents continued to rise as well, 
making this issue highly salient, even among the public (see Table 9. List of Internet 
Milestones and Security Incidents). 
This can be shown with regard to the public discourse, where cyber-realists, most 
notably intelligence officials, used threat frames to convince the public that immediate 
presidential action is necessary to solve this issue. They pushed for policy changes and the 
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formulation of a coherent strategy. The cyber-doom discourse happened out in the open 
and not in secret circles as in the 1990s. Movies, newspapers and documentaries picked up 
the issue and the narrative of the crippling-blow taking out the US economy became 
prevalent in the public (part 3). The cyber-doom discourse had characteristics of 
hegemonic and naturalizing speech acts that presents the possibility of devastating cyber-
attacks as some kind of natural force, the question being not if but when they will happen. 
This security framing shows some of the features of the early cyber-utopian discourse 
arguing that the digital revolution is an irresistible force leading to a determined future. 
The narrative had a high fidelity and is highly commensurable because of the steady news 
of hacking events (like the Sony Hacks or the hack of the Office of Personnel Management 
in 2014) representing what the cyber-realists are warning about. Furthermore, these cyber-
realist advocates are seen as experts on the issue, while secrecy prevents critical evaluation 
of their claims. The structural composition of the cyber-security discourse increases the 
authority of cyber-realist advocates (Nissenbaum, 2005).
The outcome was a new national cyber-security strategy that gave cyber-realists new 
competences (like hoarding zero-day vulnerabilities and sophisticated new malware 
technologies) and allowed them to realize some of their strategic goals (to gather 
"actionable intelligence about global networks and systems, adversary capabilities, and 
malware brokers and markets" (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 16)). It also included 
offensive-driven concepts such as equating digital and physical force and the euphemism 
of active defense for preemptive cyber-attacks. More so, military actors and the 
intelligence community officially became the primary institutions defending and 
safeguarding cyberspace. Civil actors or private cyber-security firms were thus 
marginalized in this process.
While the cyber-doom discourse happened out in the open, the Stuxnet revelation 
was more of an expert issue (part 4). It can also be argued that the Stuxnet revelation 
triggered a global norm-diffusion process where more and more states began to formulate 
cyber-security policies and strategies (Shafqat & Masood, 2016) and began to mimic 
concepts and ideas developed in the US. In 2013, DNI Clapper argued that cyber-security 
replaced terrorism as the most-pressing national security issue (Boyd, 2016). This 
securitization was successful and thus, the cyber-security budget grew. The increased 
salience of the topic also increased the standing of those agencies in charge of this issue 
because they were able to use this window of opportunity to their advantage. All these 
interrelated processes (equifinality), the new cyber-doctrine, Stuxnet and hacking events 
and this new institutional framework further materialized the norm of control within the 
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institutions of the intelligence community and the executive in general, making them in 
fact hegemonic. 
A crucial test for the hegemony of cyber-realism were the Snowden leaks that 
presented a critical juncture or shock, where the dominance of cyber-realism and its 
policies, legitimized with the war on terror, came under public scrutiny (part 5). Former 
cyber-utopians such as Al Gore heavily criticized government overreach and the full-take 
principle collecting the whole haystack. Gore called it "outrageous", "completely 
unacceptable" and "crimes against the Constitution" (Gabbatt, 2013). President Obama, 
campaigning with claims to cut-back the mass surveillance apparatus of the Bush-
administration, came under fire domestically and internationally and was forced to set up a 
critical review panel. The panel did a balanced job and argued for a more qualitative 
approach: SIGINT and targeted surveillance to fight terrorism were seen as legitimate 
tools, but the full-take principle, the lack of suspicion, the evasion of checks and balances 
through secrecy and the dominance of military and intelligence-actors in this whole 
surveillance-cyber-security nexus were criticized. They argued for a more civil approach, 
contesting the ongoing militarization of cyberspace. Although Obama adopted some 
smaller changes and acknowledged the potential dangers of a militarized cyberspace, the 
dominance of cyber-realism remained unbroken. 
Table 8. Causal Mechanism of the Hybrid Presidency
Context Economic recession & mobile Internet revolution 
with high Internet penetration in the US and 
worldwide.
Part 1 Obama supported cyber-utopian and criticized 
extreme cyber-realists ideas in the election 
campaign.
Part 2 In office, structural constraints and pragmatism of 
the presidency lead to a continuation/path-
dependency of most cyber-realist policies. 
Institutionalization of offensive cyber-war 
capabilities leads to a professionalization of 
personnel and attack capabilities (Stuxnet).
Context Increase of noteworthy hacking and computer 
security incidents during the Obama administration 
around 2010/11.
Part 3 Cyber-realists engage in discursive framing 
(cyberdoom) to increase the salience of cyber-
security and cyber-war in public discourse. Cyber-
security becomes top-priority. Extension of 
offensive cyber-war capabilities and influences the 
creation of a new cyber-security strategy. Cyber-
security becomes a mature policy subsystem.
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Part 4 Stuxnet and the diffusion of technical artifacts such 
as Xkeyscore accelerate a global norm-diffusion of 
cyber-realism, picked up by local norm-
entrepreneurs in other states.
Part 5 Snowden leaks question the legitimacy of offensive 
cyber-realism, but path-dependency prevents bigger 
changes.
Outcome Stabilization of Internet control practices and 
dominance of norm of Internet control inside the 
US but also more and more globally.
 401
5. Conclusion
"We’re losing a lot of people because of the Internet […]. We have to go see Bill Gates 
and a lot of different people that really understand what’s happening. We have to talk to 
them about, maybe in certain areas, closing that Internet up in some way. Somebody will 
say, 'Oh freedom of speech, freedom of speech.' These are foolish people. We have a lot of 
foolish people." 
President Donald J. Trump (2016)
Let me now answer the research question by shortly summarizing the process that led to 
the establishment of the norm of Internet control. This chapter summarizes the empirical 
findings while the next chapter focuses on theoretical explanations for the norm of Internet 
control.
The following graphic presents the timeline of crucial events this thesis discussed. It 
shows the development paths of each paradigm and the relative dominance of each, 
indicated by the thickness of the arrows.
Figure 30. Dominant Paradigms shaping the Internet technology & critical junctures 
of hegemonic change
The graphic combines key technological milestones of the Internet with important 
junctures of each paradigm. It shows the early dominance of the engineering perspective 
(orange) towards the Internet, which of course was only valid with the early developer and 
ARPA community until it became gradually replaced by a more utopian perspective. Of 
course, utopians even existed among the ARPA developers like J.C.R. Licklider. The 
junctures on this arrow indicate the different development steps of the ARPANET/Internet. 
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Utopianism (green) became the dominant perspective among early Internet users in 
the 1980s, while politics at the same time began to recognize computer security incidents. 
During the 1990s, the three paradigms existed in parallel. Utopianism got politicized by the 
Clinton/Gore administration while the information war doctrine (red) began to form within 
military and intelligence circles. During the mid 1990s, utopianism created a spin-off, a 
more liberal version described as the Californian ideology that is still present today in Big 
Data and Web 2.0 business models. However, this thesis could not analyze this vast field. 
9/11 was the critical juncture that led to the creation of a cyber-realist paradigm out of the 
IW doctrine, combined with counter-terrorist policies. This led to a decline of utopianism.
Of course, a timeline is just descriptive and not analytical. The sum of the individual 
causal mechanisms presented for the individual chapters combined looks like the following 
graphic that is based on the theoretical model presented thus far. 
Figure 31. Cyber-Realism becoming dominant meaning for Internet (own diagram)
The Internet during the early 1990s was predominantly understood in liberal utopian terms 
(green/blue on the left) as it diffused globally. The thesis has shown that the "hands-off 
norm" diffused together with the Internet and was actively promoted by policy-
entrepreneurs. One effect of this norm was the privatization of the Internet infrastructure 
and the strong anti-censorship consensus that was reinforced by the Supreme Court. The 
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Internet was thus understood as a global commons and as a facilitator of global democracy. 
For many it represented a cyber-utopia.
The diffusion of the Internet had a particular effect on impact constituencies 
concerned with national security (red, middle). For them, the promised anonymity of the 
Internet and the attribution problem introduced by TCP/IP was a major problem. In 
theoretical terms, these early cyber-realists engaged in deviant usage modalities, utilizing 
the Internet for the conduct of war, a usage neither intended by the original designers nor 
by utopians. Repurposing the Internet first for Information, later for cyber-war resulted in 
new problem-solving practices and ideas which formed a coherent paradigm with its focus 
on controlling or exerting control over this new technology that was perceived as chaotic 
and fundamentally insecure. This assessment was not necessarily wrong, since the Internet 
was not designed to be secure or to guarantee authenticity of data.
During the course of the 1990s, cyber-realism became institutionalized in the 
military and intelligence bureaucracy of the US, which is a primary reason for why it could 
become dominant. Over time, it gained institutional support of the biggest political 
bureaucracy in the world. Cyber-realist advocates also began to lobby for policies like the 
Clipper chip or CALEA, but could not break the dominance of cyber-utopianism during 
the 1990s. Only with the cumulative disenchantment of cyber-utopianism with the Y2K-
panic, the dot-com crash and the war on terror, could realism replace utopianism. This 
paradigm change is very much in line with the theory: the old paradigm witnessed an 
anomaly it could not explain (the dot-com crash dismantled the rosy future predictions and 
Y2K showed that technology is not just positive) while at the same time an alternative 
paradigm was ready that could explain these events better. The Y2K event and 9/11 fit 
nicely to the expectations of realism and the paradigm advocates were highly capable of 
framing these events in their terms ("cyber-safehavens" for terrorists for example). Cyber-
realists became the new dominant meaning managers explaining the Internet with the 
GWOT-framework. However, we also saw change on lower orders of magnitude, for 
example when new administrations entered office or when new policy goals were 
formulated (several security directives, Clipper, CALEA, Information Superhighway, 
Patriot Act, IRPTA). Thus, paradigm change is not just a sudden change from one 
paradigm to another in a short amount of time, but also unfolds slowly.
But there is another factor that is crucial: cyber-realism got politicized (red arrow to 
the top) because it was supported by key political advocates within in the Bush 
administration. This confirms the insight of the advocacy coalition framework that access 
to power is crucial. The role of the Vice President as a norm-entrepreneur is also an 
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interesting finding of this thesis. Cheney argued that in times of constant war it is 
appropriate to mass monitor the Internet.
The context of the war on terror is a crucial explanation for the dominance of cyber-
realism because it created a new enemy that was both a domestic and a global, networked 
threat. The focus on terror prevention by accumulating more data was highly compatible 
with the idea of information superiority or dominance that was developed by military 
actors during the 1990s. Thus, we saw the merger of two idea sets into one paradigm. 
More so, the post 9/11 and realism-inspired national security reforms upgraded the 
standing of intelligence agencies and the military became the primary means of combatting 
terrorism, which at the same time gave rise to the idea that the military should be the 
dominant actor in digital battle-spaces as well. This made these actors more important, 
giving them more resources and thus political influence, which in turn they used for 
increased advocacy. New policies like the Patriot Act were adopted, which gave NSA and 
others new surveillance and cyber-attack capabilities. In other words, the norms of cyber-
realism became embedded in Internet surveillance artifacts such as Stellarwind. 
Surveillance and cyber-war technologies were designed as counter-artifacts, trying to 
reconstitute the original Internet (red arrow to the right) by trying to disable anonymity 
online and reintroducing intelligence and control in a network that was designed to have 
none. 
These artifacts and policies were maintained by Obama, although a different pathway 
could have been chosen. Instead, Obama increased the sophistication of cyber-attacks 
(Stuxnet), accelerated the professionalization (USCYBERCOM) and developed new 
doctrines. Artifacts like Stuxnet and Duqu also showed that surveillance and cyber-war are 
logically connected, forming a nexus. We saw that cyber-doom discourses under President 
Obama framed the Internet in predominantly negative terms, thus altering the meaning and 
perception of this technology for a wider audience. This public and political advocacy of 
cyber-realist actors is one key explanation for why President Obama chose to maintain the 
Internet-surveillance infrastructure he opposed during the election. But there are of course 
others. First, cyber-security incidents became highly salient under Obama, both in quality 
and quantity, which gave cyber-realist arguments greater urgency and credibility. Second, 
because of the technical complexity and the secrecy of computer network operations and 
mass surveillance, it is hard to assess the overall costs and benefits of such systems. 
Advocates of course claim that these tools are appropriate and effective. At the same time, 
independent oversight and evaluation is lacking. This structural composition of the policy-
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field puts cyber-realist arguments in a stronger position, thus increasing the staying power 
of the status quo, as theory predicted.
There is another factor that only becomes visible over time. Internet surveillance 
technology and cyber-war capabilities become normalized and institutionalized over time 
(USCYBERCOM), which further increased their staying power. In contrast, cyber-
utopianism never was fully institutionalized and thus more fragile. Cyber-realism on the 
other hand became deeply embedded within the national security structure of the US and 
thus is likely to stay. Another reason why the cyber-realist agenda is likely going to stay 
are external adversaries like Russia and China. 
However, there is a particular irony here. Cyber-realism created a self-fulfilling 
prophecy or a classical security dilemma: based on the fear that other states might disrupt 
the high-tech US Information society over the Internet, the US rushed into the 
development of offensive computer network attack capabilities, which in turn inspired 
other countries to develop the same capabilities, which ultimately produced the very 
insecurity one was afraid of in the first place. Thus, the more states engage in disruptive or 
destructive Internet control activities, the less secure the global Internet infrastructure gets. 
This is where IR constructivism and realism meet. The diffusion of the Internet control 
norm together with Internet surveillance artifacts that enable this norm led other states to 
emulate such practices. The more states repeat this behavior, the more the norm of Internet 
control gets normalized, and the more insecure the global digital infrastructure gets. This 
creates a cyber-security dilemma. It can be argued that the norm of Internet control 
currently diffuses globally, with many countries adopting cyber-realist ideas and norms in 
their national security strategies. It is unclear however, if a tipping point of some sort is 
reached. To determine this would be the job of future research. The next chapter will 
summarize the findings that are relevant for the theories.
5.1 Theoretical Findings
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize and hypothesize the theoretical findings that 
might be useful for further studies and to show how this thesis contributes to the research 
landscape. I indicate the hypotheses that might be useful for further investigation in italics. 
I will shortly summarize my initial critique and ambitions of this thesis and then introduce 
the gathered insights.
The thesis contributes to research because it provides one of the first longitudinal 
studies of the militarization of cyberspace thesis, outlined in the beginning (see chap. 1.2 
Literature Review). It does so by focusing not only on one history, for example of the 
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technical development of the Internet, but adopts multiple perspectives, from designers, 
users, policy-makers and military and intelligence actors. It shows how their perspectives 
partly overlap, but more so how these actors perceive the same technology in vastly 
different ways. More so, this thesis shows that each of these perspective have concrete 
discursive effects, such as the change of meaning of the Internet, the inspiration of new 
policy, but also material impacts on technology. I showed how paradigm ideas influenced 
both the design and technical reconstitution of key artifacts such as the Internet or counter-
artifacts, such as surveillance technology. Thus, this thesis expands on discursive or 
narrative approaches in studying the securitization of the Internet. It offers an alternative 
framework to study technology from the perspective of norm research. Let me now 
summarize the key findings that might be relevant for future norm-research studies. There 
is no particular order to these findings.
First, the thesis has shown that it makes sense to expand the view on norm-networks, 
including supportive ideas, goals and problem definitions. The paradigmatic perspective 
was useful for explaining the early emergence of norms within paradigms. I showed that 
norms developed out of problem-solving activities of key actors that, over time, became 
normalized. These processes take decades until initial ideas form coherent paradigms and 
norms. Utopian norms had their origins in the centralized practice of using computers, 
which led to the normative demand that technology or information should be free and 
unregulated. Realist norms had their origin in solving the problem of perceived computer 
insecurity and SIGINT, which then became expanded with political goals such as 
information superiority and the politics of terrorist prevention. These accelerated the norm-
diffusion and gave Internet control norms a new direction. Had I conceptualized norms as 
static things with an essential content, I might have overlooked this gradual shift (see chap. 
2.1.3 Critique of Diffusion Models).
Second, the interplay of utopianism and realism also shows that it is useful to 
perceive norms in plural. The rise and diffusion of norms often coincides with the decline 
of others and this becomes only apparent if one broadens the scope. The following graphic 
depicts the norm change with key events described in this thesis. Observe that there is no 
concrete measurement of salience, but that this represents a heuristic based on the 
empirical insights. I argue that norms first require salience within an advocacy group 
(counter-culture, hackers or military actors) and if they get politicized, they gain salience 
among policymakers as well. It must be stated that the order of causation is not entirely 
clear, because politicians often react to public demands and so it could be argued that 
public salience comes before political salience. This was certainly the case with cyber-
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utopianism, but cyber-realism showed that it first was dominant among national security 
actors within the political administration. In both instances, the politicization of paradigms 
and norms is key.
Figure 32. Empirical findings for Norm Diffusion (own diagram) 
I have added the percentage of worldwide Internet users (grey) to show an interesting 
effect: Cyber-utopianism was dominant during the 1990s, but mostly among early adopters 
which, technically, were a minority. However, since these early adopters acted as 
explainers and sense-makers for the rest of the population, their normative impact was 
higher. Thus, we can hypothesize that early-mover advantages seem to matter with the 
diffusion of norms. Claiming the early meaning-space and establishing the first narrative is 
also one of the key arguments of narrative research. Cyber-realism on the other hand 
became dominant at a time when more Internet users were exposed to its ideas, which 
means that it reached potentially more people. What is true in both cases is that norms and 
paradigms must be compatible to other ideas of a time-period (which I sometimes called 
the "zeitgeist"). Utopianism resonated well with the end of the Cold War while cyber-
realism resonated well with the war on terror narrative. If there is an overlap between a 
paradigm’s idea, or semantic network and the dominant ideas in society, this potentially 
increases the follower base of a paradigm. Thus, the more norms resonate with idea sets or 
discursive formations of a time, the higher the chances for diffusion. A fruitful question for 
future research would be how resonance can be theorized and how it works. What can be 
hypothesized is that commensurability and narrative fidelity is important, which is in line 
with framing theory. Both cyber-utopianism and realism invented interesting narrative 
devices and concepts such as "cyberspace", "electronic frontier", "cyber-9/11", "cyber-
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war" or metaphors such as the "death of distance" or "the Information Superhighway". This 
includes expectations of the future or prognostic frames, one utopian and one dystopian. 
Cyber-realism also engaged in frame-bridging, connecting its ideas with utopian concepts. 
The idea of a cyber-space as a realm is one of those bridges. The lack of control, that was 
seen as positive by utopians was reframed by cyber-realists as uncontrollable chaos or 
anarchy, which gives it a more negative connotation. This means that paradigms can lose 
control over their frames if they reach a wider audience.
The previous graphic also shows something else, which I have barely touched upon. 
Paradigms do not vanish after they lose their dominance. They still are part of the political 
idea space or primeval policy soup (see chap. 2.2.4 Explaining Change). Cyber-utopian 
ideas (green) did not die out after 9/11. In contrast, a sense-making period kicked in and 
most utopian advocates turned to privacy issues.178 Utopian ideas began to resurface during 
the Obama administration and the Snowden leaks but could not gain dominance again. On 
the other hand, the whole idea-norm-network of the Information Superhighway (blue) lost 
most of its salience. The metaphor still exists, but it is not as widespread anymore. The 
same is true for the original engineering perspective (orange). This is evidence for theories 
of norm-regression which argue that norms can die out and that norm-diffusion is no 
deterministic or teleological process. Drawing on the paradigm perspective, the thesis 
offers a useful mechanism that can explain the regression of norms: if an anomaly 
produces an unexplainable crisis for a paradigm that negates its predictions and 
expectations, while at the same time a viable alternative exists, then norm and paradigm 
change is likely. This is a variation of Legro’s argument (Legro, 2000). It could also serve 
as a scope condition necessary for paradigm change.
Third, the interplay of multiple norms is interesting if we add the notion of dark 
norms that contest traditional liberal-democratic norms. Cyber-realism promotes several 
dark norms, like suspicion-less mass surveillance of Internet data or the intrusion into other 
nation’s networks regardless of their sovereignty rights. This implies that the contestation 
of liberal norms is successful and that this could be part of the explanation why cyber-
realist norms became dominant. Especially realist advocates are evidence for the argument 
that norm-diffusion is not about morality and deontological norms (the analysis did not 
uncover any morality argument legitimizing the norm of Internet control), but might be 
driven by power interests of particular groups. This was confirmed by some sources who 
called Internet-surveillance and cyber-capabilities as a "power-grab" or described it as a 
"means of power". This affirms the notion that dark norms include a power-component. 
178 What happened to utopianism in the mid 2000s would be an interesting future-research project.
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Power includes the marginalization of alternatives. In my case, the dominance of cyber-
realism positions military and intelligence actors as the dominant instrument of states in 
dealing with the Internet, while marginalizing civil- or non-military approaches to cyber-
security. Cyber-utopians argued for a decentralized governance structure of the Internet 
which became marginalized or overwritten by the realist state-centric approach. The power 
dimension is also visible with the information in-balance in the cyber-security field, 
produced by classification and the clandestine nature of cyber-operations that prevents 
external oversight and evaluation. Even intelligence actors such as Michael Hayden argue 
that the secrecy partly goes too far and even obstructs efficient cyber-security (Hayden, 
2016b, p. chap. 8). This knowledge gap, or a dominated discourse as philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas would call it, is problematic. There is a huge knowledge-divide because of 
classification. Observers and parliamentary control have a structural disadvantage here 
because the advocates of cyber-realism maintain the relevant knowledge to critically 
evaluate their demands. Whether post 9/11 Internet surveillance indeed is effective, or 
even meets the goal of preventing terrorism, was never evaluated. Whereas efficiency and 
rationality criteria are guiding almost all policy subfields, they are absent in national 
security issues. There is no evaluation of whether the trillion dollar programs are indeed 
effective which implies that the GWOT and Internet control are taken for granted. 
However, I could only touch upon this issue and future research should untangle this 
power dynamic. 
Fourth, the paradigm perspective was useful for studying norm emergence and 
politicization on the domestic level. I have shown that a huge variety of actors advocate 
norms, from military or national security actors such as the director of NSA or National 
Intelligence, Vice Presidents such as Cheney or Gore and even Internet users. We should 
not underestimate the norm-advocacy of intelligence actors worldwide. A hypothesis could 
be that the similar interest formation of intelligence actors explains the dominance of 
cyber-realism in both democratic and authoritarian states. However, I could not 
systematically test this because I focused on the US alone. This would be interesting to test 
in future research.
I could confirm the assumption that the closer a norm-advocate is to the political 
power structure, the higher the chances for diffusion among political circles are. This was 
the case with Gore and Cheney. The advocacy coalition perspective also confirmed another 
insight from norm-research, namely that institutionalization matters. If a paradigm and its 
norm get embedded in powerful institutions such as the military or intelligence agencies, 
its staying power increases, especially if these actors become upgraded and more 
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important over time. Cyber-utopianism lacked this institutionalization, which guaranteed 
the socialization and education of new paradigm followers and advocates. The paradigm 
perspective showed how important education, textbooks and paradigm socialization were. 
Cyber-realist military career tracks and textbooks exemplify this.
This also creates persistency of arguments and ideas, which is another explanation 
why cyber-realism could become dominant. One peculiar element of cyber-realism is the 
persistency and continuity of certain ideas and frames. Winn Schwartau’s frame of the 
"digital Pearl Harbor" was first uttered in 1991 and still appears in current discourses, 
although no such event ever happened (Schwartau, 1997). Initiatives like Clipper, CALEA, 
the Patriot Act and FISAAA show similar elements: they all aimed at giving the IC more 
capabilities while downscaling legal restrictions. This might have to do with the structural 
composition of the national security policy field: the same actors rotate to different 
functions (former NSA heads become DNI, or heads of CIA/FBI), which allows them to 
present the same arguments over a longer period of time. The history of cyber-war and 
surveillance is a history of a few reappearing names (Alexander, Cheney, Hayden, 
McConnell). Additionally, from an IC perspective, their proposed policies are stable: less 
oversight, more competencies, more information gathering, less encryption. This makes it 
somewhat possible to predict future policies demands from these actors. In contrast, 
policymakers change every four or eight years, but they often are dependent on insights 
from the IC, which reduces their ability to critically evaluate their demands. Technical 
complexity and IT-literacy further complicate this matter. We see that technologically 
educated politicians show higher interest in IT-matters and thus are theoretically better 
suited for critical evaluation. Thus, the advocacy for ideas stays stable whereas the targets 
of this advocacy change with each election. Thus, continuity and consistency of advocacy 
increases changes for dominance. Cyber-utopianism lacked both continuity and consistent 
advocacy.
Another related insight from policy-research is that the structure of the policy-field 
matters. Cyber-utopians could advocate their norms because the 1990s technology policy-
field was large enough to make regulation necessary, while at the same time it was not pre-
structured. Cyber-realism became dominant within the national security field which is 
highly secretive and closed to outsiders. Closed or mature policy-systems imply that norm 
change is harder because outside voices are less heard. That utopianism played no role in 
the Bush administration might have to do with the fact that there were no utopian 
advocates present within this administration. Instead, there might have been cyber-realist 
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group-think (Badie, 2010). The psychological dynamics within paradigms would be also 
interesting for future research.
The fifth insight is that institutionalization does not just mean institutions and 
organizations, but also technology. Norm and technology diffusion are clearly intertwined 
processes. The combination of social construction of technology and norm-research is 
useful. The two theoretical camps are compatible and offer complementary explanations. 
Most notable are the aforementioned early-mover advantage in framing a technology and 
path-dependency of technology. The technology perspective also removes the strong actor-
centrism of original norm-research. Neither cyber-utopianism nor realism would exist 
without the Internet. At the same time, these paradigms shape our perception of the 
technology (because of their framing) and also influence our usage modalities. The norm 
of control developed out of a particular perspective on the Internet which was also shaped 
by the technical modalities of the Internet, namely the security blind spots. The causation 
goes in both ways: paradigms influence usage of a technology while the technical 
affordances influence usage and thus the formation of paradigms. The analysis has shown 
that both realism and utopianism competed with each other regarding the technical 
affordance of decentralization or the end-to-end principle. This design choice had a 
different impact for both paradigms. What kind of impact it has depends on the distinct 
usage modalities. Utopians saw the end-to-end principle as positive because it supported 
their goal of flat hierarchies. Realists saw it as problematic because it complicated 
SIGINT. 
Thus, how actors use a technology influences their normative preferences. Cyber-
realists engaged in the deviant usage of the Internet for war, while utopians used it for 
idea-exchange and community-building. Both groups adopted a somewhat technological 
determinist perspective and argued that there is an essence inherent to the Internet. Both 
paradigms also assumed that their individual usage modality of the technology would 
implicate the very same global usage modality. Utopians thought everyone would use the 
Internet for empowerment, academics thought everyone would use the Interent for 
knowledge diffusion while miltiary actors naturally thought that everyone would use the 
Internet for war. This had the character of a self-fullfilling prophecy (dot-com crash & 
cyber-security dilemma), which will I discuss further in a bit.
Additionally, technical knowledge matters. It seems reasonable that tech-savvy users 
see a technology less as a threat and potentially more in positive terms, while technology 
illiterate decision-makers are more likely to adapt a negative perspective. This should be 
tested in future research.
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I also showed that norm-research should consider technical affordances of artifacts, 
especially in cases where norms are directed at artifacts (like the prohibition of land-mines, 
drones, nuclear or chemical weapons). Thus, political technologies like weapon systems, 
cyber-attack capabilities or surveillance-infrastructure should be further analyzed by norm-
research since these technologies clearly include a political dimension. These devices are 
not neutral or instrumental technologies but serve and reinforce political agendas and 
distinct ideas. The framework I have provided in this thesis thus might apply to other 
technologies and their normative components.
Once a technology is developed or bought, it is unlikely to go away and thus will 
increase the staying power of norms and ideas that are related to it. Mass surveillance 
continues because the technical infrastructure is in place and became normalized over time. 
More so, powerful technical artifacts such as Internet surveillance systems create a 
demand-pull in other countries, which too want to buy or develop these capacities. The 
Snowden leaks facilitated this trend. Thus, with the diffusion of these artifacts, the norms 
embedded in these systems (like "mass surveillance is appropriate") are likely to diffuse as 
well. This creates a powerful argument and precedent, especially in authoritarian regimes: 
"if the liberal US are doing this, so can we". I only have hinted at the fact that other 
countries are actively emulating (Florini, 1996) the mass surveillance capacities by the US, 
thereby spreading the norm of Internet control globally. Future research should confirm 
this. The same mechanism also worked with utopianism and the early Internet, since many 
Western democracies also replicated the "hands-off" norm and the privatized US Internet 
governance model.
5.2 Methodological Issues and Alternative Explanations
This chapter discusses some methodological issues that appeared in this study. The 
purpose is critical reflection.
This thesis did not study the global diffusion of Internet norms, as originally 
intended. I only gave limited evidence for the global reach of the "hands-off" norm 
promoted by Gore and how it resonated with other democratic states. More so, I only 
hinted at the global norm diffusion of Internet control practices with intelligence agencies. 
I strongly invite future research to address this gap and to provide comparable data on the 
dominance of paradigms in other countries. An interesting question would be the degree of 
overlap between control practices of democracies and authoritarian regimes by creating 
some sort of index.
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Another shortcoming is that I did not provide any mathematical measurement on the 
dominance of the Internet control norm. Analytically it is hard to determine whether norm 
A is stronger or more dominant than norm B. I have assessed the dominance of norms 
heuristically by observing the frequency of cyber-realist ideas appearing in public and 
political discourses and by pointing to some opinion polls. Discourse theory and STS argue 
that closure can be witnessed when the meaning-fluctuation stops. However, this is hard, if 
not impossible to study in the empirical reality. Maybe an even longer timeframe is needed 
for that. It is possible that utopian frames and ideas will be forgotten in 20 years or so. 
Alternatively, one could have analyzed the current cyber-war discourse in higher detail, as 
I originally intended. However, due to space and time constraints this step was skipped. I 
am optimistic that future studies will fill this gap.
Methodologically, some issues with process tracing have to be discussed. The first 
issue concerns the correct identification of junctures. Internet governance scholars might 
argue that crucial pathways of the Internet were enabled elsewhere, for example during the 
1990s at international consortiums. Economists or copyright researchers might point to 
crucial legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1996 that represents an 
economic vector of Internet content control in terms of copyright. Cyber-security scholars 
might point to crucial developments on the international level, such as the EU Budapest 
Convention on Cyber-crime (2004) or the Tallinn Process to codify the laws of war for 
cyber-space (Schmitt, 2013). This critique probably is well founded. Since I excluded the 
economic and international perspective from this research, I invite other scholars to 
theorize the causal impact of this path-trajectory on Internet control, which probably will 
represent an additive causal effect. 
In the same vein, there could be a hidden, alternative pathway that enabled cyber-
realism to become dominant. Although I carefully screened the existing literature and did 
not find evidence for this, the possibility cannot be excluded. One possible alternative 
explanation could lie in utilizing a different set of theories to explain the events in the 
causal mechanism. A critical reader might have observed that my thesis includes a 
constructivist reading of IR-realism. Instead of using norm-research as a starting point, IR-
realist theories might provide useful additional arguments to explain the dominance of 
cyber-realism. I already have hinted at the power-maximizing tendencies of both states and 
their intelligence agencies, creating a classical security dilemma globally: States desiring 
to increase their security develop offensive hacking tools that diminish the security of 
others. The early Internet of the digital natives was an instance of an anarchic global 
system. With the emergence of the state in cyber-space we began to see classical realist 
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phenomena like power-struggles and arms races. What we currently witness is the struggle 
to create a new global order in this chaotic system and actors like Russia, the US or China 
struggle to reach global dominance in cyberspace. The question is whether we will see 
some kind of Westphalian order in cyberspace. 
Alternatively, a rational choice or cost/benefit perspective might be useful to explain 
the dominance of cyber-realism, especially with regard to the staying power of the status 
quo (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, p. 31). I have indicated in the Obama chapter that once an 
intelligence reform is in place, money and resources have been spent and stakeholders 
occupy new positions, which means there is little structural incentive for change (Hayes, 
2012). A strong intelligence apparatus is beneficial for presidential decision-making, 
which is why extensions of intelligence capacities are seldom cut-back. Thus, from a 
rational choice perspective it is rational to maintain a surveillance infrastructure that had 
cost billions of dollars instead of dismantling it. 
Studies on political bureaucracies or organizational studies also might be helpful 
here, especially if it comes to the turf-battle dynamics between intelligence organizations. 
Critics might point to the fact that the Intelligence Community is not as homogenous and 
like-minded as I assume in this thesis. History is full of examples where NSA withheld 
information from CIA or where the IC mistrusted military intelligence agencies and 
organizations. All of these branches of government adhere to different organizational 
cultures (Barnett & Finnemore, 2009), to different norms and maybe even paradigms. For 
example, I described a general euphoria of military thinkers regarding the revolution in 
military affairs (see chap. 4.4.2.1 Optimistic Cyber-Realism: Revolution in Military 
Affairs (1992-2000)), whereas intelligence actors from NSA were relatively sceptical early 
on (see chap. 4.4.8 The Norm of Internet Control). This diverging perspective within 
cyber-realism could either represent a learning-curve or indicate different organizational 
cultures.179 A follow-up study should investigate the norms and ideas of these agencies, 
maybe with in-depth interviews and oral histories to check whether how much they 
correspond with cyber-realism as I have outlined. We are also lacking sources that 
document the early cooperation and idea exchange between military and intelligence actors 
during the information warfare period. The same is true for the private-public partnerships 
in this sector.
Economic theories of actor interests might be helpful. Others have observed that the 
intelligence apparatus in the US is in large parts driven by private industry (Shorrock, 
2009), creating a dynamic sometimes called "surveillance-industrial-complex" (Harris, 
179 Learning theories might also be worthwhile in studying the ideas of political elites regarding the Internet.
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2014). Understanding surveillance and cyber-war from a market perspective with different 
stakeholders trying to maintain their business models further helps to understand the 
staying power of cyber-realism. There is so much money involved that the stakeholders 
must have a strong material interest in maintaining external threats to which they sell 
solutions. Thus, a future study could adopt a congruence testing approach, checking 
whether rationalist or constructivist theories might be better in explaining the dominance 
of cyber-realism (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).
Similar evidence comes from intelligence studies. Secrecy and classification 
practices create an interesting dynamic that should be analyzed more deeply. Knightley 
indicates that there is a mysterious historical trend that intelligence agencies are always up-
scaled. They are given more personnel, money and capacities over time and that the 
reverse movement (like the Watergate scandal) only rarely occurs. Most intelligence 
agencies like MI5, KGB, CIA or NSA were intended as small bureaucracies with quite 
narrow functions that over time significantly expanded or even became dominant players 
in the political system, as with the KGB in the Soviet Union (Knightley, 2003, p. chap. 
14). In other words, once broad surveillance capacities, technologies and organizational 
structures are in place, they exercise a strong staying power producing strong rational 
incentives but also normalizing tendencies to keep them intact.
Another open question is whether there exists a historical tendency of state control 
over communication technologies. I have hinted at the fact that other technologies, such as 
the telegraph, radio, the cable TV and others initially also have been perceived in utopian 
terms (see chap. 4.2.2 Ideas: Stewart Brand and the Counter-culture (1960-1970)). The 
question is whether the norm change from utopia to realism is a general historical pattern 
with technology. Is there a historic trend towards state control of technology? Comparative 
case studies, comparing the Internet with the telegraph or the cable-TV would be 
interesting.
Let me now offer a word on generalization. Of course, the general mechanism of this 
thesis cannot be generalized. However, the theoretical elements identified in the previous 
chapters can. The very same framework of norms and technology could be used for 
studying other artifacts like drones (UAV), border-surveillance systems or other kinds of 
weaponry. More so, I would speculate that we can see a similar norm-change from 
utopianism to realism in other Western democracies, like the United Kingdom. Cyber-
realism probably will have a similar shape, whereas cyber-utopianism probably will look 
different, absent of the counter-cultural and libertarian elements present in the US.
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5.3 Discussion and Outlook
It is worth repeating what Al Gore, Barack Obama, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint Cerf and others 
have said about the Internet over the course of this thesis. The core reason it exists is its 
openness. The lack of control emerging from the free-wheeling ARPA spirit and the 
openness of the design process and the protocol design are central for the success of the 
Internet. The idea not to restrict anything on the net, to create total freedom so to speak is 
central. This was only possible because the Internet developed in a context that explicitly 
endorsed and supported this lack of control. The decentralized nature and its creative chaos 
were once seen as positive, inherently liberal-democratic features of the Internet which 
should be protected from state-encroachment and totalitarian tendencies of imposing 
control. Cyber-utopians were right in the sense that the Internet is an empowering tool that 
allows everyone, even marginalized citizens to be heard and to participate in a global 
conversation. What utopianism not expected was what kind of voices it would also 
empower: fascists, trolls, propagandists, populists, terrorists and other criminals that are 
also part of liberal societies. In that sense, the idea that the Internet reflects all, even the 
undesirable, aspects of a liberal society is not that far-fetched. But the Science and 
Technology Studies perspective has shown that features like "empowerment", "freedom of 
speech" or the Internet's "openness" are not its essence: these features exists because the 
technology is embedded in a society that cherishes these features. In other words, the 
Internet is not inherently democratic but it is democratic for us because we used to 
perceive and frame it in these terms. The Internet allows global, uncensored 
communication because democratic states explicitly endorsed this. The idea of a 
democratic global cyberspace is a socially constructed, but fragile reality of the Internet 
that currently is under siege (Deibert, 2015). If democratic states no longer uphold these 
values and authoritarian or nationalistic states begin to shape the global Internet and 
advocate for more control and surveillance, it might lead to a technical and social 
reconstruction, or reconstitution of the Internet. 
The militarization of cyberspace is such a reconstitution that might produce 
undesirable consequences. The analysis has shown that the US is a country "whose stated 
goal is to dominate cyberspace as a battlefield and that has the means to do it" (Harris, 
2014, p. Prologue). Currently, the dominant approach of US vis-à-vis cyberspace is 
through military and intelligence means, guided by a national security doctrine. The US 
has created a widespread set of instruments, ranging from state-hacking with NSAs special 
units, computer espionage on a large scale as well as collecting every piece of information 
traversing global cyberspace and utilize it as a means of offensive cyber-war and 
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surveillance. The analysis has shown that surveillance, espionage and cyber-war cannot be 
separated: they are part of the same mind-set, forming a nexus. Thus, if cyber-realist 
advocates demand more cyber-war capabilities, this often also includes new surveillance 
capabilities. The discourses on cyber-war and surveillance should not be separated, but 
conceived as one.
The global war on terror was the metaphorical "fall of man", not just in terms of 
human rights becoming contested by extraordinary rendition or water-boarding practices, 
but also in terms of the digital domain. The war on terror also brought war and an 
exceptionalist logic to cyberspace. This exceptionalist logic both contests core norms of 
liberal democracies and the openness of the Internet itself. 9/11 established cyber-realist 
norms and ideas in the shared consciousness: first the unquestioned belief that it is 
possible, given enough intelligence, to prevent surprise attacks by terrorists and second 
that the battle-space expands globally, domestically, and digitally because terrorists hide 
against the backdrop of society. Third, this diagnosis normalizes the use of extraordinary 
foreign military and surveillance technology to be used against US and other nations' 
citizens. It represents a militarization of cyberspace that was legitimized as a temporary 
state of emergency after 9/11. 
The civil law-enforcement paradigm of managing issues in cyberspace and the liberal 
interpretation of the Internet was abandoned and replaced with a war logic: The Internet no 
longer is a global-village but a battle-space and a target. Legal regimes of liberal 
democratic states restrict invasive surveillance by demanding a targeted approach based on 
suspicion became dismantled with the war on terror. Whereas surveillance in the past 
worked in a deductive fashion – from initial suspicion to target surveillance to test the 
suspicion – the new norm has a reversed logic. It operates without suspicion and collects 
data inductively, to generate a suspicion once after the data is collected. This is highly 
problematic and can undermine citizens' trust in their governments, as the writers of the 
NSA report indicated (Clarke et al., 2014). It is also problematic because it contests the 
core notion of democracies. Collecting vast data-streams or "full-take", which became the 
default or the norm even for democratic states, includes totalitarian ideas. In the 
introduction, I referred shortly to surveillance practices of the former Stasi. The Stasi, too, 
aimed for a "full-take" approach in terms of intercepting and opening letters sent from the 
GDR to the West, or in terms of the "full-take" interception of all phone-calls within the 
GDR (Foschepoth, 2013). But the Stasi never had the technological infrastructure to reach 
this goal. Nowadays, democratic states have built this very infrastructure.
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But Western states also have externalized this logic. Since the war on terror is global, 
this practice is repeated on a global scale. Offensive cyber-war blurs the line between 
intelligence operations, surveillance and military conduct (Harris, 2014, p. chap. 4). 
Offensive computer network attacks expand control towards foreign objects and servers: 
information should not just be controlled domestically, but also inside other countries. 
Historically, this is an utterly new development. Cyber-war serves as the logical expansion 
of the norm of control internationally. It is not just passive surveillance anymore, but 
active manipulation of data and target systems.
The militarization of cyberspace is problematic, because it contests the notion of the 
Internet as a civilian or democratic space, run by private companies and inhabited by 
millions of international citizens. A "neighborhood, a library, a marketplace, school yard, a 
workshop – and a new, exciting age in human experience, exploration and development" 
(Harris, 2014, p. chap. 10). The unilateral, state-centric claim to control cyberspace is in 
opposition to the decentral structure of the Internet as a commons that should be 
maintained by everybody. With what right can the US claim dominance over the Internet 
and with what right can it deny non-democratic states such as China and Russia the same 
claim? Of course, the US is a role model of the future and other states want to mimic the 
cyber-competencies that were established in the post 9/11 world. Whereas the use of 
cyber-war competencies for domestic and international spying is at least somewhat 
regulated in democratic states, it is not in countries like China and Russia. There, 
sophisticated CNA and CNE tools are turned against their own societies. Russia and China 
are using the cyber-war arsenal to wage internal information wars to maintain the authority 
of the elite (Blank, 2013).
In sum, this exceptionalist norm of control became normalized in the sense that 
control of cyberspace became a goal that is shared and adapted by more and more states. 
In other words: democracies and dictatorships both claim the right to control the Internet 
and all the information stored and transmitted therein. A provocative thesis thus would be 
that in cyberspace, there is no longer much difference between authoritarian regimes and 
democracies. If someone would break into your computer network to steal data you would 
not know whether its NSA or the Russian FSB. The question is, whether this new 
authoritarian logic in cyberspace is part of, or even precedes, the current crisis of liberal 
norms and democracies. If democracies become more authoritarian, represented by right-
wing or even neo-fascist regimes, it should not come as a surprise that the online behavior 
of these states also shows authoritarian or totalitarian tendencies. 
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If that thesis is true, then we can expect that democracies will adopt new means of 
Internet control that currently are pioneered by authoritarian regimes: the ban of encryption 
technology to circumvent state surveillance, more Internet censorship under the disguise of 
"fake news" or "moral decency", as can be seen in Poland, the treatment of Internet 
companies as media institutions for which censorship and content control laws apply (as in 
Russia), the construction of Internet kill-switches (as in Turkey) and, in the worst-case, the 
physical reengineering of the Internet to enable more surveillance, probably legitimized 
under the pretense of terrorism (as in China). Cyber-realist advocates and authoritarian 
leaders alike already formulate demands to reengineer the Internet to allow better 
surveillance. DNI McConnell argued in 2010 that "we need to reengineer the Internet to 
make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment – who did it, 
from where, why and what was the result – more manageable" (McConnell, 2010) and 
likewise, current US President Trump argued in the entry quote for this chapter "We have 
to talk to them [Internet engineers] about, maybe in certain areas, closing that Internet up 
in some way". The risk of neo-nazi or neo-fascist parties taking over the vast Internet 
surveillance machinery in many states is highly problematic. Internet surveillance data can 
be easily used to draft kill or deportation lists of immigrants, homosexuals, Muslims or 
political opponents. But there is not just a human risk, but also a technical one.
I said in the beginning that the Internet allows a global democratic conversation 
because it was technologically and socially constructed in that way. If more countries 
follow an authoritarian logic, the idea of a global, liberal-democratic interconnected 
network of networks is history and with it the possibility of easy and instant human 
interaction on a global scale. Instead, we will see what Tim Berners Lee warned about: a 
balkanized or nationalized splinter-net as developed by China. In this vision, each country 
will have its own nationalized network. Global access to information would be limited. 
Global idea exchange would hampered and national governments would position 
themselves as curators or censors, deciding what information can be accessed or not. 
Authoritarianism and nationalism contest the logic of a shared, global commons. The only 
regimes in the world to prevent this from happening are liberal democracies. If they do not 
advocate their liberal norms of freedom of speech, rule of law, human rights and privacy 
on the Internet, no one else will.
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Appendix
Quantifying the Internet and the Digital Revolution
This appendix provides some basic statistics that shed light on the evolution of the Internet 
and its growth. It includes dominant usage and users and is therefore a precondition for 
understanding many current topics such as the prevalence of cyber-security or the Big-
Data hype. 
Figure 33. Diffusion of ICT in the USA between 1975-2015, Source: (WorldBank, 
2016a)
The graphic shows the diffusion of Internet users, broadband subscriptions, telephone 
subscriptions and personal computers per 100 people in the U.S.. The data was obtained 
from the WorldBank Development indicators, which did not include data for PC usage 
between the years 2002-2004 and since 2006. Nevertheless, the early growth period is 
covered. Since the U.S. is the home market of these technologies, no other country shows 
similar growth rates at the respective points in time. 
To qualify this growth, some additional information from the US Department of 
Commerce Census Bureau is included (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). In early 1984, the 
technology users were mostly white (8,6%), had a middle-class income of $30-50000 per 
year (15,2%) or were families with high education (college degree 12,8%, graduate degree 
18,3%) and no children (14,1%). These users represented the majority until 1997 
(Venkatesh, Chuan-Fong Sih, & Stolzoff, 2000, p. 207). In terms of gender equality, 
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computers in the early days tended to be male-dominated (64,8% male) but over time the 
gender-gap disappeared (Venkatesh et al., 2000). What were computers used for? In 1984 
the largest proportion was "learning to use a computer", directly followed by "video 
games". In 1989, as computers spread through business, the most common task became 
"word-processing", followed by "games". The user demographic in the early days is quite 
narrow: white, young males with high education predominantly using the computer for 
games. This most likely corresponds with the early users of the ARPANET during the 
1970s, although demographic data is missing in this case. 
The period between 1994 and 1997 is described as a "watershed transition" during 
which computer and Internet uses across all demographic criteria shifted dramatically 
(Venkatesh et al., 2000, p. 215). This is attributed to the introduction of the Internet which 
also transforms the dominant use of computer as work or game-stations to communication 
technologies. Elton and Carey (Elton & Carey, 2013) argue that the inventor’s dilemma, 
the chicken-egg problem, was effectively circumvented because the PC was popular 
enough to provide a first user base, who benefited from new Internet services and who e-
mailing and surfing the web as dominant activities. The Internet’s decentrality and 
openness enabled new usage scenarios, because there was no central regulation instance 
that prevented services (for example because of copyright reasons) such as "e-commerce" 
and "online-shopping". The victory of the Internet is indicated by the decline of traditional 
land-line phone connections since 2000. What is remarkable about this growth in the early 
days is that, the percentage of Internet users in the U.S. almost doubles in each following 
year (1993 2,2%; 1994 4,8%; 1995 9,2%; 1996 16,4%; 1997 21,6%). The 50% mark was 
reached in 2001 (WorldBank, 2016a)
Globally, the Internet diffusion is a bit slower, showing a clear gab between so called 
first, second and third worlds, as the following graph shows. 
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Figure 34. Percentage of Internet Users of the World Population, Source: 
(Internet Live Stats, 2016)
 With the new millennium, only 6.7% of the world population had access to the 
Internet. In 2007 the smartphone revolution began with the introduction of the Apple 
iPhone, expanding the user base of the Internet to a wider demographic. Around 20,6% of 
the world population had Internet access then, growing steadily to around 40% in 2014. 
Figure 35. Longitudinal Internet Diffusion per Region in percent, Source: 
(WorldBank, 2016b)
This graph shows the distribution by region based on the World Bank Development 
Indicators (WorldBank, 2016b). The developed world (OECD, North America, EU) were 
the first movers, reaching an Internet penetration of 50% and more between 2000 and 
2005. 
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Other industrial countries like China and the Russian Federation reached this threshold 
between 2011 (Russia) and 2014 (China). What becomes clear is that within the next ten 
years, the global Internet population will grow reaching a similar Internet penetration like 
the OECD countries (around 80% of the population)180. Studies suggest that the early 
adopters of a new technology tend to be the younger, wealthy, educated (and 
technologically savvy) progressive users, while older (Linchuan Qiu, 2013). Older people 
and technical conservative users more often adopt a "wait and see approach" or ignore new 
technologies in general. Users from poorer regions of the world simply lack access because 
of costs or lacking availability of infrastructure. This pattern is called "digital divide" 
(Prensky, 2001) and can be found not just with the diffusion of the Internet during the 
1990s, but also with newer technologies (such as Smartphones or Social Media Services of 
the mid 2000s).
 
Figure 36. Internet Devices per Region, Source: (Engel, 2014)
This graph shows the physical topology of the Internet, based on the geolocation of 
devices connected to the Internet as of 2014. It clearly It shows that the global village is 
highly biased towards major cities and industrial centers of the world, creating a large 
digital gap towards the country side and remote regions of the Earth (Siberia, Africa, 
Australia). The same is true for the basic physical infrastructure that carries the global 
Internet traffic. The major IXP that are the largest switching locations that interconnect the 
different regional subnetworks are also biased towards western countries. Most of these 
180 The very young and the very old seldom connect to the Internet, which might explain the lacking 20%.
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IXP located in OECD countries handle the majority of Internet traffic (Chatzis et al., 
2013). This means that most of the data packets are routed through the West.
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Table 9. List of Internet Milestones and Security Incidents
Date Internet Milestone Noteworthy Security Incident
1957 - ARPA founded
1964 - Paul Baran writes "On 
Distributed Communications 
Networks"
1966 - ARPANET Project begins
1967 - Willis Ware warns Lawrence 
Roberts of network security 
issues
1968 - Whole Earth Catalog launches
1969 - ARPANET Prototype running
1971 - Ray Tomlinson presentes E-
Mail
- Blue Box phone phreaking 
hits the news
1972 - ARPANET public 
presentation
1972 - Begin of Internetworking 
project
1974 - TCP proposed by Cerf and 
Kahn
1975 - Altair 8800 & Apple 1 initiate 
PC revolution
1977 - First successful TCP 
networking test
1979 - TCP/IP becomes DoD 
standard
1980 - BSD includes TCP/IP
1981 - AT&T hacked, Captain Zap 
changes billing rates to get 
late-night discounts
1983 - ARPANET transition to 
TCP/IP
- Hackers break into Los 
Alamos National Laboratory 
and make news headlines. 
First hearings on computer 
security in the house of 
representatives follow
- War Games released
1984 - The WELL launches
- Gibson coins Cyberspace in 
Neuromancer
1986 - NSFNET launches
1988 - NSFNET Internet backbone - First self-replicating worm 
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transition from ARPANET (Morris’) spreads through 
ARPANET, causes $10 
million damage 
1989 - Berners-Lee proposes WWW - Malicous Computer Worm 
found in NASA Computer 
"Worms Against Nuclear 
Killers"
1990 - ARPANET is 
decommissioned
- Electronic Frontier Foundation 
founded
1991 - First Website, release of 
HTML
1993 - Mosaic Web Browser
- Information Superhighway
- Windows 3.1 released
- NSA developed plans for 
CNA against Haiti Radar 
Systems
1994 - Amazon founded
- Yahoo founded
- Netscape Navigator and SSL 
Encryption 
- www.whitehouse.gov launch
- Intension into Rome 
Laboratory at Griffith Air 
Force Base
1995 - First item sold on ebay.com
- Windows 95 released
- first online banking with 
Wells Fargo
- Internet is privatized
- Netscape Initial Public 
Offering initiates dot-com 
frenzy
- China and Russia begin to 
emulate US information war 
doctrine
1996 - 15 % of Americans are Online
- Barlow publishes Declaration 
of Independence of 
Cyberspace
- First documented phishing & 
DDoS attacks
1997 - WIFI invented
- AOL messenger released
- NSA conducts Eligible 
Receiver Simulation, uncovers 
network vulnerabilities
1998 - Google founded
- Bill Clinton’s first Email
- ICANN takes over Internet 
stewardship
- Solar Sunrise, 18 year old 
hacker penetrates DoD 
Servers
- Moonlight Maze attack, 
military maps and troop 
configurations stolen from 
Pentagon, Russian origin
- Hacking during Kosovo War
1999 - Napster launches - Y2K Panic
2000 - .com bubble bursts
- Blogger launches
- ILOVEYOUVIRUS infects 
millions PCs and causes $15 
billion financial damage.
2001 - Wikipedia created
- 50% of Americans are online
- 9/11
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2002 - TOR launches
2003 - Apple iTunes Store launch
- Piratebay launch
- Myspace launch
- Begin of Titan Rain attacks 
(massive data extraction from 
US government), F-35 Fighter 
schematics stolen
2004 - Facebook founded, global 
launch 2007
- World of Warcraft launched
2006 - Google buys Youtube
2007 - iPhone & Google Android 
released, begin of smartphone 
revolution
- Dropbox founded, start of 
Cloud computing
- Twitter global launch
- Begin of Big Data with 
Hadoop
- IBM releases Watson AI
- Aurora Generator tests 
physical destruction of a 
generator by a CNA
- Estonia DDoS Attacks
- Operation Orchard in Syria 
(disrupting Syrian Radar with 
CNA)
- CNA against Iraqi insurgents
2008 - HTML5 introduced
- Google Android released
- First Presidential Tweet by 
Candidate Obama
- Hybrid Warfare in Georgia
- Republican and Democrat 
election campaign data stolen 
by CNE
- Agent.btz penetrates classified 
and air-gapped DoD Networks
- Conficker infects 11 million 
hosts, causing $9.1 billion 
financial damage
2009 - Cloud Computing Hype
- WhatsApp messenger released
- electronic currency Bitcoin 
launches
- Iraqi insurgents hack into 
UAV drones
2010 - Stuxnet discovered
- US Cybercommand opens
2011 - Arab Spring
- Wikileaks Cables
- Smartphones overtake PC as 
dominant Internet device
- First Sony PSN hack, affects 
77 million gamer accounts, 
$171 million outage costs
- Anonymous launches 
operation payback on VISA, 
Paypal as a result of Wikileaks 
affair
- Pentagon hacked, 24000 files 
stolen by unknown intruders
- Creech Air Force based 
hacked, Predator drones 
infected by malware
- 2 US GPS satellites hacked 
2013 - Snowden Leaks - Patriot Missile System, and 
Navy’s Aegis defense system 
hacked
- Department of Energy 
employee data (security 
numbers, payroll) stolen
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2014 - 88% of Americans are online - Federal Employee Database at 
OPM hacked, millions 
security clearances stolen
- Heartbleed vulnerability 
discovered, affected millions 
of Internet services
- White House advisors hacked
- Sony hacked by Korean 
Hackers after release of 'The 
Interview’ film
This table gives a more detailed overview over computer security events such as network 
breaches or digital espionage. This list was compiled while screening computer security 
books and articles. I included those events that either where the "first" of some kind (for 
example using a new attack vector), or that were regarded as historically important by 
different authors or the media (for example events generating enormous costs). Because of 
space limitations it is not complete.
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Polls on the Dominance of Cyber-Realism
The purpose of this appendix is to provide different statistics and polls on the dominance 
of cyber-utopian and realist ideas.
Table 10. Pew Research Surveys - % Saying each is a major threat to the U.S.
2016181 2013182 2009183 2008184 2005185
Islamic extremist 
groups like al 
Qaeda, ISIS
80 75 - 72 -
Cyberattacks 
from other 
countries
72 70 - - -
Global 
Economic 
Instability
67 - - - -
Iran’s nuclear 
program
- 68 72 60 61
North Korea’s 
nuclear program
- 67 69 55 66
spread of 
infectious 
diseases
60 - - - -
Refugees from 
fragile states
55 - - - -
climate change 53 45 44 - -
China’s 
emergence as 
world power
50 54 53 48 52
tensions with 
Russia
42 - - 44 -
Economic 
Problems in EU
- 37 - -
Pakistan’s 
political 
instability
- - - 43 -
This data was compiled using different, representative Pew telephone surveys 
conducted in the respective years. The participants were given a list of threats and they had 
to select the top problems facing the world each year.
181 (Pew Research Center, 2016)
182 (Pew Research Center, 2013)
183 (Pew Research Center, 2013)
184 (Pew Research Center, 2008)
185 (Pew Research Center, 2013)
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Table 11.Gallup Poll - Percentage of people who see an issue as a critical threat 
to the U.S.
2016186 2015187 2013188 2010189 2004190
International 
Terrorism
79 84 81 81 82
Development of 
nuclear weapons 
by Iran
75 77 83 - -
Cyberterrorism
, the use of 
computers top 
cause 
disruption or 
fear in society
73 - - - -
The spread of 
infectious 
diseases
63 - - - -
The conflict in 
Syria
58 - - - -
The military 
power of North 
Korea
58 64 - - -
Development of 
nuclear weapons 
by North Korea
- - 83 - -
Large numbers 
of refugees 
trying to come to 
Europe and 
North America
52 - - - -
Global warming 
or climate 
change
50 - - - -
The conflict 
between Israeli 
and the 
Palestenians
45 49 44 47 58
The military 
power of China
41 - 51 46 39
The economic 
power of China
41 40 52 - -
The military 
power of Russia
39 49 29 23 18
186 (McCarthy, 2016)
187 (Swift & Dugan, 2015)
188 (Jones, 2013)
189 (Jones, 2010)
190 (Jones, 2010)
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The conflict 
between Russia 
and Ukraine
- 44 - - -
The conflict 
between India 
and Pakistan
- - 25 23 18
National security threat perceptions depend on daily political events which explains 
why some indicators are present at different points in time. Additionally, the polling 
agencies used different questions over time which is why the China indicators are divided 
between military power and economic power.
Table 12. Internet Society Survey 2011, Source: 
(Internet Society, 2011)
15. Has the Internet 
reached its full 
potential, or will it 
become even more 
important in the future? 
Global (%) US (%) Russia (%)
The Internet will be even 
more important in the 
future 
95 94 98
The Internet has already 
reached its full potential 
5 6 2
16. Please choose the top 3 areas in which you believe the Internet currently plays an important role. 
Social engagement (e.g. 
connecting with 
friends/family) 
60 64 81
Education (e.g. online 
courses) 
47 57 41
Communication 
efficiency (e.g. 
collaboration) 
45 44 44
Entertainment (e.g. 
music, art) 
45 43 55
Global commerce/global 
economic development 
27 21 18
Access to information 
about governance (e.g. 
making sure citizens get 
information needed to 
keep governments 
accountable) 
26 31 30
Scientific endeavors (e.g. 18 20 11
Polls on the Dominance of Cyber-Realism
461
medical research) 
National 
commerce/national 
economic development 
13 12 9
Other (SPECIFY) 1 0 1
None—The internet 
currently does not play an 
important role 
0 1 0
19. What is the biggest concern facing the Internet today? 
User privacy 26 30 13
Spam and other unwanted 
traffic 
23 21 39
Security of Internet 
infrastructure 
20 26 18
Copyright and intellectual 
property issues 
8 2 10
Government control 8 12 8
Lack of Internet access 6 2 6
Net neutrality (the idea 
that companies providing 
Internet service should 
not give preferential 
treatment to some 
websites, or content 
providers, over others) 
5 5 2
Usability by multiple 
languages
3 0 2
Nothing 1 1 2
16. Please choose the top 3 areas in which you believe the Internet currently plays an important role. 
Social engagement (e.g. 
connecting with 
friends/family) 
60 64 81
Education (e.g. online 
courses) 
47 57 41
Communication 
efficiency (e.g. 
collaboration) 
45 44 44
Entertainment (e.g. 
music, art) 
45 43 55
Global commerce/global 
economic development 
27 21 18
Access to information 
about governance (e.g. 
making sure citizens get 
information needed to 
keep governments 
26 31 30
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accountable) 
Scientific endeavors (e.g. 
medical research) 
18 20 11
National 
commerce/national 
economic development 
13 12 9
Other (SPECIFY) 1 0 1
None—The internet 
currently does not play an 
important role 
0 1 0
19. What is the biggest concern facing the Internet today? 
User privacy 26 30 13
Spam and other unwanted 
traffic 
23 21 39
Security of Internet 
infrastructure 
20 26 18
Copyright and intellectual 
property issues 
8 2 10
Government control 8 12 8
Lack of Internet access 6 2 6
Net neutrality (the idea 
that companies providing 
Internet service should 
not give preferential 
treatment to some 
websites, or content 
providers, over others) 
5 5 2
Usability by multiple 
languages
3 0 2
Nothing 1 1 2
20. There should be no restrictions on accessing lawful content via the Internet. 
Agree strongly 44 40 63
Agree somewhat 36 33 28
Disagree somewhat 14 18 7
Disagree strongly 6 9 2
21. There should be no restrictions on lawful software or services on the Internet. 
Agree strongly 41 32 64
Agree somewhat 37 34 26
Disagree somewhat 16 24 8
Disagree strongly 6 10 2
23. The ability to share and access information privately using the Internet is important to me. 
Agree strongly 57 59 41
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Agree somewhat 35 35 40
Disagree somewhat 6 4 14
Disagree strongly 2 1 5
24. The Internet needs to be controlled to protect end-users. 
Agree strongly 42 24 34
Agree somewhat 39 40 41
Disagree somewhat 13 24 16
Disagree strongly 6 12 9
25. The Internet needs to remain as uncontrolled as possible to promote innovation. 
Agree strongly 21 24 21
Agree somewhat 34 34 33
Disagree somewhat 30 29 30
Disagree strongly 15 13 15
58. How concerned are you that Internet Service Providers are monitoring your use of the Internet? 
Very concerned 29 31 20
Somewhat concerned 43 43 31
Not very concerned 22 21 34
Not concerned at all 6 5 16
64. How concerned are you that the Government is monitoring your use of the Internet? 
Very concerned 37 46 36
Somewhat concerned 36 32 30
Not very concerned 21 17 23
Not concerned at all 7 5 11
Source: Internet Society, 
2011
This table presents the findings of the Internet Societies 2011 global Internet survey 
with over 6000 online participants worldwide and 1001 in the U.S.. A downsides of this 
survey are that there is no longitudinal measurement and that only online participants were 
asked, which reduces representativity. For this overview, I only selected these items that 
came close to the identified cyber-utopian and realist ideas and frames discovered in this 
thesis. I also chose to include two comparable cases, the global average and Russia, a more 
authoritarian democracy. In theory, we should expect stronger support for Internet control 
in Russia, however this is not always the case.
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Table 13. 2016 Presidential Candidates' Opinion on Cyber-Realist Ideas 
Donald 
Trump (Rep)
Hillary 
Clinton (Dem)
Jill Stein 
(Green)
Gary Johnson 
(Lib)
American 
Voters
Do you support 
the Patriot Act?
Yes Yes No, and pass 
strict laws 
prohibiting any 
government 
surveillance
No, and pass 
strict laws 
prohibiting any 
government 
surveillance
Yes 55% / No 
45%
Should the NSA 
be allowed to 
collect basic 
metadata of 
citizen’s phone 
calls such as 
numbers, 
timestamps, 
and call 
durations?
Yes, basic data 
collection is 
necessary to 
track suspected 
terrorists
No No, only with a 
warrant 
showing 
probable cause 
of criminal 
activity 
No, only with a 
warrant 
showing 
probable cause 
of criminal 
activity
Yes 31% / No 
69%
Should the U.S. 
government 
grant immunity 
to Edward 
Snowden? 
No, he should 
be returned to 
the U.S. to 
stand trial and 
face the 
consequences 
of his actions
No, he should 
be returned to 
the U.S. to 
stand trial and 
face the 
consequences 
of his actions
Yes, he should 
be protected 
under the 
Whistleblower 
Protection Act 
Yes, he should 
be protected 
under the 
Whistleblower 
Protection Act
Yes 48% / No 
52%
Should Apple 
unlock the 
iPhones of 
suspected 
terrorists for 
the FBI?
Yes, but only in 
situations 
where the 
owner is a 
proven threat to 
national 
security
Yes, but only in 
situations 
where the 
owner is a 
proven threat to 
national 
security
No, backdoors 
can expose 
innocent 
owners to 
malicious 
hackers 
No Yes 53% / No 
47%
Should the U.S. 
continue NSA 
surveillance of 
its allies?
Yes, 
surveillance of 
all foreign 
countries is 
essential to 
tracking 
potential 
terrorist threats 
No No, spying on 
our allies 
severely 
damages our 
reputation 
abroad
No, and abolish 
the NSA
Yes 52% / No 
48%
Should internet 
service 
providers be 
allowed to 
speed up access 
to popular 
websites (that 
pay higher 
rates) at the 
expense of 
slowing down 
access to less 
popular 
websites (that 
pay lower 
Yes No, treat all 
traffic equally 
and continue 
the openness of 
the Internet
No, treat all 
traffic equally 
and continue 
the openness of 
the Internet
Yes Yes 17% / No 
83%
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rates)?
(ISideWith.com
, 18.01.2016)
This table presents the summarized position of each presidential candidate before the 2016 
election and contrasts it with an online poll that Isidewith.com conducted on its website. 
Although each item received millions of votes, the downside of this methodology is it is 
online only and the participants could answer multiple times. As such, the public’s position 
is not quite representative. I have selected only these items that addressed topics of this 
thesis.
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Table 14. Intelligence Community Directors
FBI CIA DCI/DNI DHS NSA CYBERCOM
1990
William 
Hedgcock 
Webster
May 1987 – 
August 
1991
William 
Hedgcock 
Webster
May 1987 – 
August 
1991
1991
William O. 
Studeman 
August 
1988 – May 
1992
1992
William S. 
Sessions
November 
1987 – July 
1993
Robert Michael Gates 
November 1991 – January 
1993
Floyd I. 
Clarke 
(acting), 
July 1993 – 
September 
1993
1993
1994
R. James Woolsey
February 1993–January 
1995
1995
J. Michael 
McConnell 
May 1992 – 
February 
1996
1996
John Mark Deutch
May 1995–December 1996
1997
1998
Kenneth A. 
Minihan 
February 
1996 –
1999
2000
Louis J. 
Freeh
September 
1993 – June 
2001
 
Thomas J. 
Pickard 
(acting), 
June 2001 – 
September 
2001
2001
2002
2003
George John Tenet
July 1997–July 2004
2004
Porter J. 
Goss
September, 
2004–April 
2005
Tom Ridge
January 
2003 – 
February 
2005
Michael V. 
Hayden 
March 1999 
– 2005
2005
Porter J. 
Goss
September 
2004 – May 
2006
2006
John 
Negroponte
April 2005 – 
February 
2007
2007
Robert S. 
Mueller III 
September 
2001 – 
September 
2013
Michael V. 
Hayden
May 2006 – 
February 
2009 John 
Michael 
Michael 
Chertoff
February 
2005 – 
January 
2009
Keith B. 
Alexander
August 
2005 –April 
2014
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2008
McConnell
February 
2007 – 
January 
2009
2009
Dennis C. 
Blair
January 
2009 – May 
2010
David C. 
Gompert
May 2010 – 
August 
2010 
2010
Leon E. 
Panetta
February 
2009 – July 
2011
2011
Michael J. 
Morell
July 2011 – 
September 
2011
David H. 
Petraeus
September 
2011 – 
November 
2012
2012
Michael J. 
Morell
November 
2012 – 
March 2013
Janet 
Napolitano
January 
2009 – 
September 
2013
2013
Keith B. 
Alexander
May 2010 – 
March 2014
Jon M. 
Davies 
(acting)
March 2014 
– April 2014
2014
2015
James B. 
Comey
September 
2013 – 
present
John O. 
Brennan
March 2013 
– present
James R. 
Clapper
August 
2010 – 
present
Jeh 
Johnson
December 
2013 – 
present
Michael S. 
Rogers
April 2014 – 
present
Michael S. 
Rogers
April 2014 – 
present
Source
https://www
.fbi.gov/abo
ut–
us/history/di
rectors
https://en.wi
kipedia.org/
wiki/Directo
r_of_the_Ce
ntral_Intelli
gence_Agen
cy
https://www
.cia.gov/new
s–
information/
featured–
story–
archive/200
8–featured–
story–
archive/dire
ctors–of–
central–
http://www.
dhs.gov/secr
etaries–
homeland–
security 
https://www
.nsa.gov/abo
ut/leadershi
p/former_dir
ectors.shtml
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intelligence.
html (bis 
2004)
    Corpora
These sources were identified by using the snowball technique. I screened secondary 
sources for key political documents and worked backwards in time. Then I analyzed these 
documents for their most reoccurring themes, ideas (problem definitions, goals, 
instruments) and norms. I inductively build codes for reappearing concepts and marked 
them in MaxQDA. Afterwards I deductively applied these codes to the rest of the material. 
I stopped this process after nothing new was found. These documents focus on much more 
than the Internet so I chose to limit myself on the Internet and Cyberspace, ignoring for 
example Drone technology. Afterwards I screened White House documents such as policy 
directives or national security strategies for the appearances of the identified code to infer, 
whether there was an idea spillover. The corpus surely is not complete but it provided a 
large enough overview to grasp the most important elements. Note that not all of these 
texts necessary appear as quotes or citation in the text. I used only the most illustrative 
quotes as representatives for certain codings.
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Engineering Corpus
Corpus of Engineering Texts
Source (chronological) Type of Document
Bush, V. (1945). As we may think. The atlantic 
monthly, 176(1), 101-108.
media publication
Kleinrock, L. (1961). Information Flow in Large 
Communication Nets.
academic publication
Center, D. S. R. (Ed.). (1990[1962]). In Memoriam: 
J. C. R. Licklider 1915-1990.
academic publication
Baran, P. (1964). On distributed communications. I. 
Introduction to Distributed Communication 
Networks. Proceedings from Prepared for Unites 
States Air Force Project RAND, Santa Monica.
academic publication
RAND. (1964). Paul Baran and the Origins of the 
Internet. 
http://www.rand.org/about/history/baran.html.
academic publication
Davies, D. W. (1965). Proposal for the Development 
of a National Communications Service for On-Line 
Data Processing.
academic publication
Roberts, L. (1967). Multiple Computer Networks 
and Intercomputer communication. 67 Proceedings 
of the first ACM symposium on Operating System 
Principles.
academic publication
Ware, W. H. (1967). Security and Privacy in 
Computer Systems. RAND.
academic publication
Electronics (1972c). Demonstration Heralds Next 
Wave: Connecting a Network of Networks. 
Electronics, pp. 34-36.
media publication
McKenzie, A. (1972). Host/Host Protocol for the 
ARPA Network. Proceedings from Prepared for the 
Network Working Group by BBN.
academic publication
Cerf, V. G., & Kahn, R. E. (1974). A protocol for 
packet network intercommunication. IEEE, 22(5).
academic publication
Baran, P., & Farber, D. (1977). The Convergence of 
Computing and Telecommunications Systems. 
Science, Vol.195, 1166-1170.
academic publication
Cohen, D. (1978). On Interconnection of Computer 
Networks. Proceedings from Proceedings of 
Interlinkining of Computer Networks., Bonas.
academic publication
Cerf, V. (1979). DARPA Activities in Packet-
Network Interconnection. The military requirement 
for Network Interconnection Technology. U.S. 
Department of Defense, Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
academic publication
Haughney, J. (1980). ARPANET News from DCA. 
ARPANET Newsletter.
newsletter
Heart, F., McKenzie, A., McQuillan, J., Walden, D., 
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1981). Completion 
report
Engineering Corpus
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Report No. 4799. A History of the ARPANET. The 
first decade.
Denning, P. J., Hearn, A., & Kern, W. C. (1983). 
History and Overview of CSNET. Proceedings from 
CSNET Project at the ACM SIGCOMM symposi- 
um on data communications, March 8-9, 1983.
academic publication
Davies, D. (1986). An Interview with Donald W. 
Davies. National Physical Laboratory, Charles 
Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
interview
Lukasik, S. (1987). Oral History Transcript — Dr. 
Stephen Lukasik. Santa Monica, CA, American 
Institue of Physics.
interview
Licklider, J. C. R. (1988). An Interview with J.C.R. 
Licklider, Oral History 150. Cambridge, M.A. 
Charles Babbage Institute. The Center for the 
History of InformationProcessing University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis.
interview
Ruina, J. (1989). An Interview with Jack P. Ruina 
OH 163. Cambridge. M.A., Charles Babbage 
Institute. The Center for the History of 
InformationProcessing University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis.
interview
Roberts, L. G. (1989). An Interview with 
LAWRENCE G. ROBERTS OH 159. San Mateo, 
CA. Charles Babbage Institute. The Center for the 
History of InformationProcessing University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis.
interview
Taylor, R. (1989). An Interview with Robert Taylor 
OH 154. Palo Alto. Charles Babbage Institute. The 
Center for the History of InformationProcessing 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
interview
Berners-Lee, T. (1989). Information Management: A 
Proposal. CERN.
academic publication
Quarterman, J. (1989). The Matrix: Computer 
Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide (2 
Sub ed.). Digital Press.
academic publication
Heart, F. (1990). An Interview with Frank Heart. 
Cambridge, M.A., Charles Babbage Institute. The 
Center for the History of InformationProcessing 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
interview
Kleinrock, L. (1990). An Interview with LEONARD 
KLEINROCK OH 190. Los Angeles, Charles 
Babbage Institute. The Center for the History of 
InformationProcessing University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis.
interview
Cerf, V. G. (1990). An Interview with VINTON 
CERF OH 191. Reston, VA, Charles Babbage 
Institute. The Center for the History of 
InformationProcessing University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis.
interview
Berners-Lee, T., & Cailliau, R. (1990). academic publication
Engineering Corpus
472
WorldWideWeb: Proposal for a HyperText Project. 
CERN.
Lukasik, S. (1991). An Interview with Stephen 
Lukasik OG 232. Redondo Beach, Charles Babbage 
Institute. The Center for the History of 
InformationProcessing University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis.
interview
Clark, D. D. (1992). A Cloudy Crystal Ball – Visions 
of the Future. Proceedings from Presentation given 
at the 24th Internet Engineering Task Force.
academic publication
Networks, M. (1995). NSFNET: A Partnership for 
High-Speed Networking. Final Report 1987-1955.
report
Engineering, N. A. O. (Ed.). (1995). Revolution in 
the U.S. Information Infrastructure. Washington: 
National Academy Press.
academic publication
Kahn, R. E. (1995). The Role of Government in the 
Evolution of the Internet. In N. A. O. Engineering 
(Ed.), Revolution in the U.S. Information 
Infrastructure. Washington D.C.: National Academy 
Press.
academic publication
Isenberg, D. (1997). Rise of the Stupid Network. 
Computer Telephony, 16-26.
academic publication
Hafner, K., & Lyon, M. (1998). Where Wizards Stay 
Up Late: The Origins Of The Internet (First 
Paperback Edition ed.). Simon & Schuster.
academic publication
Naughton, J. (1999). A brief history of the future. 
The origins of the Internet. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
academic publication
Taylor, R. (1999). An Internet Pioneer Ponders the 
Next Revolution. Outlook 2000.
interview
Cerf, V. (2000). Internet Society Panel on Business 
Method Patents.
media publication
Abbate, J. (2000). Inventing the Internet. The MIT 
Press.
academic publication
Berners-Lee, T. (2000). Weaving the Web. The 
Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World 
Wide Web. New York: Harper Business.
media publication
Burman, E. (2003). Shift!: The Unfolding Internet-
Hype, Hope and History. John Wiley & Sons.
academic publication
Peter, I. (2004). History of the Internet. 
http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of%20the%2
0Internet/.
media publication
Metcalfe, R. (2004). Oral-History:Robert Metcalfe. 
Waltham, MA, IEEE History Center.
interview
Kahn, R. E. (2004). ROBERT KAHN: An Interview 
Conducted by Michael Geselowitz, IEEE History 
Center, 17 February 2004.
interview
Taylor, R. W. (2004). Robert W. Taylor im 
Interview mit Lutz Dammbeck. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41yZbovMe_8.
interview
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Bureau, U. S. C. (2005). Computer and Internet Use 
in the United States: 2003. P23-208.
report
Gillespie, T. (2006). Engineering a Principle: 'End-
to-End’ in the Design of the Internet. Social Studies 
of Science, 36(3).
academic publication
Metcalfe, R. (2006). Oral History of Robert 
Metcalfe. Boston, MA, Computer History Museum.
interview
Russell, A. L. (2006). 'Rough Consensus and 
Running Code' and the Internet OSI Standards War. 
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing.
academic publication
Taylor, R. (2008). Oral History of Robert (Bob) 
Taylor. Woodside, California, Computer History 
Museum. CHM Reference number: X5059.2009.
interview
Salus, P. H. (2008). The ARPAnet Sourcebook: The 
Unpublished Foundations of the Internet (Computer 
Classics Revisited). Peer-to-Peer Communications 
Inc.
academic publication
(2009). "Get Linked or Get Lost" A history of the 
Internet. 
http://www.randomhistory.com/2009/01/12_internet.
html.
media publication
Crocker, S. D. (2009c). Op-Ed Contributor. How the 
Internet Got its Rules. The New York Times.
media publication
Naughton, J. (2009). The internet at 40. A brief 
history of the future. The Open University.
media publication
McKenzie, A. (2011). INWG and the Conception of 
the Internet: An Eyewitness Account. The Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 33(1), 66-71.
media publication
Lukasik, S. J. (2011). Why the ARPANET was built. 
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 33(3), 4-
20.
academic publication
Crocker, S. D. (2012c). Meet the man who intend the 
instructions for the Internet. WIRED.
media publication
Townes, M. (2012). The Spread of TCP/IP: How the 
Internet Became the Internet. Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies, 41(1), 43-64.
academic publication
McCullough, B. (2014). On the 20th Anniversay - 
An oral history of Netscape’s founding.
media publication
Pelkey, J. (2014). "ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CAPITALISM AND INNOVATION: A HISTORY 
OF COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS 1968-
1988". 
http://www.historyofcomputercommunications.info.
media publication
Leiner, B. M., Cerf, V. G., Clark, D. D., Kahn, R. E., 
Kleinrock, L., Lynch, D. C. et al. (2015). Brief 
History of the Internet. 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-
internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet.
media publication
Cerf, V. (2015). Mail correspondence. interview
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Crocker, S. D. (2015). Mail to Steve Crocker. interview
Naughton, J. (2016). The evolution of the Internet: 
from military experiment to General Purpose 
Technology. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1, 5-28.
academic publication
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Cyber-Utopian Corpus
Corpus of Cyber-Utopian Sources
Source (chronological) Type of Document
Digital Systems Research Center. (Ed.). 
(1990[1962]). In Memoriam: J. C. R. Licklider 1915-
1990.
academic publication
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media. The 
extensions of man. London, New York.
academic publication
Wiener, N. (1965). Cybernetics, Second Edition: or 
the Control and Communication in the Animal and 
the Machine (second edition ed.). The MIT Press.
academic publication
Vydas, S. (1965). Cyborg: Evolution of the 
superman. JAMA, 194(4), 474-475.
academic publication
Simon, H. A. (1965). The shape of automation for 
men and management ([1st ed.] ed.). New York: 
Harper & Row.
academic publication
Brand, S. (1968). Whole Earth Catalog Fall 1968. 
http://www.wholeearth.com/issue-electronic-
edition.php?iss=1010.
media publication
Reich, C. A. (1971). The greening of America. 
online.hillsdale.edu.
academic publication
Company, P. C. (1972). People’s Computer 
Company. (1(1)).
media publication
Brand, S. (1972). Spacwewar. Rolling Stone. media publication
Nelson, T. N. (1974). Computer Lib. Sven Dollars. media publication
Gates, B. (1976). Open Letter to Hobbyists. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bill_Gates
_Letter_to_Hobbyists.jpg.
media publication
Toffler, A. (1980). The Third Wave. New York: 
William Morrow Company.
media publication
Anderson, B. (1981). Imagined Communities. academic publication
Vinge, V. (2001[1982]). True Names: And the 
Opening of the Cyberspace Frontier (2 ed.). Tor 
Books.
media publication
Haraway, D. (1983). A Cyborg Manifesto. Science, 
technology and socailist-feminism in the late 
twentieth cenutry. In D. Bell & B. M. Kennedy(pp. 
296-324).
media publication
Magazine, T. I. M. E. (1983). The Computer Moves 
In. 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,198301
03,00.html.
media publication
Gibson, W. (1984). Neuromancer (1st ed.). Ace. media publication
Stallman, R. (1985). The GNU Manifesto. 
https://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.en.html.
media publication
Barlow, J. P. (1990). Crime & Puzzlement. media publication
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https://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Bar
low/HTML/crime_and_puzzlement_1.html.
Ellul, J. (1990). Technological Bluff (1st ed.). 
Eerdmans Pub Co.
academic publication
Barber, B. (1992). Jihad vs. McWorld. The Atlantic, 
March.
media publication
Levy, S. (1993). Crypto Rebels. 
http://www.wired.com/1993/02/crypto-rebels/.
media publication
Wired. (1993). First Issue. 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/.
media publication
Rheingold, H. (1993). The Virtual Community. academic publication
Kapor, M. (1993c). Where is the Digital Highway 
Really Heading? The Case for a Jeffersonian 
Information Policy. Wired.
media publication
Dyson, E., Gilder, G., Keyworth, G., & Toffler, A. 
(1994). Cyberspace and the American Dream: A 
Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age.
academic publication
Levy, S. (1994). Hackers: Heroes of the computer 
revolution (4). Penguin Books New York.
media publication
Levy, S. (1995). This Changes.Everything. 
Newsweek, 126/127(27/1).
media publication
Negroponte, N. (1995). Being Digital (1 ed.). 
London: Hodder & Stoughton.
academic publication
Tapscott, D. (1995). The Digital Economy: Promise 
and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence. 
Mcgraw-Hill Co.
academic publication
Gates, B. (1995). The Road Ahead (First ed.). 
Viking.
media publication
Brand, S. (1995). We ow it all to the Hippies. Time 
Magazine, 145(12).
media publication
Barbrook, R., & Cameron, A. (1996). The 
Californian Ideology. Science as Culture.
academic publication
Barlow, J. P. (1996). A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace. wac.colostate.edu.
media publication
Winner, L. (1997). Cyberlibertarian myths and the 
prospects for community. ACM Sigcas Computers 
and Society.
academic publication
Cairncross, F. (1997). Death of Distance: How the 
Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives 
(First Printing ed.). Harvard Business School Press.
media publication
Matthews, J. T. (1997). Power Shift. Foreign Affairs. media publication
Kelly, K. (1998). New Rules for the New Economy. 
New York, London, Victoria, Toronto, Auckland, 
New Delhi: Viking.
media publication
Dyson, E. (1998). Release 2.1: A Design for Living media publication
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in the Digital Age (1st ed.). Crown Business.
Kurzweil, R. (1999). Age of Spiritual Machines 
(First Edition ed.). Viking.
media publication
Castells, M. (1999). The Information Age, Volumes 
1-3: Economy, Society and Culture (Information Age 
Series) (v. 1-3). Wiley-Blackwell.
academic publication
Hague, B. N., & Loader, B. D. (1999). Digital 
Democracy: Discourse and Decision Making in the 
Information Age. Routledge.
academic publication
Glassman, J., Hassett, K., Glassman, J. K., & 
Hassett, K. A. (1999). Dow 36,000: The New 
Strategy for Profiting from the Coming Rise in the 
Stock Market (1 ed.). Crown Business.
media publication
Ohmae, K. (1999). The Borderless World. Power 
and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (Revised 
ed. ed.). HarperBusiness.
media publication
Schwartz, P., Leyden, P., & Hyatt, J. (1999). The 
Long Boom: A Vision For The Coming Age Of 
Prosperity (Reprint ed.). Cambridge: Perseus 
Publishing.
media publication
Kelly, K. (1999). The Roaring Zeros. Wired 
http://www.wired.com/1999/09/zeros/.
media publication
Kaplan, D. A. (1999). The Silicon Boys: And Their 
Valley of Dreams (First Edition ed.). William 
Morrow.
media publication
U.S. Department of Commerce (2000). Digital 
Economy 2000.
congress hearing/report
Mitchell, W. J. (2000). e-topia. The MIT Press. academic publication
Castells, M. (2000). The information age: economy, 
society and culture. Vol. 1, The rise of the network 
society (1). Blackwell Oxford.
academic publication
Shapiro, A. L. (2000). The Control Revolution: How 
the Internet is Putting Individuals in Charge and 
Changing the World We Know (2nd.Printing ed.). 
PublicAffairs.
media publication
Bell, D. (2000). The End of Ideology: On the 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, with "The 
Resumption of History in the New Century" (2nd 
ed.). Harvard University Press.
academic publication
Surowiecki, J. (2000). The Financial Page of the 
Visionaries of the New Economy Dream On. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2000/05/29/th
e-financial-page-the-visionaries-of-the-new-
economy-dream-on.
media publication
Fukuyama, F. (2000). The Great Disruption: Human 
Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (1st 
ed.). Free Press.
academic publication
Himanen, P. (2001). The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit 
of the Information Age. Random House.
academic publication
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Horrigan, J. B. (2001). Risky Business: Americans 
see greed, cluelessness behind dot-coms’ 
comeuppance. Pew Internet Tracking Report.
academic publication
Madrick, J. (2001). The Business Media and the 
New Economy. The Joan Shorenstein Center on the 
Press, Politics and Public Policy John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Research Paper R-24.
academic publication
Steele, C., & Stein, A. (2002). Communications 
Revolutions and International Relations. In J. 
Emmons Allison (Ed.), Technology, Development, 
and Democracy: International Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Information Age (pp. 25-53). 
Albana: State University of New York Press.
academic publication
Vegh, S. (2002). Hacktivists or Cyberterrorists? The 
Changeing Media Discourse on Hacking. First 
Monday, 7(19).
academic publication
Fukuyama, F. (2002). Our Posthuman Future: 
Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. 
Farrar, Straus, Grioux.
academic publication
Wagner, P. R. (2003). Information wants to be free. 
Intellectual property and the mythologies of control. 
Columbia Law Review, 103(995), 995-1034.
academic publication
Mosco, V. (2004). The digital sublime. academic publication
Shinal, J. (2005). Netscape: The IPO that launched 
an era. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/netscape-
ipo-ignited-the-boom-taught-some-hard-lessons-
20058518550.
media publication
Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat : a brief 
history of the twenty-first century (1st ed. ed.). New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
media publication
Turner, F. (2006). From counterculture to 
cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth 
Network, and the rise of digital utopianism. 
books.google.com.
academic publication
Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How 
Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(9/23/07 ed.). Yale University Press.
academic publication
Pärna, K. (2010). Believing the Net. Leiden 
University Press.
academic publication
Zuckernman, E. (2010). Internet Freedom: Beyond 
Circumvention. 
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/02/22/in
ternet-freedom-beyond-circumvention/.
media publication
Clinton, H. R. (2010). Remarks on Internet Freedom. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/
2010/01/135519.htm.
policy document
Coleman, E. G. (2013). Coding Freedom: The Ethics 
and Aesthetics of Hacking. Princeton University 
Press.
academic publication
Rid, T. (2016). Maschinendämmerung: Eine kurze academic publication
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Geschichte der Kybernetik. Propyläen Verlag.
These sources were identified by using the same technique as the cyber-realist corpus. It 
also included a new method. To identify the most relevant cyber-utopian books I did not 
just rely on secondary sources, but also screened the New York Times bestseller list (1980 
- 2000) for technology books dealing with the Internet or describing the digital revolution. 
I picked those for deeper investigation that stayed more than four weeks on a best-seller 
list (The New York Times, 2016). The bestseller lists are a good proxy to gauge the 
relative societal impact of a book, especially during the 1990s where most people still read 
physical books. Not in all cases I have read and coded the entire book. In many instances I 
relied on summaries or press reviews.
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Corpus of Information Superhighway Initiative of the Clinton/Gore 
Administration
Source (chronological) Type of Document
Shultz, G. P. (1985c). Shaping American Foreign 
Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking. 
Foreign Affairs.
media publication
Gore, A. (1989). National High-Performance 
Computer Technology Act. 
https://w2.eff.org/Legislation/Bills_by_sponsor/Old/
gore_s1067_89.bill.
policy document
Broad, W. J. (1992c). Clinton to Promote High 
Technology, With Gore in Charge. The New York 
Times.
media publication
Headquarters, C.-G. C. (1992). TECHNOLOGY: 
THE ENGINE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH A 
National Technology Policy for America September 
18, 1992.
policy document
U.S. Congress, O. O. T. A. (1993). Advanced 
Network Technology. OTA-BP-TCT-101, NTIS 
order #PB93-203735.
congress hearing/report
U.S. Congress, O. O. T. A. (1993). Making 
Government Work: Electronic Delivery of Federal 
Services. OTA-TCT-578, NTIS order #PB94-
107067.
congress hearing/report
Clinton, W. J., & Gore, A. (1993). Technology for 
America’s Economic Growth, A New Direction to 
Build Economic Strength.
policy document
Magazine, T. I. M. E. (1993). The Info Highway. 
Bringing a revolution in entertainment, news and 
communication. 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,199304
12,00.html.
Media publication
Information Infrastructure Task Force (1993). The 
National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for 
Action.
policy document
Debnam, B. (1994c). Answers from Vice President 
Al Gore: The Information Superhighway. Observer-
Reporter.
media publication
Noam, E., & Pogorel, G. (Eds.). (1994). Asymmetric 
deregulation and the transformation of the 
international telecommunications regime.
academic publication
International Telecommunication Union (1994). 
Buenos Aires Declaration on Global 
Telecommunication Development for the 21st 
Century.
policy document
Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 
(1994). Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement 
policy document
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Access to Advanced Telecommunications 
Technologies and Services. H.R. 4922 and S.2375.
Clinton, W. J. (1994). Electronic Mail Message to 
Prime Minister Carl Bildt of Sweden. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49664.
policy document
Lippman, J., & Harmon, A. (1994c). Gore Calls for 
All-Inclusive Information Superhighway. Los 
Angeles Times.
media publication
Gore, A. (1994). INAUGURATION OF THE FIRST 
WORLD TELECOMMUNICATION 
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE (WTDC-94). 
Proceedings from WORLD 
TELECOMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT 
CONFERENCE.
policy document
Gore, A. (1994). Remarks Prepared for Delivery by 
Vice President Al Gore. Royce Hall, UCLA Los 
Angeles.
policy document
Sugrue, T. (1994). The Government’s Role in the 
National Information Infrastructure. Media Law & 
Policy.
academic publication
U.S. Department of Commerce. Technology 
Administration (1994). The Information 
Infrastructure: Reaching Society’s Goals. Report of 
the Infrastructure Task Force Committee on 
Applications and Technology. NIST Special 
Publication 868.
policy document
Cate, F. H. (1994). The National Information 
Infrastructure: Policymaking and Policymakers. 
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev., 6, 43.
academic publication
Auletta, K. (1994c). Under the Wire. Will the 
telecommunications revolution end in monopoly or 
Big Brotherhood? Neither, if Al Gore gets his way. 
The New Yorker.
media publication
Cohen, N. (1994). Wiretapping and the Digital 
Telephony Bill: Past and Present. 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/student
-papers/fall94-papers/cohen-digital-telephony.html.
academic publication
Noam, E. M. (1995). Beyond Telecommunications 
Liberalization: Past Performance, Present Hype, And 
Future Direction. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), The New 
Information Infrastructure: Stategies for U.S. Policy 
(A Twentieth Century Fund Book) (English 
Language ed.). Twentieth Century Foundation.
academic publication
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment(1995). Global Communications: 
Opportunities for Trade and Aid. OTA-ITC-642.
congress hearing/report
Reidenberg, J. R. (1995). Information Flows on the 
Global Infobahn: Toward New U.S. policies. In W. 
J. Drake (Ed.), The New Information Infrastructure: 
Stategies for U.S. Policy (A Twentieth Century Fund 
Book) (English Language ed.). Twentieth Century 
Foundation.
academic publication
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Lehman, B. A., & Brown, R. H. (1995). Intellectual 
Property and the National Information Infrastructure. 
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual 
Property Rights.
congress hearing/report
Geller, H. (1995). Reforming the U.S. 
Telecommincations Policymaking Process. In W. J. 
Drake (Ed.), The New Information Infrastructure: 
Stategies for U.S. Policy (A Twentieth Century Fund 
Book) (English Language ed.). Twentieth Century 
Foundation.
academic publication
McKnight, L., & Nuemann, R. W. (1995). 
Technology Policy and the National Information 
Infrastructure. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), The New 
Information Infrastructure: Stategies for U.S. Policy 
(A Twentieth Century Fund Book) (English 
Language ed.). Twentieth Century Foundation.
academic publication
Steering Committee on the Changing Nature of 
Telecommunications/Information Infrastructure 
(Ed.). (1995). The Changing Nature of 
Telecommunications/Information Infrastructure. 
Washington D.C.: The National Academies.
congress hearing/report
Besser, H. (1995). The information superhighway: 
Social and cultural impact. In J. Boal & I. Boal. San 
Francisco: City Lights Press.
media publication
Drake, W. J. (1995). The National Information 
Infrastructure Debate: Issues, Interests, and the 
Congressional Process. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), The 
New Information Infrastructure: Stategies for U.S. 
Policy (A Twentieth Century Fund Book) (English 
Language ed.). Twentieth Century Foundation.
academic publication
Drake, W. J. (1995). The New Information 
Infrastructure: Stategies for U.S. Policy (A 
Twentieth Century Fund Book) (English Language 
ed.). Twentieth Century Foundation.
academic publication
Kahn, R. E. (1995). The Role of Government in the 
Evolution of the Internet. In N. A. O. Engineering 
(Ed.), Revolution in the U.S. Information 
Infrastructure. Washington D.C.: National Academy 
Press.
academic publication
Drake, W. J. (1995). The Turning Point. In W. J. 
Drake (Ed.), The New Information Infrastructure: 
Stategies for U.S. Policy (A Twentieth Century Fund 
Book) (English Language ed.). Twentieth Century 
Foundation.
academic publication
Weiss, E. (1996). Creating a new civilization: The 
politics of the third wave. Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology, 9(1).
academic publication
Clinton, W. J. (1996). Executive Order 13010 - 
Critical Infrastructure Protection.
executive order
Wellbery, B. S. (1996). Privacy Protection on the 
Information Superhighway. Journal of Civil Rights 
and Economic Development, 11(3), 10.
academic publication
Kedzie, C. (1997). Communication and Democracy: academic publication
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Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictators. 
RAND.
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (1997). Critical Foundations. Protecting 
America’s Infrastructures. The Report of the 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection.
congress hearing/report
Clinton, W. J. (1997). Message to Internet Users on 
Electronic Commerce.
policy document
Cohen, H. (1997). The Communications Decency 
Act of 1996. CRS Report for Congress.
congress hearing/report
Clinton, W. J. (1998). Commencement Address at 
the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, 
Maryland.
policy document
White House (1998). PROTECTING CYBER 
SECURITY. 
http://clinton5.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/htm
l/nsc-22.html.
policy document
Hamblen, M. (1999). Clinton commits $1.46 B to 
fight cyberterrorism.
media publication
Makulowich, J. (1999). Clinton’s Cyber-Security 
Plan Takes Shape. 
https://washingtontechnology.com/Articles/1998/06/
17/Clintons-CyberSecurity-Plan-Takes-Shape.aspx.
media publication
The United States Senate Special Committee on the 
Year 2000 Technology Problem (1999). 
Investigating the Impact of the Year 2000 Problem. 
S. Prt. 106-10.
congress hearing/report
Saad, L. (1999). Public Concern Over Y2K 
Computer Glitch Drops As Awareness Grows. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4024/public-concern-
over-y2k-computer-glitch-drops-awareness-
grows.aspx.
media publication
Wiggins, R. (2000). Al Gore and the creation of the 
Internet. First Monday, 5(10).
academic publication
Cerf, V., & Kahn, R. E. (2000). Al Gore and the 
Internet.
academic publication
Computerworld. (2000). Some Key Facts and Events 
in Y2K History.
media publication
Reuters. (2000). Y2K Money Well Spent. 
http://www.everything2000.com/news/computer/y2k
moneywellspent.asp.
media publication
EPIC. (2002). Communications Decency Act. 
https://epic.org/free_speech/cda/.
policy document
CNN. (2006). Looking at the Y2K Bug. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060207191845/http://
www.cnn.com/TECH/specials/y2k/.
media publication
Information Superhighway Corpus
484
Shah, R. C., & Kesan, J. P. (2007). The privatization 
of the Internet’s backbone network. Journal of 
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 51(1), 93-109.
academic publication
Manjoo, F. (2009). Apocalypse then. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology
/features/2009/apocalypse_then/was_y2k_a_waste.ht
ml.
media publication
Bennett, A. J. (2013). The Race for the White House 
from Reagan to Clinton. Palgrave Macmillan.
academic publication
New York Times. (2013). Y2K Bug: Much Ado 
About Nothing? Retro Report. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoGNiHV09BU
.
media publication
McCullough, B. (2014). Did Al Gore really invent 
the Internet? 
http://www.internethistorypodcast.com/2014/11/did-
al-gore-really-invent-the-internet/.
media publication
Allen-Ebrahimian, B. (2016). The Man Who Nailed 
Jello to the Wall. Foreign Policy 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/29/the-man-who-
nailed-jello-to-the-wall-lu-wei-china-internet-czar-
learns-how-to-tame-the-web/.
media publication
These sources were identified by using the same technique as the cyber-realist corpus. Due 
to the changing positions of the Clinton administration, there is a partial overlap of sources 
with the cyber-realist corpus, for example in terms of critical infrastructure protection or 
the Y2k panic.
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Corpus of Cyber-Realism Carrier Texts
Source (chronological) Type of Document
Rona, T. P. (1976). Weapon Systems and 
Information War. Boeing Aerospace Company.
academic publication
Rechtin, E. (1983). The Technology of Command. 
The Charles H. Davies Lecture Series, Fall Lecture.
academic publication
White House (1984). National Security Decision 
Directive Number 145: National Policy on 
Telecommunications and Automated Information 
Systems Security.
national security directive
Naval-Studies-Board. (1988). Implications of 
Advancing Technology for Naval Operations in the 
Twenty-First Century. Naval Studies Board, Volume 
1: Overview.
academic publication
Congress. (1991). Computer security: hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Technology and 
Competitiveness of the Committee on Science.
congress hearing/report
National Research Council (1991). Computers at 
Risk. Safe Computing In the Information Age.
research report
Department of Defense (1992). Directive Number 
TS-3600.01. Information Operations. Department of 
Defense.
classified (inaccessible) national security directive
White House (1993). Statement by the Press 
Secretary. 
https://epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statemen
t_4_93.html.
policy document
United States Department of the Air Force (1995). 
Cornerstones of Information Warfare., 13.
military doctrine document
National Research Council (1991). Computers at 
Risk. Safe Computing In the Information Age.
research report
Krepinevich, A. F. (1992). The Military-Technical 
Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment. Proceedings 
from Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment, 
Washington D.C.
research report
Defense Science Board (1994). Summer Study Task 
Force on Information Architecture for the 
Battlefield.
research report
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act (CALEA) or Digital Telephony Bill (1994)
policy document
White House (1995). A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement.
national security strategy
United States Department of the Air Force (1995). 
Cornerstones of Information Warfare., 13.
military doctrine document
General Accounting Office (1996). Computer 
Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing 
Risks. AIMD-96-84.
research report
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Clinton, W. J. (1996). Executive Order 13010 - 
Critical Infrastructure Protection.
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